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SURVEY
Precision Fabrics Group, Inc. v. Transformer Sales & Service,
Inc.: Evening the Odds in Summary Judgment Motions in
North Carolina
Rule 56 must be construed with due regard not only for the
rights of persons asserting claims and defenses that are
adequately based in fact to have those claims and defenses
tried to a jury, but also for the rights of persons opposing
such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner
provided by the Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and
defenses have no factual basis.'
As people have increasingly sought legal resolutions of their
conflicts, the judiciary has recognized the need to discard "frivolous
claims and defenses" before trial.2 Its foremost procedural tool for
doing so is summary judgment, a motion through which a court may
resolve all matters lacking any genuine issue of material fact.3 In an
attempt to provide trial judges with the facts necessary to make an
informed decision on a summary judgment motion, the North
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure direct both the moving and
opposing parties to submit affidavits.! The intricacies of when to file
affidavits with the court and when to serve them upon adverse
parties have plagued both attorneys and judges! Until recently, a
1. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,327 (1986).
2. See 2 G. GRAY WILSON, NORTH CAROLINA CIVIL PROCEDURE § 56-1, at 268-69
(2d ed. 1995). But see Paul I. Cleary, Summary Judgment in Oklahoma: Suggestions for
Improving a "Disfavored" Procedure, 19 OKLA. CITY U. L REv. 251, 253 (1994)
(indicating that summary judgment is disfavored in Oklahoma due in part to trial courts'
concern over being reversed at a higher level). Judges who adjudicate such motions
appreciate the value of summary judgment for judicial efficiency: "Today, two myths limit
summary judgment practice: First, that summaryjudgment is rarely granted; and [s]econd,
that plaintiffs almost never win summary judgment. Both myths are false." Donald G.
Alexander, Summary Judgment: An Old Remedy for New Times, 9 ME. BJ. 292, 292
(1994).
3. See 2 WILSON, supra note 2, § 56-1, at 268-69; see also N.C. R. CIV. P. 56(c)
(setting forth the standard for summary judgment).
4. See N.C. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (relating to moving and opposing parties).
5. See, e.g., Crowell Constructors, Inc. v. State ex rel. Cobey, 114 N.C. App. 75,77-79,
440 S.E.2d 848, 849-50 (1994) (discussing the requirements for proper filing and service of
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment motion), rev'd on other grounds, 342 N.C.
838, 467 S.E.2d 675 (1996); Rockingham Square Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Integon Life Ins.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
pair of touchstone North Carolina Court of Appeals cases seemed to
have settled the requirements for timely service and filing in North
Carolina.
The North Carolina Supreme Court, however, recently
uprooted these holdings in Precision Fabrics Group, Inc. v.
Transformer Sales & Service, Inc.,7 when it articulated a new
interpretation of the timeliness requirement for filing opposing
affidavits and enlarged the scope of judicial discretion regarding the
time during which courts may accept such affidavits! These
measures largely appear to benefit the party opposing a motion for
summary judgment, as opposed to previous interpretations that
traditionally favored the moving party.' On a more practical level,
the Precision Fabrics decision will alter the expediency with which
opposing affidavits are served and filed, and permit greater leniency
by the courts in accepting such affidavits on the day of the hearing."
This Note first reviews the facts of Precision Fabrics and the
reasoning of the majority and dissenting opinions." Next, the Note
discusses the history and evolution of the summary judgment motion
in the United States, 2 as well as the role of affidavits in the summary
judgment process.' It then presents a brief synopsis of the other
rules affecting the availability and effectiveness of affidavits, with
emphasis on provisions specifically affecting opposing affidavits. 4
Next, the Note discusses the key decisions in the debate over
summary judgment affidavits, highlighting their importance with
Corp., 52 N.C. App. 633, 641, 279 S.E.2d 918, 923-24 (1981) (defining proper service of
opposing affidavits); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chantos, 21 N.C. App. 129, 130, 203
S.E.2d 421, 423 (1974) (determining the date by which affidavits must be served and filed
in order to be timely).
6. See Battle v. Nash Technical College, 103 N.C. App. 120, 126-27, 404 S.E.2d 703,
706-07 (1991); Nationwide, 21 N.C. App. at 130, 203 S.E.2d at 423; see also infra notes 86-
114 and accompanying text (discussing these cases).
7. 344 N.C. 713,477 S.E.2d 166 (1996).
8. See ia at 718-22, 477 S.E.2d at 169-71; see also infra notes 20-61 and
accompanying text (discussing Precision Fabrics).
9. Compare id. (holding in favor of the opposing party), with Nationwide, 21 N.C.
App. at 130-32, 203 S.E.2d at 423-24 (interpreting the summary judgment rules to impose
more rigid timing requirements on opposing affidavits). But see infra notes 12743 and
accompanying text (discussing the use of a continuance as a balancing measure).
10. See infra notes 152-61 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of the
Precision Fabrics decision on the future of summary judgment motions in North Carolina).
11. See infra notes 20-61 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 70-79 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
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regard to Precision Fabrics. The Note goes on to comment on the
importance and impact of the North Carolina Supreme Court's
decision to deviate from established principles regarding both proper
service and filing of opposing affidavits 6 and judicial discretion in
enlarging the time period in which to submit such affidavits'7 against
the backdrop of prior decisions. Finally, the Note examines the
supreme court's decision in light of the policy behind summary
judgment motions 8 and concludes with an evaluation of the
Precision Fabrics decision with regard to summary judgment practice
in North Carolina.'
The dispute in Precision Fabrics arose from Precision Fabrics
Group's ("Precision Fabrics") claim that Transformer Sales and
Service ("Transformer Sales") sold it a defective transformer."
Precision Fabrics filed a complaint on June 25, 1992 and amended it
on August 17, 1992 to assert breach of the implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness, as well as negligence by Transformer
Sales.' On June 21, 1994, Transformer Sales served Precision
Fabrics with a motion for summary judgment, together with several
affidavits stating that the transformers met all necessary guidelines
for properly manufactured products.' The summary judgment
hearing was set for July 5, 1994.' Precision Fabrics responded on
July 1, 1994 by mailing an affidavit opposing the motion for summary
judgment to Transformer Sales, and on July 5, the date of the
hearing, Precision Fabrics filed the document with the court.'
15. See infra notes 86-114 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 115-26 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 127-43 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 144-51 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 152-65 and accompanying text.
20. See Precision Fabrics, 344 N.C. at 715, 477 S.E.2d at 167.
21. See id at 715-16, 477 S.E.2d at 167. Precision Fabrics claimed that the
transformer was improperly designed, that the parts in the transformer, such as the coils,
were defective, and that the company had failed to properly inspect the transformer before
selling it to Precision Fabrics. See id.
22. See id. at 716, 477 S.E.2d at 167. Transformer Sales also asserted the affirmative
defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk. See id. at 716-17, 477
S.E.2d at 168.
23. See id. at 716-17, 477 S.E.2d at 167-68. The affiants stated, among other things,
that, "the transformer 'me[t] and exceed[ed] all the requirements needed for proper
performance of this unit"' and that the "'tests conducted by [Transformer Sales] during
and after construction did not indicate any defect within the transformer.'" Id at 716, 477
S.E.2d at 167-68 (quoting affidavits of William Outlaw, Transformer Sales' Vice-President,
and John B. Dagenhart, a registered professional engineer).
24. See id. at 716, 477 S.E.2d at 168. The hearing was set for 10:00 a.m. See id.
25. See id. at 717, 477 S.E.2d at 168. The parties stipulated that the opposing
1997] 2231
NORTH CAROLINA LA W REVIEW
At the hearing, Transformer Sales argued in favor of summary
judgment based on the supporting affidavits filed with the motion;
however, it made no reference to Precision Fabrics' opposing
affidavit." Precision Fabrics then attempted to file the opposing
affidavit with the trial court, eliciting an objection from Transformer
Sales, which claimed that it had not yet been served with the
documents.' The trial court found that the affidavit "had not been
properly served on [Transformer Sales] or filed with the court 'at
least one day prior to this matter coming on for hearing on July 5,
1994.' "' Pursuant to its discretionary authority, the trial court
refused to consider Precision Fabrics' affidavit, ruled in favor of
Transformer Sales based on its uncontested affidavits, and granted
the motion for summary judgment.2 Precision Fabrics appealed the
ruling to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
trial court's order."0 The North Carolina Supreme Court, however,
reversed the decision, holding that both the trial court and the court
of appeals misinterpreted the statutory requirements for the
timeliness of opposing affidavits and misconstrued the scope of
judicial discretion.31
In an opinion authored by Justice Orr, the court first
contemplated whether Precision Fabrics was required to file the
opposing affidavits with the court prior to the hearing.32 Focusing on
Rule 5(d),3 the court emphasized the portion of the rule requiring
affidavits were filed with the clerk of the court at 10:55 a.m., 55 minutes after the hearing
was scheduled to begin. See id. However, it is not clear from the facts as to when the
hearing actually began. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id. Even though Precision Fabrics mailed its opposing affidavit to Transformer
Sales on July 1, Transformer Sales had not yet seen it. See iUd Note that while the rules
require that service of affidavits occur one day prior to the day of the hearing, see N.C. R.
CIrv. P. 6(d), there is no requirement that the adverse party actually receive those
documents by that time. See id. 5(b) (stating that service by mail is complete upon
mailing).
28. Precision Fabrics, 344 N.C. at 717, 477 S.E.2d at 168 (quoting the trial court's
summary judgment order).
29. See id. at 717-18, 477 S.E.2d at 168. The court relied on Battle v. Nash Technical
College, 103 N.C. App. 120, 404 S.E.2d 703 (1991), as authority for acting within its
discretion. See Precision Fabrics, 344 N.C. at 717,477 S.E.2d at 168 (citing Battle); see also
infra notes 110-14 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of Battle with regard
to the discretionary power of a trial court in accepting summary judgment affidavits).
30. See Precision Fabrics Group, Inc. v. Transformer Sales & Serv., Inc., 120 N.C.
App. 866,869,463 S.E.2d 787,789 (1995), rev'd, 344 N.C. 702,477 S.E.2d 166 (1996).
31. See Precision Fabrics, 344 N.C. at 718-22, 477 S.E.2d at 169-71.
32. See id. at 718-19,477 S.E.2d at 169-70.
33. See N.C. R. CIV. P. 5(d) (setting forth the guidelines for service and filing of
procedural documents).
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that pleadings and other papers following the complaint be "'filed
with the court either before service or within five days thereafter.' "
Because the opposing affidavits were served on Transformer Sales by
mail on July 1, 1994, Precision Fabrics complied with the statutory
five-day requirement by filing the affidavit with the court on July 5,
1994. In reaching this conclusion, the supreme court specifically
discounted the court of appeals' reliance on Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Chantos,36 which held that "it seems implicit in Rule
56(c) that such affidavits must be filed and served prior to the day of
the hearing." 7 The court dismissed Nationwide's broad inferences
regarding the timeliness of service and filing of affidavits, opting
instead to follow a stricter approach to statutory construction.3 ' The
court stated that " ' "if the language used is clear and admits but one
meaning, the Legislature should be taken to mean what it has plainly
expressed.' 39  Therefore, the majority endorsed a literal
interpretation of the rule as requiring only service, and not filing, of
the affidavits prior to the day of the hearing, leaving the matter of
statutory construction to the legislature. '
The court next directed its attention to the requirements for
timely and proper service of opposing affidavits.4 Once again, the
court referred to the rules, specifically Rule 5(b), which states:
"'Service by mail shall be complete upon deposit of the pleading or
paper enclosed in a post-paid, properly addressed wrapper in a post
office or official depository under the exclusive care and custody of
the United States Postal Service.' ,2 Because Precision Fabrics
34. Precision Fabrics, 344 N.C. at 718, 477 S.E.2d at 169 (alteration in original)
(quoting N.C.R. CIV. P. 5(d)).
35. See iU; see also id. at 719-20, 477 S.E.2d at 169-70 (holding that Precision Fabrics
correctly served the affidavits under Rule 5(b)).
36. 21 N.C. App. 129, 203 S.E.2d 421 (1974); see also infra notes 86-99 and
accompanying text (discussing Nationwide).
37. Id. at 130,203 S.E.2d at 423; see also Precision Fabrics, 344 N.C. at 719, 477 S.E.2d
at 169 (citing Precision Fabrics Group, Inc. v. Transformer Sales & Serv., Inc., 120 N.C.
App. 866, 869, 463 S.E.2d 787, 789 (1995) (citing Nationwide, 21 N.C. App. at 130, 203
S.E.2d at 423), rev'd, 344 N.C. 702, 477 S.E.2d 166 (1996)). Rule 56(c) states, in relevant
part, "[t]he adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits." N.C.
R. CiV. P. 56(c) (emphasis added).
38. See Precision Fabrics, 344 N.C. at 719,477 S.E.2d at 169.
39. Id. (quoting Nova Univ. v. Board of Governors, 305 N.C. 156,170, 287 S.E.2d 872,
882 (1982) (quoting Asbury v. Town of Albermarle, 162 N.C. 247, 250, 78 S.E. 146, 148
(1913), but omitting "of" between "admits" and "but")).
40. See id.; accord Powell v. Board of Trustees, 3 N.C. App. 39, 43, 164 S.E.2d 80, 83
(1968) (leaving all statutory changes to the legislature).
41. See Precision Fabrics, 344 N.C. at 719-21,477 S.E.2d at 169-71.
42. Id. at 720,477 S.E.2d at 170 (emphasis omitted) (quoting N.C. R. Civ. P. 5(b)).
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deposited a copy of the opposing affidavits addressed to Transformer
Sales in the mail on July 1, 1994, the court held that it properly
served the papers.'3 The next question was whether the service was
timely under Rule 56(c), which requires that the service of opposing
affidavits be complete the day before the hearing, in this case on July
4, 1994.' Once again, the fact that the affidavits were in the mail
four days before the hearing was sufficient evidence for the court to
find that they had been served within the necessary time period
under Rule 56(c). 5
In its discussion of what constitutes proper and timely service of
opposing affidavits, the supreme court rejected the lower court's use
of Rule 6(e) to require Precision Fabrics to give Transformer Sales
an additional three days' notice.46  Rule 6(e) mandates that
"[w]henever a party has the right to do some act or take some
proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice
or other paper upon him and the notice or paper is served upon him
by mail, three days shall be added to the prescribed period.' 7
According to the supreme court, Rule 6(e) was designed to
"'"alleviate the disparity between constructive and actual notice
when the mailing of notice begins a designated period of time for the
43. See id.
44. See id.; see also supra note 37 (setting forth the relevant language of Rule 56(c)).
This deadline has been recognized throughout decisions on summary judgment. See, e.g.,
Battle v. Nash Technical College, 103 N.C. App. 120, 126-27, 404 S.E.2d 703; 706 (1991);
Rose v. Guilford County, 60 N.C. App. 170, 172, 298 S.E.2d 200, 202 (1982); Planters Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. v. Rush, 17 N.C. App. 564,566,195 S.E.2d 96,97 (1973).
45. See Precision Fabrics, 344 N.C. at 720, 477 S.E.2d at 170. The court also held that
Precision Fabrics met the requirement under Rule 6(d) that opposing affidavits must be
"'served not later than one day before the hearing."' Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting
N.C. K. Civ. P. 6(d)). With regard to method of service, the court strictly adhered to the
letter of the rules, particularly Rule 5(b), which deems service to be complete once
affidavits are properly placed in the mail. See id; N.C. R. Civ. P. 5(b); see also supra text
accompanying note 42 (quoting the text of Rule 5(b)). Because Precision Fabrics
deposited its opposing affidavit in the mail on July 1, 1994, four calendar days before the
hearing, the service was deemed proper. See Precision Fabrics, 344 N.C. at 720,477 S.E.2d
at 170. Scholars concur with the court's interpretation of Rule 5(b) that proper mailing of
papers and pleadings constitutes correct service under the statute. See, e.g., WILLIAM A.
SHUFORD, NORTH CAROLINA CIVIL PRACrlCE AND PROCEDURE § 5-4, at 42-43 (3d ed.
1988); 1 WILSON, supra note 2, § 5-3, at 91.
46. See Precision Fabrics, 344 N.C. at 720-21, 477 S.E.2d at 170. The lower court
adjusted the date by which Precision Fabrics had to serve its affidavit to June 27, 1994,
three days before July 1, 1994, the date on which the affidavit was mailed. See Precision
Fabrics Group, Inc. v. Transformer Sales & Serv., Inc., 120 N.C. App. 866, 869, 463 S.E.2d
787,789 (1995) ("When the service is by mail, three days must be added to the prescribed
period."), rev'd, 344 N.C. 702,477 S.E.2d 166 (1996).
47. N.C. R. Civ. P. 6(e).
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performance of some right."' " Because Transformer Sales was not
necessarily entitled to any action in response to Precision Fabrics'
opposing affidavit,4 9 the court held that Rule 6(e) did not apply."
In analyzing the timely service of affidavits, the supreme court
also distinguished Battle v. Nash Technical College,' a case that the
trial court relied upon to refuse Precision Fabrics' opposing affidavit
offered on the day of the hearing. 2 The supreme court focused on
the fact that in Battle, the plaintiff did not serve its opposing
affidavits on the defendant prior to the date of the hearing, thereby
allowing the trial court to exclude the affidavits without ever raising
the issue of timeliness of service.5" However, under the supreme
court's assessment of the rules, Precision Fabrics had properly and
timely served its opposing affidavits on Transformer Sales; therefore,
because the facts in the two cases were not the same, the Battle
holding had no bearing on Precision Fabrics.'
Finally, the Precision Fabrics court discussed the scope of the
trial court's discretion in determining whether to accept affidavits in
48. Precision Fabrics, 344 N.C. at 721,477 S.E.2d at 170 (quoting Williams v. Moore,
95 N.C. App. 601, 604, 383 S.E.2d 416, 417 (1989) (quoting Planters Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co. v. Rush, 17 N.C. App. 564, 566, 195 S.E.2d 96, 97 (1973))). In Planters, the court
distinguished between service of supporting affidavits in person and service via mail,
finding that the latter invoked the additional time requirement under Rule 6(e). See
Planters, 17 N.C. App. at 566, 195 S.E.2d at 97-98. The court also found that the plaintiff
would have failed to make timely personal service due to the incorrect counting of the 10-
day period in which it had to serve. See id. at 566, 195 S.E.2d at 97. Thus, the court held
that "[b]ecause of plaintiff's failure to give defendant the extra three days notice as
required by Rule 6(e) when service of notice is by mail, the allowance of the motion for
summary judgment was error." Id. at 566,195 S.E.2d at 97-98.
49. The wording of Rule 56(e) indicates that the party opposing the motion in "his
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." N.C. R. Civ. P. 56(e). There is, however,
no provision granting the moving party a right to respond to the opposing affidavits. See
id. But see Precision Fabrics, 344 N.C. at 722, 477 S.E.2d at 171 (recommending a
continuance to allow the moving party an opportunity to respond to the opposing
affidavits).
50. See Precision Fabrics, 344 N.C. at 721, 477 S.E.2d at 170. For a detailed analysis
of the respective burdens of proof on the moving and opposing parties, see Martin B.
Louis, A Survey of Decisions Under the New North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, 50
N.C. L REV. 729,737-44 (1972).
51. 103 N.C. App. 120,404 S.E.2d 703 (1991).
52. See Precision Fabrics, 344 N.C. at 721, 477 S.E.2d at 170-71; see also infra notes
100-14 and accompanying text (discussing Battle).
53. See Precision Fabrics, 344 N.C. at 721, 477 S.E.2d at 171; see also Battle, 103 N.C.
App. at 123, 404 S.E.2d at 704 (setting forth the facts of the case with regard to the
summary judgment hearing).
54. See Precision Fabrics, 344 N.C. at 721,477 S.E.2d at 170-71.
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opposition to a summary judgment motion.' It referred to well-
established authority that, in the event that opposing affidavits are
not received by the moving party prior to the summary judgment
hearing, "'the court should exercise its discretion to continue the
hearing if requested.' ," To balance its leniency on the party
opposing the motion, the supreme court expanded the discretion of
the trial court to include instances in which it would be appropriate
to continue a hearing "in order to give defendant's counsel time to
respond to plaintiff's counter affidavit," even if not requested to do
so.5 The court held that because Precision Fabrics' opposing
affidavit was served and filed in a timely manner, regardless of actual
receipt by the moving party, the trial court erred in excluding it.
58
The decision in Precision Fabrics concluded with a brief dissent
from Chief Justice Mitchell." He concurred with the court of
appeals' interpretation of Rule 56(c) requiring that opposing
affidavits be filed with the court prior to the summary judgment
hearing." Citing Nationwide as controlling authority, the Chief
Justice asserted that the trial court correctly excluded Precision
Fabrics' opposing affidavit because it was not filed with the court in a
timely manner pursuant to Nationwide.1 Therefore, Chief Justice
Mitchell supported maintaining the traditional approach to summary
judgment.
The Precision Fabrics decision is the most recent step in the
evolution of the summary judgment, which dates back to 1855 when
it applied only to actions upon bills of exchange and promissory
notes involved in English commerce.62 Because commercial interests
in colonial America were similar to those in England, a parallel
motion developed in the United States, though it continued to be a
55. See id. at 721-22,477 S.E.2d at 171.
56. Id. at 721, 477 S.E.2d at 171 (quoting I WILSON, supra note 2, § 6-5, at 112).
57. Id. This would enable the trial court to accept the opposing affidavits without
compromising the position of the adverse party.
58. See id.
59. See id. (Mitchell, CJ., dissenting).
60. See id. (Mitchell, CJ., dissenting).
61. See id. (Mitchell, C.., dissenting) (citing Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chantos, 21
N.C. App. 129,130,203 S.E.2d 421,423 (1974)).
62. See Pridgen v. Hughes, 9 N.C. App. 635, 637, 177 S.E.2d 425, 426 (1970) (citing
Charles E. Clark, Summary Tudgmenis: A Proposed Rule of Court, 2 F.R.D. 364 (1943)
(describing the history of summary judgment)). Summary judgment was known as the
"Keating's Act" at that time. See generally John A. Bauman, The Evolution of the
Summary Judgment Procedure: An Essay" Commemorating the Centennial Anniversary of
Keating's Act, 31 IND. LJ. 329 (1956) (discussing the history of the Keating's Act and the
development of summary judgment).
2236 [Vol. 75
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limited measure." In 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
went into effect." Among them, Rule 56 provided for summary
judgment," which became a more universal remedy available to all
parties in all types of actions.' North Carolina enacted similar rules,
the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, including a version of
Rule 56.' Summary judgment, however, did not gain widespread
popularity as a judicial procedure until 1986, when the United States
Supreme Court handed down three decisions favoring it." Since
then, summary judgment has evolved into a widely used tool in trial
court advocacy. 69
The primary purpose of summary judgment is to focus a trial on
the disputed facts in a case by petitioning the court beforehand to
dismiss those matters containing "no genuine issue as to any material
fact." 70 Summary judgment promotes judicial efficiency by ensuring
63. See Cleary, supra note 2, at 254. The motion was first used in the United States in
New York and continued to be predominantly a plaintiff's remedy, even after spreading to
other states. See Pridgen, 9 N.C. App. at 637, 177 S.E.2d at 426; see also James .
Chadbourn, A Summary Judgment Procedure for North Carolina, 14 N.C. L REV. 211,
219-20 (1936).
64. See FED. R. CIV. P. 86(a) (stating the effective date of the original Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure).
65. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
66. See Eugene A. Gordon, The New Summary Judgment Rule in North Carolina, 5
WAKEFOREST INTRAMURAL L REV. 87,88 (1969); see also Cleary, supra note 2, at 254-
55 (confirming the widespread availability of summary judgment after the promulgation of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
67. See N.C. R. Civ. P. 56; see also Pridgen, 9 N.C. App. at 637-38, 177 S.E.2d at 426-
27 (discussing the history of summary judgment in North Carolina); 2 WILSON, supra note
2, § 56-1, at 269-70 (noting that North Carolina's Rule 56 is "virtually identical to its
federal counterpart").
68. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (allowing a summary judgment
motion in a wrongful death suit); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986)
(allowing a summary judgment motion in a libel suit); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (allowing a summary judgment motion in a suit
involving antitrust conspiracy). These decisions are often referred to as "the Trilogy."
See, e.g., Eric K. Yamamoto et al., Summary Judgment at the Crossroads: The Impact of
the Celotex Trilogy, 12 U. HAW. L REV. 1, 3 & n.1 (1990) (citing the three cases as a
trilogy); Gregory A. Gordillo, Note, Summary Judgment and Problems in Applying the
Celotex Trilogy Standard, 42 CLEv. ST. L REv. 263,264 (1994) (referring to the "Celotex
Trilogy"). Following these three decisions, the moving party was no longer required to
show a lack of material facts, and the trial court was given greater latitude in determining
when summary judgment should be granted. See Cleary, supra note 2, at 257.
69. See Cleary, supra note 2, at 255.
70. N.C. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see also 2 WILSON, supra note 2, § 56-1, at 268-69
("Summary judgment affords the primary means for weeding out frivolous claims and
defenses between the pleading stage and trial.").
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a "'just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action,' "
and "can be a valuable aid to meeting public and client demands for
a justice system that performs with less cost, complication and
delay."72 An integral part of the summary judgment motion is the
use of affidavits by both the moving and the opposing parties as
evidence of whether an issue is triable.73 A valid affidavit must "(1)
be made on personal knowledge, (2) set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence, and (3) show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify as to the matters stated therein."74 Under Rule
6(d), the party moving for summary judgment must serve supporting
affidavits with the motion.' The supporting affidavits assist the
moving party in meeting the burden of proof by showing that there is
no genuine issue of material fact. 6 In contrast, the opposing party
must demonstrate that an issue of triable fact exists and should not
be disposed of through summary judgment.7 While Rule 56 and
Rule 6 do not require the opposing party to file affidavits arguing
against the summary judgment motion,7 legal scholars widely believe
that it would be "most imprudent for a party to fail to oppose a
motion for summary judgment with all the counter-material available
71. Celoex, 477 U.S. at 327 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1).
72. Alexander, supra note 2, at 292.
73. See SHUFORD, supra note 45, § 56-8, at 459-61. According to one authority, the
affidavit is "the most effective weapon in the arsenal of evidentiary materials for a
summary judgment motion." 2 WILSoN, supra note 2, § 56-9, at 292.
74. SHUioRD, supra note 45, § 56-8, at 459; see also N.C. R. CiV. P. 56(e) (setting the
requirements for affidavits). An unverified answer is not sufficient to meet the
requirements for an affidavit and therefore is not admissible as such. See Venture
Properties I, LLC. v. Anderson, 120 N.C. App. 852, 854-55, 463 S.E.2d 795, 796-97
(1995), disc. rev. denied, 342 N.C. 898, 467 S.E.2d 908 (1996).
75. See N.C. R. CIV. P. 6(d); see also 2 WILsoN, supra note 2, § 56-9, at 295
("Although Rule 56 is silent, Rule 6(d) requires that summary judgment affidavits be
served with the motion.").
76. See Kidd v. Early, 289 N.C. 343, 352, 222 S.E.2d 392, 399 (1976) (holding that the
moving party has the "burden of establishing the lack of any triable issue of fact").
77. See Flillman v. United States Liab. Ins. Co., 59 N.C. App. 145,148, 296 S.E.2d 302,
305 (1982). Note that the opposing party does not have to prove that it would triumph on
the claim in court, but merely has to show that the issue is validly in dispute. See Milsaps
v. Wilkes Contracting Co., 14 N.C. App. 321,325,188 S.E.2d 663,665 (1972).
78. See N.C. R. CIv. P. 56(c) (stating that the "adverse party prior to the day of
hearing may serve opposing affidavits" (emphasis added)); id. 6(d) (directing that
"opposing affidavits may ... be served not later than one day before the hearing"
(emphasis added)); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (stating that
the reference in Federal Rule 56(c) to "affidavits, if any" indicates that there is no
requirement to serve affidavits on the adverse party); cf. Perry v. Aycock, 68 N.C. App.
705, 707, 315 S.E.2d 791, 793 (1984) ("[M]ere failure to respond with opposing affidavits
or depositions does not automatically mean that summary judgment is appropriate.").
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to him."7 9
Several rules govern when supporting and opposing affidavits
should be filed and served upon the other party. Under Rule 56(c),
"[t]he adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing
affidavits." '' Rule 56, however, should not be read in isolation;
instead, it is common practice to read Rule 56(c) "in conjunction
with Rule 6(d),"'" which requires that opposing affidavits "be served
not later than one day before the hearing."" In general, the
procedure for the service of legal documents between parties is
governed by Rule 5(b), which states that "[s]ervice by mail shall be
complete upon deposit of the pleading or paper.., in a post office or
official depository under the exclusive care and custody of the
United States Postal Service." In contrast, the filing of such
pleadings or papers must meet the guidelines set forth in Rule 5(d),
which requires that the pleadings or papers "be filed with the court
either before service or within five days thereafter." 84 The deadline
for serving and filing opposing affidavits is subject to the discretion
of the trial court judge, who may, upon request, extend the time
period under Rule 6(b).'
A clearer understanding of the relevancy and breadth of the
summary judgment motion may be gained by examining the use and
effectiveness of affidavits against the backdrop of the above rules.
Prior to Precision Fabrics, the leading case on summary judgment
affidavits in North Carolina was the court of appeals decision in
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Chantos.6 In Nationwide, the
79. SHUFORD, supra note 45, § 56-9, at 464; see also David R-ittner & Lynne iUberato,
Summary Judgment in Texas, 35 S. TEX. L, REV. 9, 88 (1994) ("From a practical
standpoint, failure to produce opposing affidavits frequently will doom an otherwise
meritorious response.").
80. N.C. R. Crv. P. 56(c).
81. 6 JAMES WM. MOORE Er AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAcriCE 56.14[1], at 56-189
(2d ed. 1988); cf. Beaufort Concrete Co. v. Atlantic States Constr. Co., 352 F.2d 460, 462
(5th Cir. 1965) (adhering to the practice of reading the two rules together).
82. N.C. R. Crv. P. 6(d).
83. Id. 5(b).
84. Id. 5(d).
85. See id. 6(b). The rule specifically states that when an act must be completed within
a specific time period (i.e., the day before the hearing), "the court for cause shown may at
any time in its discretion with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if
request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed." Id.
(emphasis added). But see infra notes 127-43 and accompanying text (explaining that the
supreme court in Precision Fabrics appeared to deviate from the literal wording of the rule
to grant lower courts the authority to enlarge the time period without formal request from
the party to be benefited).
86. 21 N.C. App. 129, 203 S.E.2d 421 (1974). Numerous courts have cited the
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defendant filed a motion for summary judgment in response to
Nationwide's claim for reimbursement of its payment to a third party
who was injured as a result of the defendant's negligent driving.'
The defendant filed and served the summary judgment motion on
April 4, 1973, but failed to present affidavits in support of the motion
until the hearing on May 28, 1973.' The trial court overruled
Nationwide's objections that the affidavits should not be admitted
into evidence, received the testimony, and granted the motion.' The
court of appeals reversed," providing a pivotal interpretation of the
rules relating to summary judgment.-" The court focused on Rule
56(c), which states that adverse parties "'may serve'" opposing
affidavits prior to the day of the hearing, and Rule 6(d), which
requires that supporting affidavits be served with the motion.'
Based on what the court construed as an absence of direct language,
it inferred that the "clear intent of the legislature is that supporting
affidavits should be filed and served sufficiently in advance of the
hearing to permit opposing affidavits to be filed prior to the day of
the hearing."'
The Nationwide court also addressed the scope of judicial
discretion over summary judgment motions.' While noting that
Rule 6(b) does grant the trial court discretion in determining
whether to expand the time period in which certain procedural
matters can be accomplished, the court specifically stated that "the
discretion to be exercised is a judicial discretion, not an unrestrained
Nationwide decision as controlling authority with regard to summary judgment affidavits.
See infra note 99 (listing examples of such cases).
87. See Nationwide, 21 N.C. App. at 129, 203 S.E.2d at 422. Nationwide was the
defendant's insurer. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id Rule 6(d) states that "[wIhen a motion is supported by affidavit, the
affidavit shall be served with the motion." N.C. P. CiV. P. 6(d).
90. See Nationwide, 21 N.C. App. at 132, 203 S.E.2d at 424. The unanimous decision
was authored by Chief Judge Brock. See id. at 130, 203 S.E.2d at 423.
91. See id. at 130-31,203 S.E.2d at 423-24.
92. Id. at 130,203 S.E.2d at 423 (quoting N.C. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
93. See id (citing N.C. R. CIV. P. 6(d) ("When a motion is supported by affidavit, the
affidavit shall be served with the motion. .. ")).
94. Id. As additional support for its conclusion, the court referred to Rule 6(d), which
also requires that supporting affidavits be served with a motion for summary judgment.
See id. (citing N.C. R. CIV. P. 6(d)). The court also cited additional authorities in the area
of civil procedure. See icL (citing 6 MOORE Er AL., supra note 81, 56.14[1], at 56-188 to
56-189, and 3 WILLIAM M. BARRON & ALEXANDER HOLTZoFF, FEDERAL PRAcricE
AND PROCEDURE § 1237, at 167 (Charles Alan Wright ed., 1958)).
95. See id. at 130-31, 203 S.E.2d at 423.
2240 [Vol. 75
1997] SUMMARY JUDGMENTAFFIDAVITS 2241
one."96 Thus, the court imposed the requirement that the moving
party request the enlargement of time prior to the expiration of the
initial deadline.' Because the defendant in Nationwide failed to
request an extension of the deadline for service and filing of the
supporting affidavits, the trial court was precluded from granting
such an extension.9 The court's delineation of the scope of judicial
discretion coupled with its interpretation of the "implicit" filing and
service deadlines for affidavits made the Nationwide decision a
strong precedent for later cases.9
While Nationwide focused on supporting affidavits, in Battle v.
Nash Technical College'0 the North Carolina Court of Appeals
expanded the Nationwide holding to include opposing affidavits as
well.1"' Debra Battle brought suit when her college informed her
employer that she had defaulted on her student loan, causing her to
lose her job."n She sought to recover lost wages as well as any other
96. Id. Rule 6(b) states that "the court for cause shown may at any time in its
discretion with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor is
made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a
previous order." N.C.R. CIv. P. 6(b).
97. See Nationwide, 21 N.C. App. at 131,203 S.E.2d at 423.
98. See id. The court's apparent strictness with the defendant is explained in part by
the fact that the defendant appeared to have deliberately withheld the supporting
affidavits until the date of the hearing. See id. The court explained that the purpose of the
filing and service rules is to eliminate surprise and to allow the opposing party ample time
to respond. See id. at 131, 203 S.E.2d at 423-24. The defendant attempted to justify its
deliberate withholding of the affidavits by reasoning that because Rule 43(e) permits oral
testimony at the hearing, it follows that affidavits should also be allowed to be presented
for the first time at the hearing. See id. at 132, 203 S.E.2d at 424. The court rejected this
argument, indicating that the admission of oral testimony under Rule 43(e) is also subject
to judicial discretion and that witnesses testifying in person can be cross-examined,
whereas a written affidavit cannot. See id.
99. See, e.g., Precision Fabrics Group, Inc. v. Transformer Sales & Serv., Inc., 120 N.C.
App. 866, 869, 463 S.E.2d 787, 789 (1995) (citing Nationwide's holding that affidavits must
be filed prior to the day of the summary judgment hearing), rev'd, 344 N.C. 713, 477 S.E.2d
166 (1996); Crowell Constructors, Inc. v. State ex rel. Cobey, 114 N.C. App. 75, 78, 440
S.E.2d 848, 850 (1994) (referring to the Nationwide holding), rev'd on other grounds, 342
N.C. 838, 467 S.E.2d 675 (1996); Rose v. Guilford County, 60 N.C. App. 170, 172, 298
S.E.2d 200, 202 (1982) (relying on Nationwide to make determinations regarding service
and filing of affidavits); Rockingham Square Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Integon Life Ins. Corp.,
52 N.C. App. 633, 641, 279 S.E.2d 918, 924 (1981) (citing Nationwide as authority for the
timeliness of affidavits in summary judgment motions).
100. 103 N.C. App. 120,404 S.E.2d 703 (1991).
101. This allowed Nationwide to have a far greater effect on summary judgment
affidavits, including the one at issue in Precision Fabrics. See Precision Fabrics Group, Inc.
v. Transformer Sales & Serv., Inc., 120 N.C. App. 866, 869, 463 S.E.2d 787, 789 (1995)
(citing Nationwide as authority for requiring that opposing affidavits be filed one day prior
to the date of the hearing), rev'd, 344 N.C. 702,477 S.E.2d 166 (1996).
102. See Battle, 103 N.C. App. at 121-22, 404 S.E.2d at 703-04. Ms. Battle violated
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expenses she incurred as a result of the termination of
employment."° In response, the college filed a motion for summary
judgment, claiming that there was no genuine issue of material fact."
Ms. Battle did not file any opposing affidavits." Hence, the trial
court granted the motion and dismissed the action with prejudice! °6
On appeal, Ms. Battle argued that she was not required to present
opposing evidence until the defendant proved that summary
judgment was warranted." The Battle court echoed Nationwide's
reasoning, stating that while there was no specific reference to the
service and filing of supporting affidavits in Rule 56,
"'[n]evertheless, it seems implicit in Rule 56(c) that such affidavits
must be filed and served prior to the day of the hearing. ,,.. Based
on this interpretation of the rule on supporting affidavits, the Battle
court expanded Nationwide's inference to include the timely filing of
opposing affidavits, holding that "opposing affidavits should be filed
prior to the day of the hearing."'" Because Ms. Battle had failed to
present any opposing affidavits until the day of the hearing, the court
of appeals ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to accept them.1 '
In a concurring opinion, Judge Greene, who also wrote the
majority opinion for the court of appeals in Precision Fabrics,'
added that Ms. Battle could have asked the trial court to enlarge the
§ 143-553 of the North Carolina General Statutes, which requires state employees to repay
all debts to the State in full before being allowed to work for the State. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 143-553 (1996).




107. See id. at 126,404 S.E.2d at 706. Specifically, Ms. Battle stated that the trial court
had erred in refusing" 'to allow plaintiff to include her response to defendant's summary
judgment and attachments thereto in the record on appeal and the transcript of the hearing
since plaintiff should have been allowed to file these items and they should have been
considered by the trial court."' Id. (quoting plaintiff's brief). Other issues on appeal
included whether Ms. Battle violated Rule 11(b) by failing to serve the proposed record on
appeal on defendant in a timely manner and whether she failed to comply with various
rules of appellate procedure. See id.
108. Id. at 126-27, 404 S.E.2d at 706 (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chantos, 21
N.C. App. 120, 130, 203 S.E.2d 421, 423 (1974)). The Battle opinion heavily quoted
Nationwide's discussion of the filing and service of affidavits throughout its analysis of that
issue. See id. at 126-27, 404 S.E.2d at 706-07.
109. Id. at 127, 404 S.E.2d at 707.
110. See id. The court went on to state that the inclusion of the information was not
necessary to its adjudication of the matters on appeal. See id.
111. Precision Fabrics Group, Inc. v. Transformer Sales & Serv., Inc., 120 N.C. App.
866, 867, 463 S.E.2d 787,788 (1995), rev'd, 344 N.C. 713, 477 S.E.2d 166 (1996).
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time in which to file her affidavits. 2  Citing Rule 6(b), the
concurrence reminded the court that "[if] a request for permission to
file affidavits is made on the day of the summary judgment hearing,
the trial court 'may permit the act to be done where the failure to act
was the result of excusable neglect.' ".3 However, because Ms.
Battle neither requested an extension prior to the hearing nor
presented an excuse for failing to serve the affidavits before the day
of the hearing, the trial court was precluded from expanding the time
in which it could accept the affidavits."
Nationwide and Battle constituted the controlling case law with
regard to the timeliness of summary judgment affidavits until the
Precision Fabrics decision." Recognizing the impact of uprooting
such established precedent the supreme court focused directly on
the legal analysis in both Nationwide and Battle."6 The opinion
began by discounting the widely followed holding in Nationwide that
Rule 56(c) "implicitly requires that affidavits in support of a motion
for summary judgment be filed and served prior to the date of the
summary judgment hearing." 7 The supreme court denounced the
court of appeals' liberal interpretation of the rule, citing precedent
directing the judiciary to adhere to the literal words of the legislature
when its intent is clear. 18  Thus, because Rule 56(c) fails to
112. See Battle, 103 N.C. App. at 128-29,404 S.E.2d at 707-08 (Greene, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 128-29, 404 S.E.2d at 708 (Greene, J., concurring) (quoting N.C. R. Civ. P.
6(b)).
114. See id. at 129,404 S.E.2d at 708 (Greene, I., concurring). Therefore, "the plaintiff
cannot complain about [their] exclusion." Id. (Greene, J., concurring). Other court of
appeals holdings have agreed that there must be a showing of excusable neglect or a
request prior to the hearing to allow such an extension. See, e.g., Crowell Constructors,
Inc. v. State ex rel. Cobey, 114 N.C. App. 75,78, 440 S.E.2d 848, 850 (1994) (agreeing with
the Nationwide court that there must be a showing of excusable neglect or a pre-hearing
request for an extension), rev'd on other grounds, 342 N.C. 838, 467 S.E.2d 675 (1996);
Rockingham Square Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Integon Life Ins. Corp., 52 N.C. App. 633, 641,
279 S.E.2d 918, 924 (1981) (holding that the lower court correctly refused to admit tardy
affidavits, as the party offering them failed to present evidence of excusable neglect).
115. The scope of the two cases can be seen most clearly in the court of appeals'
decision in Precision Fabrics. See Precision Fabrics Group, Inc. v. Transformer Sales &
Serv., Inc., 120 N.C. App. 866, 869, 463 S.E.2d 787,789 (1995) (basing the decision on the
holdings in both Nationwide and Battle), rev'd, 344 N.C. 702, 477 S.E.2d 166 (1996); see
also supra note 99 (listing cases relying on Nationwide).
116. See Precision Fabrics, 344 N.C. at 719-21, 477 S.E.2d at 169-71.
117. Id. at 719,477 S.E.2d at 169 (explaining the Nationwide holding).
118. The court stated that"' "if the language used is clear and admits but one meaning,
the Legislature should be taken to mean what it has plainly expressed."' " Id. (quoting
Nova Univ. v. Board of Governors, 305 N.C. 156,170, 287 S.E.2d 872,881 (1982) (quoting
Asbury v. Town of Albemarle, 162 N.C. 247,250,78 S.E. 146,148 (1913) but omitting "of"
between "admits" and "but")).
2244 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75
specifically address the issue of when to file opposing affidavits with
the trial court, the supreme court refused to "amend" the rules by
adopting the Nationwide court's interpretation of the legislative
intent behind Rule 56(c)." This reasoning is consistent with the
well-accepted practice in North Carolina of adhering to the exact
language of a statute to avoid undermining legislative intent."'
Therefore, the supreme court's literal interpretation of the summary
judgment rule in Precision Fabrics appears to be more consistent
with the judicial approach to "clearly" worded statutes than was the
Nationwide court's interpretation.'
While the supreme court's ruling in favor of more lenient filing
requirements for opposing affidavits constitutes a break with
precedent, its analysis of the time frame for affidavit service is more
consistent with past decisions." The court of appeals found that the
opposing affidavits should have been served three days earlier under
Rule 6(e) to allow the moving party time to respond.' The supreme
court, however, rejected the lower court's interpretation of the rule
as misguided, since there is no action available to the moving party in
response to opposing affidavits." In fact, the court in Planters
National Bank & Trust Co. v. Rush119 specifically held that the Rule
6(e) extension provision applied only to the moving party, stating
that opposing parties have "the right to fie opposing affidavits up
119. See id. The court cited Powell v. Board of Trustees, 3 N.C. App. 39, 43, 164 S.E.2d
80, 83 (1968), for the warning that "[i]f changes seem desirable, it is a matter for the
legislature." Precision Fabrics, 344 N.C. at 719, 477 S.E.2d at 169.
120. For example, in Byrd v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 256 N.C. 684, 124 S.E.2d 880
(1962), the supreme court stated that "words used in a statute must be given their natural
or ordinary meaning, unless the act itself indicates that a different meaning is intended."
Id. at 686, 124 S.E.2d at 882; see also In re Watson, 273 N.C. 629, 635, 161 S.E.2d 1, 7
(1968) (following Byrd in adhering to the actual language of the statute).
121. Compare Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chantos, 21 N.C. App. 129, 130, 203 S.E.2d
421, 423 (1974) (inferring legislative intent), with In re Arthur, 291 N.C. 640, 64143, 231
S.E.2d 614, 615-16 (1977) (applying the literal language of the statute).
122. See Precision Fabrics, 344 N.C. at 719-20, 477 S.E.2d at 169-70. The court adhered
primarily to the rules with regard to the validity of service by mail and the fact that service
must occur one day prior to the hearing. See id. at 719-20, 477 S.E.2d at 170 (citing N.C.
R. Crv. P. 5(b), 6(d), 56(c)).
123. See Precision Fabrics Group, Inc. v. Transformer Sales & Serv., Inc., 120 N.C.
App. 866, 868-69, 463 S.E.2d 787,789 (1995), rev'd, 344 N.C. 702, 477 S.E.2d 166 (1996).
Rule 6(e) states, in pertinent part, "[w]henever a party has the right to some act ... after
service of notice ... by mail, three days shall be added to the prescribed period." N.C. R.
Civ. P. 6(e); see also supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text (reviewing the supreme
court's discussion regarding Rule 6(e)).
124. See Precision Fabrics, 344 N.C. at 721, 477 S.E.2d at 170. Therefore, Rule 6(e)
does not apply to opposing affidavits. See id.
125. 17 N.C. App. 564,195 S.E.2d 96 (1973).
SUMMARY JUD GMENT AFFIDAVITS
through the day before the date fixed for hearing the summary
judgment motion. 126  Thus, unlike its decision on the filing of
affidavits, the Precision Fabrics court's interpretation of Rule 6(e)
was consistent with past holdings.
In the final portion of its opinion, the supreme court further
reshaped summary judgment jurisprudence by giving trial courts the
discretion to continue summary judgment hearings when the moving
party has not actually received opposing affidavits by the day of the
hearing."v It has been widely accepted that the trial court has ample
discretion to reschedule the course of a summary judgment motion."
In Nationwide, for example, the court of appeals recognized the trial
court's discretion under Rule 6(b) to expand the period of time
within which a party must complete an action.' The court reiterated
this holding in Crowell Constructors, Inc. v. State ex rel. Cobey,"
stating that "Rule 6(b) gives the trial court discretion to order the
time within which to file and serve the affidavits." ' However, the
supreme court in Precision Fabrics failed to recognize any of these
cases and offered little authority to substantiate its continuation
recommendation. Most importantly, the court failed to cite the rule
under which a court has discretion to grant such a continuance." In
126. Id. at 566, 195 S.E.2d at 97; accord Precision Fabrics, 344 N.C. at 721-22, 477
S.E.2d at 170.
127. See Precision Fabrics, 344 N.C. at 721-22, 477 S.E.2d at 171; see also supra notes
55-58 and accompanying text (discussing this aspect of the Precision Fabrics holding).
128. The Rules contain a number of examples of such discretion. See, e.g., N.C. R. Civ.
P. 6(b) (stating that "the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion" enlarge a
time period (emphasis added)); N.C. R. CIv. P. 6(d) (permitting flexibility in the deadlines
for service of motions and opposing affidavits); N.C. R. Civ. P. 56(f) (indicating that the
court "may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained," provided the party
provides justification for why the affidavits are not ready at the trial date (emphasis
added)).
129. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chantos, 21 N.C. App. 129, 130, 203 S.E.2d 421,
423 (1974).
130. 114 N.C. App. 75,440 S.E.2d 848 (1994), rev'd on other grounds, 342 N.C. 838,467
S.E.2d 675 (1996).
131. Id. at 78,440 S.E.2d at 850 (relying on Nationwide, 21 N.C. App. at 131,203 S.E.2d
at 423); accord Rockingham Square Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Integon Life Ins. Corp., 52 N.C.
App. 633, 643, 279 S.E.2d 918, 924 (1981) (stating that "Rule 6(b) and 6(d) gives [sic] the
trial court discretion to allow the late filing of affidavits").
132. See Precision Fabrics, 344 N.C. at 721-22, 477 S.E.2d at 171 (failing to cite any
rules on point). Most notably, the court did not cite Rule 6(b), which grants general
discretion to extend litigation deadlines. See N.C. R. Civ. P. 6(b). The only rule explicitly
addressing a trial court's capacity to grant a continuance in a summary judgment motion is
Rule 56(f), which states, in part, "the court ... may order a continuance to permit
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make
such other order as is just." N.C. R. Civ. P. 56(f). However, this section is intended for
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fact, the only foundation for its recommendation was an academic
treatise that made the suggestion in the context of a discussion of
Rule 6(d).' The treatise states that "the court should exercise its
discretion to continue the hearing if requested" if the moving party
does not receive the opposing affidavits prior to the date of the
hearing.'TM However, the treatise fails to cite any statutory or case
authority for this recommendation. 5 Furthermore, Rule 6(d) grants
judicial discretion only over the deadline for service of opposing
affidavits."6  Consequently, it does not seem applicable to the
granting of a continuance once opposing affidavits are served,
lending little weight to the supreme court's position on judicial
discretion in summary judgment motions.'
Not only does the Precision Fabrics court fail to provide support
for its continuation recommendation, but it also contradicts
precedent by allowing trial courts to grant such a continuance sua
sponte."5 While both Nationwide and Crowell acknowledged judicial
discretion to postpone affidavit deadlines, each case clearly set forth
limits on such discretion."9 In Nationwide, the court stated that
situations in which the opposing party is unable to provide affidavits that substantiate its
opposition to the motion for summary judgment. See Ua; see also Ipock v. Gilmore, 73
N.C. App. 182, 189-91, 326 S.E.2d 271, 277 (1985) (explaining that a court may grant a
continuance under Rule 56(f) when the opposing party is unable to present affidavits that
support its position and outlining evidence that the opposing party should present to get a
continuance); I-fliman v. United States Liab. Ins. Co., 59 N.C. App. 145, 154, 296 S.E.2d
302, 308 (1982) (interpreting Rule 56(f) as allowing a continuance when the opposing
party needs additional time to gather evidence to substantiate an opposing affidavit). In
Precision Fabrics, the supreme court deemed the opposing affidavits properly filed and
served, rendering Rule 56(f) inapplicable to the facts. See Precision Fabrics, 344 N.C. at
718-20, 477 S.E.2d at 169-70; see also supra notes 32-54 and accompanying text (discussing
the court's holding that the opposing affidavits were properly served and filed under the
applicable rules). Thus, it is not altogether surprising that the court did not mention Rule
56(f).
133. See Precision Fabrics, 344 N.C. at 721-22, 477 S.E.2d at 171 (citing 1 WILSON,
supra note 2, § 6-5, at 112).
134. 1 WILSON, supra note 2, § 6-5, at 112.
135. See i (making no references to any legal authority that supports such a
continuance).
136. See N.C.R. CIV. P. 6(d).
137. The opposing affidavit at issue in Precision Fabrics was validly served by the day
of the hearing. See Precision Fabrics, 344 N.C. at 718-20, 477 S.E.2d at 169-70. The notion
of granting a continuance in a Rule 6(d) situation is also not mentioned by other civil
procedure authorities. See, e.g., SHUFORD, supra note 45, § 6-7, at 50 (failing to mention a
continuance as a possible alternative in a summary judgment situation).
138. See Precision Fabrics, 344 N.C. at 722, 477 S.E.2d at 171. "Sua sponte" is defined
as: "Of his or its own will or motion; voluntarily; without prompting or suggestion."
BLACK's LAw DICIONARY 1424 (6th ed. 1990).
139. See Crowell Constructors, Inc. v. State ex rel. Cobey, 114 N.C. App. 75, 78, 440
SUMMARY JUDGMENTAFFIDAVITS
judicial autonomy to extend such a deadline was not unrestrained,
but that a "request for enlargement of time must be made before the
expiration of the [original] period," and that if the time had already
expired, "there must be a showing of excusable neglect."' Likewise,
the Crowell court limited trial court discretion by asserting that
"there must be a request for enlargement of time or a showing of
excusable neglect" when a party offers affidavits on the day of the
hearing. 1 Thus, prior to the Precision Fabrics case, it was a
necessary prerequisite that the opposing party ask for an extension
or make an affirmative showing of excusable neglect. The Precision
Fabrics court, however, ignored this history of restraint on trial court
discretion and vested what appears to be unlimited discretion to
continue a summary judgment hearing, stating that "even without a
request by a party, it is still within the trial court's discretion to
continue the hearing in order to give defendant's counsel time to
respond to plaintiff's counter affidavit. , 42 Finally, this holding seems
inconsistent with the court's earlier criticism of Nationwide's broad
interpretation of the rules of civil procedure.'43
Though it deviates from precedent, the Precision Fabrics
decision does appear to comport with the policy behind summary
judgment, a device created to promote judicial efficiency without
sacrificing a party's right to a hearing on the issues.' While the
S.E.2d 848, 850 (1994) (articulating the necessary procedural steps that a party must take
to postpone a judicial deadline), rev'd on other grounds, 342 N.C. 838, 467 S.E.2d 675
(1996); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chantos, 21 N.C. App. 129,130-31, 203 S.E.2d 421, 423
(1974) (stating the requirements that must be met before a court can grant an extension).
140. Nationwide, 21 N.C. App. at 131, 203 S.E.2d at 423. In Nationwide, the party
neither made a request nor presented evidence of excusable neglect; therefore, the court
held on appeal that the trial court properly exercised its discretion to exclude the
affidavits. See id.
141. Crowell, 114 N.C. App. at 78, 440 S.E.2d at 850. The need to show excusable
neglect for not filing affidavits in a timely manner is recognized by scholars, see, e.g.,
SHUFORD, supra note 45, § 6-4, at 48, and in other court decisions, see, e.g., Rockingham
Square Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Integon Ife Ins. Corp., 52 N.C. App. 633, 641, 279 S.E.2d
918, 923-24 (1981) (upholding the lower court's denial of admission of tardy affidavits
because the party offering them did not present evidence of excusable neglect).
142. Precision Fabrics, 344 N.C. at 722, 477 S.E.2d at 171. Note that the supreme court
did not indicate that either party requested a continuance. See id. at 715-18, 477 S.E.2d at
167-69 (describing the procedural history of the case). Instead, the supreme court urged
the lower court to continue the hearing until the moving party received the opposing
affidavits and could make a response if so desired. See id. at 721-22,477 S.E.2d at 171.
143. Compare id at 721-22, 477 S.E.2d at 171 (liberally construing judicial discretion),
with id. at 719, 477 S.E.2d at 169 (criticizing the court of appeals for adhering to the
Nationwide court's implicit reading of legislative intent with regard to Rule 56(c)).
144. See Gordon, supra note 66, at 94 ("[Summary judgment] is not a tool for use in
clearing calendars. The concept of a fair trial over-shadows such use.").
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holding that a lower court must accept opposing affidavits filed on
the day of the hearing may increase the amount of testimony in
evidence and slow the judicial process, the admission of such
information will better enable the trial court to make an informed
decision, thereby serving the interests of justice.'" This is beneficial
both to the court and to the parties in a case; while the purpose of
the motion is to expedite a trial, "an improper granting of a motion
for summary judgment resulting in an appeal and reversal can delay
the final disposition of the case and materially increase the work of
the court."' Furthermore, even if the motion is not granted, the
process of presenting evidence prior to trial may "flush[] out adverse
evidence that was not disclosed through discovery."'47 Finally, as the
United States Supreme Court indicated in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,48
summary judgment is intended to take into account the concerns of
the party bringing the suit, as well as those of the party attempting to
dispose of it through summary judgment.'4 Precision Fabrics not
only accomplishes this by relaxing the requirements for timely filing
of opposing affidavits," but it also suggests that trial courts grant a
continuance whenever the moving party has not received the
opposing affidavits by the day of the hearing so that the party may
have an opportunity to respond to the allegations therein.'5' Thus,
the decision appears to advance the underlying principles and goals
of summary judgment by facilitating the use of opposing affidavits
for the benefit of the opposing party and augmenting the trial court's
discretion to continue a hearing for the benefit of the movant.
Precision Fabrics may have a significant impact on summary
judgment practice in North Carolina. Foremost, the court's holding
145. Some states require a higher threshold of proof for a successful summary judgment
motion. See, e.g., Yamamoto et al., supra note 68, at 9-26 (comparing Hawaii's "slightest
doubt standard" for summary judgment with the federal courts' less-demanding trial
standard).
146. Gordon, supra note 66, at 91-92. Judges in other states, such as Oklahoma, agree
with this assessment. See, e.g., Cleary, supra note 2, at 267 ("Judges have expressed
concern that a plaintiff's day in court may be inordinately delayed if a grant of summary
judgment is appealed and then reversed.").
147. 1 WILSON, supra note 2, § 56-2, at 273; see also Gordon, supra note 66, at 93
(setting forth the benefits of the summary judgment process, regardless of whether the
motion is granted). Partial summary judgment is another alternative. See SHUFORD,
supra note 45, § 56-10, at 465-66.
148. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
149. See id at 327; see also supra text accompanying note 1 (quoting the relevant
language from Celotex).
150. See Precision Fabrics, 344 N.C. at 718-19,477 S.E.2d at 169.
151. See id. at 721-22, 477 S.E.2d at 171.
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regarding service and filing of opposing affidavits erases any past
confusion over when the two formalities should be completed. Part
of this ambiguity stemmed from the fact that courts have often used
"file" and "serve" interchangeably. For example, in Rockingham
Square Shopping Center, Inc. v. Integon Life Insurance Corp.,' 2 the
plaintiff argued that Rule 56 did not require that opposing affidavits
be filed with the court before the hearing." The court cited the
Nationwide proposition that affidavits should be filed and served
prior to the day of the hearing.' However, the court's holding failed
to address the requirements for timely filing of affidavits, instead
holding that "affidavits in opposition to a motion for summary
judgment should be served prior to the day of the hearing.' ' 15 The
court's omission of any ruling on the plaintiff's specific claim that the
affidavits were not required to be filed prior to the hearing date
indicates that the court mistakenly equated service upon an opposing
party with filing documents with the court. Imprecise use of the
terms "service" and "filing" by the courts creates potential ambiguity
for those attempting to decipher when it is necessary to file opposing
affidavits. Precision Fabrics eliminates any such confusion by clearly
stating the requirements for timely filing and service of affidavits."
Precision Fabrics also increases the probability of successfully
opposing a motion for summary judgment. This is most clearly
illustrated by contemplating how past decisions would come out
differently under the Precision Fabrics ruling. For example, in both
Rose v. Guilford County' and Battle v. Nash Technical College," the
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's refusal to accept opposing
affidavits filed on the day of the hearing by relying on the
Nationwide inference that the rules required that such affidavits be
filed prior to the hearing date.59 Under the Precision Fabrics ruling,
152. 52 N.C. App. 633,279 S.E.2d 918 (1981).
153. See id. at 641, 279 S.E.2d at 923. The plaintiff also asserted that it was within the
trial court's discretion to permit a late filing of the affidavits under Rule 6(d). See id.
154. See id. at 641,279 S.E.2d at 924 (citing Nationwide).
155. Id. (emphasis added).
156. See Precision Fabrics, 344 N.C. at 718-19, 477 S.E.2d at 169.
157. 60 N.C. App. 170, 298 S.E.2d 200 (1982). Rose involved a dispute over the
rezoning of the plaintiff's land to forbid mobile homes, of which the plaintiff owned two.
See id. at 170-71, 298 S.E.2d at 201. The defendant filed for summary judgment and,
because the trial court refused to admit plaintiff's opposing affidavits, the motion was
granted based solely on the pleadings. See id. at 172,298 S.E.2d at 202.
158. 103 N.C. App. 120, 404 S.E.2d 703 (1991). See supra notes 100-14 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the facts and legal analysis in Battle.
159. See Battle, 103 N.C. App. at 126-27, 404 S.E.2d at 706-07; Rose, 60 N.C. App. at
172, 298 S.E.2d at 202. Both decisions cited Nationwide's well-known passage: "'It
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however, the opposing affidavits in both Rose and Battle would have
been considered timely when filed on the day of the hearing and thus
would have been admitted into evidence.' Hence, it is possible that
summary judgment would not have been granted in those cases.'
These examples reveal how the Precision Fabrics decision favors
opposing parties by allowing them an increased opportunity to
submit information that could alter the course of a summary
judgment motion.
Overall, Precision Fabrics establishes the new interpretation of
what constitutes timely service and filing of summary judgment
affidavits. The supreme court's literal reading of Rule 56(c) replaces
Nationwide's inference that affidavits opposing a motion for
summary judgment must be filed before the summary judgment
hearing.'6' This ruling favors parties opposing summary judgment by
allowing them to present their affidavits directly to the court on the
day of the motion hearing. Likewise, the court clarified that the use
of opposing affidavits does not invoke the added burden under Rule
6(e) of serving such papers on the moving party three days earlier
than normally required.' Once again, the supreme court's ruling
works to the benefit of the opposing party by maintaining the
maximum time period during which a party must serve the moving
party under the rules. These rulings are balanced by the supreme
court's recommendation that a trial court act sua sponte to continue
a hearing to give the moving party an opportunity to respond to
opposing affidavits, tempering its otherwise pro-opposing party
decision.'6 Finally, Precision Fabrics will promote justice by shifting
the goals of summary judgment from judicial efficiency to increased
knowledge of the information involved in the case, while at the same
follows that the clear intent of the legislature is that supporting affidavits should be filed
and served sufficiently in advance of the hearing to permit opposing affidavits to be filed
prior to the day of the hearing.'" Battle, 103 N.C. App. at 127, 404 S.E.2d at 706-07
(quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chantos, 21 N.C. App. 129,130,203 S.E.2d 421, 423
(1974)); Rose, 60 N.C. App. at 172,298 S.E.2d at 202 (quoting Nationwide, 21 N.C. App. at
130,203 S.E.2d at 423).
160. Cf. Precision Fabrics, 344 N.C. at 718-19, 477 S.E.2d at 169 (holding that the
affidavits were filed in a timely manner with the trial court).
161. Cf. Beaufort Concrete Co. v. Atlantic States Constr. Co., 352 F.2d 460, 463 (5th
Cir. 1965) (noting that the exclusion of opposing affidavits could be fatal to a plaintiff's
case).
162. See Precision Fabrics, 344 N.C. at 718-19, 477 S.E.2d at 169; see also supra notes
32-40 and accompanying text (discussing the court's analysis of Rule 56(c) with regard to
the filing of opposing affidavits).
163. See Precision Fabrics, 344 N.C. at 720-21, 477 S.E.2d at 170.
164. See id. at 721-22,477 S.E.2d at 171.
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time showing "due regard"" for the interests of both parties to a
summary judgment procedure. It is clear that the decision will even
the odds in summary judgment motions in North Carolina.
ALIClA CHRISTINA ALMEIDA
165. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986); see also supra text
accompanying note 1 (stating the fll quote).
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Faithfully Maintaining the State's Public Schools: The North
Carolina Supreme Court's Decision in Craven County Board of
Education v. Boyles Dramatically Expands the Reach of the
State Constitution's County School Fund
In North Carolina, public education is one of the state's most
important responsibilities. The North Carolina Constitution
expressly recognizes the value of public education' and charges the
General Assembly with maintaining a statewide public school
system. In past opinions, the North Carolina Supreme Court has
affirmed this obligation, stating that "[u]nquestionably, the education
of residents of this State is a recognized object of State
government."3  The General Assembly has responded to this
mandate by making education a significant budget priority-the
state's 1995-1997 biennial budget allocated over $4 billion per year to
public education.!
While much of the state's support for public schools arises from
annual appropriations by the General Assembly, the state
constitution contains an increasingly important and controversial
source of school revenue-the county school fund. Article IX,
Section 7 of the constitution provides:
All moneys, stocks, bonds, and other property belonging to
a county school fund, and the clear proceeds of all penalties
and forfeitures and of all fines collected in the several
counties for any breach of the penal laws of the State, shall
1. See N.C. CONST. art. I, § 15 ("The people have a right to the privilege of
education, and it is the duty of the State to guard and maintain that right."); id, art. IX, § 1
("Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government and the
happiness of mankind, schools, libraries, and the means of education shall forever be
encouraged.").
2. See ia art. IX, § 2 ("The General Assembly shall provide ... for a general and
uniform system of free public schools ....").
3. State Educ Assistance Auth. v. Bank of Statesville, 276 N.C. 576, 587, 174 S.E.2d
551,559 (1970).
4. See Joseph S. Ferrell, The State Budget, in NORTH CAROLINA Focus: AN
ANTHOLOGY ON STATE GOVERNMENT, POLITICS, AND POLICY 349, 353 tbl.2 (Mebane
Rash Whitman & Ran Coble eds., 3d ed. 1996). Total annual state expenditures were
roughly $13 billion. See U North Carolina's public schools receive about two thirds of
their financial support from the state; federal (7.5%) and local (28.2%) contributions
account for their remaining support. See Mebane Rash Whitman, The Right to Education
and the Financing of Equal Educational Opportunities in North Carolina's Public Schools,
in NORTH CAROLINA Focus, supra, at 121,125 tbl.1.
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belong to and remain in the several counties, and shall be
faithfully appropriated and used exclusively for maintaining
free public schools.5
This constitutional provision has been the subject of numerous-
North Carolina Supreme Court decisions in which the court has
attempted to define exactly what "proceeds" the provision covers.6
The court's latest decision involving Article IX, Section 7, Craven
County Board of Education v. Boyles, 7 significantly broadens the
provision's application and creates uncertainty about the proper
disposition of numerous payments to the state. While the decision
reveals new sources of revenue for North Carolina's schools, it may
have an adverse impact on other state regulatory programs."
This Note examines the Craven County Board of Education
decision and discusses its impact in both jurisprudential and practical
terms. The Note begins with a description of the facts of the case
and the court's opinion, including the court's broad interpretation of
Article IX, Section 79 The Note then explores the historical origins
of the county school fund, and the North Carolina Supreme Court's
attempts to interpret the provision and establish its limits."0 Finally,
5. N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 7 (emphasis added). At least 13 other states have similar
constitutional provisions: Indiana, see IND. CONST. art. 8, § 2 (allocating the revenue from
state fines and forfeitures to the Common School Fund to support public schools);
Michigan, see MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 9 (allocating the revenue from state fines to the
state's public libraries); Missouri, see Mo. CONST. art. 9, § 7 (allocating the revenue from
state penalties, forfeitures, and fines to the local schools); Nebraska, see NEB. CONST. art.
VII, § 5 (allocating the revenue from state fines, penalties, and license fees to the counties
to support local schools); Nevada, see NEV. CONST. art. 11, § 3 (allocating the revenue
from state fines to the counties to support public schools); New Mexico, see N.M. CoNST.
art. XII, § 4 (allocating the revenue from state fines and forfeitures to the current school
fund to support public schools); North Dakota, see N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 2 (allocating
the revenue from state fines to the local schools); South Dakota, see S.D. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 3 (allocating the revenue from state fines to the counties to support local schools);
Virginia, see VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 8 (allocating the revenue from state fines and
forfeitures to the Literary Fund to support local schools); Washington, see WASH. CONST.
art. 9, § 3 (allocating the revenue from state forfeitures to the common school fund to
support local schools); West Virginia, see W. VA. CONST. art 12, § 5 (allocating the
revenue from state fines and forfeitures to the state school fund to support local schools);
Wisconsin, see Wis. CONST. art. 10, § 2 (allocating the revenue from state fines and
forfeitures to the state school fund to support local schools); and Wyoming, see WYO.
CONST. art. 7, §§ 2, 5 (allocating the revenue from state forfeitures, fines, and penalties to
state education spending).
6. See infra notes 53-134 and accompanying text (discussing state supreme court
cases involving Article IX, Section 7).
7. 343 N.C. 87,468 S.E.2d 50 (1996).
8. See infra notes 135-65 and accompanying text (discussing the decision's impact).
9. See infra notes 14-34 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 35434 and accompanying text.
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the Note explains the significance of Craven County Board of
Education with respect to previous decisions involving Article IX,
Section 7,11 analyzes the decision's effect on specific state programs
and state spending in general,"2 and identifies questions that the
decision left unresolved. 3
On June 11, 1991, the Division of Environmental Management
("DEM") within the North Carolina Department of Environment,
Health, and Natural Resources ("DEHNR") assessed a $1,466,942.44
civil penalty against the Weyerhaeuser Company for operating its
pulp mill in Craven County in violation of the state's air pollution
standards.' 4 Weyerhaeuser appealed the fine,' but before the Office
of Administrative Hearings ("OAH") decided the appeal, DEHNR
and Weyerhaeuser reached a settlement agreement under which
Weyerhaeuser agreed to pay the state $926,000.16 The agreement,
executed on October 11, 1991, stipulated that $922,000 of the
payment was for" 'the sole purpose of redressing any harm or risk, if
any, to the environment or the public health of the people of North
Carolina, which may have resulted from any actions or admissions by
11. See infra notes 135-58 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 159-65 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 166-76 and accompanying text.
14. See Craven County Bd. of Educ., 343 N.C. at 88, 468 S.E.2d at 51. The pulp mill
violated the conditions of its emissions permit by operating for 1457 days without required
emission control equipment. See Proposed Alternate Record on Appeal at 34-35, Craven
County Bd. of Educ (No. 365PA95) (consisting of Letter from Jim Mulligan, Regional
Supervisor, Washington Regional Office of DEM, to David F. Gardner, Weyerhaeuser Co.
(Mar. 22, 1991)); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.108 (1996) (requiring any air
pollution source to obtain a permit from the state). During that time, the mill exceeded its
allowable emissions limit by at least 193 tons per year. See Craven County Bed. of Educ.,
343 N.C. at 88, 468 S.E.2d at 51; see also N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2D.0503(d) (Aug.
1996) (setting the particulate matter emission limit for fuel-burning equipment, pursuant
to § 143-215.107(a)(5) of the General Statutes). The penalty consisted of a $1000 charge
for each day the mill operated in violation of its permit, a $3000 fee for emissions test
failures, a $5000 fee for making improper modifications to equipment, and a $1,942.44
charge to cover investigation costs. See Craven County Bd. of Educ., 343 N.C. at 88, 468
S.E.2d at 51; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.114A (authorizing civil penalties for
various violations of air pollution regulations).
15. See Craven County Bd of Educ., 343 N.C. at 88, 468 S.E.2d at 51. Under the
North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 150B-1 to -52 (1995),
which applies to virtually every state agency, see U §§ 150B-1(c), 150B-2(1) (exempting
certain agencies and defining "agency"), a party may contest an administrative penalty by
filing a petition with the Office of Administrative Hearings ("OAH'). See i. § 150B-23.
OAH assigns an administrative law judge to preside over the case. See id. § 150B-32. The
judge decides the case, see i. § 150B-34, and the losing party is entitled to judicial review
of the decision, see id. § 150B-43.
16. See Craven County Bd. of Educ., 343 N.C. at 88,468 S.E.2d at 51.
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[Weyerhaeuser] in connection with any alleged violation(s).' .... The
remaining $4000 was for "violations of environmental protection
regulations."'8  The settlement agreement further stated that
Weyerhaeuser's payments "did 'not constitute, nor shall they be
construed as forfeitures, fines, penalties, or payments in lieu
thereof.' "9 DEHNR retained $1,942.44 of the payment to cover
DEM's investigative costs, and transferred the remaining $924,057.56
to the State Treasurer for deposit in the state's General Fund.
Soon thereafter, in a letter to the State Treasurer dated
November 7, 1991, the Craven County Board of Education claimed
the proceeds from Weyerhaeuser's payment pursuant to Article IX,
Section 7 of the state constitution.2 The state refused the Board's
request, and on August 18, 1993, the Board filed a declaratory
judgment action in Wake County Superior Court.' On February 27,
1995, the superior court granted summary judgment for the Board
and ordered the State Treasurer to pay to the Board the proceeds
from the Weyerhaeuser settlement.' The state appealed, and the
supreme court granted discretionary review.24
In a unanimous opinion by Justice Frye, the court echoed its
earlier interpretation of Article IX, Section 7 in State ex rel.
Thornburg v. House & Lot." The House & Lot court held that the
provision identifies" 'two distinct funds for the public schools ... (1)
the clear proceeds of all penalties and forfeitures in all cases,
regardless of their nature, so long as they accrue to the state; and (2)
the clear proceeds of all fines collected for any breach of the criminal
17. Id. at 88-89, 468 S.E.2d at 51 (quoting the settlement agreement).
18. Id. at 89, 468 S.E.2d at 51.
19. Id. (quoting the settlement agreement).
20. See id.
21. See id.; see also N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 7 (creating the county school fund).
22. See Craven County Bd. of Educ., 343 N.C. at 89, 468 S.E.2d at 51; Proposed
Alternate Record on Appeal at 4, Craven County Bd. of Educ. (No. 365PA95).
23. See Craven County Bd. of Educ., 343 N.C. at 89, 468 S.E.2d at 51; Proposed
Alternate Record on Appeal at 67, Craven County Bd. of Educ. (No. 365PA95).
24. See Craven County Bd. of Educ., 343 N.C. at 89,468 S.E.2d at 51.
25. See id., 343 N.C. at 90-91, 468 S.E.2d at 52 (citing State ex rel. Thomburg v. House
& Lot, 334 N.C. 290, 294, 432 S.E.2d 684, 688 (1993)). House & Lot involved the proper
disposition of the proceeds from the sale of property forfeited pursuant to the state's
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). See House & Lot, 334 N.C.
at 291, 432 S.E.2d at 684; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75D-1 to -14 (1990) (the North
Carolina RICO Act); infra note 117 (describing the RICO Act). The court ordered the
state to transfer the proceeds from RICO forfeitures to the county school fund. See House
& Lot, 334 N.C. at 295-96,432 S.E.2d at 687. For a more detailed description of House &
Lot, see infra notes 125-34 and accompanying text.
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laws.' ,,26 Because Weyerhaeuser's settlement payment resulted from
a civil violation, the Craven County Board of Education court
focused on the first category.' It identified two dispositive issues
that determined whether the Weyerhaeuser payment met the House
& Lot definition and thus had to be turned over to the county school
fund: (1) whether the payment accrued to the state; and (2) whether
it constituted a penalty.'
The court dispensed with the first issue quickly. Simply noting
that "[t]he monies from the settlement were paid to DEHNR," the
opinion stated that it was "clear" that they "accrued to the state. ' ' 9
As for the second issue, the court held that the Weyerhaeuser
payment "constituted a penalty." ' It asserted that "[t]he monies
were ... paid because of a civil penalty assessed against
Weyerhaeuser" and "[t]he fact that [they] ... were paid pursuant to
a settlement agreement does not change [their] nature."'
Furthermore, the court indicated that the language in the settlement
agreement expressly stating that Weyerhaeuser's payment was not to
be considered a penalty was not determinative.32 Quoting precedent,
the court stated that "it is neither 'the label attached to the money'
nor 'the [collection] method employed,' but 'the nature of the
offense committed' that determines whether the payment constitutes
a penalty." The court concluded its brief opinion by affirming the
26. Craven County Bd. of Educ., 343 N.C. at 90, 468 S.E.2d at 52 (emphasis omitted)
(alteration in original) (quoting House & Lot, 334 N.C. at 294, 432 S.E.2d at 686). The
court first articulated this interpretation of Article IX, Section 7 in Mussallam v.
Mussallam, 321 N.C. 504, 364 S.E.2d 364 (1988), a case concering the proper disposition
of the proceeds from a forfeited appearance bond. See id. at 508-09, 364 S.E.2d at 366; see
also infra notes 107-16 and accompanying text (discussing the Mussallam decision).




31. Id. The court noted that Weyerhaeuser agreed to make the payment only "after
the department found that the company had violated state environmental standards and
assessed a civil penalty against Weyerhaeuser for violation of those standards," and that
Weyerhaeuser made the payment "in lieu of contesting the civil penalty that had been
assessed." Id.
32. See id at 91, 468 S.E.2d at 53 ("[TIhe fact that the parties chose not to call the
payment a fine, penalty, or forfeiture is not determinative.").
33. Id. at 92, 468 S.E.2d at 53 (quoting Cauble v. City of Asheville, 301 N.C. 340, 344,
271 S.E.2d 258,260 (1980)). Cauble addressed the question of whether Article IX, Section
7 applies to municipal parking fines. See Cauble, 301 N.C. at 342, 271 S.E.2d at 259; see
also infra notes 81-87 and accompanying text (discussing Cauble in greater detail). In
Craven County Board of Education, the court compared the voluntarily-paid parking fines
in Cauble with Weyerhaeuser's settlement agreement, asserting that just as the
voluntariness of the parking fine payment did not change the fact that it was still a penalty,
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trial court's summary judgment order, stating that "there is no
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the clear proceeds [of
Weyerhaeuser's settlement payment] constituted a penalty as that
term is used in Article IX, Section 7 of the North Carolina
Constitution. "
Craven County Board of Education is the North Carolina
Supreme Court's latest attempt to interpret Article IX, Section 7, a
provision reflecting the state's historical commitrment to state-
supported public education." North Carolina's original constitution,
adopted in 1776, directed that:
[A] School or Schools shall be established by the
Legislature for the convenient Instruction of Youth, with
such Salaries to the Masters paid by the Public, as may
enable them to instruct at low Prices; and all useful
Learning shall be duly encouraged and promoted in one or
more Universities. 6
The General Assembly created the University of North Carolina
in 1789,37 but it did not establish a statewide public school system
until 1839.' However, it laid the groundwork for public schools in
1825 when it created the Literary Fund ("the Fund") "for the
support of common and convenient Schools for the instruction of
youth., 39 Initially, the Fund failed to generate much revenue,4 but
forfeiture, or fine, "it is not determinative that the monies [paid by Weyerhaeuser] were
collected by virtue of a settlement agreement" or that "Weyerhaeuser stated that the
payment not be construed as a penalty." Craven County Bd of Educ., 343 N.C. at 92, 468
S.E.2d at 53.
34. Craven County B& of Educ., 343 N.C. at 92,468 S.E.2d at 53.
35. For an account of the history of the state's efforts to create a stable source of
revenue for its public schools, see generally David M. Lawrence, Fines, Penalties, and
Forfeitures: An Historical and Comparative Analysis, 65 N.C. L REV. 49, 52-60 (1986)
(discussing the historical background of Article IX, Section 7 of the North Carolina
Constitution). For a discussion of the history of public schools in the South, see generally
EDGARW. KNiGHT, PuBuc EDcUnION THE SotmH (1922).
36. N.C. CONST. of 1776, § XLL
37. See Act of Dec. 22,1789, ch. 20,1715-1803 N.C. Sess. Laws 472,472.
38. See Act of Jan. 8, 1839, ch. 8, 1838-39 N.C. Sess. Laws 12, 12. Opposition to tax-
funded public education and the notion that education was a matter of familial rather than
state responsibility accounted for the delay. See Lawrence, supra note 35, at 53; see also
KNIGHT, supra note 35, at 161 ("Early in the nineteenth century the attitude of the public
was indifferent and often hostile to the principle of public schools ... ."); William K. Boyd,
The Finances of the North Carolina Literary Fund (pt. 1), 13 S. ATLANTIC Q. 270, 271-72
(1914) (stating that other reasons for the delay included uncertainty about the state
constitution's mandate, poor funding, intrastate dissention, and low-quality teachers).
39. Act of Jan. 4, 1826, ch. 1268, § 1, 1820-25 N.C. Sess. Laws 167, :167. The Fund's
sources of revenue included dividends from state-held stocks, license taxes, and proceeds
from the sale of state-owned swamp land. See id. See generally Boyd, supra note 38, at 270
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between 1838 and 1840, state and federal contributions increased the
Fund dramatically,41 allowing the General Assembly finally to
establish a school system.2
The school system enjoyed stable financing and operated well
for the next twenty years, but the Civil War devastated the state's
schools and depleted the Fund.43 To restore a stable source of
revenue for the school system, the framers of the Reconstruction
Constitution of 1868 "replaced the statutorily based Literary Fund
with a constitutionally based 'irreducible educational fund.' " The
new constitutional fund was to be used "for establishing and
perfecting in this State a system of Free Public Schools, and for no
other purposes or uses whatsoever." The sources of revenue for
this new fund included "the net proceeds that may accrue to the
State... from fines, penalties, and forfeitures."'
The 1868 Constitution's education fund lasted only until 1875,
when opponents of Reconstruction, who "gained control of state
government" and "forced a constitutional convention," adopted
numerous changes to the constitution.47 They created two education
funds that are both still in effect today. One, now called the state
school fund," consisted of most of the revenues from the 1868
Constitution's fund and provided financial support for state
(detailing the financial history of the Literary Fund); William K. Boyd, Finances of the
North Carolina Literary Fund (pt. 2), 13 S. ATLANTIc Q. 361 (1914) (same).
40. In 1831, the Fund contained less than $75,000. See Lawrence, supra note 35, at 53;
see also KNIGHT, supra note 35, at 174 (stating that the Fund's growth "was slow during
the first years of its existence" and insufficient to support public schools).
41. By 1840, the Fund contained nearly $2,250,000. See Lawrence, supra note 35, at
54. In 1837, Congress distributed the federal treasury's surplus revenue to the states;
North Carolina's share was over $1.4 million. See KNIGHT, supra note 35, at 174-75.
42. See Act of Jan. 8, 1839, ch. 8,1838-39 N.C. Sess. Laws 12, 12.
43. See Lawrence, supra note 35, at 54. The state's schools lost much of their revenue
because counties "diverted tax moneys from education to war-related expenditures," and
the state invested most of the Literary Fund in Confederate bonds that were worthless
after the War. Id. In 1866, the Fund contained only $766. See id.
44. Id. (quoting N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 4).
45. N.C. CoNsT. of 1868, art. IX, § 4. The framers of Article IX, Section 4 of the 1868
constitution sought to identify a stable, recurring source of revenue for the state's schools
and to prevent the General Assembly from diverting that revenue to noneducational uses.
See Lawrence, supra note 35, at 55-56 (describing the probable motivations behind
constitutionalizing the fund).
46. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 4. Other sources included proceeds from the sale
of state-owned lands and swamp lands, gifts to the state, and the remaining holdings of the
literary Fund. See id.
47. Lawrence, supra note 35, at 57-58.
48. See N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 6.
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education spending.49  The other, now called the county school
fund,50 allocated "the clear proceeds of all penalties and forfeitures,
and of all fines collected in the several counties for any breach of the
penal ... laws of the State," which had been part of the 1868
Constitution's fund, directly to the state's counties for education
spending. The framers of the county school fund gave control over
this revenue to the counties for a number of reasons, including the
counties' inability to raise adequate funding for education on their
own and the state's continuing tendency to divert educational assets
to other uses.52
Soon after the creation of the county school fund, the North
Carolina Supreme Court began to define the proceeds to which the
provision applied. The court's earliest cases involved qui tam
actions-civil suits in which state law empowered private litigants to
bring suit for violations of state regulations and retain some or all of
the penalties assessed.53 The first such case was Katzenstein v.
Raleigh & Gaston Railroad Co.' In Katzenstein, the court held that
Article IX, Section 7 did not prevent partial or total private recovery
in qui tam actions.55 The law at issue required railroads to pay their
customers a late fee whenever the railroads failed to deliver their
customers' freight on time.! The defendant, the Raleigh and Gaston
Railroad Company, shipped the plaintiffs freight late, so the plaintiff
sued under the state law. The defendant claimed that the plaintiff
could not recover because Article IX, Section 7 of the constitution
required all penalties imposed by state law to go into the county
school fund. 8 The court ruled that the defendant's interpretation
was incorrect. Drawing a distinction between "those penalties that
accrue to the state and those that are given to the person aggrieved,"
the court held that it was only the former "class of penalties that are
given to the county school fund."5 9
49. See N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 4 (amended 1875).
50. See N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 7.
51. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 5 (amended 1875).
52. See Lawrence, supra note 35, at 59.
53. See id. at 70. Qui tam actions were common at a time when state agencies did not
have the resources to enforce state laws themselves. See id.
54. 84 N.C. 591 (1881).
55. See id. at 595.
56. See idU at 591 (citing Act of Mar. 22, 1875, ch. 240, § 2, 1874-75 N.C. Sess. Laws
322,322).
57. See id. at 591-92.
58. See id. at 593.
59. Id. at 595.
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Ten years after Katzenstein, the court's decision in State ex rel.
Hodge v. Marietta & North Georgia Railroad' provided an example
of the penalties that do pass to the counties through the county
school fund. In Hodge, the plaintiff sued the defendant railroad
company under a state law levying a $500 civil penalty, "'to be sued
for in the name of the State,'" against any railroad failing to file an
annual report with the state. 1 The court held that unlike the qui tam
action in Katzenstein, the language of this law indicated "legislative
intent that the penalty should be sued for and recovered by the
State," and that "the Constitution devotes such penalties and
forfeitures to the school fund."62
The Hodge court was unwilling to endorse the holding in
Katzenstein that Article IX, Section 7 permitted the state to create
private causes of action for aggrieved individuals to recover penalties
for violations of state law, stating that it preferred to "leave that
question open."" However, a few years later the court did reiterate
the Katzenstein holding in Sutton v. Phillips." In Sutton, the court
upheld a state law permitting private parties to sue "any person
selling and delivering provisions by unauthorized weights and
measures."" As evidence of the law's constitutionality, the court
.referred to the fact that the General Assembly had re-enacted the
law and amended it three times since the 1875 addition of Article IX,
Section 7 to the state constitution, and stated that when reviewing
the constitutionality of an act of the legislature, if there is "any
reasonable doubt" about the act's constitutionality, "it will be
resolved in favor of the lawful exercise of [the legislature's]
"powers.'" 6 The court also cited a number of cases in which private
parties were allowed to recover under similar state laws.'
60. 108 N.C. 24,12 S.E. 1041 (1891).
61. Id. at 25, 12 S.E. at 1041 (quoting Act of Feb. 8, 1872, ch. 138, § 32, 1871-72 N.C.
Sess. Laws 186,208-09).
62. Id. at 26,12 S.E. at 1041.
63. Id. Because Hodge involved a penalty accruing to the state, the court stated that
the question was "immaterial." Id. at 25-26,12 S.E. at 1041.
64. 116 N.C. 502, 21 S.E. 968 (1895). For an argument supporting the Sutton court's
interpretation of Article IX, Section 7 based on contemporaneous newspaper accounts of
debate over the provision and court decisions soon after its adoption, see Lawrence, supra
note 35, at 71-72.
65. Sutton, 116 N.C. at 502,21 S.E. at 968.
66. Sutton, 116 N.C. at 504,21 S.E. at 968.
67. See id. at 505,21 S.E. at 968 (citing Cole v. Laws, 104 N.C. 651, 10 S.E. 172 (1889);
Williams v. Hodges, 101 N.C. 300, 7 S.E. 786 (1888); Hines & Battle v. Wilmington &
Weldon R.R. Co., 95 N.C. 434 (1886); McGwigan v. Wilmington & Weldon R.R. Co., 95
N.C. 428 (1886); McGowan v. Wilmington & Weldon R.R. Co., 95 N.C. 417 (1886);
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Katzenstein, Hodge, and Sutton established that civil penalties
may accrue either to individuals or to the state, and that Article IX,
Section 7 requires only those accruing to the state to be deposited in
the county school fund.' In its 1900 decision in Board of Education
v. Town of Henderson,6 9 however, the court distinguished civil
penalties from criminal fines, and established the rule that the
proceeds from criminal fines always must go to the county school
fund. In Town of Henderson, the Vance County Board of Education
sued to recover from the Town of Henderson's treasury the revenue
generated by fines and penalties collected for violations of local
ordinances." Because North Carolina's Code contained a law
making all violations of local ordinances misdemeanors under state
criminal law,7 the Board claimed that Article IX, Section 7 required
towns to deposit all fines collected pursuant to local ordinances in
the county school fund." The court agreed, stating that "all the fines
the [Town of Henderson] has collected upon prosecutions for
violations of the criminal laws of the State, whether for violation of
its ordinances made criminal by ... the Code, or by other criminal
statutes, ... belong to the common school fund of the county."73
Hence, the court established that there is "a clear distinction
between a fine and a penalty."'74 A fine, the court stated, "is the
Middleton v. Wilmington & Weldon R.R. Co., 95 N.C. 167 (1886); Branch & Pope v.
Wilmington & Weldon R.R. Co., 88 N.C. 570 (1883); Whitehead & Stokes v. Wilmington
& Weldon R.R. Co., 87 N.C. 255 (1882); Keeter v. Wilmington & Weldon R.R. Co., 86
N.C. 346 (1882); Branch v. Wilmington & Weldon R.R. Co., 77 N.C. 347 (1877)).
68. See id. at 504-05, 21 S.E. at 968; Hodge, 108 N.C. at 25-26, 12 S.E. at 1041;
Katzenstein v. Raleigh & Gaston R.R. Co., 84 N.C. 688, 693 (1881); see also Lawrence,
supra note 35, at 71 ("[Article IX, Section 7] did not require that [all fines, penalties, and
forfeitures] ... accrue to the State ... [but] simply ... that those that did accrue be
allocated to education.").
69. 126 N.C. 689,36 S.E. 158 (1900).
70. See id. at 690,36 S.E. at 158.
71. See Act of Feb. 12, 1872, ch. 195, § 2, 1871-72 N.C. Sess. Laws 344, 344 (current
version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-4 (1993) (stating that "if any person shall violate an
ordinance of a county, city, town, or metropolitan sewerage district... he shall be guilty of
a Class 3 misdemeanor")).
72. See Town of Henderson, 126 N.C. at 690-91, 36 S.E. at 158.
73. Id. at 692, 36 S.E. at 159 (emphasis omitted) (please note that slight wording and
punctuation differences exist between the version of this quote published in the North
Carolina Reports and the version published in the South Eastern Reporter, this version is
taken from the North Carolina Reports). Accordingly, the court held unconstitutional a
Code provision allocating the revenues from such fines to towns "'for municipal
purposes.' " Id. at 693,36 S.E. at 159 (quoting the Code); see also Act of Feb. 21, 1899, ch.
128, § 1, 1899 N.C. Sess. Laws 262, 262 (amending Code § 3806, the provision declared
unconstitutional by the Town of Henderson court).
74. Town of Henderson, 126 N.C. at 691, 36 S.E. at 159 (please note that slight
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sentence pronounced by the court for the violation of the criminal
law of the State," while a penalty "for a violation of the statute law of
the State or the ordinance of a town" is recovered "in a civil
action."75 That distinction is important, the court asserted, because
while penalties, based upon the qui tam cases, do not have to accrue
to the state but "might be given to the party suing," fines "shall
belong to the common school fund, and there is no ground for
deducting anything from [them].,
7
1
One year later, the court reiterated its Town of Henderson
holding in Board of School Directors v. City of Asheville" and
required the City of Asheville to turn over to the county school fund
the revenues in its treasury from fines for local ordinance violations.8
punctuation differences exist between the version of this quote published in the North
Carolina Reports and the version published in the Southeastern Reporter, this version is
taken from the North Carolina Reports).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 694-96, 36 S.E. at 160. Justice Furches, writing for the court, based this
holding on a curious line of reasoning. He interpreted the phrase "clear proceeds" in
Article IX, Section 7 as applying only to penalties and forfeitures. See id. at 695-96, 36
S.E. at 160. Consequently, "the clear proceeds of all penalties and forfeitures" allows for
some portion of a penalty or forfeiture to be paid to a party other than the state, whereas
"all fines collected" without the "clear proceeds" qualifier allows for no such diversion.
See id. In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Faircioth criticized Justice Furches's
reasoning as "unsound and illogical," pointing out that the word "of' before "all fines
collected" makes the natural reading of the entire passage "the clear proceeds of all
penalties, and the clear proceeds of forfeitures, and the clear proceeds of all fines
collected." Id. at 696-97,36 S.E. at 160-61 (Faircioth, CJ., concurring in result).
A few years later, in State v. Maultsby, 139 N.C. 583, 51 S.E. 956 (1905), the court
provided a more logical explanation for the distinction between criminal fines and civil
penalties and forfeitures. In overturning a state law awarding informants one half of the
fine for the illegal sale of whiskey, the court stated that criminal fines "[firom their very
nature, being punishment for violation of the criminal law ... are imposed in favor of the
State," and thus accrue only to the state. Id. at 585, 51 S.E. at 956. Therefore, the clear
proceeds of a criminal fine constitute the entire fine. See id. at 585, 51 S.E. at 956. Civil
penalties, on the other hand, may accrue either to the state or to aggrieved parties,
depending on the legislation creating them. See idU at 584-85, 51 S.E. at 956 (citing
Katzenstein, Hodge, and Sutton). The clear proceeds covered by Article IX, Section 7 are
only those directed to the state. See idU at 584, 51 S.E. at 956. For a general discussion of
the Henderson and Maultsby decisions, see Lawrence, supra note 35, at 71-73.
77. 128 N.C. 249,38 S.E. 874 (1901).
78. See id. at 251-52,38 S.E. at 875. The court rejected the city's argument, based on
Chief Justice Faircloth's concurring opinion in Town of Henderson, see Town of
Henderson, 126 N.C. at 696-699, 36 S.E. at 160-61 (Faircloth, CJ., concurring in result),
that "clear proceeds" in Article IX, Section 7 should apply to fines as well as penalties and
forfeitures. See City of Asheville, 128 N.C. at 249-50, 38 S.E. at 875; see also supra note 76
(explaining Chief Justice Faircloth's reasoning). The City asserted that the "clear
proceeds" of all three were only those that "h[ad] not been appropriated by act of the
Legislature to other purposes." City of Asheville, 128 N.C. at 250, 38 S.E. at 875. Since
the General Assembly had directed that the revenue from the fines in question accrue to
COUNTYSCHOOL FUND
After remand to determine the exact amount of the fines, the court
again considered the City's claim that the General Assembly had the
power to appropriate fines to the locality assessing them.79 It again
rejected the claim, stating that while the General Assembly "may
give to cities and towns the entire penalty incurred for the violation
of ordinances to be recovered in a civil action," when it "declares the
violation of an ordinance a misdemeanor, the fine imposed for the
criminal offense must go in the way directed by [Article IX, Section
7].8
In a modem application of the Town of Henderson rule, the
court in Cauble v. City ofAsheville s1 held that the City had to transfer
to the county school fund the revenues it received from fines for
overdue parking violations, criminalized by § 14-4 of the North
Carolina General Statutes.' The Cauble court eschewed some of the
formalism of earlier court opinions. It stated that the "label
attached" to the assessment for a violation of a local ordinance "does
not control."' Regardless of whether "the monies are denominated
'fines' or 'penalties,' "' they constitute a fine under Article IX,
Section 7 if they are "'exacted of a person guilty of a misdemeanor,
or a crime.' "' Furthermore, the court rejected the City's claim that
because the overdue parking assessments were paid voluntarily,
rather than "as a result of a criminal conviction," they should not be
regarded as fines.86 The court stated that it is the "nature of the
offense committed," not "the method employed ... to collect" that
the localities assessing the fines, the City claimed that Article IX, Section 7 should not
apply. See id. at 250, 38 S.E. at 875.
79. See Board of Sch. Dirs. v. City of Asheville, 137 N.C. 503,50 S.E. 279 (1905).
80. Id. at 508-09, 50 S.E. at 281.
81. 301 N.C. 340,271S.E.2d 258 (1980).
82. See id. at 345,271 S.E.2d at 261; see also supra note 71 (providing the relevant text
of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-4 (1993)). As of 1995, parking violations are excepted from the
criminalization provision. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-4(b) (1993).
Justice Exum dissented from Chief Justice Branch's majority opinion, arguing that the
parking fines were "collected for violation of the [local] ordinance only," and that "[a]
person who may have in fact violated [§ 14-4] pays no fine pursuant to that statute until he
has been duly prosecuted and adjudged guilty of its violation." Cauble, 301 N.C. at 347,
271 S.E.2d at 262 (Exum, J., dissenting). Those paying the parking fine had "neither been
prosecuted for, pled guilty to, nor found guilty of" violating § 14-4. Id. at 347, 271 S.E.2d
at 262 (Exum, J., dissenting).
83. Cauble, 301 N.C. at 344, 271 S.E.2d at 260.
84. Id. (emphasis omitted).
85. Id. (quoting State v. Rumfelt, 241 N.C. 375, 377, 85 S.E.2d 398, 400 (1955)
(quoting State v. Addington, 143 N.C. 683,686,57 S.E. 398,399 (1907))).
86. Id.
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determines whether the assessments constitute fines.'
Despite the Town of Henderson court's rigid holding that the
revenue from all criminal fines "shall belong to the common school
fund, and there is no ground for deducting anything from it,"'
subsequent rulings allowed some of the proceeds from fines to be
used to repay criminal enforcement costs.8 For example, in State v.
Maultsby, while overturning a state law allocating to informants one
half of the fine for the illegal sale of liquor,9' the court asserted that
authorities may deduct "the sheriff's fees for collection" before
turning over the revenue from fines to the county school fund.'
Also, in its post-remand decision in Cauble, the court permitted the
City of Asheville to deduct "reasonable costs of collection" from
overdue parking fines before turning them over to the county school
fund.' The court justified its ruling on the grounds that "'clear
proceeds' as used in Article IX, Section 7 is synonymous with net
proceeds and ... the costs of collection should be deducted from the
gross proceeds of monies received for traffic violations in order to
determine the net or 'clear proceeds.' 94 The court stated that
collection costs "do not include the costs associated with
[enforcement] ... but are limited to the administrative costs of
collecting the funds."' Furthermore, costs must "bear a reasonable
relation to the cost of collection" in order to be deductible.9 6 The
General Assembly has since clarified this issue, defining "clear
proceeds" as follows:
The clear proceeds of all penalties and forfeitures and of all
fines collected for any breach of the penal laws of the State,
as referred to in Article IX, Section 7 of the Constitution,
shall include the full amount of all penalties, forfeitures or
fines collected under authority conferred by the State,
87. Id. (emphasis omitted).
88. Board of Educ. v. Town of Henderson, 126 N.C. 689, 695-96, 36 S.E. 158, 160
(1900).
89. The court first raised this possibility in Board of School Directors v. City of
Asheville, 137 N.C. 503, 50 S.E. 279 (1905), when it speculated that a county sheriff or
clerk might be able to retain a five-percent commission from all penalties collected. See
iU at 512,50 S.E. at 282.
90. 189 N.C. 583,51 S.E. 956 (1905).
91. See Act of Feb. 16,1903, ch. 125, § 12,1903 N.C. Sess. Laws 144,146.
92. Maultsby, 189 N.C. at 585,51 S.E. at 956.
93. Cauble v. City of Asheville, 314 N.C. 598,604,336 S.E.2d 59,63 (1985).
94. Id. (quoting N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 7)
95. Id. at 606,336 S.E.2d at 64.
96. Id. at 605,336 S.E.2d at 64.
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diminished only by the actual costs of collection, not to
exceed ten percent (10%) of the amount collected.'
Beyond its decisions establishing that law enforcement officials
may deduct collection costs from criminal fines before turning them
over to the county school fund, the court in Shore v. Edmisten"
distinguished restitutionary payments from criminal fines and held
that restitutionary payments were not covered by Article IX, Section
7. In Shore, the court allowed the Greensboro Police Department to
retain a sixty-dollar fine levied against an individual convicted of
drug possession to compensate the department for the money it
spent on the drugs used in the sting operation." In his opinion for
the court, Justice Exum stated that fines are "pecuniary punishment
exacted by the state and imposed in the discretion of the trial court
for the purpose of punishing the defendant," whereas restitution "is
compensation to an aggrieved party."' The opinion asserted that
"[i]n determining whether a given payment is a fine or restitution,
the label given by the judge (or the legislature) is not
determinative,"' ' ' but the distinction is important because "the
disposition of the money differs accordingly."' 2 Citing the line of
cases beginning with Town of Henderson, the court stated that
Article IX, Section 7 requires fines to be deposited in the county
school fund,"u but restitution "goes to the aggrieved party.""'
Therefore, the Greensboro Police Department could retain the sixty-
dollar fine because "[a] state or local agency can be the recipient of
restitution where the offense charged results in particular damage or
loss to it over and above its normal operating costs.""
While numerous decisions since the court's qui tam cases
discussed the proper disposition of criminal fines, until recently the
97. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-437 (1994) (emphasis added). This definition, added to
§ 115C-437 in 1985, see Act of July 17, 1985, ch. 779, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 1308, 1308,
actually went into effect before the court reported its decision in Cauble, but the court
ruled that § 115C-437 did not apply retroactively to the fines at issue in the case. See
Cauble, 314 N.C. at 604-05 n.1, 336 S.E.2d at 63-64 n.I.
98. 290 N.C. 628, 227 S.E.2d 553 (1976).
99. See id. at 637, 227 S.E.2d at 561.
100. Id. at 633, 227 S.E.2d at 559.
101. Id. at 633,227 S.E.2d at 558.
102. Id. at 632,227 S.E.2d at 558.
103. See id. at 633, 227 S.E.2d at 558.
104. Id. at 632,227 S.E.2d at 558.
105. Id. at 633-34, 227 S.E.2d at 559. However, "[ilt would not ... be reasonable to
require the defendant to pay the State's overhead attributable to the normal costs of
prosecuting him." Id. at 634,227 S.E.2d at 559.
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court did not elaborate on its early rulings concerning the proper,
disposition of civil penalties. Uncertainty over the exact meaning of
the term "penal laws" in Article IX, Section 7 cast some doubt on the
provision's continued applicability to state civil penalties.'
106. See Christopher S. Nesbit, Note, State ex rel. Thomburg v. Currency: The Battle
Over Drug War Money, 68 N.C. L REV. 1064, 1073-74 (1990). Before Mussallam v.
Mussallam, 321 N.C. 504, 364 S.E.2d 364 (1988), "the term 'penal laws' was open to at
least two interpretations." Nesbit, supra, at 1073; see also infra notes 107-16 (discussing
Mussallam and describing the opinion's broad definition of "penal laws"). One view
equated penal laws with criminal laws. See Nesbit, supra, at 1073-74 (citing ROBERT A.
LEFLAR, AMERICAN CoNFLIcrs LAW § 49, at 93 (3d ed. 1977)); see also ROBERT A.
LEFLAR Er AL., A.mERcAN CoNFucrs LAW § 46, at 147 (4th ed. 1986) (stating that in
the area of conflicts law, the term "penal" is "confine[d] ... more strictly to the criminal
law"). The other view defined a "penal law" more broadly as "any law that imposes a
monetary payment for punishment on the violator." Nesbit, supra, at 1074 (citing
Lawrence, supra note 35, at 62); see also Lawrence, supra note 35, at 60-64 (discussing the
meaning of the phrase "penal laws" and arguing that a broad interpretation of its meaning
furthers the policy behind Article IX, Section 7 of ensuring a stable source of revenue for
the state's public schools). In Mussallam, the North Carolina Supreme Court adopted the
broader definition of penal laws. See Mussallam, 321 N.C. at 509, 364 S.E.2d at 367; see
also infra notes 107-16 (discussing the case). However, uncertainty remains about the
phrase's exact meaning. For example, older editions of Black's Law Dictionary defined
"penal laws" broadly as laws "imposing a penalty or punishment ... for some offense of a
public nature or wrong committed against the state," e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1344-45 (3d ed. 1933), whereas newer editions specify that the "[t]erm, in general, refers
to state and federal statutes that define criminal offenses and specify corresponding fines
and punishment," e.g., BLACK's LAw DIcrIONARY 1133 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added).
Some courts in other states have interpreted provisions like Article IX, Section 7 in
their state constitutions as applying only to revenue from criminal fines. For example, the
Indiana Supreme Court held that the provision in the Indiana Constitution earmarking the
revenue from "fines assessed for breaches of the penal laws of the State" for the public
schools, IND. CONST. art. 8, § 2, "ha[d] reference to fines assessed in criminal prosecutions,
and not to penalties recoverable in civil actions." Toledo, St. Louis & Kansas City R.R.
Co. v. Stevenson, 30 N.E. 1082,1082 (Ind. 1892). Also, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled
that the Michigan Constitution's provision allocating the revenue from "[a]ll fines assessed
... for any breach of the penal laws" to the public libraries, MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 9,
applied only to fines for violations "within the category of criminal conduct," and not those
"of the nature of a civil grievance." People ex rel. Fennell v. Common Council, 36 Mch.
186, 189 (1877). However, both the Indiana and Michigan constitutional provisions only
control the disposition of state fines. See IND. CONST. art. 8, § 2; MiCH. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 9. In contrast, Article IX, Section 7 of the North Carolina Constitution controls the
disposition of both fines and penalties. See N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 7. The fact that fines are
commonly associated with criminal offenses and that penalties are identified as civil
remedies may explain these decisions, rather than a narrow interpretation of the phrase
"penal laws." See Board of Educ. v. Town of Henderson, 126 N.C. 689, 691, 36 S.E. 158,
159 (1900) (stating that a fine "is the sentence pronounced by the court for a violation of
the criminal law of the State," whereas a penalty "is recovered in a civil action"). In fact,
in an earlier Indiana Supreme Court decision involving an old provision of the Indiana
state constitution allocating the revenue from fines for state penal law violations to county
seminaries, the court interpreted that provision as applying only to criminal fines because
"the word fines there used is the term commonly employed to designate, not penalties or
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However, the court's 1988 decision in Mussallam v. Mussallam'°
revived its earlier qui tam holdings and adopted a broad
interpretation of Article IX, Section 7. At issue in Mussallam was
the disposition of a forfeited appearance bond in a child custody
case. 108  The Guilford County Board of Education claimed the
proceeds from the forfeited bond pursuant to Article IX, Section 7,
but the wife in the case argued that the bond was intended to
compensate her for her husband's non-appearance."° The supreme
court held for the school board and rejected the wife's argument that
Article IX, Section 7 applied only to criminal penalties, forfeitures,
and fines.11 The court, in an opinion by Justice Meyer, interpreted
Article IX, Section 7 broadly "as identifying two distinct funds for
the public schools." '' The first consists of "the clear proceeds of all
penalties and forfeitures in all cases, regardless of their nature, so
long as they accrue to the state," and the second is "the clear
proceeds of all fines collected for any breach of the criminal laws.""
The court asserted that Article IX, Section 7 clearly embraces the
second category because "[o]ne could not legitimately argue that the
forfeitures for violations of penal statutes, but pecuniary punishments for breaches of the
criminal law." Common Council v. Fairchild, 1 Ind. 315, 318 (1848) (emphasis omitted).
Like Article IX, Section 7, provisions in the Missouri and Nebraska state constitutions
allocate the revenue from state fines and penalties to the local schools. See Mo. CONST.
art. 9, § 7; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 5. Courts in both states have applied those provisions
to a broader class of state assessments than merely fines for criminal violations. See
Skinner v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co., 162 S.W. 237 (Mo. 1913) (applying
Missouri's constitutional provision to a state penalty assessed against railroads for failure
to clear dry vegetation from the sides of the tracks); Sunderland Bros. Co. v. Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 179 N.W. 546 (Neb. 1920) (applying Nebraska's
constitutional provision to a state penalty against railroads for late freight shipment).
107. 321 N.C. 504,364 S.E.2d 364 (1988).
108. See id. at 506, 364 S.E.2d at 365. Hussein Sayyed Mussallam, a Kuwaiti national,
was placed in custody in North Carolina on May 16, 1985, after refusing to tura his
daughter over to his ex-wife, who had legal custody of the child. See id. at 505, 364 S.E.2d
at 364. Mussallam had taken the child to Kuwait and returned alone. See id. Mussallam
petitioned for release, and, on May 17, the Guilford County Superior Court granted his
request on the condition that he post a $25,000 bond and agree to appear at a May 31
hearing with his daughter. See id at 505-06, 364 S.E.2d at 365. He then fled the country.
See id. at 506,364 S.E.2d at 365.
109. See id. at 506-07,364 S.E.2d at 365.
110. See id. at 508-10, 364 S.E.2d at 366-67 (citing Katzenstein and Hodge as evidence
that civil penalties accruing to the state fall under the constitutional provision as well).
The wife claimed that "penal laws" meant criminal laws, and that since the bond forfeiture
had taken place in the course of a civil action, "no penal laws [had] been breached." Id. at
508,364 S.E.2d at 366.
111. Id. at 508-09, 364 S.E.2d at 366. The Craven County Board of Education court
adopted this same interpretation of Article IX, Section 7. See Craven County Bd. of Educ.,
343 N.C. at 90-91, 468 S.E.2d at 52.
112. Mussallam, 321 N.C. at 509,364 S.E.2d at 366.
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violation of a criminal law is not a 'breach of the penal laws.' ,,13 The
first category includes all "monetary payments ... [that] accrue to
the state regardless of whether the legislation labels the payment a
penalty, forfeiture or fine or whether the proceeding is civil or
criminal.""1 4 However, the court articulated a clear limitation on the
types of payments falling within Article IX, Section 7: it applies only
to those payments that are "punitive rather than remedial in nature"
and that are "intended to penalize the wrongdoer rather than
compensate a particular party.' 'lu The court concluded that because
the bond in this case was "designed to guarantee the husband's
appearance before the court" and to function "as a penalty in the
event of his failure to appear as ordered," it constituted a fine,
penalty, or forfeiture within the meaning of Article IX, Section 7,
and the school board was entitled to it."6
The court further considered the impact of Article IX, Section 7
on state civil penalties in a pair of cases involving state forfeitures
under North Carolina's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO"). 7 In the first case, State ex rel.
Thornburg v. Currency,"' the court avoided the question of whether
113. Id. at 509,364 S.E.2d at 366-67.
114. Id. at 509, 364 S.E.2d at 367 (citing Lawrence, supra note 35, at 82). The court
clearly adopted Professor Lawrence's broad definition of "penal laws." See Nesbit, supra
note 106, at 1075.
115. Mussallam, 321 N.C. at 509, 364 S.E.2d at 367. The key determination is "the
nature of the penalty or forfeiture, i.e., whether it was designed to penalize the wrongdoer
or to compensate a particular party." Id. at 510,364 S.E.2d at 367.
116. Id. Justice Frye, joined by Chief Justice Exum, disagreed with this conclusion,
arguing that the intent of the bond was to compensate the wife "frustrated in her efforts to
secure compliance with the court orders giving her physical custody of the child," and that
therefore the proceeds from the forfeited bond should accrue to her. Id. at 511-12, 364
S.E.2d at 368 (Frye, J., dissenting).
117. The state RICO Act, codified in Chapter 75) of the North Carolina General
Statutes, aims to "deter organized unlawful activity" and to "restore [to] the general
economy of the State all of the proceeds, money, profits, and property ... which is owned,
used or acquired through organized unlawful activity." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75D-2(b)
(1990). The Act authorizes the state to bring in rem forfeiture proceedings against any
property used in the course of or derived from organized criminal activity, such as drug
trafficking or money laundering. See id § 75D-5; see also id. § 75D-4(a) (defining the
criminal activity that RICO covers). See generally Joseph Robert Thornton, Note, North
Carolina RICO: A Critical Analysis and User's Guide, 66 N.C. L REV. 445 (1988)
(describing and critiquing the North Carolina RICO law).
118. 324 N.C. 276, 378 S.E.2d 1 (1989). In Currency, the state filed a forfeiture claim
under the RICO Act against money, a car, and miscellaneous weapons seized from an
accused drug trafficker. See id. at 278, 378 S.E.2d at 2. Pursuant to the Act, the City of
Graham, in which the accused had been arrested, requested that the proceeds be paid to its
police department. See id at 278-79, 378 S.E.2d at 2. However, the Alamance County
Board of Education intervened, claiming that it was the rightful recipient of the
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Article IX, Section 7 rendered the state RICO Act
unconstitutional.1 9 Instead, the court ruled that because the accused
was charged under the state's Controlled Substances Act,' its
forfeiture provisions "t[ook] precedence over the RICO Act
forfeiture provisions. '  Since the Controlled Substances Act
expressly allocated forfeitures under the Act to the county school
fund,' the court ruled in favor of the Alamance County Board of
Education."n
By altogether avoiding the apparent conflict between RICO and
Article IX, Section 7, the Currency court left many issues unresolved,
including whether the broadened interpretation of Article IX,
Section 7 in Mussallam applied to RICO forfeitures, and whether the
Mussallam interpretation applied to other state civil statutes besides
the RICO Act. 4 The court answered at least the first of these
questions four years later in State ex rel. Thornburg v. House &
Lot.'" Like Currency, House & Lot concerned a forfeiture under the
North Carolina RICO Act. 6  The state seized and initiated
forfeiture proceedings against a house in Bridgeton, North Carolina
where drug sales took place.12 The New Bern-Craven County Board
of Education intervened, asserting that Article IX, Section 7 entitled
it to receive the forfeiture proceeds.m The supreme court agreed,
forfeiture's proceeds under Article IX, Section 7. See id. at 278,378 S.E.2d at 2.
119. See i. at 283,378 S.E.2d at 4 ("We express no opinion as to the State's contention
that RICO forfeitures are in the nature of restitution or as to the constitutional validity of
the RICO forfeiture provisions.").
120. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-86 to -113.8 (1993). The Controlled Substances Act
establishes criminal penalties for illegally manufacturing or selling a variety of drugs. See
id. § 90-95; see also id. §§ 90-89 to -94 (listing different categories of prohibited
substances). These penalties include forfeiture of the banned substances, as well as any
property used to manufacture or transport illegal drugs. See id. § 90-112.
121. Currency, 324 N.C. at 284, 378 S.E.2d at 5. According to the court, because the
RICO Act stipulates that its forfeiture provisions are "cumulative, supplemental and not
exclusive," but rather "are in addition to the fines, penalties and forfeitures" imposed by a
criminal conviction, the forfeiture provisions of the Controlled Substances Act, under
which the accused was criminally charged, control. Id. at 284, 378 S.E.2d at 5 (emphasis
omitted) (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75D-10 (1990)).
122. See § 90-112(dl) (stating that "the law-enforcement agency having custody of
money that is forfeited pursuant to this section shall pay it to the treasurer ... to be used
for the school fund of the county in which the money was seized").
123. See Currency, 324 N.C. at 284-85,378 S.E.2d at 5-6.
124. See Nesbit, supra note 106, at 1071. Nesbit identified a third unresolved question:
whether the state's RICO Act was constitutional. See id.
125. 334 N.C. 290,432 S.E.2d 684 (1993).
126. See id. at 291, 432 S.E.2d at 684.
127. See id.
128. See id.
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applying Mussallam's interpretation of Article IX, Section 7 to
RICO forfeitures." Based on Mussallam, the court stated that
"whenever the proceeds resulting from a forfeiture [are] required to
be paid to the State, Article IX, Section 7, require[s] that they be
paid to the public school fund.""0 Since the RICO Act requires that
the proceeds from the sale of forfeited property be paid to the State
Treasurer, the court concluded that Article IX, Section 7 requires
that those proceeds go to the county school fund.f1 Curiously, in his
opinion for the court, Chief Justice Exum did not address the
question of whether RICO forfeitures are remedial and therefore
excluded from Article IX, Section 7 under Mussallam,32 despite the
fact that he recognized the punitive-remedial distinction in earlier
opinions' and acknowledged that the state may be the recipient of
remedial penalties.'
Craven County Board of Education built on the court's holdings
in Mussallam and House & Lot and expanded Article IX, Section 7's
control over the disposition of state civil penalties, impacting the
jurisprudence surrounding the provision in three significant ways.
First, it answered the question that both Currency and House & Lot
left unresolved: whether Article IX, Section 7 applies to state civil
penalties other than those covered by the RICO Act's forfeiture
provisions. Craven County Board of Education clearly holds that the
state does have to transfer to the county school fund the revenue
129. See id. at 294-95,432 S.E.2d at 686-87.
130. Id. at 294,432 S.E.2d at 686.
131. See id. at 295, 432 S.E.2d at 687.
132. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Meyer, the author of the Mussallam opinion,
asserted:
Forfeitures ordered and distributed pursuant to the RICO Act are remedial in
nature in that they are intended to compensate the state, local government
agencies, and other persons for losses incurred due to racketeering activity.
Therefore, RICO forfeitures are not penal in nature, and their distribution is not
controlled by Article IX, Section 7.
Id. at 296, 432 S.E.2d.at 687 (Meyer, J., dissenting); see also supra note 115 and
accompanying text (describing Mussallam's punitive-remedial distinction).
133. See Mussallam v. Mussallam, 321 N.C. 504, 510-12, 364 S.E.2d 364, 367-68 (1988)
(Frye, J., dissenting) (joined by Chief Justice Exum) (arguing that a forfeited appearance
bond in a child custody case is intended to compensate the aggrieved wife, not punish the
husband for failing to appear); see also supra note 116 (discussing the Mussallam dissent).
134. See Shore v. Edmisten, 290 N.C. 628, 633-34, 227 S.E.2d 553, 559 (1976) (holding
that "[a] state or a local agency can be the recipient of restitution"). Although Shore
involved the proper disposition of criminal fines, as opposed to civil penalties, restitution is
generally regarded as a civil remedy. See iA at 633, 227 S.E.2d at 559 (stating that
restitution is "[o]rdinarily ... recovered in a civil action"). Thus, presumably a state or
local agency may be the recipient of a civil restitutionary payment as well.
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from civil penalties such as assessments for violations of
environmental regulations." This result is not very surprising,
considering early interpretations of Article IX, Section 7, as well as
the more recent tendency of the court to apply the provision broadly.
The court's qui tam decision established that Article IX, Section 7
applied to civil penalties accruing to the state."6 Mussallam
reaffirmed these holdings, and articulated a broad interpretation of
Article IX, Section 7, defining "penal laws" as not merely criminal
laws, but any laws "that impose a monetary payment for their
violation," regardless of "whether the proceeding is civil or
criminal.'3 7  The court has adopted the Mussallam definition in
every subsequent case concerning Article IX, Section 7."s
The second significant aspect of Craven County Board of
Education is the court's holding that Article IX, Section 7 applies not
only to the proceeds from civil penalties, but also to the proceeds
from settlement payments for state-assessed penalties or fines. 9
Article IX, Section 7 now controls the disposition of these payments
even if the parties to the settlement agreement stipulate that the
payment is not to be construed as a fine, penalty, or forfeiture.'
135. See Craven County Bd. Of Educ., 343 N.C. at 91, 468 S.E.2d at 52 (holding that
"monies ... paid [to the state] because of a civil penalty" fall under Article IX, Section 7).
136. See, e.g., State ex rel. Hodge v. Marietta & N. Ga. R.R. Co., 108 N.C. 24, 26, 12
S.E. 1041, 1041 (1891) (holding that a penalty for a railroad company's failure to file an
annual report "to be sued for in the name of the state" accrued to the state and Article IX,
Section 7 "devotes such penalties.., to the [county school fund]").
137. Mussallam, 321 N.C. at 509, 364 S.E.2d at 367. But see supra note 106 (discussing
alternative definitions of "penal laws").
138. See Craven County Bd. of Educ., 343 N.C. at 90-91, 468 S.E.2d at 52 (citing the
Mussallam definition as quoted in House & Lot); State ex rel. Thornburg v. House & Lot,
334 N.C. 290, 294, 432 S.E.2d 684, 686 (1993) (citing the Mussallam definition); State ex
rel. Thornburg v. Currency, 324 N.C. 276, 283, 378 S.E.2d 1, 4-5 (1989) (citing the
Mussallam definition).
139. See Craven County Bd. Of Educ., 343 N.C. at 92, 468 S.E.2d at 53 ("[I]t is not
determinative that the monies were collected by virtue of a settlement agreement.").
North Carolina has a well-established policy favoring informal settlement of
administrative disputes. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-22 (1995) ("It is the policy of this
State that any dispute between an agency and another person... should be settled through
informal procedures."). The judicial system, in general, encourages settlements because
they ease the burden on the courts, reduce the risk and expense of litigation, and reach a
more mutually-satisfying result for the litigants. See Margaret Meriwether Cordray,
Settlement Agreements and the Supreme Court, 48 HASTINGS UJ. 9, 36-37 (1996). But see
id., passim (indicating that three recent United States Supreme Court decisions-
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co., 511 U.S. 375 (1994), Digital Equipment Corp. v.
Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863 (1994), and United States Bancorp Mortgage Co. v.
Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18 (1994)-do not seem to support this policy).
140. See Craven County Bd. of Educ, 343 N.C. at 91-92, 468 S.E.2d at 53 ("[Mlt is not
determinative ... that [DEHNR] and Weyerhaeuser stated that the payment not be
22711997]
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This holding is consistent with the court's tendency in recent
opinions to disregard the formal labels placed by judges or the
legislature on different payments. For example, in Shore, the court
held that a judge's label on a fine imposed for a violation of state
criminal law does not determine whether the payment constitutes a
fine or restitution.14" ' Likewise, in Cauble, the court stated that it is
the nature of an offense that determines whether it is civil or
criminal, not whether the state labels its sanction a fine or a
penalty.'42 Finally, in Mussallam, the court ruled that whether a
payment is punitive or remedial does not depend on what the
legislature calls it, but rather whether it is intended to punish the
wrongdoer or to compensate the injured party.43
The third and most significant ramification of Craven County
Board of Education is its impact on the Mussallam distinction
between punitive and remedial civil payments. According to
Mussallam, while punitive civil payments-meant to punish a
wrongdoer for some violation of state law-must go to the county
school fund, remedial payments-meant to compensate an injured
party-do not.' Substantial portions of both the Appellants' and
Appellee's briefs in Craven County Board of Education focused on
the question of whether Weyerhaeuser's payment to DEHNR was
punitive or remedial.' However, as in House & Lot, 4 the court's
opinion in Craven County Board of Education did not address the
issue. Its failure to do so leaves its intent unclear and subjects the
opinion to two alternative interpretations: (1) the punitive-remedial
distinction applies to state civil penalties, but the penalty in this case
construed as a penalty.").
141. See Shore v. Edmisten, 290 N.C. 628, 633, 227 S.E.2d 553, 558 (1976) ("In
determining whether a given payment is a fine or restitution, the label given by the judge
(or the legislature) is not determinative.").
142. See Cauble v. City of Asheville, 301 N.C. 340, 344, 271 S.E.2d 258, 260 (1980)
("mT1he label attached to the money does not control."). Cauble also held that the fact that
a fine is voluntarily paid does not determine whether it is a criminal or civil assessment.
See ia ("The crux of the distinction lies in the nature of the offense committed, and not in
the method employed by the municipality to collect fines for commission of the offense."
(emphasis omitted)).
143. See Mussallam v. Mussallam, 321 N.C. 504, 509, 364 S.E.2d 364, 367 (1988)
(stating that monetary payments are punitive if they are "penal in nature ... regardless of
whether the legislation labels the payment a penalty, forfeiture or fine or whether the
proceeding is civil or criminal").
144. See iU
145. See Defendants-Appellants' Brief at 20-27, Craven County Bd. of Educ. (No.
365PA95); Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief at 19-24.
146. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text (discussing the opinion's failure to
address the punitive-remedial distinction).
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was punitive; or (2) the punitive-remedial distinction is entirely
inapplicable to state civil penalties.47
If the court's intent was merely to hold that the penalty in
Craven County Board of Education was punitive, the case establishes
a stringent standard for proving that a penalty is remedial. The
Appellants' brief presented a great deal of evidence suggesting that
the penalty assessed against Weyerhaeuser was remedial, its purpose
being to compensate the state for damage to the environment
because of the pulp mill's air pollution violations.'" According to
the brief, a number of the statutory factors that DEHNR must
consider when setting a penalty "reflect a remedial purpose."'4
These factors include:
[T]he degree and extent of the harm to the natural
resources of the State, to the public health, or private
property resulting from the violation; the duration and
gravity of the violation; the effect on air quality; the cost of
rectifying the damage; and, the cost to the State of the
enforcement action.
The Appellants' Brief also cited the expressed intent of the General
Assembly in establishing air and water pollution standards as
147. The School Board actually presented each of these interpretations as alternative
arguments, see Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief at 19-24, Craven County BL of Educ. (No.
365PA95), but the court never indicated which argument motivated its decision. The
court's opinion contains indications from which either conclusion may be drawn. In its
statement of the facts of the case, the court pointed out that DEHNR's assessment against
Weyerhaeuser contained "no findings or conclusions as to any specific damage to the
environment," Craven County Bd of Educ, 343 N.C. at 88, 468 S.E.2d at 51, indicating
that perhaps it concluded that Weyerhaeuser's penalty was not remedial. On the other
hand, the fact that the opinion's author, Justice Frye, recognized the punitive-remedial
distinction in his dissent in Mussallam, see Mussallam, 321 N.C. at 510-12, 364 S.E.2d at
367-68 (Frye, J., dissenting), yet failed to address the issue in Craven County Board of
Education, indicates that the opinion's intent may have been to render the punitive-
remedial distinction inapplicable to state civil penalties.
148. On the other hand, the Appellee's Brief presented counter-evidence that the
penalty was punitive. See Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief at 22-24, Craven County B& of Educ.
(No. 365PA95). For example, the original penalty assessment against Weyerhaeuser
contained neither an estimate of the damage to the environment caused by the pulp mill's
emissions, nor any mention of the cost of remedial actions, and DEHNR spent none of the
settlement payment on remedial efforts. See id at 22. Also, in the settlement agreement,
Weyerhaeuser denied that any actual harm to the environment occurred. See iU Finally,
the Appellee's Brief noted that the General Statutes empower DEHNR to collect cleanup
costs from violators under a separate provision than the one authorizing civil penalties.
See id. at 23; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.3(a)(9) (1996) (authorizing state
assessments for remedial costs).
149. Defendants-Appellants' Brief at 26, Craven County Bd. of Educ. (No. 365PA95).
150. Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-282.1(b) (1993)).
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evidence of the remedial nature of the penalties for violations of
those standards:
"Standards of water and air purity shall be designed to
protect public health, to prevent injury to plant and animal
life, to prevent damage to public and private property, to
ensure continued enjoyment of the natural attractions of
the state, to encourage the expansion of employment
opportunities, to provide a permanent foundation for
healthy industrial development and to secure for the people
of North Carolina, now and in the future, the beneficial
uses of these great natural resources."'
The brief further noted that the settlement agreement between
DEHNR and Weyerhaeuser stated not only that the payment did not
constitute a fine, penalty, or forfeiture, but also that its "'sole
purpose'" was to redress "'any harm or risk, if any, to the
environment or the public health of the people of North Carolina,
which may have resulted from any action or omission by
[Weyerhaeuser].' "" Finally, the brief cited an affidavit from the
Director of DEM asserting that "'a significant part of the purpose
behind any assessment is to compensate the State for harm to its
natural resources and environmental programs.' "m
The alternative interpretation of Craven County Board of
Education is that the court intended to render the punitive-remedial
distinction inapplicable to state civil penalties. If so, the decision
constitutes a substantial deviation from the trend in the court's other
recent decisions.' In Mussallam, the aggrieved party who would
151. Id. (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-211 (1996)).
152. Id. at 21 (emphasis omitted) (quoting the settlement agreement). But see supra
notes 32-33, 83-85, 101-02, 143 and accompanying text (describing the court's opinion,
expressed in a number of cases, that the characterization of a payment is not
determinative of its nature).
153. Defendants-Appellants' Brief at 4, Craven County Bd. of Educ. (No. 365PA95)
(quoting Affidavit of Preston Howard, Director of DEM).
154. However, rejection of the punitive-remedial distinction would be consistent with
criticism of the United States Supreme Court's use of the same distinction to differentiate
between civil and criminal penalties. See generally J. Morris Clark, Civil and Criminal
Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L REV. 379
(1976) (discussing the Supreme Court's efforts to differentiate between civil and criminal
sanctions). The Supreme Court labels as a criminal sanction any penalty it regards as
serving primarily a punitive purpose. For example, in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886), the Court held that compelling a merchant to produce his business records during a
forfeiture proceeding stemming from an alleged customs violation invoked Fourth and
Fifth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures and the
compulsion of a defendant to be a witness against himself. See id. at 633-35, 638. The
Court added that both the law authorizing such compelled production of records and the
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have received the proceeds from the forfeited appearance bond was
a private individual.' The Mussallam court did not indicate whether
the state, as an aggrieved party, may receive remedial payments that
it does not have to pay over to the county school fund. However, the
Shore opinion supports this conclusion. In Shore, the court
distinguished between fines and restitutionary payments in the
criminal context, and held that payments constituting restitution did
not have to be paid over to the county school fund. 6 Furthermore,
the court said that public agencies, like localities or the state, may be
the recipients of restitution.' Since restitution is generally a civil
remedy," under Shore's reasoning it would seem that state agencies
could be the recipients of remedial payments that would not have to
compelled production itself were unconstitutional violations of those protections. See id.
On the other hand, any penalty serving primarily a remedial purpose constitutes a civil,
rather than a criminal sanction. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S.
537, 549, 551-52 (1943) (holding that a penalty for defrauding the government through
collusive bidding on government contracts was a civil sanction intended to compensate the
government, rather than to penalize the fraudulent act). Critics of this formalistic
approach point to the difficulty of identifying whether a sanction's purpose is primarily
punitive or remedial. See, e.g., Mary K. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil
Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the
Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HAsT]NGS IJ. 1325, 1325 (1991) (noting the "rapidly
accelerating tendency for the government to punish antisocial behavior with civil remedies
such as injunctions, forfeitures, restitution, and civil fines"); Clark, supra, at 385-91
(highlighting the arbitrariness with which the Court has labeled penalties civil or criminal
in past cases). Additionally, critics note the multiple purposes served by any penalty. See,
e.g., Cheh, supra, at 1354 (asserting that both criminal and civil sanctions "serve many of
the same objectives, including compensation, deterrence, rehabilitation, treatment and
protection, coercion to perform specific acts, and retribution"). Craven County Board of
Education is consistent with this line of thinking if the decision's intent was to reject the
punitive-remedial distinction because the purpose of every state penalty, to a greater or
lesser degree, is both punitive and remedial. Note, however, that recent United States
Supreme Court decisions indicate a desire to maintain the formal distinction between civil
and criminal remedies. See, e.g., United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2149 (1996)
(holding that forfeiture is not a criminal punishment, but rather a civil remedial action);
see also Joi Elizabeth Peake, Note, Bound by the Sins of Anothen Civil Forfeiture and the
Lack of Constitutional Protection for Innocent Owners in Bennis v. Michigan, 75 N.C. L
REV. 662, 669-79 (1997) (discussing the line of Supreme Court cases dealing with the use
of forfeiture in conjunction with criminal sanctions). The North Carolina Supreme Court's
rejection of the formal punitive-remedial distinction would also be consistent with its
recent opinions rejecting formal distinctions between civil and criminal sanctions, and
between fines and penalties. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
155. See Mussallam v. Mussallam, 321 N.C. 504,506-07,364 S.E.2d 364,365 (1988).
156. See Shore v. Edmisten, 290 N.C. 628,632,227 S.E.2d 553,558 (1976) ("Restitution
goes to the aggrieved party. A fine must go, however, to the county for the use of the
public schools.").
157. See id. at 633-34,227 S.E.2d at 559 ("A state or a local agency can be the recipient
of restitution .... ).
158. See id. ("Ordinarily [restitution is] ... recovered in a civil action.").
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be paid to the county school fund.
Regardless of which interpretation of the decision's impact on
the remedial-punitive distinction is correct, Craven County Board of
Education has significant practical implications for the state and its
agencies. The state must now transfer most, if not all, of the revenue
it collects from penalties assessed for violations of state regulations
to the county school fund. The General Statutes authorize over 250
such penalties, 9 and the annual revenue they generate for the state
is significant.' 6° Before Craven County Board of Education, the state
deposited much of the revenue from these civil assessments in the
General Fund.'61 However, the General Assembly earmarked the
revenue from many of these penalties for particular programs. For
example, penalties for violations of state solid waste regulations
finance the Emergency Response Fund, which supports emergency
cleanups of hazardous waste."' The revenue from state penalties for
violations of adult care or nursing home standards funds state
support for fiancially-threatened nursing homes.' The
Department of Transportation supports its activities with the
revenue from penalties it assesses for violations of state
159. Interview with W. Dale Talbert, Special Deputy Attorney General, Office of the
Attorney General, North Carolina Department of Justice, in Raleigh, N.C. (Feb. 7, 1997)
[hereinafter Talbert Interview]. These penalties include: Department of Commerce
penalties for violations of the state ABC laws, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-104 (1995);
Department of Insurance penalties for violations of state insurance regulations, see id.
§ 58-2-70 (1994); Department of Labor penalties for violations of state workplace safety
laws, see id § 95-138 (1993); Department of Revenue penalties for late income tax filings,
see id. § 105-163.013 (1995); DEHNR penalties for violations of air and water pollution
standards, see id. § 143-215.6A (1996) (water); iU § 143-215.114A (air); and Department
of Agriculture penalties for violations of the state's pesticide laws, see id. § 143-469.
160. The exact amount of revenue to which the Craven County Board of Education
decision applies is unclear. Officials in the North Carolina Attorney General's Office
maintain that an additional $5 million per year will accrue to the county school fund,
Talbert Interview, supra note 159, whereas representatives of the North Carolina School
Boards Association believe that nearly $50 million must now go to the fund, Telephone
Interview with Ann McColl, General Counsel, North Carolina School Boards Association
(Apr. 10,1997) [hereinafter McColl Interview].
161. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-2-70 (1989) (specifying that penalties for violations
of state insurance regulations go to the General Fund); id. § 95-138 (specifying that
penalties for state OSHA violations go to the General Fund); id § 105-248 (1995)
(specifying that late fees for the state income tax go to the General Fund).
162. See id. § 130A-306 (1995); see also id. § 130A-22 (authorizing the solid waste
penalties). In Fiscal Year 1995-96, this revenue totaled $450,000, nearly the entire
$500,000 Emergency Response Fund. Talbert Interview, supra note 159.
163. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-242 (1994); see also iU § 131D-34 (1995) (setting
penalties for violations of adult care home standards); id. § 131E-129 (setting penalties for
violations of nursing home standards). In Fiscal Year 1995-96, these penalties accounted
for over $65,000. Talbert Interview, supra note 159.
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transportation regulations.'" Finally, the Employment Security
Commission funds the state unemployment assistance program with
revenue from penalties assessed against employers failing to pay
their portion of the state unemployment tax.'" If the civil penalties
funding these and other programs are now subject to Article IX,
Section 7, the General Assembly will have to tap into alternative
sources of revenue, such as taxes or fees, or reduce spending in other
areas to maintain the programs' current funding levels and to
compensate for the loss of revenue to the General Fund. It seems
logical for the legislature to reduce state expenditures on public
education by an amount equal to the new revenue flowing into the
county school fund, but it may be politically difficult for legislators to
support cuts in education spending.
Like some of the Article IX, Section 7 decisions before it,
Craven County Board of Education raises a number of questions."
The first and most significant question is the viability of the punitive-
remedial distinction. It is unclear whether the court merely intended
to hold that the DEHNR penalty at issue was not remedial, or
whether it intended to reject Mussallam's punitive-remedial
distinction for state civil penalties altogether.67  A second
unanswered question involves the proper method for distributing the
revenue accruing to the county school fund from state fines,
penalties, and forfeiture." One possibility is that the state transfer
the revenue from a given penalty to the school board for the county
in which the violation generating the penalty took place.'69 However,
such a procedure will be difficult to follow in the case of a violation
164. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-16 (1993) ("[A]I funds and property collected by the
Department of Transportation shall be paid or converted into the State Highway Fund.");
see also id. § 136-18 (laying out the Department's responsibilities). The Department
collected nearly $8 million in penalty revenue in Fiscal Year 1995-96. Talbert Interview,
supra note 159.
165. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-5 (1995) (establishing the Employment Security
Administration Fund); see also i § 96-10 (authorizing late tax payment fees). In Fiscal
Year 1995-96, the Commission received over $1.5 million in revenue from these penalties.
Talbert Interview, supra note 159.
166. Representatives from the North Carolina Attorney General's Office and the
North Carolina School Boards Association are negotiating resolutions to these issues and
attempting to agree on a list of the state penalties that agencies must now deposit in the
county school fund. McColl Interview, supra note 160; Talbert Interview, supra note 159.
167. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
168. McColl Interview, supra note 160; Talbert Interview, supra note 159.
169. McColl Interview, supra note 160; Talbert Interview, supra note 159; cf. In re
Dunlap, 66 N.C. App. 152, 155, 310 S.E.2d 415, 417 (1984) (holding that the county in
which the crime took place, rather than the county in which the defendant failed to appear
for trial, was entitled to the revenue from a forfeited bail bond).
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that occurs in one county but has effects in another, or in the case of
one party that commits numerous violations across the state.17 To
eliminate the confusion from violations like these that cannot be
easily pinpointed to an exact location, the state is considering a pro
rata distribution of the proceeds in the county school fund. 7' Finally,
Craven County Board of Education raises the question of what role
school boards may play in administrative settlement negotiations."
Under the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act, a party
"interested in a contested case" may intervene in an administrative
hearing at the administrative law judge's discretion or pursuant to
Rule 24 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure" Rule 24
grants a party the right to intervene
[w]hen the applicant claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action
and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may
as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect
that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately
represented by existing parties.'
School boards may claim that as the eventual recipients of the
revenue from state civil penalties, they have an interest sufficient to
allow them to intervene in administrative hearings involving penalty
assessments, and thus they ought to be permitted to participate in
administrative settlement negotiations as well.' 5 However, their
participation might significantly complicate the negotiation process. 
17
In any event, these three unresolved questions in the wake of Craven
County Board of Education may require further judicial resolution.
Craven County Board of Education demonstrates the North
Carolina Supreme Court's desire to interpret Article IX, Section 7 of
the state constitution broadly. The decision expands the funds to
which that provision applies by including the revenue from
numerous state civil penalties, as well as settlement payments by
those charged with violating state regulations. Furthermore, the
170. McColl Interview, supra note 160; Talbert Interview, supra note 159.
171. McColl Interview, supra note 160; Talbert Interview, supra note 159.
172. McColl Interview, supra note 160; Talbert Interview, supra note 159.
173. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-23(d) (1995).
174. N.C. IL CIrv. P. 24(a)(2). A party may also intervene by right "[w]hen a statute
confers an unconditional right to intervene." Id. 24(a)(1).
175. Cf. Harrington v. Overcash, 61 N.C. App. 742, 744, 301 S.E.2d 528, 529 (1983)
(holding that "'[o]nce the intervenor becomes a party, he should be a party for all
purposes'" (quoting W. SHUFORD, N.C. CWvM PRACiCE AND PROCEDURE § 24-11, at
212 (1973))).
176. Talbert Interview, supra note 159.
2278 [Vol. 75
COUNTY SCHOOL FUND
decision may seriously curtail, if not eliminate, the state's ability to
collect remedial payments from those same violators. Yet the court's
holding arguably ignored fiscal reality in North Carolina today. The
framers of Article IX, Section 7 created the county school fund at a
time when state funding for public schools was insufficient and the
state legislature was prone to divert educational resources to
noneducational purposes.'" Today, North Carolina devotes nearly
forty-percent of its annual budget to education spending. 8  The
additional revenue that Craven County Board of Education may
generate for the public schools'79 seems insignificant in comparison to
the $4 billion that the state already allocates every year to
education." Yet that revenue provides a substantial amount of
support to other important state programs.8 that may struggle to find
support from other sources.
On the other hand, because supporting public education has
always been an important state goal, perhaps a broad reading of
Article IX, Section 7 is appropriate. As one Chief Justice stated in
an early interpretation of Article IX, Section 7: "[G]eneral
education and a general system of public instruction ... [is] an
important question of State policy."'1' Craven County Board of
Education reinforces the importance of state-supported education
and seems to be consistent with the intent of the framers of Article
IX, Section 7, who wanted to secure a substantial and stable source
of revenue for the state's schools.' Even if Article IX, Section 7
clashes with modem fiscal reality, perhaps the proper means of
rectifying the situation is not through "judicial interpretation," but
by "straightforward amendment of the [c]onstitution."' 8 It would
177. See Lawrence, supra note 35, at 57-60 (describing the motivations behind Article
IX, Section 7).
178. See Ferrell, supra note 4, at 353 tbl.2.
179. See supra note 160.
180. See Ferrell, supra note 4, at 353 tbl.2.
181. See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text (providing examples of some of
these programs).
182. Sutton v. Phillips, 116 N.C. 502, 511, 21 S.E. 968, 970 (1895) (Faircloth, CJ.,
dissenting) (arguing that Article IX, Section 7 should apply to all penalties collected under
state law, not just those accruing to the state).
183. See Lawrence, supra note 35, at 58-60.
184. Lawrence, supra note 35, at 83 (acknowledging that Article IX, Section 7 may now
be "a constitutional anachronism"). At least four other states have had constitutional
provisions similar to Article IX, Section 7 but have removed them by repeal, amendment,
or supercession: Arkansas, compare ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 4 (allocating the
proceeds from state fines, penalties, and forfeitures to the public school fund), with ARK.
CONST. art. 14, § 2 (establishing the public school fund without enumerating any revenue
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then be up to the citizens of North Carolina and their elected
representatives to decide how best to allocate "the clear proceeds of
all penalties and forfeitures and of all fines collected in the several
counties for any breach of the penal laws of the State."1
SCOTr DOUGLAS BAUER
sources); Florida, compare FRA. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 4 (allocating the proceeds
from state fines and forfeitures to the common school fund), and FLA. CONST. of 1885, art.
12, § 9 (amended 1926) (allocating the proceeds from state fines to the county school
fund), with FLA. CONST. art. 9, § 6 (creating the state school fund without enumerating any
revenue sources); Iowa, compare IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. 9, § 4 (allocating the proceeds
from state fines to support the county schools), with IOWA CONST. art. 9, 2nd, § 4
(repealed 1974) (allocating, before repeal, the proceeds from state fines to support public
schools and libraries); Kansas, see KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (amended 1966) (removing, as
amended, the proceeds from state fines as revenue supporting the public schools).
185. N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 7.
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The King Can Do No Wrong.1 How the Harter v. Vernon
Court Ignored Confusing Precedent and Simplified the
Analysis Required to Determine Eleventh Amendment
Immunity
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.",2  The
Amendment was ratified in response to Chisholm v. Georgia,3 in
which the Supreme Court held that a South Carolina plaintiff could
sue the state of Georgia in federal court for repayment of a
Revolutionary War debt.4 The Court, in holding that Georgia was
1. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *246. This phrase is the foundation of
sovereign immunity. It was derived from English constitutional history from "the simple
fact of practical politics that the king could not be made to answer in his own courts."
JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICiAL POwER OF THE UNrTED STATES: THE ELEvENTH
AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 40 (1987); see also, e.g., Louis L Jaffe, Suits
Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunihy, 77 HARV. L REv. 1, 3-4 (1963)
(stating that there are two origins of sovereign immunity: first, because the king is the law,
he is immune from suit; second, the king, as the physical manifestation of justice, is
incapable of violating the law-he literally can do no wrong); Jennifer L Long, Note, How
to Sue the President: A Proposal for Legislation Establishing the Extent of Presidential
Immunity, 30 VAL. U. L REV. 284, 292 n.62 (1995) ("The origin of sovereign immunity
dates to ancient times, when it was believed that allowing the King to be sued in his courts
was a contradiction to the sovereignty of the King." (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 895A introductory note (1979))). In the United States, however, governmental
officials generally are as personally responsible for their unjustified acts as any other
private citizens. See R.J. Gray, Private Wrongs of Public Servants, 47 CAL. L REV. 303,
305 (1959).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. For an extensive summary of the Eleventh Amendment
and the principle of sovereign immunity, see 12 JAMES WMN MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACrICE § 123.03 (3d ed. 1997); 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT Er AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3524 (2d ed. 1984). For an excellent historical
account of the Amendment from Chisholm v. Georgia through the late twentieth century,
see ORTH, supra note 1. See also CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (1972) (discussing the ratification of the Amendment and the
early Supreme Court interpretation).
3. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
4. See i at 419. Chisholm has been the subject of much scholarly analysis. See, e.g.,
1 JULIUS GOEBELS, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801723-40 (1971); JACOBS, supra note 2, at 46-74;
ORTH, supra note 1, at 12-29; Akhil Reid Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE
L.J. 1425, 1467-73 (1987); Stewart A. Baker, Federalism and the Eleventh Amendment, 48
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not entitled to immunity, relied on Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution, which did not expressly preclude states from being
sued in federal court.5 Chisholm's unpopularity was widespread and
U. CoLO. L REV. 139, 141-43 (1977); William A. letcher, A Historical Interpretation of
the Eleventh Amendment A Narrow Construction of an Affimative Grant of Jurisdiction
Rather Than a Prohibition Against It, 35 STAN. L REV. 1033, 1045-63 (1983); Doyle
Mathis, The Eleventh Amendment Adoption and Interpretation, 2 GA. L REV. 207 passim
(1968); see also infra note 188 and accompanying text (discussing the intent of Congress
when enacting the Eleventh Amendment).
5. Article M of the Constitution provides: "The judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States
... to Controversies ... between a State and Citizens of another State ... and between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or subjects." U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 2, cL. 1.
Clause 2 further states: "In all Cases ... in which a State shall be a Party, the
Supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned,
the Supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such
Exceptions... as Congress shall make." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, c. 2.
The four justices who wrote opinions for the Chisholm majority relied exclusively on
the Constitution; however, they each found different reasons to support the holding. See
ORTH, supra note 1, at 14-18. Justice Blair wrote merely that citizens of other states could
sue a state in federal court. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 450-53 (Blair, J.). Justice
Cushing agreed and added that an action in assumpsit against a state is included in
constitutional controversies. See id. at 469 (Cushing, J.).
Justice Wilson believed that a state was an "artificial person." Id. at 455 (Wilson, J.).
While a state had certain rights, such as acquiring property, incurring debts, and entering
into contracts, he emphasized that "in truth and nature, those, who think and speak, and
act, are men." Id. at 455-56. (Wilson, J.). Next, Justice Wilson explained that man is
amenable to the courts only because "he binds himself" by the law. See i. at 456 (Wilson,
J.). "If one free man, an original sovereign, may do all this; why may not an aggregate of
free men [the state] ... do this likewise?" Id. (Wilson, J.). He concluded that it could, and
that sovereign immunity does not exist under the Constitution. See iU at 456, 466 (Wilson,
J.).
Chief Justice Jay noted that in the United States, there are no subjects, but rather
citizens, and each such citizen is an equal. See iU at 472 (Jay, CJ.). Hence, any citizen
could sue another, or where necessary could sue thousands of his equals by suing the city
of which they are members. See id. (Jay, CJ.). This being true, Chief Justice Jay could see
no reason why a citizen could not sue a larger collection of citizens through their state. See
id. at 472-73 (Jay, CJ.).
Justice Iredell was the lone dissenter. See id. at 429 (Iredell, J., dissenting). He
explained that the jurisdiction of the Court extended only so far as Congress authorized by
law, and that Congress, in the Judiciary Act of 1789, had not extended the judicial
authority to include the case before the Court. See id. at 433-34 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
Moreover, he concluded his opinion by stating that in addition to the clear lack of
congressional authorization, the policy of allowing "a compulsive suit against a state for
the recovery of money" was "pregnant" with undesirable consequences. Id. at 449-50
(Iredell, J., dissenting); see also ORTH, supra note 1, at 14-18 (summarizing each of the
Justices' opinions, as well as providing their historical context). For an examination into
Justice Iredell's dissent, see John V. Orth, The Truth About Justice Iredell's Dissent in
Chisholm v. Georgia (1793), 73 N.C. L REV. 255 (1994).
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pervasive.' In response, Congress quickly drafted--and the states
slowly ratified--the Eleventh Amendment "to prevent federal
tribunals from imposing judgments on states." 9
Accordingto the express language of the Eleventh Amendment,
immunity is available only to states involved in diversity suits.0
However, although the plain language of the amendment appears to
proscribe immunity to a narrow range of cases," the Supreme Court
6. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890) (stating that Chisholm caused "a
shock of surprise throughout the country"). For a discussion of how the Hans court
dramatically altered the course of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence by expanding the
notion of sovereign immunity, see infra notes 112-18 and accompanying text. The threat
that states would be compelled to pay Revohitionary War debts caused such an
antagonistic fervor that the Georgia House of Representatives passed a bill that, although
rejected by the state senate, provided that anyone forcing payment from Georgia "shall
suffer death.., by being hanged." ORTH, supra note 1, at 18 (citation omitted); see also
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662 (1974) (stating that after Chisholm, "[s]entiment for
passage of a constitutional amendment to override the decision rapidly gained
momentum").
7. One month after Chisholm "both houses of Congress had proposed the Eleventh
Amendment." ORTH, supra note 1, at 20.
8. Due to state delays, it took five years for states to ratify the Eleventh
Amendment; as a result, presidential proclamation of the amendment was delayed until
1798. See JACOBS, supra note 2, at 66-67; ORTH, supra note 1, at 20; RONALD D.
RoTuNDA E AL, TREA E ON CONsirUnToNAL LAW. SuBsTANcE AND PROCDuRE
82-83 (1986).
9. Jennifer G. Schecter, Note, Recent Case, 26 SETON HAULL REv. 431, 434 (1995)
(citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11
(1890)).
10. See supra text accompanying note 2 (setting forth the language of the Eleventh
Amendment).
11. See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 393, 406-07 (1821) (applying
a strict interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment to provide states with immunity only in
diversity suits). In Cohens, the Court held that a state was not entitled to immunity when
sued by its own citizens. See id. at 406-07. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion distinguished
between diversity jurisdiction and federal question jurisdiction, suggesting that immunity
was proper in the former but not the latter. See id. at 383-84. Moreover, Chief Justice
Marshall intimated that the origin of the Eleventh Amendment revolved around protecting
state treasuries from common law suits by Revolutionary War debt creditors. See id. at
406-07. According to Chief Justice Marshall,
at the adoption of the constitution, all the States were greatly indebted; and the
apprehension that these debts might be prosecuted under the federal Courts,
formed a very serious objection to that instrument .... [A]nd to quiet the
apprehensions that were so extensively entertained ... [the Eleventh
Amendment was] adopted .... That its motive was not to maintain the
sovereignty of a State from the degradation supposed to attend a compulsory
appearance before the tribunal of the nation, may be inferred from the terms of
the amendment.
Id.; see also Osbom v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 868-70 (1824)
(providing that while a state was immune from a state-citizen diversity suit in federal
court, a plaintiff could escape the effects of state immunity by merely suing an officer of
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has interpreted the Eleventh Amendment expansively. 2 Not only
are states immune from suits initiated by their own citizens, ' but
immunity also vests with entities that are classified as "arms of the
state."' 4 However, as a general rule, local entities, such as counties,
municipalities, political subdivisions, and state officers acting in their
individual capacities, are not vested with Eleventh Amendment
the state).
In fact, only once during Chief Justice Marshall's tenure on the Supreme Court did the
Court "accept a claim of immunity based on the Eleventh Amendment." ORTH, supra
note 1, at 41 (citing Governor of Georgia v. Madrozo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110 (1828)).
Because immunity was granted so rarely, the early Justices seemed to place federalism
above state sovereignty in Eleventh Amendment immunity determinations. Consequently,
many commentators have asserted that Congress was interested more in protecting the
state treasury from Revolutionary War debt than in granting a broad power of sovereignty
for the states in passing the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Robert A. Wood, Note, An
Error in Eleventh Amendment Interpretation: Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v.
Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 27 CREIGHTON L REV. 477, 484-85 (1994). For a critique on the
Court's expansive interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, see infra notes 118-19 and
accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1133 (1996) (concluding that
Congress lacked the authority under the Indian Commerce Clause to revoke the states'
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury,
323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945) (maintaining that a plaintiff could not evade Eleventh
Amendment immunity in suing the state of Indiana in federal court merely by naming
individual state officials as defendants); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1890)
(holding that a state was immune to a federal question suit from one of its own citizens);
see also Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State
Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE LI. 1, 3 (1988) (stating that the Court has adhered to the
idea of the Eleventh Amendment granting the states broad constitutional immunity from
suits in federal court).
13. See, e.g., Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 476
(1987); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238, 247 (1985); Pennhurst State
Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,
662-63 (1974); Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123,150 (1908); Hans, 134 U.S. at 20-21.
14. See, e.g., Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989);
Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); Ford Motor Co., 323 U.S. at 462. The
Eleventh Amendment also forbids suits against state officers that are "in substance ...
suit[s] against the state." Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292, 296 (1937);
see also Alex F. Rogers, Note, Clothing State Governmental Entities with Sovereign
Immunity: Disarray in the Eleventh Amendment Arm-of-the-State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L
REV. 1243, 1245 (1992) (noting that the Court has extended the term "state" to include
state-created entities it deems "arms of the state").
However, there are several exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity. First, a
state can explicitly waive the immunity, thereby consenting to suit in federal court. See,
e.g., Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth., 506 U.S. at 144; Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99.
Second, Congress can abrogate a state's immunity under the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See, e.g., Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 239-40. Third, "[t]he Eleventh
Amendment does not bar citizens from bringing the action in a state court." Jennifer A.
Winking, Note, Eleventh Amendment" A Move Towards Simplicity in the Test for
Immunity, 60 Mo. L. REv. 953, 957 (1995).
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immunity.' Therefore, the initial and most important issue in
Eleventh Amendment immunity cases is whether the party being
sued is classified as a local entity or an arm of the state.
16
Recently, in Harter v. Vernon,'7 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether a North Carolina
sheriff was an "arm of the state" under the Eleventh Amendment.
The court began by examining the Eleventh Amendment immunity
doctrine and analyzing the arm-of-the-state tests utilized by the
Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit. 8  After noting
inconsistencies with a test it previously had used in Gray v. Laws,'
the court announced a reformulated, simplified test that narrowed
the scope of the Eleventh Amendment and concluded that North
Carolina sheriffs are not entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity."
After summarizing the facts of Harter, this Note examines the
majority opinion.2' It next reviews Judge Luttig's dissent to the
denial of a request for rehearing en bane, in which he asserts that the
arm-of-the-state test utilized in Harter was a blatant misreading of
precedent.' The Note next reviews the relevant background law'
15. See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650 (1980); Mount Healthy
City Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,280-81 (1977); Moor v. County of Alameda,
411 U.S. 693, 719-21 (1973); Uincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890). One
reason that political subdivisions are denied Eleventh Amendment immunity is that
"cities, towns, and counties are distinct corporations, which, although 'territorially a part
of the state' function as independent corporate bodies." Rogers, supra note 14, at 1246
(quoting Luning, 133 U.S. at 530). A second rationale for denying local agencies immunity
stems from the services that they typically provide. Because local governmental agencies
typically provide indispensable services such as "police and fire protection, education, and
sanitation," it is necessary for federal courts to "compel compliance with the Constitution
by those who are most likely to violate it." ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION 386 (2d ed. 1994).
16. See Schecter, supra note 9, at 435.
17. 101 F.3d 334 (4th Cir. 1996).
18. See Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44-49 (1994); Gray v.
Laws, 51 F.3d 426, 430-35 (4th Ci. 1995); Ram Ditta v. Maryland Nat'l Capital Park &
Planning Comm'n, 822 F.2d 456, 457-58 (4th Cir. 1987). For a detailed discussion of these
cases, see infra notes 125-37,143-76 and accompanying text.
19. 51 F.3d 426 (4th Cir. 1995); see also infra notes 164-76 and accompanying text
(discussing Gray).
20. See Harter, 101 F.3d at 343.
21. See infra notes 27-93 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 94-104 and accompanying text. Judge Luttig was joined by Chief
Judge Wilkinson, as well as Judges Russell, Wilkins, and Williams. See Harter, 101 F.3d at
343.
23. See infra notes 105-79 and accompanying text.
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and analyzes the Harter decision in light of this precedent.24 While
agreeing with Judge Luttig that the Harter court may have
sidestepped the importance Gray placed on state sovereignty, the
Note concludes that it was Gray, not Harter, that misread
precedent." Consequently, Harter's simplified arm-of-the-state
Eleventh Amendment analysis is justified for several reasons: Not
only will its simplicity be a welcome predictive tool for the district
courts in the Fourth Circuit, but Harter's narrowing of the scope of
the Eleventh Amendment also will be consistent with the many
scholars and judges who have criticized an expansive interpretation
of the Amendment.
6
In Harter, plaintiff-appellant Vernon was the sheriff of
Rockingham County, North Carolina.' In the late 1980s, he hired
Wayne Harter and Robert Payne.2 When Vernon faced reelection
in 1994, he pressured his employees, including Harter and Payne, to
"campaign actively on his behalf, and to donate funds to his
reelection."2' Vernon threatened to discharge his employees if they
failed to support him in the primary election." Harter and Payne
"minimally supported" Vernon in the election.
31
At the time of the primary, Vernon initiated an investigation
concerning alleged misconduct of certain deputies. 2 As a result of
the investigation, Vernon fired Harter and Payne due to their alleged
involvement in the "wrongdoings."33 On January 31, 1995, Hatter
and Payne filed suit in federal district court.' Claiming they had
24. See infra notes 180-210 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 199-205 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 211-16 and accompanying text.
27. See Harter, 101 F.3d at 336.
28. See U4. Harter was hired as a dispatcher while Payne was hired to serve as a
deputy sheriff. See id.
29. Id. Specifically, "sheriff's department employees were solicited for campaign
contributions during shift meetings, and were told to post signs supporting Sheriff Vernon
in their yards." Id.
30. See id.
31. Id. Payne did not vote in the election, and he contributed only ten dollars to the
campaign. See i Although Hatter told Vernon "that he supported him," Hatter did not
actively campaign for Sheriff Vernon. Id. However, despite the minimal support of
Hatter and Payne, Vernon won the primary election. See id.
32. See id. The investigation revealed that several members of Payne's shift
"repeatedly failed to check-out with the dispatcher before taking their breaks." Id.
33. See id. The sheriff merely talked to three employees who allegedly supported him
in the election and fired the other two men who did not support him without speaking to
them directly. See iU In addition, Harter and Payne were never told that their job
performance was inadequate. See id.
34. See id.
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been terminated because they had not supported the sheriff in his
reelection campaign,35 Harter and Payne alleged violations of the
United States and North Carolina Constitutions." Their suit named
as defendants Rockingham County and Sheriff Vernon, in both his
official and individual capacities 7
At trial, the district court granted summary judgment to the
county on all claims38 and to Vernon on the constitutional claims
against him in his personal capacity." However, the court ruled that
Vernon was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity with
respect to claims against him in his "official capacity.' ° Specifically,
the court's determination that a judgment against the sheriff would
not affect the state treasury "'largely, if not wholly disposed of any
claim to immunity.' ,i' Consequently, the court concluded that a
North Carolina sheriff was not a state officer for Eleventh
35. See id.
36. See id. Specifically, at trial Harter and Payne alleged violations of the "First,
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, the North Carolina
Constitution, and the public policy of the state of North Carolina." Harter v. Vernon, 953
F. Supp. 685,688-89 (M.D.N.C.), affd, 101 F.3d 334 (4th Cir. 1996).
37. See Harter, 101 F.3d at 336.
38. See Harter v. Vernon, 953 F. Supp. 685, 693 (M.D.N.C.), aff'd, 101 F.3d 334 (4th
Cir. 1996) (concluding that Vernon's employment decisions could not be attributed to the
county and dismissing the § 1983 claims against the county). In addition, the trial court
dismissed the state-law claims against the county because the court determined that a
sheriff exercised a considerable degree of autonomy regarding whom to hire and fire. See
id. (citing Peele v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 90 N.C. App. 447, 450,368 S.E.2d 892, 894
(1988)).
39. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's due process claims. See id. at 699.
Additionally, the court relied on Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), which found
that government actors are immune to civil suits when doing their jobs so long as their
"conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known," id. at 818, to conclude that Sheriff Vernon was
entitled to qualified immunity with regard to plaintiffs First Amendment claim against
him in his individual capacity. See Harter v. Vernon, 953 F. Supp. 685, 697 (M.D.N.C.),
aff'd, 101 F.3d 334 (4th Cir. 1996).
40. See Harter, 953 F. Supp. at 692.
41. Id. at 690 (quoting Gray v. Laws, 51 F.3d 426, 431 (4th Cir. 1995)). n determining
that Vernon was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, the trial court used the
Ram Ditta four-part test, which indicated that the most important consideration was the
impact on the state treasury. See id. (citing Ram Ditta v. Maryland Nat'l Capital Park &
Planning Comn'n, 822 F.2d 456, 457-58 (4th Cir. 1987)). However, the court also
recognized the Hess Court's emphasis on the impact of a judgment on the state treasury
and state sovereignty. See id. (citing Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30,
39-40 (1994)). Neither party disputed that a judgment against a North Carolina sheriff
would not be satisfied out of the state treasury. See id. at 691 (citing Braswel v. Ellis, 950
F. Supp. 145, 147-48 (E.D.N.C. 1995) (holding that the state treasury is not responsible for
judgments against sheriffs)).
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Amendment immunity purposes.42
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, Vernon advanced two
arguments as to why the district court erred in concluding that a
North Carolina sheriff was a local officer.43 First, he claimed the
district court applied the wrong arm-of-the-state test to preclude
granting him immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.' In the
alternative, Vernon argued that even if the correct test was utilized,
the district court applied the test incorrectly. 45  After briefly
reviewing the Eleventh Amendment immunity doctrine, the Fourth
Circuit dismissed Vernon's arguments and affirmed the decision of
the district court."
Judge Motz, writing for the court,47 began by recognizing that
the immunity provided by the Eleventh Amendment was
significantly broader than its express language would suggest. 4  Not
only is it "well established that an 'unconsenting state is immune
from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by
citizens of another state,' but imunty also applies to entities that
are classified as "'arm[s] of the state.' "o Additionally, while the
Eleventh Amendment bars suits against "'state employees acting in
their official capacity,' ,,.. it does not extend to local governmental
agencies and employees.
52
42. See id. at 692.
43. See Harter, 101 F.3d at 337.
44. See id Specifically, Vernon asserted that the district court failed to give proper
consideration to the state's "sovereign integrity and dignity." Id.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 343.
47. Judge Motz was joined by Judge Niemeyer. See id. at 336. Judge Russell
concurred only in the judgment. See id. (Russell, J., concurring only in the judgment). In
fact, Judge Russell concurred with Judge Luttig's dissent from the denial of rehearing the
case en banc. See ia at 343 (Russell, J., concurring). For a discussion of Judge Luttig's
dissent, see infra notes 94-105 and accompanying text.
48. See Harter, 101 F.3d at 337; see also supra text accompanying note 2 (setting forth
the language of the Eleventh Amendment, which implies that immunity should apply only
to states named in diversity suits).
49. Harter, 101 F.3d at 337 (quoting Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf
& Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993)); see also supra note 13 (listing judicial authority
expanding Eleventh Amendment immunity to preclude state citizens from suing their
home state in federal court).
50. Harter, 101 F.3d at 337 (quoting Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274,280 (1977)).
51. Id. (quoting Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,71 (1989)).
52. See Id. (citing Will, 491 U.S. at 79); see also supra note 15 and accompanying text
(explaining that political subdivisions, municipalities, counties, and suits against state
officers acting in their individual capacity are not afforded immunity under the Eleventh
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The court then identified what had been the traditional Fourth
Circuit test to determine whether an employee or state agency was a
local entity or an arm of the state.5 3 The four-part test was first
articulated in Ram Ditta v. Maryland National Capital Park and
Planning Commission.'4 While the first and most important inquiry
under the test was whether the state treasury would be responsible
for paying any potential judgment 5 Ram Ditta included three other
factors for a court to consider: the degree of autonomy between the
entity and the state, the entity's involvement in local versus statewide
concerns, and the entity's status under state law. 6
However, the court in Harter emphasized that the circuit was
now governed by the test set forth by the Supreme Court in Hess v.
PortAuthority Trans-Hudson Corp.,57 which the court summarized as
requiring the Eleventh Amendment analysis to focus on the
Amendment's "twin reasons for being: preventing judgments from
depleting state treasuries, and maintaining 'the integrity retained by
each state in our federal system.' ,8 Despite the Hess Court's
seeming reliance on both the state treasury and state sovereignty, the
Harter court stressed that Hess had not significantly changed the
Eleventh Amendment analysis utilized in Ram Ditta.59 The Harter
court noted that Hess included other indicators of immunity, which
the Harter court believed "echo[ed] the factors articulated in Ram
Ditta." The Harter court explained that when, as in Hess, the other
indicators pointed in different directions, a court must focus on
whether the state treasury will be forced to pay the judgment against
the entity, which both courts identified as the most important
immunity consideration.61
Amendment).
53. See Harter, 101 F.3d at 337.
54. See id. (citing Ram Ditta v. Maryland Nat'l Capital Park and Planning Comm'n,
822 F.2d 456, 457-58 (4th Cir. 1987)).
55. See id. (citing Ram Dina, 822 F.2d at 457).
56. See id. (citing Ram Ditta, 822F.2d at 457-58).
57. See id. (citing Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30 (1994)).
58. Id. (quoting Hess, 513 U.S. at 39). In Hess, the Court concluded that the New
York/New Jersey Port Authority, a bi-state entity, was not an "arm of the state" entitled
to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Hess, 513 U.S. at 52.
59. See Harter, 101 F.3d at 338 (citing Gray v. Laws, 51 F.3d 426, 434 (4th Cir. 1995)).
For a discussion of Gray, and the resulting confusion in North Carolina district courts, see
infra notes 164-79 and accompanying text.
60. See Harter, 101 F.3d at 338; see also infra note 155 and accompanying text
(discussing the other indicators of immunity).
61. See Harter, 101 F.3d at 338. Harter relied on Hess, from which it quoted that" 'the
impetus for the Eleventh Amendment [was the] prevention of federal court judgments that
must be paid out of a State's treasury.... Accordingly, Courts of Appeals have recognized
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The Harter court further explained that a determination that the
state treasury will not pay a judgment also is significant. 2 "If that is
the case, then 'the most salient factor in Eleventh Amendment
decisions' weighs against a finding of immunity."" Although in this
situation a court would consider the other Ram Ditta factors,
determining that the treasury will not have to pay a judgment is
usually dispositive so that the state actor would not be immune from
suit in federal court." Although Vernon tried to persuade the court
that state sovereignty should be the key factor when the state
treasury was not impacted, he was unsuccessful.0
The court concluded that the test for determining if an entity is
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity centers on the impact on
the state treasury." If the state treasury would be affected by a
judgment against the entity, the entity is entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity.67 If, however, the state treasury is not
affected, the court will consider the three other Ram Ditta factors-
mindful that the "decisive factor" of the state treasury weighs against
finding immunity for the entity or officer."
Because it was undisputed that in North Carolina the state
treasury did not have to pay judgments against a county sheriff,69 the
the vulnerability of the State's purse as the most salient factor in Eleventh Amendment
determinations."' Id. (quoting Hess, 513 U.S. at 48). The Harter court cited its own
precedent in support. See idU at 339 (citing Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir.
1996); Gray, 51 F.3d at 433; Bockes v. Fields, 999 F.2d 788, 790-91 (4th Cir. 1993); Ram
Dina, 822 F.2d at 457); see also Hess, 513 U.S. at 49 (stating that "a vast majority of
Circuits... have concluded that the state treasury factor is the most important factor to be
considered ... and, in practice, have generally accorded this factor dispositive weight").
62 See Harter, 101 F.3d at 339.
63. Id at 338 (quoting Hess, 513 U.S. at 48) (emphasis added). The court observed
that Hess stressed that if the " 'state... [was not] obligated to bear and pay the difference
... the Eleventh Amendment's core concern is not implicated."' Id. (quoting Hess, 513
U.S. at 51).
64. See id at 339.
65. See id. In particular, Vernon relied on Hess and "the Supreme Court's recent
discussion of state sovereignty in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida." Id. However, the
Harter court summarily rejected Vernon's argument. See iUi The court noted that the
Hess Court deemed the treasury factor dispositive, making no distinction between cases
where it would pay ajudgment and those where it would not. See i (citing Hess, 513 U.S.
at 48-49). In addition to citing a series of cases that denied immunity when the state
treasury was not impacted, Hess itself involved a suit where the state treasury was not
responsible for a judgment. See Hess, 513 U.S. at 37. The Court deemed this factor
critical in denying the Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation immunity. See id. at 45.
66. See Harter, 101 F.3d at 340.
67. See id In that case, it would not be necessary to consider the other Ram Ditta
factors. See id. at 339 (citing Gray v. Laws, 51 F.3d 426, 433-34 (4th Cir. 1995)).
68. See id. at 340.
69. See id. As explained in the district court's opinion, see Harter v. Vernon, 953 F.
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court considered the three other Ram Ditta factors.70  The first
consideration was the degree of autonomy of a North Carolina
county sheriff.7' A high degree of state control would favor
immunity, while a large amount of county (local) control would
militate against Eleventh Amendment immunity.72  The court
concluded that this factor was ambiguous. 3 Although the state of
North Carolina exercises a measurable amount of control over
county sheriffs 74 each county also enjoys a significant amount of
authority over its sheriff.75 In addition to providing for the election
of the sheriff, the local government "sets and pays the salaries of a
sheriff and his deputies and the county determines and pays the
overall [sheriff's] budget., 76 Additionally, in the event of a sheriff
vacancy, the county appoints a new sheriff "for the remainder of the
sheriffs term." Most importantly, no state agency oversees the
sheriff, and a county sheriff, in exercising his duties, possesses a
considerable amount of autonomy from both state and county
Supp. 685, 691 n.3 (M.D.N.C.), aff'd, 101 F.3d 334 (4th Cir. 1996), the state imposes
several requirements on a sheriff to ensure that he can satisfy any judgment levied against
him. First, a North Carolina sheriff must post a bond that would cover an adverse
judgment. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-76-5, 162-8 (1994). Moreover, if the sheriff's bond
is insufficient, and a county commissioner could have discovered the deficiency by
reasonable diligence, the county commissioner is held liable. See id § 58-72-60. Finally, a
county's insurance policy may also help satisfy a shortfall to an injured party. See Smith v.
Phillips, 117 N.C. App. 378,381-84,451 S.E.2d 309,312-13 (1994).
70. See Harter, 101 F.3d at 340. Hess and Gray, however, each mentioned the
importance of the "sovereign dignity of the states" as an independent factor in the
Eleventh Amendment immunity analysis. See Hess, 513 U.S. at 39-41; Gray, 51 F.3d at
434. However, the Harter court stated that this factor is not "a separate, free-floating
factor outside of the Ram Ditta considerations." Harter, 101 F.3d at 340. Rather, the
court explained it would use the three other Ram Dina factors to measure whether a suit
against the sheriff would infringe on the sovereign dignity of the state. See id This
confusion was the principal concern of Judge Luttig in his dissenting opinion from
rehearing the case en banc. See id. at 343-46 (Luttig, J., dissenting).
71. See Harter, 101 F.3d at 340.
72. See id. at 340-41.
73. See id. at 341.
74. See id. at 340-41. Not only does the state constitution create the position, but state
statutes set the four-year term, describe the qualifications for office, and prescribe the
sheriff's multiple duties. See id. (citing N.C. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (creating the office); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 162-1 to -2 (1995) (setting the sheriff's four-year term and qualifications for
office); id §§ 162-13 to -14, 162-22 to -23 (delineating several duties of the sheriff)).
75. See id.
76. Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-103 (1991) (setting the salaries of a sheriff and
his deputies); id. § 153A-149 (determining the office's overall budget)).
77. Id at 341 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 162-5 (1995)). The county attorney also
prosecutes petitions for the removal of a North Carolina sheriff. See id (citing N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 128-17 (1995)).
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Next, the court examined the second Ram Ditta factor and
concluded that a North Carolina sheriff primarily was involved with
local rather than state concerns.- For example, although a sheriff
does enforce state law, he "may only enforce these laws, or perform
these duties, within a given county."s Therefore, since a sheriff is
primarily a local entity, this factor weighed against granting Vernon
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment."
The final Ram Ditta factor considers how state law has
traditionally treated the entity.' The court acknowledged that this
factor has caused a considerable amount of confusion.' North
Carolina courts were split on the issue. In two instances, courts
concluded that a sheriff, as an arm of the state, was entitled to
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.' However, the Harter
court found these cases unpersuasive given that "neither was decided
78. See id. For example, a North Carolina sheriff is authorized to supervise, hire, and
fire employees. See id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-103(1) (1991)).
79. See id.
80. Id. at 342. The court noted that "it has long been understood that a sheriff is a
'law enforcement officer of the county."' Id. at 341 (quoting Southern Ry. Co. v.
Mecklenburg County, 231 N.C. 148,151,56 S.E.2d 438,440 (1949)). In addition, the court
further explained that the term "sheriff' is derived from the Saxon word " 'seyre,' a shire
or county, and 'reeve,' bailiff or keeper." Id. at 341-42 (quoting Commonwealth v. Cluley,
56 Pa. 270, 275 (1867)).
81. See id. at 342.
82. See id. (citing Ram Ditta v. Maryland Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n, 822
F.2d 456, 458 (4th Cir. 1987)). To make this determination, a court may consider several
factors, including "constitutional provisions which characterize the entity," relevant
regulations and statutes, and the holdings of state courts. Id (citing Hess v. Port Auth.
Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44-46 (1994) (relying on state statutes and state court
rulings); Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280-81 (1977) (considering
the relevant state statutes); Gray v. Laws, 51 F.3d 426, 437 (4th Cir. 1995) (examining a
state court decision and state statutes)).
83. See id. Specifically, some federal courts have treated a state court's determination
of whether an entity was state or local for Eleventh Amendment purposes as
determinative. See id (citing Levinson-Roth v. Parries, 872 F. Supp. 1439, 1447 (D. Md.
1995); Gulledge v. Smart, 691 F. Supp. 947, 955 (D.S.C. 1988) (relying on a South Carolina
state court determination that a deputy sheriff is not a county employee), aff'd without
opinion, 878 F.2d 379 (4th Cir. 1989)). However, this approach is incorrect, the Harter
court stated, because the question of whether an entity is entitled to immunity "under the
Eleventh Amendment is a question of federal, not state law." Id. (citing Ram Ditta, 822
F.2d at 458 n.5).
84. See id. (citing Messick v. Catawba County, 110 N.C. App. 707,713-14, 431 S.E.2d
489, 493 (1993); Slade v. Vernon, 110 N.C. App. 422, 425, 429 S.E.2d 744, 746 (1993)).
Sheriff Vernon argued that ignoring Messick and Slade would "violate the dignity of North
Carolina." Id, at 342. However, the Harter court refuted this point by stating that "[o]ur
holdings on questions of state law do not bind state courts, nor do state court
determinations on questions of federal law control us." Id.
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by the state's highest court" and that neither provided. any reasoning
to support their conclusions.' More instructive, the court believed,
was Hull v. Oldham," another North Carolina case. Hull, unlike
Messick v. Catawba County,"7 and Slade v. Vernon, relied on the
relevant provisions of the North Carolina Constitution to hold that a
county sheriff was a local official and not entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity.' The Harter court concluded this prong of
the Eleventh Amendment analysis by underscoring that all relevant
constitutional and legislative provisions viewed a county sheriff as a
local official." Consequently, this prong of the test militated against
granting immunity to a North Carolina sheriff.91
In sum, the circuit court affirmed the district court's denial of
Eleventh Amendment immunity.' Not only was the state treasury
unaffected by a judgment against a county sheriff, but the "other
three Ram Ditta factors [were] either equivocal, or militate[d] toward
denial of immunity."93
Although there was no dissenting opinion, Judge Luttig filed a
dissent from the denial of a request for rehearing en banc.Y' Judge
Luttig's request to rehear the case en banc was defeated by a seven-
to-six vote.' Judge Luttig argued that the panel opinion in Harter
flagrantly disregarded the earlier Gray v. Laws96 decision in several
85. Id.; see also Gray, 51 F.3d at 437 (cautioning that federal courts should not over-
rely on state court decisions where the court did not justify the holding).
86. 104 N.C. App. 29,407 S.E.2d 611 (1991).
87. 110 N.C. App. 707,431 S.E.2d 493 (1993).
88. 110 N.C. App. 422,429 S.E.2d 744 (1993).
89. See Hul, 104 N.C. App. at 41, 407 S.E.2d at 618. Hull cited various constitutional
provisions indicating that a North Carolina sheriff is a local officer. See id. (citing N.C.
CONST. art. VI, § 2 (providing that a North Carolina sheriff is elected by county voters,
setting a sheriff's term at four years, and stating a sheriff is subject to removal for cause));
see also Harter, 101 F.3d at 342 (" 'The sheriff is the only officer of local government
required by the Constitution.'" (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 17E-1 (1995))).
90. See Harter, 101 F.3d at 342-43.
91. See id. at 343.
92. See id.
93. Id.
94. See id. at 343 (Luttig, J., dissenting).
95. See U4. As a result, Judge Luttig filed a dissenting opinion; he was joined by Chief
Judge Wilkinson and Judges Russell, Wilkins, and Williams. See U4. (Luttig, J., dissenting).
Judge Luttig argued that in the Fourth Circuit, "one panel cannot overrule or modify a
published opinion of another panel" without an en banc hearing. Id. at 344 (Luttig, J.,
dissenting). Doing so, according to the judge, causes the earlier decision to be the
controlling law when the two opinions conflict. See id. (Luttig, J., dissenting).
96. 51 F.3d 426 (4th Cir. 1995).
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ways.' First, and most significantly, the Harter opinion misread both
Hess and Gray by refusing to acknowledge that Gray had modified
the Ram Ditta factors in light of Hess to introduce a concern for state
sovereignty as an independent factor." According to Gray, he
explained, a concern for both the state treasury and for state
sovereignty "'should dominate the inquiry in cases where it is
difficult to discern whether a particular entity is an arm of the
state.' "" In Harter, the court essentially ignored the state
sovereignty factor by stating that it was "merely a proxy for the other
[Ram Ditta] factors."1® Second, Judge Luttig noted that although
Gray acknowledged that a concern for protecting judgments against
the state treasury was the most important immunity factor, that case
did not hold the treasury factor dispositive.0 Third, the Gray court
held that when the state treasury would not be affected, the
immunity question would be determined by other factors, "chief
among which" are state sovereignty and state control.'02 In contrast,
he pointed out that the Harter court relied almost exclusively on
Hess: if the treasury will not be affected, "' "the most salient factor
in Eleventh Amendment decisions" weighs against a finding of
immunity. Although in that situation a court should consider the
other Ram Ditta factors, Hess makes clear that the impact on the
state treasury is generally determinative[,]'" even when there is no
impact on the state treasury."n Judge Luttig concluded that the
97. See Harter, 101 F.3d at 344 (Luttig, J., dissenting). Interestingly, Judge Luttig
wrote the opinion in Gray. See Gray, 51 F.3d at 428.
98. See Harter, 101 F.3d at 344 (Luttig, J., dissenting).
99. Id. (Luttig, J., dissenting) (quoting Gray, 51 F.3d at 432).
100. Id. at 340.
101. See ii at 345 (Luttig, J., dissenting). According to Judge Luttig, the Gray court
was consistent with Hess because it noted that "'a determination that the state treasury
will be liable for a particular judgment is largely, if not wholly, dispositive of entitlement to
Eleventh Amendment immunity.'... This was essentially our holding in Bockes." See id.
(Luttig, J., dissenting) (quoting Gray, 51 F.3d at 433-34 (citation omitted and emphasis
added in original)). However, Harter extended this conclusion in a slight but significant
way to assert that Hess "held" that the state treasury factor was dispositive. See id. at 339.
102. Id. at 345 (Luttig, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 345 (Luttig, I., dissenting) (quoting id. at 339 (quoting Hess, 513 U.S. at 48)).
Nowhere, according to Judge Luttig, did Hess or Gray state that "Eleventh Amendment
concerns are to be discounted and downgraded when the state treasury is not implicated."
Id. (Luttig, I., dissenting). However, the Gray opinion concluded its analysis of Hess on a
confusing note:
[I]n the end, we do not believe that Hess, as it applied to single state entities,
materially altered the Eleventh Amendment analysis we formulated in [Ram
Ditta] .... We recognized [the impact on state treasury as the most important
factor] ... [and] each of the other [factors] in Ram Ditta was recognized in Hess
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Harter court's failure to acknowledge Gray's "nuanced analysis" was
an affront to the precedent established in the Fourth Circuit and a
basis for future confusion in the district courts regarding both the
role of judicial precedent and the proper Eleventh Amendment test
for immunity."4
The Eleventh Amendment was ratified in 1798 in response to
Chisholm v. Georgia," in which the Court permitted a South
Carolina citizen to sue the state of Georgia in federal court under the
Constitution."6 According to the express language of the Eleventh
Amendment, immunity is available only to states involved in
diversity suits." As a result, a plain reading of the amendment
suggests only a narrow range of applications.18 For the most part,
early Supreme Court interpretation "gave the Amendment a narrow
interpretation; that is, the limitation on federal jurisdiction was itself
limited."" 9 Not only was Eleventh Amendment immunity granted
sparingly, but when Chisholm was mentioned in court opinions, the
Justices expressed a belief that the case was decided correctly."' In
doing so, these Justices postulated that the Eleventh Amendment
had "altered the Constitution, not merely restated the original
understanding.""'
However, in Hans v. Louisiana," the Court departed from this
as relevant to the question of Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Gray, 51 F.3d at 434.
104. See Harter, 101 F.3d at 345-46 (Luttig, I., dissenting).
105. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793); see also supra note 4 (listing scholarly commentary on
Chisholm); supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text (discussing the negative reaction by the
public and Congress to Chisholm).
106. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 480; see also supra note 5 and accompanying text
(setting forth the U.S. CONST. art m, § 2 and discussing each of the Justices' opinions in
Chisholm).
107. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI (granting immunity to states being sued by a citizen of
another state or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state); see also supra text
accompanying note 2 (setting forth the Eleventh Amendment).
108. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
109. ORTH, supra note 1, at 7; see also supra note 11 and accompanying text (describing
the Court's early interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment in which the Court adhered
to the plain language of the Amendment and allowed access to the federal courts only in a
narrow range of circumstances). This narrow interpretation continued until as late as 1876
when the Supreme Court permitted a Louisiana bondholder to sue the Louisiana Board of
Liquidation regarding a state statute that effectively diluted his security. See ORTH, supra
note 1, at 63-65 (citing Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U.S. 531,540-41 (1876)).
110. See ORTH, supra note 1, at 42 (citing Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 55
(1849) (Woodbury, I., dissenting); Livingston's Ex'x v. Story, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 351, 397
(1837) (Baldwin, J., dissenting)).
111. Id.
112. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
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narrow view and offered an expansive interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment."u In Hans, the Supreme Court held that sovereign
immunity insulates a nonconsenting state from a federal question suit
initiated by one of its own citizens."1 In doing so, the Court rejected
the Chisholm decision as wrong,"u and introduced a broad notion of
sovereign immunity to correct what it believed would be an
anomalous result if Hans were permitted to pursue his case in federal
court."6  Consequently, the Court "rewrote the history of the
Eleventh Amendment" to introduce sovereign immunity into the
original meaning of the Constitution. 7 This example of judicial
113. See JACOBS, supra note 2, at 109-110 (discussing Hans and its historical context);
ORTH, supra note 1, at 74,76 (same); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State
Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L REV. 1889, 1998-2002 (1983)
(same).
114. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 10, 20-21. Hans involved a Louisiana citizen who sued the
state of Louisiana in federal court to recover interest on state issued bonds. See id. at 1-2.
The Louisiana General Assembly had amended the state constitution in 1874 to provide
for the exercise of judicial power whenever necessary to secure the payment of principal
and interest of the bonds. See id. at 2-3. However, in 1879, the legislature attempted to
repudiate its obligations with a new state constitution that "transferred [the bonds] to
defray the expenses of state government." Id. Hans sued the state and alleged a violation
of the Contracts Clause, a federal question. See id at 3. Despite the fact that his claim
was a federal question, the Court granted Louisiana immunity and dismissed his suit. See
id. at 20-21.
115. See id. at 11. The Court noted that Chisholm "created ... a shock of surprise
throughout the country." Id. According to Justice Bradley, "in view of the manner in
which [Chisholm] was received by the country, the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment,
the light of history and the reason of the thing, we think we are at liberty to prefer Justice
Iredell's [dissent]." Id. at 18-19.
116. See id. at 10-11. Specifically, the Court asked:
Can we suppose that, when the Eleventh Amendment was adopted, it was
understood to be left open for citizens of a state to sue their own state in the
federal courts [on federal question claims], while the idea of [similar] suits by
citizens of other states ... was indignantly repelled? ... The supposition that it
would is almost an absurdity on its face.
Id. at 15.
117. ORTH, supra note 1, at 74. Nowhere in the Eleventh Amendment do the words
"sovereign immunity" appear. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI; see also Michael P. Kenny,
Sovereign Immunity and the Rule of Law: Aspiring to a Highest-Ranked View of the
Eleventh Amendment, 1 GEo. MASON INDEP. L REv. 1, 8 (1992) (noting the absence of
the words "sovereign immunity" from the Amendment and explaining that the sovereign
immunity doctrine was "shoehorned into the amendment" by Hans). However, the Hans
Court, despite the broad scope of Article III, which seems to allow access to the federal
courts for any federal question claim, believed that men like Alexander Hamilton were
correct that the notion of sovereign immunity was inextricably linked with the
Constitution. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 13-14. The Hans Court quoted Hamilton:
"It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an
individual without its consent. This is the general sense and the general practice of
mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now
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activism, and the resultant expansive interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment, has been harshly criticized by judges... and scholars
alike." However, despite such criticism, the Hans holding has been
enjoyed by the government of every State in the Union."
Id. at 13 (quoting THE FEDERAJIST No. 81, at 488 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961)).
118. For a thorough and lengthy attack on Hans, see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116
S. Ct. 1114, 1153-59 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[W]e have two Eleventh
Amendments, the one ratified in 1795, and the other (so-called) invented by the Court
nearly a century later in Hans."). Justice Souter examined the history and structure of the
Eleventh Amendment and concluded that it was meant to preclude only "suits subject to
federal jurisdiction exclusively under the Citizen-State Diversity Clauses." Id. at 1150
(Souter, J., dissenting). He continued that if the Constitutional Framers had intended the
Eleventh Amendment to bar federal question suits, they could have easily expressed this
idea. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Easier still, the Framers could simply have adopted
the first post-Chisholm proposal introduced in the House of Representatives by
Massachusetts Congressman Theodore Sedgwick. See id (Souter, I., dissenting).
Sedgwick's bill proposed an expansive Eleventh Amendment that included immunity for
federal question suits. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Although Justice Souter's attack on
an expansive interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment is the most extensive, Justice
Stephens also criticized the expansive interpretation of the Amendment. See id. at 1145
(Stevens, I., dissenting) (arguing that an expansive interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment should be discouraged because "in this country the sovereignty of the states is
subordinate both to the citizenry of each State and to the supreme law of the federal
sovereign"); see also Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 54 (1994)
(Stevens, J., concurring) ("This Court's expansive Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence is
not merely misguided as a matter of constitutional law; it is also an engine of injustice.");
Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 504-16, 519-21 (1987)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Eleventh Amendment should be construed to
permit citizens to sue their own states in federal court on federal question claims). In
Welch, Justice Brennan was joined by dissenters Stevens, Blackmun, and Marshall, see id.
at 496, in demanding that Hans be "confined to its current domain [and that the Court]
begin a fresh examination of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence without the weight of
that mistaken precedent." Id. at 521 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Green v. Mansour,
474 U.S. 64, 78 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court, in promulgating an
expansive interpretation of sovereign immunity, has "perpetuated an erroneous
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment" in precluding an individual from suing a state
in federal court on a federal question claim); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S.
234, 248 (1985) (Brenan, J., dissenting) (noting that an expansive interpretation of the
Eleventh Amendment is based on "flawed premises, misguided history, and an untenable
vision of the needs of the federal system it purports to protect").
119. See ORTH, supra note 1, at 12-29 (arguing that the Eleventh Amendment was
intended to restrict the scope of the citizen-state Diversity Clause of the Constitution to
protect state treasuries against foreign creditors); Amar, supra note 4, at 1426 (stating that
a broad notion of "'sovereignty' has become an oppressive concept in our courts,"
permitting officials to hide behind immunity to violate citizens' constitutional rights);
Steven Breker-Cooper, The Eleventh Amendment- A Textual Solution, 38 WAYNE L. REV.
1481, 1508-23 (1992) (arguing for a narrow, literal interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment); Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity
Doctrines: Congressional Imposition of Suit Upon the States, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1203,
1279-80 (1978) (criticizing an expansive interpretation of sovereign immunity and
disclosing that "[tihe Court's failure to follow the constitutional language [of the Eleventh
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the foundation for an expanded twentieth-century approach to
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence."' Since Hans, the Supreme
Court has interpreted the amendment broadly to provide immunity
to far more entities than the plain language of the amendment
suggests." In general, immunity usually vests with states, state
entities, and officers characterized as arms of the state.1" The
Eleventh Amendment's protection, however, does not provide
counties, political subdivisions and local agencies with immunity
Amendment] suggests that sovereign immunity has lost its constitutional moorings");
Fletcher, supra note 4, at 1130 (suggesting that "the adopters of the amendment originally
had the more modest purpose of requiring that the citizen-state diversity clause of article
III be construed to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts only when a state sued an out
of state citizen"); Gibbons, supra note 113, at 2004-05 (criticizing the Court for distorting
the Eleventh Amendment and advocating a "strict construction of the Eleventh
Amendment-one that takes full account of its text and actual legislative history");
Jackson, supra note 12, at 4 (stating that Hans should be overturned because it has
fostered an expansive Eleventh Amendment immunity which is a "doctrinal abyss, replete
with inconsistencies born of pragmatic adjustments to the principle for which it supposedly
stands"); Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102
HARV. L REV. 1342, 1371 (1989) (arguing that an expansive interpretation of the
amendment which ignores the amendment's plain language is flawed and that "the
determinate text of the eleventh amendment is by far the best evidence of what the
amendment was intended to accomplish"); David L Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh
Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L REv. 61, 62 (1984) (asserting that the
doctrine of sovereign immunity "in its more blatant forms is at war with the principle that
government must be accountable to the people through the courts"); see also Calvin R.
Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. Cm. L REV. 61,
66 (1989) (rejecting the view of scholars who argue the Eleventh Amendment should only
apply to diversity cases, but introducing the idea that "the conventional [expansive
Eleventh Amendment] doctrine spawned by Hans is wrong primarily because it relies on
the Eleventh Amendment [instead of the Tenth Amendment] for its constitutional
foundation"). Moreover, some scholars criticize the very idea of sovereign immunity. See,
e.g., Kenneth Culp Davis, Sovereign Immunity Must Go, 22 ADMIN. L REV. 383, 383
(1970) (stating that sovereign immunity often causes substantive injustice, procedural
injustice, and "gross inefficiency in the allocation of functions between officers and
agencies, by preventing courts from resolving controversies they are especially qualified to
resolve"); John Paul Stevens, Is Justice Irrelevant ?, 87 NW. U. L REV. 1121, 1124-25
(1993) (arguing that sovereign immunity is better suited to a monarchy than to our system
of democracy).
120. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1151 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating "the obvious place
to look" for the notion of an expanded interpretation of sovereign immunity is not in the
Eleventh Amendment, but in Hans).
121. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text (providing the framework by which
entities are awarded immunity under the Eleventh Amendment). Moreover, the Supreme
Court may be moving towards a more expansive interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment. Last year, in Seminole, the Court held that Congress lacked the authority
under the Constitution to abrogate Florida's Eleventh Amendment immunity when sued by
an individual asserting a federal question claim under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.
See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1133.
122. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (listing cases that provide immunity for
arms of the state).
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from suit in federal court.' Consequently, a crucial question in
many Eleventh Amendment immunity cases is whether an entity is
an arm of the state,'s an inquiry that may turn simply on the test a
court chooses to apply.
Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Hess,' the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals applied the factors it set forth in Ram Ditta v.
Maryland National Park and Planning Commission.126 In Ram Ditta,
the Fourth Circuit introduced a four-part test to determine if an
entity is an "alter-ego" or an arm of the state and hence protected by
Eleventh Amendment immunity. ' First, the court acknowledged
the great deal of disparity in the number of factors federal courts
considered in an Eleventh Amendment analysis."2s Although
recognizing the importance of a multi-factored approach, the court
stressed that "it is generally held that the most important
consideration" is whether the state treasury would be forced to pay
the judgment.' This was logical, the court stressed, because when
the action is one against the state treasury, "'the state is the real,
substantial party in interest.' "' In addition, the court also revealed
three other considerations: whether the entity is autonomous from
the state, whether the entity is involved with statewide or local
concerns, and how the entity is treated as a matter of state law."l
123. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (listing cases that deny immunity for
political subdivisions of states).
124. See Schecter, supra note 9, at 435.
125. 513 U.S. 30 (1994).
126. 822 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1987).
127. See Ram Ditta, 822 F.2d at 457-58. In Ram Diua, plaintiff-appellant Debindra
Ram Ditta appealed the district court's dismissal of her personal injury claim against the
Maryland National Capital Park and Planning Commission. See i4d at 457. The
Commission, created by the State of Maryland, operated a park system and was involved
with the "physical development of parts of Montgomery and Prince George's Counties,
Maryland." Id. Ram Ditta, a resident of Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, initiated a
diversity suit against the Commission after suffering serious injury while using a swing in a
Montgomery County park operated by the Commission. See i The district court
concluded that because the Commission was a state agency, it was subject to Eleventh
Amendment immunity. See id. at 460.
128. See id. at 458 n.4 (explaining that the Sixth and Third Circuits used a nine-factor
test, and that the Fourth Circuit, in the earlier case of Patterson v. Ramsey, 552 F.2d 117
(4th Cir. 1977), used six factors); see also infra note 150 (illustrating that the circuits used
immunity tests with a number of different factors).
129. Ram Ditta, 822 F.2d at 457 (citing Hall v. Medical College, 742 F.2d 299, 304 (6th
Cir. 1984); Laje v. R.E. Thomason Gen. Hosp., 665 F.2d 724,727 (5th Cir. 1982); Blake v.
Cline, 612 F.2d 718, 723-24, 726 (3d Cir. 1979); Mier-Davis Co. v. Illinois State Toll
I-ighway Auth., 567 F.2d 323,327 (7th Cir. 1977)).
130. Id. (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945)).
131. See id. at 457-58.
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The Fourth Circuit then analyzed the Maryland Park and
Planning Commission in light of these factors.'3' Most importantly,
the court determined that the state treasury would not be required to
pay a judgment levied against the Commission.' The court also
found that the Commission possessed a considerable degree of
autonomym and was involved in local concerns.' Therefore,
although a state court had treated the Commission as a state political
entity,' 6 the strength of the other three factors favored a
determination that the Commission was not the alter ego of the state
and not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. 7
The Fourth Circuit again relied on the impact on the state
treasury six years later in Bockes v. Fields. 8 In Bockes, the court
132. See id. at 458-60.
133. See id at 458. The court recognized that a state treasury not paying a judgment
(favoring no immunity) was the converse of when the state treasury was economically
impacted (favoring immunity). See aL In this instance, any judgment against the
Commission would be paid through a statutory self-insurance program. See id. If a
judgment exceeded the insurance coverage, the county would advance the additional
funds. See id. However, the Commission was obligated to reimburse the money during the
next fiscal year. See id.
134. See i. The court concluded that the Commission existed as a "body corporate,"
similar to counties and municipalities, citing in support a state statutory scheme indicating
its close connection to a county "body corporate." See id. The court looked to such
statutory indicia as the Commission's ability to sue or be sued, to enter into contracts, to
purchase, exchange, or sell real property, and the appointment of the Commission's
members by the counties, with the state having no involvement in their appointment or
removal. See iL In addition, the court noted that the Commission's revenue was derived
solely through the use of county bonds or property taxes. See id.
135. See id. at 459. The Commission had no involvement with "operating and
developing areas" outside the borders of Montgomery and Prince George's Counties. See
id Moreover, most of the park and land development benefits were conferred upon the
residents of Montgomery and Price George's Counties. See id. (quoting MD. ANN. CODE
art. 28, § 5-107 (1983) ("[L]ands ... shall be held by ... the Commission ... especially for
the benefit of the citizens and residents of Montgomery and Prince George's Counties.
Title to the lands may not be conveyed by the State, nor may such use be extinguished
without the approval by resolution of the Commission.")).
136. See id. (citing 0 & B, Inc. v. Maryland Nat'l Capital Park and Planning Comm'n,
369 A.2d 553, 556 (Md. 1977) (holding that the Commission "was a state agency, and
therefore immune from tort suits, under the doctrine of state sovereign immunity")).
However, the Fourth Circuit noted that while a state court determination is important,
Eleventh Amendment immunity is governed by federal law. See id. at 459-60 (citing Blake
v. Cline, 612 F.2d 718,722 (3d Cir. 1979)).
137. See id. at 460.
138. 999 F.2d 788 (4th Cir. 1993). For an in-depth discussion of the facts in Bockes, see
Bockes v. Fields, 798 F. Supp. 1219,1221 (W.D. Va. 1992), modified, 999 F.2d 788 (4th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994). In 1990, Nancy Bockes was terminated from her
job as the Director of the Grayson County Department of Social Services. See Bockes, 999
F.2d at 789. Although Bockes had served as director for thirteen years, she was fired
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noted that immunity vested when a state treasury would be
responsible for a judgment levied against the entity.3 In this
instance, eighty percent of any judgment against the defendants, the
County Board of Social Services and the Department of Social
Services for Grayson County, Virginia, would ultimately be paid
from the Virginia treasury.' Therefore, the Court determined that
the Board and the Department were state entities for Eleventh
Amendment immunity purposes. 1 The conclusion was based solely
on the fact that the state treasury was responsible for a potential
judgment.42
In Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp.,43 the Supreme
"without notice and without a pre-termination hearing." Id. Bockes filed a grievance, and
the grievance panel reinstated Bockes as director and granted her "one-half [of her] back
pay for the period during which she had no job." Id. Bockes was unsatisfied with the
award. See id. Consequently, she filed a § 1983 action against Grayson County, Virginia,
the Grayson County Department of Social Services, and the members of the Board in their
individual and official capacities. See id. The district court determined that the Board as
well as the Department possessed Eleventh Amendment immunity. See id. Nevertheless,
the district judge held that the county could be sued in federal court for the Board's
termination of Bockes, which violated her due process rights. See id. (citing Bockes, 798 F.
Supp. at 1226).
139. See Bockes, 999 F.2d at 790. According to the court, " 'the rule has evolved that a
suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in
the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.'" Id. (quoting Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,663 (1974)).
140. See id. at 790. Specifically, the Board and the Department subscribed to the
Commonwealth's Public Officials Liability Self-Insurance Plan. See id. Eighty percent of
the plan's premiums were paid by the Commonwealth, while the other twenty percent
were paid by the agency. See id. The Treasurer of Virginia managed the "separate trust
fund which covers liability that subscribing agencies incur in the discharge of their duties."
Id.
141. See id. at 791. In doing so, the Board and the Department were immune from a
former director's civil rights suit. See id. at 791. In addition, the court concluded that the
county was immune from suit because Bockes was fired pursuant to a policy which was
derived from the Commonwealth, not the county. See id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.1-
26 (Michie 1995) (providing that the state board, and not the county, has the authority to
set "general goals and programs" for social services employees)).
142. See id. at 790-91. When this was the case, none of the other Ram Ditta factors
needed to be considered, and the entity was immune from suit. See id. at 791 (citing Ram
Ditta v. Maryland Nat'l Capital Park and Planning Comm'n, 822 F.2d 456, 458-60 (4th Cir.
1987) (considering other factors when a judgment would not be satisfied from the state
treasury)).
143. 513 U.S. 30 (1994); see also Adam Adrignolo, Recent Case, 5 SETON HALL
CONST. LU. 809, 816 (1995) (commenting on Hess and concluding that "the majority
opinion established financial vulnerability of the state's treasuries as the most important
factor in determining the applicability of sovereign immunity to bi-state entities");
Schecter, supra note 9, at 453-57 (discussing how Hess simplified the test for Eleventh
Amendment immunity by focusing almost exclusively on the state treasury factor);
Winking, supra note 14, at 967-71 (same).
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Court resolved a conflict among the circuits1' and held that a bi-state
entity created pursuant to the Interstate Compact Clause' was not
entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.1"
In Hess, petitioners Albert Hess and Charles F. Walsh were
injured in unrelated accidents while working for the Port Authority
Trans-Hudson Corporation ("PATH"), a bi-state railway. 4' Both
men initiated personal injury suits in federal district court alleging
negligence.1" The district court and Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit dismissed both suits after concluding that PATH was vested
with Eleventh Amendment immunity.'49 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to clarify whether bi-state entities are vested with immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment.15'
144. See Hess, 513 U.S. at 34, 38. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
determined that the Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. (PATH) is an "agency of the
state and is thus entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity." Id. at 34 (citing Port Auth.
Police Benevolent Ass'n v. Port Auth., 819 F.2d 413, 418 (3d Cir. 1987)). However, in
1989 the Second Circuit held that PATH was not vested with immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment. See i. at 38 (citing Feeney v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 873 F.2d 628,
631 (2d Cir. 1989), aff'd on other grounds, 495 U.S. 299 (1990)). Specifically, the court
noted that because the state treasury would not be impacted by a judgment against PATH,
this factor "outweigh[ed]" other factors indicating state control. See id. (citing Feeney, 873
F.2d at 631). The Supreme Court noted that it declined to decide whether PATH enjoyed
Eleventh Amendment immunity when the Court affirmed the Second Circuit's decision in
Feeney. See id. (citing Feeney, 495 U.S. at 308-09).
145. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 ("No State shall, without the Consent of
Congress... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State .....
146. See Hess, 513 U.S. at 52.
147. See id. at 32. PATH is "a wholly owned subsidiary of the Port Authority of New
York and New Jersey... [that] operates a commuter railroad connecting New York City
to northern New Jersey." Id. at 33. PATH was created in 1921, when Congress, pursuant
to the Compact Clause of the Constitution "consented to a compact between" New York
and New Jersey. Id. at 35.
148. See id. at 33. The two workers claimed a right to compensation under the Federal
Employer's Liability Act (FELA), the federal law governing work-related injuries to
railroad workers. See id. (citing the Federal Employer's Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51
(1994)).
149. See id. at 32-33. .Hess and Walsh filed their complaints within FELA's three-year
statute of limitations, but neither man "met the [one]-year limit specified in the States'
statutory consent to sue the Port Authority." Id. at 33. PATH moved to dismiss. See id
PATH argued that as a state agency it was vested with Eleventh Amendment immunity
and that Hess and Walsh failed to initiate their suits within the one-year statute of
limitations. See id. at 34. The suits were consolidated for appeal. See id. at 35. In
granting PATH Eleventh Amendment immunity, the lower courts adhered to Third Circuit
precedent. See id. at 34 (citing Port Auth. Police BenevolentAss'n, 819 F.2d at 418).
150. See id. at 39. A secondary justification for Hess was that it forced the Court "to
respond to the underlying problem which gave rise to the case: the difficulties with the"
arm-of-the-state test in Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440
U.S. 391 (1979). See Winking, supra note 14, at 968. Specifically, since district courts had
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Writing for the majority,' Justice Ginsburg began by
acknowledging that the Eleventh Amendment was adopted primarily
in response to states' fears that federal courts would force them into
financial ruin by compelling them to pay their Revolutionary War
debts.'52 She then applied a modified version of the six-factor Lake
Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency3 test,5
4
considering the following factors: (1) whether the entity was
controlled by state or local governance; (2) whether the
difficulty applying the test in a uniform manner, many courts manipulated the factors in a
way to reach an acceptable result. See id. For example, in Feeney v. Port Authority Trans-
Hudson Corp., 873 F.2d 628 (2d Cir. 1989), affd on other grounds, 495 U.S. 299 (1990), the
Second Circuit placed a significant amount of emphasis on the impact on the state
treasury, despite the fact that Lake Country did not instruct courts to emphasize any one
factor over the other. See i at 631; see also Rogers, supra note 14, at 1269-71 (describing
how the circuits dealt with the confusing Lake Country test by developing their own tests).
For example:
The First Circuit considers seven factors[, ... the Second and Eighth Circuits are
guided by the six criteria articulated in Lake Country[,] ... and the Third Circuit
explores nine factors. The Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits [use] ... four
criteria[, ... [the] Fifth employs a six-part test[,] ... the Ninth relies only on five
criteria, [and] the Tenth looks at only two questions ....
Id. at 1269-71 (footnotes omitted).
151. Hess was a five to four decision. See Hess, 513 U.S. at 31. Justice Ginsburg
delivered the opinion of the Court. See id. She was joined by Justices Stevens, Kennedy,
Souter, and Breyer. See id. Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion. See id. at 53
(Stevens, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor dissented, and was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas. See id. at 55 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
152. See id. at 39 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 151
(1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275,
276 & n.1 (1959); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 27 (1933)).
153. 440 U.S. 391 (1979).
154. See id. at 400-02. In Lake Country, the Court denied the Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency (TRPA), a California and Nevada bi-state entity, Eleventh Amendment immunity.
See id. at 402. Specifically, the Court concluded that the entity was more similar to a local
agency than to a state. See id. at 401-02. Some years later, the Fourth Circuit, in Ristow v.
South Carolina Ports Authority, 58 F.3d 1051 (4th Cir. 1995), distilled the Lake Country
analysis to six factors:
(1) the characterization of the entity by the language of its creating statutes; (2)
the origin of the entity's funding, (3) whether the state is financially responsible
for the liabilities and obligations incurred by the entity; (4) the source of the
power to appoint the entity's officers or members; (5) whether the function
performed by the entity is traditionally state or municipal; (6) and whether the
entity's actions are subject to a veto by the state.
Id. at 1052. Moreover, Ristow noted that Ram Ditta had reduced the six-part test into a
non-exclusive four-part test. See id. at 1052 n.3. Therefore, the three non-treasury factors
in Ram Ditta are in fact similar to the Hess and Lake Country traditional factors of
immunity. See Harter, 101 F.3d at 340 ("[P]ossible harm to a state's sovereign dignity is
not a separate, free-floating factor outside of the Ram Ditta considerations. Instead, we
utilize the Ram Ditta factors to measure whether the sovereign dignity of a state would be
affected by a suit against an entity or official.").
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implementing legislation characterized the entity as a state entity; (3)
how state courts have regarded the entity; (4) whether the functions
of the entity traditionally were regarded as state or local; (5) and
whether the state treasury bore financial responsibility to the
agency." However, Hess was more difficult than Lake Country,
because in Hess, the factors pointed in different directions. 6 When,
as in Hess, the immunity factors pointed in different directions, the
Eleventh Amendment's "twin reasons for being" remained the
"prime guide."'' These "twin reasons" are the solvency of the state's
treasury and individual state sovereignty and dignity.55 The Court
summarily dismissed the state sovereignty factor by explaining that
permitting suit in federal court was not an affront to the dignity and
integrity of a Compact Clause entity, 9 and the Court emphasized
that the impetus for the Eleventh Amendment was the protection
from federal court judgments paid out of a state's treasury.1 6 As a
result, the Court proceeded to identify the "vulnerability of the
State's purse as the most salient factor in Eleventh Amendment
determinations."' 6' Moreover, this factor was to be accorded
155. See Hess, 513 U.S. at 44-45. The three non-treasury Ram Dita factors consist of
whether the entity is autonomous from the state, whether the entity is involved in local or
statewide concerns, and how the entity is treated as a matter of state law; these factors
mirror exactly the first, third, and fourth Hess factors. See Ram Ditta v. Maryland Nat'l
Capital Park & Planning Comm'n, 822 F.2d 456, 458 (4th Cir. 1987). Moreover, these
factors clearly relate to state sovereignty and control.
156. See Hess, 513 U.S. at 44-45. As Justice Ginsburg noted, in Lake Country all the
factors supported denial of immunity. See id (citing Lake Country, 440 U.S. at 402).
Conversely, in Hess, the first factor was ambiguous because PATH was subject to both
local and state control. See id. at 44. While it was required that eight of the twelve PATH
commissioners be resident voters of PATH's general district, the commissioners were
appointed by the state. See id. The second factor militated against immunity because
"[t]he compact and its implementing legislation do not type the Authority [PATH] as a
state agency; instead they use various terms [identifying PATH as a local entity]." fad at
4445. Because state courts had treated PATH as an agency of the state, the second factor
favored immunity. See id at 45 (citing Whalen v. Wagner, 4 N.Y.2d 575, 581-83 (1958)).
Moreover, the fourth factor did not advance the analysis because PATH's functions could
not be "classified as typically state or unquestionably local." Id. at 45. Finally, the state
treasury factor supported denying PATH Eleventh Amendment immunity. See i
Because PATH was fiscally independent and was financed predominantly by independent
funds, the state would not be liable for a judgment against PATH. See id.
157. Id. at 47.
158. See id at 39-41. Specifically, the Court emphasized that a bi-state entity occupied
a different position in our federal system than a single state entity. See i at 40. Whereas
states, as distinct elements of the Union were separate sovereigns, bi-state entities are the
"creations of three discrete sovereigns: two States and the Federal Government." Id.
159. See id. at 41.
160. See id at 48 (citing Fletcher, supra note 4, at 1129).
161. Id. In stressing the importance of state fiscal responsibility, the Court listed a
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significant weight even when the treasury was not forced to pay a
judgment.162 Therefore, because PATH was financially independent
and because a judgment against PATH would not impact the states'
treasuries, the Court concluded that PATH was not entitled to
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.1"
One year later in Gray v. Laws,"" the Fourth Circuit addressed
series of federal cases that confirmed that the majority of the circuits viewed the state
treasury factor as the most important in the Eleventh Amendment analysis. See id at 48-
49 (citing Baxter v. Vigo City Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 732-33 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that
the most significant factor in an Eleventh Amendment analysis is whether the entity raises
its own funds, or is dependent on the state for its funding); Hutsell v. Sayre, 5 F.3d 996, 999
(6th Cir. 1993) ("The most important factor ... is whether any monetary judgment would
be paid out of the state treasury."); Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct &
Sewer Auth., 991 F.2d 935, 942-43 (1st Cir. 1993) (providing that if the entity could not tap
the Commonwealth treasury, the entity was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity); Bolden v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 953 F.2d 807, 818 (3d Cir. 1991) (en
banc) (noting that the most important factor is whether any judgment is paid from the
state treasury); Feeney v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 873 F.2d 628, 631 (2d Cir. 1989)
(providing that if there is any doubt regarding whether to extend Eleventh Amendment
immunity to an entity, "the Supreme Court has emphasized the exposure of the state
treasury as a critical factor"), aff'd on other grounds, 495 U.S. 299 (1990)).
162. See id. at 51. In that case, there would be a strong indicator supporting a denial of
Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Court noted that the question was simple: "If the
expenditures of the enterprise exceed receipts, is the State in fact obligated to bear and
pay the resulting indebtedness of the enterprise? When the answer is 'No'--both legally
and practically-then the Eleventh Amendment's core concern is not implicated." Id.
Additionally, the Court mentioned several cases supporting the importance of the state
treasury factor when the treasury was not economically impacted. See id. at 48-49 (citing
Barket, Levy & Fine, Inc. v. St. Louis Thermal Energy Corp., 948 F.2d 1084, 1087 (8th Cir.
1991) ("Because Missouri and Ilinois are not liable for judgments against Bi-State, there
is no policy reason for extending the states' sovereign immunity to Bi-State."); Jacintoport
Corp. v. Greater Baton Rouge Port Comm'n, 762 F.2d 435, 440 (5th Cir. 1985) ("The
purpose of immunity ... largely disappears when a judgment against the entity does not
entail a judgment against the state.")).
This point was criticized by the four dissenting Justices. Written by Justice O'Connor,
the dissent argued that in making the treasury factor "[the] single overarching principle,"
the Court narrowed the scope of the Eleventh Amendment by reducing the significance of
state sovereignty. Id. at 59 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Additionally, while the dissent
stressed that Eleventh Amendment immunity vests when the state treasury is forced to
pay judgment, the dissent argued that the converse-denying an entity immunity when the
treasury is not economically impacted-is not valid. See id. at 60-61. (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). In contrast, the dissent favored an examination into the degree of state
control over the entity to determine if immunity was proper. See id. at 61-62. (O'Connor,
J., dissenting). This would allow, the dissent explained, a situation where immunity would
vest due to significant state control despite the fact that the treasury would not be directly
impacted. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
163. See id. at 52-53.
164. 51 F.3d 426 (4th Cir. 1995). For a thorough discussion of Gray and Eleventh
Amendment immunity, see Thomas R. Johnson, Note, The Eleventh Amendment-The
Fourth Circuit's Adaptation of Hess v. Trans-Hudson Port Authority Corp. in Gray v.
Laws, 75 N.C. L REv. 347 (1996).
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Eleventh Amendment immunity in light of Hess." After briefly
reviewing Hess, the court noted several confusing aspects of the
decision.'" For example, in Hess, the Court did not explain whether
courts should consider the importance of the state treasury and state
sovereignty factors when the traditional factors pointed in the same
direction.'67 Moreover, the Court neglected to "ascribe relative
weights to these factors or explain the interrelationship of these two
considerations.""'
The court recognized that a determination that the state treasury
would be responsible for a judgment was "largely, if not wholly,
dispositive of entitlement to Eleventh Amendment immunity."''
However, the court found that when the state treasury would not be
directly affected, a determination of immunity should be guided by
the other relevant considerations referenced by the [Hess]
Court, chief among which are whether the suit will
jeopardize "the integrity retained by [the] State in our
federal system" and whether the state possesses such
control over the entity claiming Eleventh Amendment
immunity that it can legitimately be considered an "arm of
the state."'"7
In addition to the court's inconsistency in stating which factors
were most important under Hess to determine Eleventh Amendment
immunity, the Gray court was unable to coordinate the significance
of Ram Ditta in light of Hess.7' For example, the court concluded
165. See Gray, 51 F.3d at 426. Although Hess involved a bi-state entity formed under
the Compact Clause of the Constitution, the Gray court concluded that the Eleventh
Amendment's "twin reasons for being," should be equally relevant in the context of a
single state entity. Id. at 432. This conclusion is somewhat troubling because the Hess
Court clearly distinguished differences between bi-state entities and states or single-state
entities. See Hess, 513 U.S. at 40-43; see also Johnson, supra note 164, at 374 (stating that
in Gray, the court "wrestled multistate jurisprudence into a settled single-entity analysis").
166. See Gray, 51 F.3d at 433.
167. See id.
168. Id. Also, the Court failed to articulate how the "other factors influence ... the
central inquiry into the action's effect on the state's treasury and sovereignty." Id.
169. Id. (citing Hess, 513 U.S. at 48; Bockes v. Fields, 999 F.3d 788, 790-91 (4th Cir.
1993)).
170. Id. at 434 (quoting Hess, 513 U.S. at 39). However, the Gray court neglected the
fact that Hess deemed the state treasury factor as the most important immunity
consideration regardless of whether the treasury was economically impacted. See Hess,
513 U.S. at 48-51; see also supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text (discussing same).
Placing a heightened importance on state sovereignty and control when the state treasury
is not impacted was the foundation of the dissent's argument in Hess. See Hess, 513 U.S. at
61 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
171. See Gray, 151 F.3d at 434-35.
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that "we do not believe that Hess... materially altered the Eleventh
Amendment analysis we formulated in Ram Ditta,"'' and it
emphasized that the changes in the immunity analysis as a result of
Hess were "arguably ... not significant ... but neither [were] they
inconsequential."'73 In addition, the court stated that a modification
of the Ram Ditta test was necessary only to add state sovereignty as a
primary concern "and to formulate differently several of the other
relevant considerations that [the court] had previously
enumerated."'74 Although this language suggests more than minor
modifications to the Ram Ditta test, the court did not elaborate.'
Instead, the court deferred to the district court to decide the
Eleventh Amendment issue.7
The Gray court's failure to provide meaningful guidance is
evidenced by the lack of continuity among federal district courts in
North Carolina. Following Gray, the courts were hopelessly split on
whether there is Eleventh Amendment immunity for county sheriffs.
While three judges in the Eastern District held that a North Carolina
sheriff is a state actor entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity,'"
172. Id. at 434. Specifically, the court noted that it recognized in Ram Dina the
importance of the impact on the treasury. See i. (citing Ram Ditta v. Maryland Nat'l
Capital Park and Planning Comm'n, 822 F.2d 456, 457 (4th Cir. 1987)). In addition, the
court acknowledged that "each of the other considerations enumerated in Ram Dina was
recognized in Hess as relevant to the question of Eleventh Amendment immunity." Id.
However, the Gray court seemed to forget that in Hess and in Ram Dina, the state
treasury did not have to pay a judgment, which was the most salient factor militating
toward a denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Hess, 513 U.S. at 46; Ram Ditta v.
Maryland Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n, 822 F.2d 456, 458 (4th Cir. 1987).
173. Gray, 51 F.3d at 434.
174. Id. The court, however, offered no guidance concerning how and to what extent
this reformulation should be accomplished. Moreover, Gray's confusion was epitomized
by leaving "undetermined the questions of federal-state comity and state control in the
[Eleventh Amendment] analysis, alternatively placing them as 'chief concerns in the
immunity analysis and [then] on an equal footing with other Lake Country factors."
Johnson, supra note 164, at 374.
175. See Gray, 51 F.3d at 434.
176. See id. The court stated that "[t]he district court is in the best position to address
in the first instance the competing questions of fact and state law necessary to resolve the
... issue." Id. Moreover, in its recommendations to the district court on remand, the Gray
court dealt almost completely with the state treasury factor. See id. at 435-37.
Specifically, the Gray court directed the district court to statutory provisions that indicated
whether a judgment against the defendants would be paid from the state treasury. See id.
at 435 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-300.8 (1993) (providing that the state treasury will
pay judgments against local health department employees in limited situations)); see also
Johnson, supra note 164, at 358-59 nn.74-76 (examining the relevant North Carolina
statutory provisions indicating whether judgments against local health department
employees and local health departments are paid out of the state treasury).
177. See Harter, 101 F.3d at 338 (citing Braswell v. Ellis, 950 F. Supp. 145, 147
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judges in the Middle and Western Districts characterized a sheriff as
a local official and denied Eleventh Amendment immunity."
Moreover, North Carolina state courts also were split over whether
sheriffs are local or state officials under the Eleventh Amendment;
two state courts held that a sheriff was a state official, while another
examined the relevant sections of the North Carolina Constitution
and determined that a sheriff was a local officer.179
It was against this historical backdrop that the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decided Harter and
concluded that a North Carolina county sheriff was not an arm of the
state entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity."' The basis of the
majority decision was that the Ram Ditta test ''8 read in conjunction
with the Hess test',  mandated weighing the impact on the state
treasury as the most significant factor." Specifically, the court stated
that when the state treasury was forced to pay a judgment, Eleventh
Amendment immunity was proper, and no other considerations were
needed."f Moreover, the court also stated that a lack of impact on
the state treasury weighed heavily in favor of a determination that
the entity would not be entitled to immunity." However, in this
case, the other Ram Ditta factors, which were similar to the Hess
factors, were to be considered. 8
The Harter holding" is consistent with the historical precedent
(E.D.N.C. 1995) (holding a North Carolina sheriff immune from liability under an official
capacity suit by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment); Merritt v. Beckham, No. 5:94-CV-
462-BO (3), 1995 WL 907879, at *1-2 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 8, 1995) (same); Edwards v. Smith,
No. 5:94-CT-24-BR, 1994 WL 910950, at *1 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 22,1994) (same)).
178. See id. at 338 (citing Carter v. Good, 951 F. Supp. 1235, 1247 (W.D.N.C. 1996)
(holding that a North Carolina sheriff is not a state official for Eleventh Amendment
immunity purposes); Harter v. Vernon, 953 F. Supp. 685, 692 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (same)).
179. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text (briefly summarizing these state
court determinations).
180. See Harter, 101 F.3d at 343.
181. See Ram Ditta v. Maryland Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n, 822 F.2d 456,
457-58 (4th Cir. 1987); see also supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text (describing the
elements of the test).
182. See Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44-49 (1994); see also
supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text (describing the test).
183. See Harter, 101 F.3d at 343.
184. See id. at 339.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. Although Judge Luttig dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc because he
believed that the Harter court misread Hess and Gray, he did not criticize the
determination that North Carolina sheriffs were not arms of the state for Eleventh
Amendment purposes. See U at 343-46 (Luttig, J., dissenting). Rather, Judge Luttig
questioned the immunity test involved in making the determination. See ia. at 344 (Luttig,
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in several respects. First, extensive reliance on the state treasury
factor to determine Eleventh Amendment immunity is consistent
with what many think was the intent of Congress in adopting the
amendment-to protect state treasuries from Revolutionary War
debt."
Second, although the Harter court did sidestep the state
sovereignty consideration by deeming it less important than the state
treasury factor," this was entirely consistent with Hess and Ram
Ditta.! In Hess, the Court noted that because the immunity factors
pointed in different directions, the Court would be guided by the
impact on the state treasury and state sovereignty, "the Eleventh
Amendment's twin reasons for being."'' However, the Court
focused on why the impact on the state treasury was the "most
salient factor in Eleventh Amendment [immunity] determinations."''
Moreover, in Ram Ditta, the Fourth Circuit succinctly stated that "it
J., dissenting). Specifically, he believed that the Harter court ignored the sovereignty
factor. See id. (Luttig, J., dissenting). For a further discussion of Judge Luttig's dissent,
see supra notes 94-104 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 11 and accompanying text; see also Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116
S. Ct. 1114, 1143 (Stevens, I., dissenting) ("There is no difficulty in finding [the] cause [of
the Eleventh Amendment] . . .. 'Those who were inhibited from commencing a suit against
a State, or from prosecuting one which might be commenced before the adoption of the
amendment, were persons who might probably be its creditors."' (quoting Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 407 (1821))); Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 406-07
(1821) ("[A]t the adoption of the [C]onstitution, all the States were greatly indebted; and
the apprehension that these debts might be prosecuted in the federal courts ... [prompted
the Eleventh Amendment] to be proposed in Congress, and adopted by the State
legislatures."); Fletcher, supra note 4, at 1129 (identifying "the award of money judgments
against the states [as] the traditional core of eleventh amendment protection").
Additionally, as Professor Orth explained:
Always a dollars and cents proposition, the Amendment was adopted to overturn
[Chisholm] .... Fearful of suits by British creditors and American Tories whose
property had been confiscated during the Revolution, the states amended the
Constitution to deprive federal courts of jurisdiction over suits against states by
citizens of another state or by foreigners.
ORTH, supra note 1, at 7.
189. The court noted that the sovereign dignity of the states was not a separate
consideration to be examined independently. See Harter, 101 F.3d at 340. Rather, the
court stressed that it would "utilize the Ram Dia factors to measure whether the
sovereign dignity of a state would be affected by a suit against an entity or official." Id.
190. For a discussion on the Hess and Ram Ditta decisions, see supra notes 125-37, 143-
63 and accompanying text.
191. Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 39-40, 47 (1994). The Hess
Court summarily dismissed the state sovereignty factor by concluding that denying
immunity to a bi-state entity was not an affront to the integrity and dignity of the entity.
See id. at 41-42.
192. Id. at 48-49. The Court provided an exhaustive list of cases supporting this point.
See supra notes 161-62.
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is generally held that the most important consideration is whether
the state treasury will be responsible for paying any judgment that
might be awarded. '
Third, the Harter court was not alone in emphasizing the
importance of the state treasury in Eleventh Amendment immunity
determinations. As the Hess Court recognized, virtually every other
circuit court of appeals also has deemed the impact on the state
treasury as the most important factor.m
Fourth, focusing heavily on the state treasury, at the expense of
other factors such as state sovereignty, effectively narrows the scope
of the Eleventh Amendment because it reduces the likelihood that
an entity will be awarded immunity. This is beneficial, according to
many Justices and scholars, because any restriction of the Eleventh
Amendment's scope is closer to the plain language of the
amendment.'
However, in reaching its decision, the Harter court ignored the
"nuanced analysis" articulated in Gray.196 The Gray court stressed
193. Ram Ditta v. Maryland Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n, 822 F.2d 456, 457
(4th Cir. 1987).
194. See Hess, 513 U.S. at 48-49; see also supra notes 161-62.
195. See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text (describing the narrow language of
the Eleventh Amendment and the Court's subsequent expansion of the list of entities that
would be provided with immunity); see also supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text
(citing judges and scholars who have criticized the expansive interpretation of the
Eleventh Amendment as violating the plain meaning of the amendment's text); Marshall,
supra note 119, at 1371 (" 'If gentlemen pervert the most clear expressions, and the usual
meaning of the language of the people, there is an end of all argument.'" (quoting 3
JONATHAN ELLIOT, TiE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 543 (William S. Hein & Co. 1996) (2d ed.
1888))).
However, other judges have believed that a broad reading of the Eleventh
Amendment is consistent with the Constitutional Framers' intent to protect the sovereign
immunity of states in the Union. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890) ("It is
inherent in the nature of sovereignty [for a state] not to be amenable to the suit of an
individual without [a state's] consent." (quoting THE FEDERAUST No. 81, at 416-17
(Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 1987))); see also id. at 20 ("[T]he obligations of a
State rest for their performance upon its honor and good faith, and cannot be made the
subjects of judicial cognizance unless the State consents to be sued, or comes itself into
court .... "). Hans has been the foundation of an expansive interpretation of the
Amendment. See supra note 118 (providing Justice Souter's belief that the Hans holding,
and not the text of the Eleventh Amendment, is the basis for an expansive interpretation
of Eleventh Amendment immunity). Most recently, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, the majority in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S.
Ct. 1114, 1116 (1996), relied on Hans to expand Eleventh Amendment immunity even
further. See ia at 1122, 1127, 1130. For a discussion of Hans, see supra notes 112-17 and
accompanying text.
196. See Harter, 101 F.3d at 345 (Luttig, J., dissenting).
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that wh6n the treasury was not implicated, the court should focus on
other relevant considerations, "chiefly" state sovereignty and state
control.' 7 Although the state treasury was not affected in Harter, the
court ignored Gray and continued to deem the effect on the state
treasury as the most significant factor in the immunity
determination.'
Ignoring the Gray decision is justified on several levels.
Although Judge Luttig, the author of the Gray opinion, criticized the
Harter court for flagrantly disregarding Gray,' it was Gray that
ignored the earlier precedent in Hess and Ram Ditta. Specifically,
the Gray court ignored the Hess Court's admonition that the treasury
factor was the most salient element in the immunity analysis even
when the treasury was not implicated.' Not only did the Hess Court
fail to distinguish between situations when the state treasury would
or would not pay a judgment, 0' the Court explicitly stated that the
state treasury factor was dispositive even when the treasury was not
affected.' Most importantly, the treasury factor was dispositive in
Hess, despite the fact that the state treasury was not responsible for a
potential judgment.203
197. See Gray v. Laws, 51 F.3d 426, 434 (4th Cir. 1995). This point was one of Sheriff
Vernon's main arguments. He stressed that if the state was not responsible for the
judgment, the determinative factor was the sovereign dignity of the state. See Hater, 101
F.3d at 339. Judge Luttig also expressed this concern in his dissent for rehearing en bane.
See i at 344 (Luttig, J., dissenting). Judge Luttig argued that "neither Hess nor Gray
implied that Eleventh Amendment concerns are to be downgraded ... when the state
treasury is not implicated. Yet this is exactly what today's opinion purports to do." Id. at
345 (Luttig, J., dissenting). Judge Luttig also believed that the Harter court essentially
ignored the state sovereignty factor "by holding that it is not an independent factor, but
merely a proxy for the other [Ram Dita] factors collectively." Id. at 344 (Luttig, J.,
dissenting).
198. See Harter, 101 F.3d at 340. According to Harter, if the state treasury is not
responsible for a judgment against the entity or officer, "the most decisive factor weighs
against Eleventh Amendment immunity." Id.
199. See id. at 343 (Luttig, J., dissenting).
200. See Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30,48-49 (1994).
201. See iU. In its discussion, the court listed cases illustrating the importance of the
impact on the treasury, among which were several decisions where immunity was not
granted because the treasury was not affected. See iU; see also supra note 162 (listing
these cases). For example, the Court noted that "'[t]he purpose of immunity ... largely
disappears when a judgment against the entity does not entail a judgment against the
state."' Hess, 513 U.S. at 49 (quoting Jacintoport Corp. v. Greater Baton Rouge Port
Comm'n, 762 F.2d 435,440 (5th Cir. 1985)).
202. See Hess, 513 U.S. at 48-49. According to Hess, if the answer to whether the state
would have to pay a judgment against the entity is "No' --both legally and practically-
then the Eleventh Amendment's core concern [the treasury] is not implicated." Id. at 51.
203. See id. at 37,48-49,52-53.
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Similarly, the Gray court also ignored Ram Ditta because it
neglected to consider Ram Ditta's conclusion that "it is generally
held that the most important consideration is whether the state
treasury will be responsible for paying any judgment that might be
awarded. 2 4 Moreover, as with Hess, the Ram Ditta court deemed
the state treasury factor as the most important component even when
the treasury was not affected.s
On another level, the Harter court's failure to adhere to Gray's
"nuanced analysis" is justified because of the confusion inherent in
Gray. The Gray court stated that it "d[id] not believe that Hess ...
materially altered the Eleventh Amendment analysis [the Fourth
Circuit] formulated in [Ram Ditta]."' But the Gray test as applied
bore no relation to either Hess or Ram Ditta °.2 " Adding to the
confusion, the court then stated that while "the changes ... wrought
by Hess [on Ram Ditta] are not significant ..., neither are they
inconsequential."" Having made these observations, the court
provided a rough framework of the appropriate analysis and
remanded the case to the district court to consider "in light of this
opinion and Hess.' '21 The inadequacy of "leaving the particulars of
204. Ram Ditta v. Maryland Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n, 822 F.2d 456, 457
(4th Cir. 1987) (citing Hall v. Medical College, 742 F.2d 299, 304 (6th Cir. 1984); Laje v.
M.E. Thomason Gen. Hosp., 665 F.2d 724, 727 (5th Cir. 1982); Blake v. Cline, 612 F.2d
718,723-24,726 (3rd Cir. 1979); Mler-Davis Co. v. ]llinois State Toll Highway Auth., 567
F.2d 323,327 (7th Cir. 1977)).
205. See id. at 456.
206. Gray v. Laws, 51 F.3d. 426, 434 (4th Cir. 1995). In Gray, the court began its
analysis by stressing that the Hess Court had failed to provide guidance about whether the
state treasury and sovereignty factors were dispositive if they "suggest[ed] the same
conclusion, regardless of the conclusion suggested by the other [traditional] factors." Id. at
433. Moreover, the Gray court was also critical of the Hess Court's reliance on the state
treasury and state sovereignty factors because they seemingly applied only when the
traditional indicators of immunity pointed in different directions. See id. Finally, Gray
remarked that Hess "did not ascribe relative weights to [the state treasury and state
sovereignty] factors or explain the interrelationship of these two considerations." Id.
207. Essentially, the Gray test placed a heightened importance on state sovereignty
and control when the state treasury is not affected. See iU This emphasis is ironic because
the Gray test almost exactly mirrors the argument of the Hess dissent. See Hess, 513 U.S.
at 61 (O'Connor, I., dissenting) (arguing that when the treasury is not directly affected,
"[a]n emphasis on control, rather than impact on the state treasury, adequately protects
state managerial prerogatives while retaining a crucial check against abuse").
208. Gray, 51 F.3d at 434.
209. Id. The court concluded that Hess would necessitate regarding the concern for
state sovereignty as a primary factor and "reformulat[ing] differently several of the other
relevant considerations that we had previously enumerated." Id. at 434. How this was to
be accomplished was never discussed. Rather, the court stated that " '[t]he District Court
is in the best position to address in the first instance the competing questions of fact and
state law necessary to resolve the Eleventh amendment issue.'" Id. (quoting Keller v.
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the Eleventh Amendment analysis somewhat undefined ... resulted
in confusion among the district courts, including the split in North
Carolina district courts as to the Eleventh Amendment immunity of
North Carolina sheriffs.,
210
Therefore, if for no other reason, the Harter test is
commendable for its simplicity. One reason the Court granted
certiorari in Hess was to simplify the Lake Country six-factor, arm-
of-the-state doctrine.21' Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Hess, there was considerable confusion in circuit courts of appeals
regarding how to apply the complicated, fact-intensive, six-factor
Lake County test.2' Hess simplified the Lake Country test by
increasing the emphasis on the state treasury. The same can be said
of Harter. Although the Harter test is both simplistic and restrictive,
it should be a far easier predictive tool for district courts to apply
than the Gray test. While the Gray court seemed utterly confused on
how to reconcile Ram Ditta with Hess, the Harter test's focus on the
impact on the state treasury reduces the analysis considerably."
The decision of the Harter court to simplify the Fourth Circuit
test for determining immunity under the Eleventh Amendment and
to find that North Carolina county sheriffs cannot hide behind the
shield of the Eleventh Amendment is a logical extension of judicial
and academic views in favor of narrowing the scope of the Eleventh
Amendment. 4 Additionally, Harter also is justified by the trend in
arm-of-the-state Eleventh Amendment analysis to focus on the
Prince George's County, 827 F.2d 952, 964 (4th Cir. 1987)). Finally, the Gray court's
recommendations to the district court focused almost exclusively on the state treasury
factor, at the expense of any insight regarding how state sovereignty and control fit into
the equation. See id. at 435-37; see also supra note 176 (further describing this point).
210. Harter, 101 F.3d at 338. For a brief discussion of the split, see supra notes 177-78
and accompanying text. It is ironic that Judge Luttig concluded his dissent by stating that
Harter's misreading of Gray would "hopelessly confuse the district courts of this circuit."
Id. at 345 (Luttig, J., dissenting). It was the North Carolina district courts which suffered a
lack of guidance and direction from the inadequate analysis and confusion inherent in
Gray. See id at 346 (Luttig, J., dissenting). It is interesting that Judge Luttig wrote both
the Gray opinion and the Harter dissent in which he criticized Harter for misreading Gray.
211. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
213. If the state treasury is responsible for a judgment, the entity or officer is immune
from suit in federal court. See Harter, 101 F.3d at 340-41. Moreover, if the state treasury
is not directly affected, a strong basis exists for denying the entity immunity. See id. In
that case, however, the court should consider the three other Ram Dina factors-
autonomy from the state, involvement in local rather than state concerns, and treatment
under state law. See id.
214. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
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validity of the test as a predictive tool."
Within the Fourth Circuit, the confusion regarding the proper
test for determining Eleventh Amendment immunity was epitomized
in the Gray v. Laws decision, or lack thereof. Not only did Gray
misread Hess and Ram Ditta, but it also failed to provide any
predictive authority to assist district courts in their Eleventh
Amendment analysis. As a result, Harter was decided at a time when
there was no consistency in the district courts on how to address
Eleventh Amendment immunity."' The simplicity of Harter's
emphasis on the state treasury factor adheres to what many scholars
believed was the impetus behind the ratification of the Eleventh
Amendment-protection of the state treasury. Moreover, although
the Harter test is restrictive, it will end confusion in the district courts
and remain closer to the plain language of the Eleventh
Amendment.
CHRISTOPHER BUCHHOLTZ
215. See supra note 150 and accompanying text (illustrating that part of Hess'
importance was that it simplified the Lake Country test and helped to end confusion in the
circuits); see also supra note 125-31 (noting that Ram Ditta simplified Fourth Circuit
Eleventh Amendment arm-of-the-state analysis by introducing a four-factor test).
216. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text (describing the split in the North
Carolina district courts regarding the Eleventh Amendment immunity of county sheriffs).
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Driving Drunk into Double Jeopardy: State v. Oliver
It has been estimated "that over one-half of the population of
the United States will be involved in an accident involving a drunk
driver during their lifetime."' This is a frightening statistic, especially
because alcohol is present disproportionately in crashes resulting in
fatalities and serious injuries. In 1995 alone, there were 17,274
deaths caused by drunk drivers Because of such statistics, the early
1980s witnessed "a groundswell of public indignation" over drunk
driving.4 As a result, a "flood of legislation" attempted to solve the
problem during this period.5
In North Carolina, Governor James B. Hunt, Jr. directed the
Governor's Crime Commission in 1981 to concentrate on the
problem of the drinking driver.6 The commission issued a report in
1982 that recommended a number of changes in the drunk driving
laws, including a recommendation to "[e]nact a statute calling for an
immediate ten-day administrative revocation of a driver's license for
operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content of 0.10
percent or more."7 The legislature enacted this proposal in 1983 as
part of the Safe Roads Act.'
1. Theodore A. Bruce & Patricia R. Bruce, The Legislative Response to the Drunk
Driving Dilemma: An Empirical Analysis of Its Success and Failure, 33 ST. Louis U. LJ.
177,178(1988).
2. See . LAURENCE Ross, DmERRING THm DRINKING DRIvER: LEGAL PoLicy
AND SOCIAL CONTROL 4 (1984).
3. See Matthew L Wald, Out of the Media Spotlight, Drunken-Driving Deaths
Increase, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 29,1996, at A25.
4. L Poindexter Watts, The Drinking-Driving Problem: Assessing Some Proposed
Solutions, POPULAR GOV'T, Winter 1983, at 20,20; see also Bennett R- Beach, Is the Party
Finally Over?, TIME Apr. 26, 1982, at 58, 58 (discussing the increased awareness of the
drunk driving problem); Arlen J. Large, Death on the Road, WALL ST. 1., Apr. 20,1982, at
Al (same); Mark Starr et al., The War Against Drunk Drivers, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 13, 1982,
at 34,34 (same); Mark Starr & Dan Shapiro, How Drunks Get Off, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 13,
1982, at 38,38 (discussing common defenses used by drunk drivers).
5. Ross, supra note 2, at xxv. "In 1982, for example, 378 bills relating to drunk
driving were introduced in 37 states .... ." Id.
6. See Watts, supra note 4, at 20.
7. Id. at 26.
8. 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 435 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.5
(1993)). The statute provides for a mandatory 10-day license suspension after a judicial
official reviews a revocation report filed by an arresting officer and chemical analyst and
determines there is probable cause to suspend the license. See id. This statute differs
slightly from the license suspension statutes of other states. For instance, in North
NORTH CAROLINA L4 W REVIEW
Initial challenges to this law on due process and double jeopardy
grounds failed, but recent Supreme Court decisions beginning with
United States v. Halper9 have forced many states to reconsider the
issue." The North Carolina Supreme Court addressed the issue in
State v. Olivet" and held that the automatic license revocation
provision did not constitute punishment and did not bar a
subsequent driving while intoxicated ("DWI") prosecution under the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution."
This Note first discusses the court's decision in Oliver and the
reasoning the court employed to support its decision.' The Note
then outlines the double jeopardy issue implicated by such laws and
the pre-Halper decisions which found that license revocation was not
punishment for double jeopardy purposes. 4 The Note next discusses
the United States Supreme Court decisions that have cast some
doubt on these earlier license revocation cases.' In analyzing Oliver
in light of these decisions, the Note demonstrates that the Oliver
court's conclusion is justified only under a narrow interpretation of
Halper.'6 Finally, the Note illustrates how the court's interpretation
of the license revocation statute in Oliver might weaken its earlier
due process analysis. 7
On June 24, 1994, Norman Lee Oliver, Jr. was charged with
DWI in violation of § 20-138.1 of the North Carolina General
Carolina, suspensions are often longer-ranging from 30 to 90 days; also, while North
Carolina provides for immediate review by a judicial official, see id. § 20-16.5(g), some
states allow for a temporary permit until judicial review is available. See, e.g., CAL. VEH.
CODE § 23157(f) (West 1997) (immediate license suspension with a 30-day temporary
permit); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2742 (1995) (immediate three-month suspension with a
15-day temporary permit, and allowing a request for a hearing); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 322.2615(b) (West 1997) (immediate six-month suspension with a 30-day temporary
permit, and allowing 10 days to request a hearing); MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. II § 16-
205.1 (1996) (immediate 45-day suspension with a 45-day temporary permit and allowing
10 days to request a hearing); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.123 (West 1997) (90-day
suspension becoming effective after the commissioner of public safety notifies the driver of
the intention to revoke, with the possibility of administrative and judicial review).
9. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
10. See infra notes 154,158,165, 185, 217.
11. 343 N.C. 202,470 S.E.2d 16 (1996).
12. See id. at 210, 470 S.E.2d at 21.
13. See in.fra notes 18-59 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 60-90 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 91-142 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 143-207 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 208-27 and accompanying text.
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Statutes.18 After advising Oliver of his rights regarding the
breathalyzer test, State Highway Patrol Trooper E.L. Morris, the
charging officer, administered the test, which revealed Oliver's blood
alcohol concentration to be 0.08 percent. 9 Trooper Morris then
completed a revocation report, which was submitted to the
magistrate.' After reviewing the report, the magistrate entered an
order revoking Oliver's driver's license for ten days." His license
was restored at the expiration of the ten-day period when he paid the
fifty-dollar restoration fee.'
On May 4, 1995, Oliver was found guilty of DWI in district
court.' He appealed to superior court and filed a motion to dismiss
on the grounds that under the Double Jeopardy Clause,. his
previous license revocation precluded criminal prosecution for
DWI. He also filed a motion to suppress the result of the
breathalyzer test on the grounds that Trooper Morris was required to
take him before another officer to inform him of his rights under
state law.'6
18. See Oliver, 343 N.C. at 204, 470 S.E.2d at 18. Section 20-138.1(a) of the North
Carolina General Statutes provides:
A person commits the offense of impaired driving if he drives any vehicle upon
any highway [or] any street...
(1) While under the influence of an impairing substance; or
(2) After having consumed sufficient alcohol that he has, at any relevant time
after the driving, an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-138.1(a) (1993).
19. See Oliver, 343 N.C. at 205, 470 S.E.2d at 18. At the time of the testing, "Trooper






24. The Double Jeopardy Clause provides: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
25. See Oliver, 343 N.C. at 205,470 S.E.2d at 18.
26. See id. Prior to the administration of a breathalyzer test, North Carolina law
requires the following procedures:
Any person who drives a vehicle on a highway or public vehicular area thereby
gives consent to a chemical analysis if charged with an implied-consent offense.
The charging officer must designate the type of chemical analysis to be
administered, and it may be administered when the officer has reasonable
grounds to believe that the person charged has committed the implied-consent
offense.
Except as provided in this subsection or subsection (b), before any type of
chemical analysis is administered the person charged must be taken before a
chemical analyst authorized to administer a test of a person's breath, who must
inform the person orally and also give the person a notice ....
1997] 2317
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The North Carolina Supreme Court first considered the double
jeopardy claim?27 Before analyzing Oliver's specific assertions, the
court examined United States Supreme Court cases beginning with
Halper in order to ascertain the appropriate standard to determine if
the license revocation constituted punishment under the Double
Jeopardy Clause." Based on this review, the court concluded:
[T]he narrow issue before this Court is whether the ten-day
driver's license revocation... cannot fairly be said to serve
a remedial purpose because the revocation also serves the
goals of punishment such that defendant's subsequent
criminal conviction for DWI amounts to a second
punishment for the same offense in violation of the Double
Jeopardy Clause.'
The court determined that the license revocation served a
remedial purpose and therefore did not constitute punishment." In
support of this conclusion, the court first reasoned that
"[h]istorically, this Court has long viewed drivers' license revocations
as civil, not criminal, in nature. ''" 1 The court then relied on language
from Henry v. Edmisten,3 2 which held that license revocation did not
violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution." In
Henry, the court noted that
[a]fter a person charged with impaired driving fails a breath
test, prompt remedial action by the state is needed. Such a
person ... represents a demonstrated present as well as
appreciable future hazard to highway safety. The safety of
the impaired driver and other people using the state's
highways depends upon immediately denying the impaired
If the charging officer or an arresting officer is authorized to administer a
chemical analysis of a person's breath and the charging officer designates a
chemical analysis of the blood of the person charged, the charging officer or the
arresting officer may give the person charged the oral and written notice of rights
required by this subsection.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.2(a) (1993).
27. See Oliver, 343 N.C. at 205-10,470 S.E.2d at 18-21.
28. See id. at 206-07,470 S.E.2d at 19.
29. Id. at 207,470 S.E.2d at 19.
30. See id.
31. Id. at 207, 470 S.E.2d at 20; see infra notes 64-90 and accompanying text
(discussing earlier cases that categorize license revocation as civil instead of criminal).
32. 315 N.C. 474,340 S.E.2d 720 (1986).
33. See id. at 476, 340 S.E.2d at 723. The Fourteenth Amendment provides: "[N]or
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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driver access to the public roads. 4
The Oliver court rejected the defendant's claim that Henry was
inapplicable to his case by stating that "[w]hile Henry did not present
the Court ... with an issue involving the principles of double
jeopardy, we nevertheless find persuasive the Court's analysis." 5
The defendant in Oliver also argued that license revocation was
not solely remedial because the legislature intended the revocation
to have deterrent and retributive effects. 6 In rejecting this argument,
the court again quoted Henry and stated that " '[w]hatever the intent
of individual proponents of the bill, the bill as finally enacted reflects
an intent by the legislature for the revocation provision to be a
remedial measure.' 7
After relying on prior cases and legislative intent to conclude
that the revocation procedure was solely remedial, the court stated
that it was "not persuaded in light of Halper ... to depart from the
repeated holdings of this Court characterizing the purpose of drivers'
license revocations as remedial rather than as punishment." 8 The
court noted that in Halper, the Supreme Court labeled its holding as
a "'rule for the rare case'" and that the sanction Halper faced was
"'overwhelmingly disproportionate to the damages.' ",9 However,
since the license revocation in Oliver was "neither [an] excessive nor
overwhelmingly disproportionate" response to the dangers presented
by a drunken driver, it was not the rare case contemplated by
Halper.'
The court recognized that license revocation has deterrent
effects but observed that the punitive aspects of a sanction should
"not be determined from the defendant's perspective since 'even
34. Henry, 315 N.C. at 494, 340 S.E.2d at 733.
35. Oliver, 343 N.C. at 208,470 S.E.2d at 20.
36. See id. The defendant cited Institute of Government commentary stating:
This [revocation] provision serves a couple of functions important to the
Governor and the proponents of the bill. First, it provides an immediate "slap in
the face" to virtually all drivers charged with DWI. Second, the fact that it is
imposed independent of the trial on the criminal charge makes it more certain
that a sanction will be imposed, regardless of the defendant's status or his
lawyer's expertise.
James C. Drennan, Inpaired Driving: The Safe Roads Act, in NORTH CAROLINA
LEGISLATION 1983: A SUMMARY OF LEGISLATION IN THE 1983 GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF
INTERESTTO NORTH CAROLINA PUBLIC OFFICLmLs 114,117 (Ann L Sawyer ed., 1983).
37. Oliver, 343 N.C. at 209, 470 S.E.2d at 21 (quoting Henry, 315 N.C. at 495, 340
S.E.2d at 734).
38. Id.
39. Id. (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435,449 (1989)).
40. Id.
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remedial sanctions carry the sting of punishment.' ,,' Because any
deterrent effects of license revocation were "merely incidental" to
the purpose of protecting public safety, these deterrent effects did
not change the remedial nature of the revocation.42
Furthermore, the court stated that a driver's license was "'not a
natural or unrestricted right, nor [was] it a contract or property right
in the constitutional sense.' , As a conditional privilege, a license
can be issued and revoked according to conditions prescribed by the
General Assembly." Since the revocation was merely a recognition
of the driver's failure to adhere to these conditions, it could not be
punishment.'
After rejecting the double jeopardy claim, the court also
rejected the defendant's argument that § 20-16.2 of the North
Carolina General Statutes requires an officer, other than the
arresting officer, to notify a person charged with DWI of his rights
regarding the breathalyzer test in order for the test results to be
admissible in a criminal prosecution.4 The defendant relied on
Nicholson v. Killens.47 In Nicholson, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals upheld a trial court decision rescinding the revocation of a
defendant's license for refusing to submit to a breathalyzer test
because the arresting officer had failed to have another officer
inform him of his rights regarding the chemical breath analysis.'
However, the Oliver court noted that the Nicholson holding was
limited to the statutes governing automatic license revocation
resulting from a refusal to submit to breath analysis.49 Therefore, the
court concluded, the failure of the charging officer to take the
defendant before another officer to notify him of his rights had no
adverse effect on the subsequent criminal prosecution."
The court then addressed an apparent inconsistency in the
statute governing chemical analysis. 1 Even though the statute
41. Id. (quoting Halper, 490 U.S. at 447 n.7).
42. See id. at 209-10, 470 S.E.2d at 21.




46. See id. at 213, 470 S.E.2d at 23.
47. 116 N.C. App. 473,448 S.E.2d 542 (1994).
48. See id. at 478, 448 S.E.2d at 544.
49. See Oliver, 343 N.C. at 211, 470 S.E.2d at 22 (citing Nicholson, 116 N.C. App. at
478-79, 448 S.E.2d at 545).
50. See id. (citing Nicholson, 116 N.C. App. at 478,448 S.E.2d at 544).
51. See id at 211-13, 470 S.E.2d at 22-23; see also supra note 26 (quoting N.C. GEN.
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requires the charging officer to take a defendant before another
officer prior to performing chemical analysis of his breath, the
charging or arresting officer may give the defendant the requisite
oral and written notice of rights when chemical analysis of the blood
is to be performed' 2 To reconcile this inconsistency, the court stated
that all parts of a statute "should be construed together and
compared with each other" so as to resolve any reconcilable
ambiguity and "effectuate the true legislative intent."
To ascertain the true legislative intent of § 20-16.2(a), the court
considered the apparent conflict between the sections governing
administrative revocation and § 20-139.1(bl), the section governing
the admissibility of chemical analysis in criminal proceedings for
DWI. Before an officer may perform a breathalyzer test, § 20-
16.2(a) requires the charging officer to take the person charged
before a chemical analyst who is to inform the person of his rights.'
For an administrative license revocation to be valid, § 20-16.5(a)(4)
requires both the charging officer and the chemical analyst to file a
revocation report.5!6 Read together, these sections suggest that a
charging officer cannot, by herself, administer the breathalyzer test
to be used in the administrative revocation. However, under § 20-
139.1(bl) an arresting officer can administer a breathalyzer test as
STAT. § 20-16.2(a) (1993)).
52. See Oliver, 343 N.C. at 212, 470 S.E.2d at 22 (citing § 20-16.2(a)); see also supra
note 26 (providing the statutory language). The court concluded:
Thus, [§ 20-16.2(a)] arguably implies a rather oblique internal discrepancy or
ambiguity in that when a chemical analysis of the blood is performed, the
arresting officer is permitted to notify defendant of his rights regarding the test,
yet when a chemical analysis of the breath is performed, an inference arises from
the language "the person charged must be taken before a chemical analyst" that
the arresting officer may not notify defendant of his rights regarding the test,
even if such officer is authorized to administer the test.
Oliver, 343 N.C. at 212,470 S.E.2d at 22.
53. Oliver, 343 N.C. at 212,470 S.E.2d at 22 (citations omitted).
54. See id. at 212-13, 470 S.E.2d at 23. Section 20-139.1(bl) provides:
Except as provided in this subsection, a chemical analysis is not valid in any case
in which it is performed by an arresting officer or by a charging officer under the
terms of [§ 20-16.2]. A chemical analysis of the breath may be performed by an
arresting officer or by a charging officer when both of the following apply:
(1) The officer possesses a current permit issued by the Department of
Environment, Health, and Natural Resources for the type of chemical analysis.
(2) The officer performs the chemical analysis by using an automated instrument
that prints the results of the analysis.
N.C. GBN. STAT. § 139.1(bl) (1993).
55. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.2(a).
56. See U § 20-16.5(a)(4).
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long as certain additional requirements are satisfied.7 The court
emphasized that this was consistent with § 20-16.2(a) to the extent
that that statute allows an arresting officer to notify a defendant of
his rights regarding chemical analysis of the blood; the court found
"these two provisions, which do not restrict the abilities of the
arresting officer, reflective of the true legislative intent."'58 Therefore,
it held that "any disparity or ambiguity" in the statute could be
resolved by concluding that the legislature intended to permit a
qualified arresting officer to notify a defendant of his rights, orally
and in writing, regarding a chemical analysis of the breath."
An understanding of the scope of Oliver's holding necessitates
an overview of earlier cases dealing with double jeopardy challenges
to license revocation. The guarantee against double jeopardy
consists of three separate protections: "It protects against a second
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a
second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it
protects against multiple punishments for the same offense."6
Although civil license revocation has long been challenged as
violating this protection,61 the United States Supreme Court has
consistently held that a legislature can "impose both a criminal and a
civil sanction in respect to the same act or omission" without
violating the Double Jeopardy Clause. 2 This distinction between
criminal and civil proceedings led to the failure of the early double
jeopardy challenges to license revocation in North Carolina courts."
The first of these challenges occurred in Harrell v. Scheidt.6 In
Harrell, the Department of Motor Vehicles revoked the defendant's
57. See Oliver, 343 N.C. at 213,470 S.E.2d at 23,
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). These protections are the
result of several policy considerations behind the Double Jeopardy Clause. In addition to
preventing the "inherent injustice in punishing a person twice for the same offense, [the
clause] preserves the finality of judgments [and avoids the] dangers in allowing the
government to subject an individual to repeated trials." David S. Rudstein, Civil Penalties
and Multiple Punishment Under the Double Jeopardy Clause: Some Unanswered Questions,
46 OiKLA. L. REv. 587,589 (1993).
61. See infra notes 64-90 and accompanying text.
62. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938); see also United States v. One
Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 366 (1984) (concluding that the forfeiture
mechanism of the Gun Control Act of 1968 was "a separate civil sanction, remedial in
nature," and therefore, it could not be additional punishment for a criminal act).
63. See infra notes 154-57 and accompanying text (discussing the Oliver court's
reliance on these earlier cases).
64. 243 N.C. 735, 92 S.E.2d 182 (1956).
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license for three years following his second conviction for driving
under the influence." On appeal, the court was confronted with the
sole issue of whether the three-year revocation was part of the
punishment for the DWI offense." The court concluded that "the
revocation of a license to operate a motor vehicle is not a part of, nor
within the limits of punishment to be fixed by the court, wherein the
offender is tried."'67 In addition, the court stated that "'[t]he
operation of a motor vehicle on [the] highways is not a natural right.
It is a conditional privilege, which may be suspended or revoked
under the police power.' "'
In Honeycutt v. Scheidt,69 the court addressed the nature and
purposes of civil license revocation. In Honeycutt, the defendant's
license was suspended for three months upon his second conviction
for speeding." After a third speeding conviction, his license was
suspended for four months.7' The defendant claimed that his second
conviction could not be used twice as a basis for suspending his
driver's license.' In rejecting this argument, the court again relied
on the fact that license revocation is a remedy and not a criminal
punishment.73 Even though the court recognized that the revocation
would have some deterrent effects by "serv[ing] to impress such
offender with the necessity for obedience to the traffic laws and
regulations,"74 the court stated that the primary purpose of the
revocation was to protect the public."
65. See id. at 736, 92 S.E.2d at 183. The defendant challenged the revocation because
at the time of his second conviction, the warrant had not stated that it was his second
offense. See id.
66. See id. at 738,92 S.E.2d at 184.
67. Id. at 739, 92 S.E.2d at 185. In making this determination, the court relied on
cases from other states that had characterized license revocation as civil and therefore not
punishment, stating that license revocation is not "an added punishment for the offense
committed. It is civil and not criminal in its nature." Id. at 740, 92 S.E.2d at 185 (citing
Commonwealth v. Funk, 186 A. 65, 69-70 (Pa. 1936)).
68. Id. at 738, 92 S.E.2d at 184 (quoting Commonwealth v. Bllett, 4 S.E.2d 762, 767
(Va. 1939)). The court compared this license revocation to the revocation of an attorney's
professional license. See id. at 740-41, 92 S.E.2d at 186. Just as a disbarment proceeding is
designed primarily to protect the public rather than to punish the offending attorney, the
court reasoned that revocation of a driver's license also is meant to protect the public. See
69. 254 N.C. 607,119 S.E.2d 777 (1961).
70. See id. at 607,119 S.E.2d at 778.
71. See id. at 608,119 S.E.2d at 778.
72. See id.
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The court again discussed the civil nature of revocation
proceedings in Joyner v. Garrett,7 in which the defendant willfully
refused to take a breathalyzer test." After the defendant was
convicted on a DWI charge, his license was suspended in a
Department of Motor Vehicles hearing for his failure to submit to
the breathalyzer test.78 The court rejected the defendant's argument
that the twelve-month suspension resulting from his guilty plea
constituted his full penalty." In doing so, the court stated that "[tihe
suspension of a license for refusal to submit to a chemical test at the
time of an arrest ... and a suspension which results from a ...
conviction of that charge are separate and distinct revocations."8
Since one action was civil and the other was criminal, they were
independent of each other, and the outcome of one had no effect on
the other."1
In State v. Carlisle," the court relied on Joyner to hold that the
revocation of a habitual offender's license did not subject him to
additional punishment for offenses for which he had already been
tried and convicted.' In Seders v. Powell," the court also relied on
Joyner and previous license revocation cases to hold that there was
no constitutional right to confer with counsel prior to taking a
breathalyzer test." Because license revocation is a separate civil
proceeding not intended to punish the defendant, the Seders court
reasoned that the constitutional rights afforded criminal defendants
are not necessary in the civil context.86
76. 279 N.C. 226, 182 S.E.2d 553 (1971).
77. See id. at 228,182 S.E.2d at 555.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 238,182 S.E.2d at 561.
80. Id.
81. See id. at 238, 182 S.E.2d at 562.
82. 285 N.C. 229,204 S.E.2d 15 (1974).
83. See iU. at 231, 204 S.B.2d at 16 (citing Joyner, 279 N.C. at 234-35, 182 S.E.2d at
559). "'Proceedings involving the suspension or revocation of a license to operate a motor
vehicle are civil and not criminal in nature, and the revocation of a license is no part of the
punishment for the crime for which the licensee was arrested.'" Id. (quoting Joyner, 279
N.C. at 234, 182 S.E.2d at 559). In addition to making the distinction between civil and
criminal proceedings, the court stated that "[t]he "purpose of a revocation proceeding is
not to punish the offender, but to remove from the highway one who is a potential danger
to himself and other travelers." Id. at 232, 204 S.E.2d at 16.
84. 298 N.C. 453,259 S.E.2d 544 (1979).
85. See id. at 461, 259 S.E.2d at 551.
86. See id. at 462, 259 S.B.2d at 550. A second rationale for the court's holding in
Seders was that "anyone who accepts the privilege of driving upon our highways has
already consented to the use of the breathalyzer test and has no constitutional right to
consult a lawyer to void that consent." Id.
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These cases, which established the remedial nature of civil
license revocation, formed the background for the court's decision in
Henry v. Edmisten, which involved a due process challenge to the
same statute at issue in Oliver. In Henry, the magistrate entered an
order revoking the defendant's license after a breath analysis
revealed that his blood alcohol concentration was 0.10 %.' After
weighing several factors, the North Carolina Supreme Court
concluded that the process provided by the ten-day revocation
statute comported with the minimum constitutional standard of due
process.' Again, the court stated that "the summary revocation
87. See 315 N.C. 474, 340 S.E.2d 720 (1986). Although this Note is concerned with
protection against double jeopardy as it relates to license revocation, some understanding
of due process jurisprudence is necessary to examine fully the argument that because a
driver's license is a privilege, its revocation cannot be punishment. See infra notes 185-96
and accompanying text (discussing the license-as-privilege argument). In Bell v. Burson,
402 U.S. 535 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a driver has an important interest in a
driver's license, which cannot be deprived without the procedural due process guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 539. Furthermore, the Court held that because
the license was an entitlement, the revocation of that license was subject to constitutional
restraints, whether the entitlement was deemed a "right" or a "privilege." See id. The
Court adopted a case-by-case approach to determine whether the procedural requirements
of the Due Process Clause were met. See id. at 540.
In Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979), the Supreme Court addressed a challenge
to a Massachusetts law requiring revocation of a driver's license for refusal to take a
breathalyzer test. See id. at 3. Although the claim that an individual has a protected
property interest in his driver's license was not disputed, the Court concluded in upholding
the statute that administrative procedures providing for an immediately available post-
suspension hearing were sufficient to protect due process rights. See id. at 10-12. For
more complete discussions of the due process required in license revocation proceedings,
see Kirsten K Davis, Note, Ohio's New Administrative License Suspension for Drunk
Driving: Essential Statute Has Unconstitutional Effect, 55 OHIo ST. UJ. 697, 703-13 (1994);
Timothy A. Shafer, Note, Drunk Driving and Due Process Don't Mix, 40 RUTGERS L
REV. 611, 619-24 (1988).
88. See Henry, 315 N.C. at 478, 340 S.E.2d at 724; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.5
(1993) (governing license revocation for refusal to submit to chemical analysis or for
failure of chemical analysis). One subsection provides: "If a person's driver's license is
subject to revocation under this section, the charging officer and the chemical analyst must
execute a revocation report." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.5(c). According to another
subsection:
If a properly executed revocation report concerning a person is filed with a
judicial official when the person is present before that official, the judicial official
must ... determine whether there is probable cause to believe that each of the
conditions of subsection (b) has been met. If he determines that there is such
probable cause, he must enter an order revoking the person's driver's license ....
Id. § 20-16.5(e).
89. See Henry, 315 N.C. at 480-82, 340 S.E.2d at 725-26. In making this
determination, the court employed a three-factor balancing test. See iU at 480, 340 S.E.2d
at 725. These factors included "the private interest affected by the ... revocation[,] ...
the risk of erroneous deprivation[, and] the state's interest served by the summary
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procedure of § 16.5 is not a punishment but a highway safety
measure."
'
The court's determination in Henry, as well as in the earlier
license revocation cases, that civil license revocation proceedings do
not constitute punishment was consistent with the majority of state
courts that had considered the issue.-" However, this ability to
characterize civil proceedings as remedial was weakened by the
United States Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. Halper." In
Halper, the Court "consider[ed] whether and under what
circumstances a civil penalty may constitute 'punishment' for the
purposes of double jeopardy analysis."" The defendant submitted
sixty-five false claims to Blue Cross and Blue Shield demanding
payment of twelve dollars per claim when the actual payment due
was three dollars per claim. ' After being convicted on all counts, the
defendant was sentenced to two years' imprisonment and fined
$5,000.' The government then brought an action under the civil
False Claims Act, 6 which subjected the defendant to a penalty of
more than $130,000.' The specific question before the Court was
whether the statutory penalty subjected Halper to a second
punishment in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause."
procedure." Id. at 482-88, 340 S.E.2d at 726-30. The court felt that the risk of erroneous
deprivation was low because of the statutory requirement that both the charging officer
and chemical analyst file a revocation report, which must be scrutinized by "a detached
and impartial judicial officer." Id. at 485,340 S.E.2d at 728.
90. Id. at 495, 340 S.E.2d at 734. In making this determination, the court noted that
earlier cases had held "that revocation proceedings are civil rather than criminal in
nature." Id. Additionally, the court noted that this statute expressly provided that
"[proceedings under this section are civil actions." Id.
91. See, e.g., State v. Nichols, 819 P.2d 995 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); Ellis v. Pierce, 282
Cal. Rptr. 93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Freeman v. State, 611 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1992); State v. Maze, 825 P.2d 1169 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992); Butler v. Department of Pub.
Safety & Corrections, 609 So. 2d 790 (La. 1992); Johnson v. State, 622 A.2d 199 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1993).
92. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
93. Id. at 436.
94. See id. at 437. The Court noted that "[tihe underlying details of Halper's fraud are
of little importance with respect to his double jeopardy claim." Id. at 437 n.2.
95. See id.
96. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1994).
97. SeeHalper, 490 U.S. at 438.
98. See id. at 441. The Court was concerned with whether the civil penalty constituted
a second punishment, rather than whether the civil proceeding subjected the defendant to
a second prosecution. See id. at 440-41; see also supra note 60 and accompanying text
(stating the three protections granted by the Double Jeopardy Clause); infra notes 130-38,
149 and accompanying text (summarizing Justice Scalia's argument that the main
consideration should be whether the defendant was subjected to multiple prosecutions).
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The government argued that the civil penalties authorized by
the False Claims Act did not violate the guarantee against double
jeopardy because the multiple punishment prohibition is violated
only by second criminal penalties.' The Court stated, however, that
the government misunderstood the nature of the multiple-
punishment inquiry because a civil penalty constitutes punishment
when it is "so extreme and so divorced from the Government's
damages and expenses."1 "0  Therefore, because of the common
understanding that civil proceedings advance both punitive and
remedial goals, "the labels 'criminal' and 'civil' are not of paramount
importance."'01 Instead, the inquiry into whether a civil sanction
constitutes punishment "requires a particularized assessment of the
penalty" and its purposes."° Because the purposes of punishment
are retribution and deterrence, a civil sanction is punishment when it
"cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather
can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent
purposes."'" Therefore, a defendant who has been punished in a
criminal proceeding may not be subjected to a civil sanction that
99. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 441. The government also argued that the civil or criminal
nature of a proceeding was a matter of statutory construction and that Congress had
intended these proceedings to be civil. See id.; see also infra note 163 and accompanying
text (discussing the idea that the judiciary should defer to the intent of the legislature in
determining whether a penalty was punitive or remedial).
100. Halper, 490 U.S. at 441-42. The Court agreed that the government could impose
both a criminal and civil sanction in response to the same act, but it stated that this ignored
the question of "whether a civil sanction, in application, may be so divorced from any
remedial goal that it constitute[d] 'punishment' for the purpose of double jeopardy
analysis." Id. at 443. In order to determine the remedial goals of the government, the
Court stated that "the Government is entitled to rough remedial justice." Id. at 446. In
other words, the government could receive compensation similar to liquidated damages
"according to somewhat imprecise formulas." Id.
101. Id. at 447. The Court stressed that "[t]he notion of punishment, as we commonly
understand it, cuts across the division between the civil and the criminal law." Id. at 447-
48. The idea that punishment is present in civil as well as criminal proceedings is the basis
of academic debate surrounding the purposes of criminal prosecutions and the punishing
effects of civil law. See, e.g., Mary MK Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies
to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil
Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGs L.J. 1325, 1329 (1991); John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost:
The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models-And What Can Be Done About It, 101
YALE J. 1875, 1878 (1992); Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground
Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE .. 1795, 1799 (1992); Franklin E. Zimring,
The Multiple Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE .J. 1901, 1904
(1992).
102. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448. In other words, "a civil as well as a criminal sanction
constitutes punishment when the sanction as applied in the individual case serves the goals
of punishment." Id.
103. Id.
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serves deterrent and retributive purposes in addition to its remedial
goal.
1'4
However, the Court stated that it did not intend to cast doubt on
the "time-honored judgments" that remedial civil penalties did not
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause." Instead, this rule was "for the
rare case ... where a fixed-penalty provision subject[ed] a prolific
but small-gauge offender to a sanction overwhelmingly
disproportionate to the damages ... caused.""' The Court
concluded that Halper was such a case because the civil penalty
involved bore "no rational relation to the goal of compensating the
Government for its loss, but rather appear[ed] to qualify as
'punishment' in the plain meaning of the word.""°l
The United States Supreme Court next dealt with the issue of
when a civil penalty constitutes punishment in Austin v. United
States,"° in which a defendant convicted of cocaine possession
claimed that subsequent civil forfeiture of his property violated the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment."l Because the
Excessive Fines Clause limits the power to punish, which "'cuts
across the division between the civil and the criminal law,' ..0 the
Court was not concerned with the civil or criminal nature of the
forfeiture; instead, the Court focused on whether the forfeiture
constituted punishment.' The Court stated that forfeiture, which
serves a remedial purpose, might still be subject to the limitations of
the Excessive Fines Clause if the forfeiture could "only be explained
as serving in part to punish.""' In determining the purpose behind
the forfeiture statute at issue in the case, the Court indicated that
while the Halper Court focused on "the sanction as applied, ... it
ma[de] sense here to focus on [the statute] as a whole." '13 Based on
"the historical understanding of forfeiture as punishment," the Court
104. See id. at 448-49.
105. Id. at 449. The Court noted the difficulty in determining when a civil sanction
would constitute punishment, but it stated that "in the ordinary case [civil damage]
provisions can be said to do no more than make the Government whole." Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
109. See id at 604. The Excessive Fines Clause provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
U.S. CONST. amend. VUL
110. Austin, 509 U.S. at 610 (quoting Halper, 490 U.S. at 447-48).
111. See id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 622 n.14 (citing Halper, 490 U.S. at 448) (citations omitted).
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concluded that the statute was not designed solely to fulfill a
remedial purpose, and therefore was subject to the Excessive Fines
Clause.""
The Halper issue came before the Court again in Department of
Revenue v. Kurth Ranch."9 The defendants in Kurth Ranch were
arrested for growing marijuana and entered into a plea agreement.
116
After conviction and a civil forfeiture action that recovered "cash
and equipment used in the marijuana operation,""7 the Montana
Department of Revenue assessed $900,000 in taxes on the marijuana
pursuant to a new state tax on dangerous drugs."1 The question
before the Court was whether the tax imposed after the criminal
penalty violated "the constitutional prohibition against successive
punishments.""
After recognizing that Halper stood for the proposition that "the
legislature's description of a statute as civil does not foreclose the
possibility that it has a punitive character,"" the majority stated that
it was necessary to determine whether the Montana drug tax had
punitive characteristics that would subject it to the Double Jeopardy
Clause. 1  The majority began its analysis by pointing out the
difference between taxes with revenue-raising purposes, and fines,
penalties, and forfeitures, which were more easily characterized as
sanctions.' However, despite the revenue-raising nature of taxes,
the Court felt that there was a point where "an exaction labeled as a
tax approaches punishment."' Even though a high tax rate and a
deterrent purpose do not automatically categorize a tax as
punishment, the Court found that such characteristics are consistent
114. Id. at 621-22. Because the Court considered the history of forfeiture to be
punitive, it rejected the government's argument that the forfeiture was remedial because it
"remove[d] the 'instruments' of the drug trade" and compensated the government for its
law enforcement expenses. Id. at 620. As the Court stressed, "even assuming that [the
statute] serve[s] some remedial purpose, the Government's argument must fail [because]
'a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can
only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes is punishment."'
Id. at 621 (quoting Halper, 490 U.S. at 448) (alterations omitted).
115. 511 U.S. 767 (1994).
116. See id. at 771-72.
117. Id. at 772-73.
118. See id.
119. Id. at 769.
120. Id. at 777-78.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 779-80.
123. Id. at 780.
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with a punitive goal.' After emphasizing the high tax rate, the
Court also noted that the tax was conditioned on the commission of a
crime, which was indicative "'of penal and prohibitory intent rather
than the gathering of revenue.' ""s Therefore, the tax was "fairly
characterized as punishment."'2 6
The majority distinguished its analysis from the Halper test
because "Halper's method of determining whether the exaction was
remedial or punitive 'simply does not work in the case of a tax
statute,' "which does not serve the same purpose as civil penalties."
However, the majority concluded that "the drug tax [was] not the
kind of remedial sanction that may follow [an earlier] punishment of
a criminal offense."" Because the tax was a second punishment, it
was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause in a proceeding
subsequent to the first prosecution; otherwise, the tax would be "the
functional equivalent of a successive criminal prosecution."'"
In dissent, Justice Scalia wrote that he felt it was necessary to
overrule Halper."0 He noted that "if there [were] a constitutional
prohibition on multiple punishments," then this prohibition could
124. See id. The Court noted that "while a high tax rate and deterrent purpose lend
support to the characterization of the drug tax as punishment, these features, in and of
themselves, do not necessarily render the tax punitive." Id. at 781.
125. Id. (quoting United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295 (1935)). The Court
noted that "the tax assessment not only hinges on the commission of a crime, it also is
exacted only after the taxpayer has been arrested for the precise conduct that gives rise to
the tax obligation in the first place." Id.
126. Id. at 784.
127. Id. (quoting id at 787 (Rehnquist, Ci., dissenting)). In Halper, the Court
recognized that a civil penalty was remedial when it allowed the state to collect costs
"attributable to the defendant's conduct." Id. Unlike the majority, Justice O'Connor felt
that the Halper test should apply. See id. at 796 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). According to
Justice O'Connor, the Halper test consisted of a two-part inquiry: "[Tjhe defendant must
first show the absence of a rational relationship between the amount of the sanction and
the government's nonpunitive objectives; the burden then shifts to the government to
justify the sanction with reference to the particular case." Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Justice O'Connor felt that the first prong of the test would be satisfied only in the "rare
case," which this was not. Id. at 796-97 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 784.
129. Id. In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist claimed that characterizing the tax as
punishment "drastically alter[ed] existing law" because "[t]his clearly [was] not the 'rare
case' contemplated by Halper." Id. at 785-86 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). He asserted
that under Halper, a penalty was civil in nature if it allowed compensation to the
government for the costs incurred in prosecuting the crime. See id. at 786 (Rehnquist, CJ.,
dissenting). According to the Chief Justice, because "[t]axes are customarily enacted to
raise revenue to support the costs of government," the majority incorrectly concluded that
the high tax rate and deterrent purpose of the statute necessitated its characterization as
punishment. Id. at 787-88 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
130. See id. at 804 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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not be avoided by merely changing the order of the penalties."
Therefore, he worried that if the Court were to continue to follow a
broad reading of Halper, it would ultimately be faced with the task of
disallowing criminal punishment that followed a civil sanction." For
this reason, Justice Scalia asserted that it was "time to put the Halper
genie back in the bottle."" He felt that this could be done by
recognizing that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibited only
multiple prosecutions, and not multiple punishments.,m Despite the
fact that the Court often stated in past opinions that both successive
punishments and successive prosecutions were prohibited by the
Double Jeopardy Clause, Justice Scalia argued that "the repetition of
a dictum does not turn it into a holding."' According to Justice
Scalia, notwithstanding this dicta, until Halper the Court had never
invalidated a statute providing for a second civil punishment for the
same offense. "6  Therefore, "by extending the no-double-
punishments rule to civil penalties, while simultaneously affirming
that it demanded more than mere fidelity to legislative intent, Halper
gave the [Double Jeopardy Clause] a breadth of effect it had never
before enjoyed."' 7 Because this was not a case of multiple
prosecution, Justice Scalia contended that the drug tax did not
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause."
As anticipated by Justice Scalia, DWI defendants across the
country began to rely on Kurth Ranch to avoid criminal prosecution
by comparing the civil dangerous drug tax to civil license
revocation." Prosecutors responded to these challenges by relying
131. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
132. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
133. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
134. See id. at 804-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting). According to Justice Scalia, "[t]he view
that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit multiple punishments is ... 'confirmed
by history.'" Id. at 798 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting United States ex rel. Marcus v.
Hess, 317 U.S. 537,555 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
135. Id. at 800 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
136. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 802 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
138. See id. at 807-08 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
139. See Daniel T. Gilbert & John A. Stephen, Is Suspension of Drivers' Licenses in
Jeopardy?, PROSECUTOR, May-June 1995, at 24, 25; see also Sarah Avery, Lawyers Offer
New Challenge to DWI Law: Double Jeopardy Claim Used in N.C., Other States, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), July 14, 1995, at Al (discussing early challenges to the Safe
Roads Act); Harvey Berkman, Double Jeopardy Downs DUI Cases: But Appeals Courts
Balk on License Suspension Issue, NAT'L L.J., June 26,1995, at A7 (noting that trial judges
in 18 states had dismissed cases based on the double jeopardy defense). For a general
discussion of the double jeopardy defense, see RICHARD E. ERWIN, DEFENSE OF DRUNK
DRIVING CASES §§ 7.01-7.08 (3d ed. 1996). For a sample motion to dismiss the DWI
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on legislative intent, the non-excessive nature of license suspensions,
and the license-as-privilege argument."' In addition, if the license
suspension and criminal proceeding are viewed as the same
proceeding, the guarantee against Double Jeopardy is not violated. 4
In Olive, the North Carolina Supreme Court addressed each of
these arguments when it held that North Carolina's administrative
license revocation did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. 4
Each of these arguments can be analyzed from two perspectives
because of the apparent ambiguity of Halper 3 While the Court
charge on double jeopardy grounds, see LAWRENCE TAYLOR, DRUNK DRIVING DEFENSE
§ 3.0.6 (4th ed. 1996).
140. See Jesselyn McCurdy, Double Jeopardy/Administrative License Revocation,
PROSECUTOR, May-June 1995, at 21, 23 (discussing prosecution responses to double
jeopardy challenges to administrative license revocation).
141. See infra notes 202-18 and accompanying text.
142. See Oliver, 343 N.C. at 210,470 S.E.2d at 21.
143. Most of the debate regarding administrative license revocations as punishment
centers on this ambiguity-i.e., which statement by the Court represents the true rule of
Halper. See Daniel A. Allen, Note, To Punish or to Remedy-That Is the Constitutional
Question: Double Jeopardy Confusion in State v. Hansen, 30 CREIGHTON L REV. 235,
262 (1996) (arguing that administrative license revocations constitute punishment under
Halper even though Halper involved monetary penalties); David G. Dargatis, Note, Put
Down That Drink: The Double Jeopardy Drunk Driving Defense Is Not Going to Save
You, 81 IOWA L REv. 775, 779 (1996) (stating that the "[double jeopardy] defense is
insupportable because it is based on isolated language from Supreme Court holdings taken
out of context, and [it] expands the scope of punishment in double jeopardy
jurisprudence"); Ken Davies, Comment, Halper, Austin and Kurth Ranch: Can Illinois'
Summary Suspension Statute Withstand the Double Jeopardy Clause Challenge in Light of
the Recent Decisions of the United States Supreme Court, 21 S. ILL. U. LJ. 149, 159-60
(1996) (stating that the cases "leave open to question the necessary showing to determine
if a ... penalty amounts to punishment"); Jennifer E. Dayok, Comment, Administrative
Driver's License Suspension: A Remedial Tool That Is Not in Jeopardy, 45 AM. U. L REV.
1151, 1174 (1996) (stating that the double jeopardy defense relies on the strict language of
the cases without placing them in the context of the administrative license suspension
argument); Carlos F. Ramirez, Note, Administrative License Suspensions, Criminal
Prosecution and the Double Jeopardy Clause, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 923, 924 (1996)
(arguing that "the appropriate test should balance the effect of the [license suspension] on
the driver against the state's interest in protecting the public safety").
The Court's decision in Kurth Ranch raises several of the issues involved in the Halper
debate. For instance, the majority found it necessary to determine whether the drug tax
had punitive characteristics that would subject it to the Double Jeopardy Clause. See
Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 777. The majority rejected the Halper Court's disproportionality
analysis because of the difference between tax statutes and civil penalties. See id. at 784.
Chief Justice Rehnquist also rejected Halper's disproportionality analysis but concluded
that because taxes were enacted to raise revenue for the government, this was not the rare
case contemplated by Halper. See id. at 786 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). Justice
O'Connor asserted that the two viewpoints of Halper were not inconsistent with each
other, instead, she claimed that the Halper test consisted of a two-part inquiry. See id. at
796 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text (setting
out the Halper test).
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stated that "a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a
remedial purpose ... is punishment,"144 it also stated that a civil
sanction would qualify as punishment only when the sanction was
"overwhelmingly disproportionate" and bore "no rational relation to
the goal of compensating the Government for its loss."'14 Under a
multiple punishment framework, the excessiveness or
disproportionality of the civil penalty is central to the analysis.' 6
This focus limits Halper to "a rule for the rare case."' 47 However,
from a multiple prosecution standpoint, the excessiveness of the
penalty is irrelevant because if there have been two separate
proceedings, then the guarantee against double jeopardy has been
violated regardless of whether any penalty is imposed. 48  Despite
Justice Scalia's assertion to the contrary, it is under this latter
framework that Halper would no longer be a "rule for the rare
case."
149
144. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435,448 (1989).
145. Id. at 449.
146. Professor Rudstein has noted that from a multiple punishment standpoint,
the government is entitled to convict and punish an individual in a criminal
prosecution and also impose a penalty upon her in a separate civil proceeding,
even though both sanctions are based upon the same conduct. The only
limitation placed upon this principle by Halper is that the penalty imposed in the
civil proceeding not be of such a magnitude as to constitute "punishment" for
purposes of double jeopardy analysis.
Rudstein, supra note 60, at 602; see also Halper, 490 U.S. at 449 (stating that a civil penalty
would constitute punishment only when the penalty was "overwhelmingly
disproportionate").
147. Halper, 490 U.S. at 449.
148. See Stanley E. Cox, Halper's Continuing Double Jeopardy Implications: A Thorn
by Any Other Name Would Prick as Deep, 39 ST. LoUIs U. LJ. 1235, 1244 (1995) (arguing
that "[t]he total amount of punishment received is irrelevant to double jeopardy
analysis"). From a multiple prosecution standp6int, "[t]he issue for double jeopardy
analysis is not how much punishment a guilty criminal deserves, but whether the
government has attempted to punish in two proceedings." Id. at 1244 n.31 (emphasis
added). The basis for this argument is that multiple punishments cannot be the evil
prevented by the Double Jeopardy Clause because there is no prohibition against multiple
punishments if they are imposed in the same proceeding, therefore, "it makes sense to
construe the clause as protecting against multiple attempts to punish." Id. at 1255. This
perspective reflects the Halper Court's statement that a civil penalty constituted
punishment any time it could not "fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose."
Halper, 490 U.S. at 448.
149. Justice Scalia's dissent in Kurth Ranch is notable for its recognition that the
Double Jeopardy Clause prevents only multiple prosecutions. See Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S.
at 798 (Scalia, J., dissenting). However, Justice Scalia's definition of prosecution includes
only criminal prosecutions. See id. at 805 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This approach leads him
to conclude that Halper would be overruled by applying the multiple prosecution test. See
id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). This interpretation, however, is directly contrary to Halper,
which was grounded on a finding that punishment could exist in civil proceedings. See
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In Oliver, the North Carolina Supreme Court appeared to read
Halper broadly when it stated that "the narrow issue before this
Court is whether the ten-day driver's license revocation ... cannot
fairly be said to serve a remedial purpose because the revocation also
serves the goals of punishment."" However, the court then analyzed
the case from a multiple punishment standpoint,"1 inquiring into the
excessiveness of the revocation.U2  By adopting a multiple
punishment framework, the court took a narrow view of the holding
in Halper. 3
Halper, 490 U.S. at 441-42. Whereas Justice Scalia viewed this finding of punishment as an
application of the multiple punishment test, see Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 802 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting), because of Halper's ambiguity, it can also be viewed as an application of the
multiple prosecution framework. See Cox, supra note 148, at 1267 (recognizing that "civil
proceedings which seek or obtain punishment can trigger the prohibition on successive
prosecutions"). While both frameworks make an inquiry into whether a civil sanction
imposes punishment, they differ on the amount of punishment that constitutes a double
jeopardy violation. From a multiple punishment perspective, there is a violation only when
the punishment is "overwhelmingly disproportionate." Halper, 490 U.S. at 449; see also
Rudstein, supra note 60, at 602-03 (stating that Halper requires only that the civil penalty
"not be of such a magnitude as to constitute 'punishment' "). Under a multiple
prosecution standpoint, a double jeopardy violation occurs when a proceeding (whether
civil or criminal) attempts to punish to any degree. See Cox, supra note 148, at 1239
("Because even minor punishments trigger double jeopardy protection, they cannot be
winked at if the Double Jeopardy Clause is to have credibility."). Therefore, once it is
understood that a prosecution includes any sanction not strictly remedial, then contrary to
Justice Scalia's opinion, the multiple punishment framework is actually the narrower
interpretation of Halper. See id. at 1267. For example, from a multiple punishment
standpoint, if a defendant has been subjected to punishment in a civil proceeding, then he
could still face criminal prosecution so long as no punishment is imposed upon conviction.
See Rudstein, supra note 60, at 614-16 (asserting that although there would be no criminal
punishment, there would be the "collateral consequences" of conviction). However, this
situation would not be allowed from a multiple prosecution standpoint. See Cox, supra
note 148, at 1266 (noting that one weakness of the multiple punishment framework is that
it makes criminal acquittals irrelevant).
150. Oliver, 343 N.C. at 207, 470 S.E.2d at 19. In Halper, the Court stated that "a civil
sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only
be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment."
Halper, 490 U.S. at 448 (emphasis added). Read broadly, this statement means that any
retributive or deterrent purpose, no matter how small, constitutes punishment for purposes
of double jeopardy analysis. See Cox, supra note 148, at 1239.
151. The court recognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause protected against a second
prosecution for the same offense. See Oliver, 343 N.C. at 205, 470 S.E.2d at 18. However,
its ultimate holding was grounded in a belief that this revocation was not punishment. See
id. at 210, 470 $.E.2d at 21 (concluding that the ten-day driver's license revocation did not
constitute punishment as such, and consequently, defendant's criminal conviction for DWI
did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause).
152. See id. at 209, 470 S.E.2d at 21 (stating that the revocation was neither an
excessive nor overwhelmingly disproportionate response).
153. See id. ("Halper did not hold that every civil sanction be viewed as punishment...
rather, the Court labeled its holding as a 'rule for the rare case."' (quoting Kurth Ranch,
1997] DOUBLE JEOPARDY - 2335
The court's narrow view of Halper is evidenced by its reliance
on early North Carolina case law 4 that had "long viewed drivers'
license revocations as civil, not criminal, in nature."' 5 'However,
because of the Supreme Court's ruling in Halper, the court was
unable to base its holding that the license revocation did not violate
the Double Jeopardy Clause solely on this civil/criminal distinction."6
Therefore, instead of using the distinction directly, the court used it
to infer that the legislature intended the revocation to be remedial.'
In order to reach this conclusion, the court rejected the
argument that the legislative history established additional deterrent
purposes behind revocation proceedings." s According to the
legislative commentary, one of the functions of the license revocation
was "'to provide [a] slap in the face to virtually all drivers charged
with DWI.' ""9 However, the court concluded that "'[w]hatever the
intent of individual proponents of the bill, the bill as finally enacted
reflects an intent by the legislature for the revocation provision to be
a remedial measure.' 6' In making this determination, the court
relied on the fact that § 20-16.5(o) of the North Carolina General
Statutes161  provided that the proceedings were to be civil.' 62
However, the Halper court stated that courts could not rely on
511 U.S. at 796-97 (O'Connor, ., dissenting))).
154. See supra notes 64-90 and accompanying text (reviewing earlier North Carolina
cases which held that license revocations were remedial). Other states have also relied on
their prior case law to hold that, even after Halper, license revocations do not constitute
punishment. See, e.g., Snow v. Superior Court, 903 P.2d 628, 634-35 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995);
State v. Schwander, No. IN94-08-1350, 1995 WL 413248, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. June 15,
1995); Davidson v. MacKinnon, 656 So. 2d 223, 224 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Voisinet v.
State, 909 S.W.2d 262, 263 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); Tench v. Commonwealth, 462 S.E.2d
922,924 (Va. Ct. App. 1995).
155. Oliver, 343 N.C. at 207,470 S.E.2d at 20.
156. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 447-48 ("Mhe labels 'criminal' and 'civil' are not of
paramount importance.... The notion of punishment, as we commonly understand it, cuts
across the division between the civil and the criminal law....").
157. See Oliver,343 N.C. at 208-09,470 S.E.2d at 20-21.
158. See id. Other states have also relied on legislative intent to hold that the license
revocation served only remedial purposes. See, e.g., Schwander, 1995 WL 413248, at *4;
State v. Jones, 666 A.2d 128, 141 (Md. 1995) (holding that although legislative intent was
both to punish and to remediate, the sanction can be fully justified as serving a solely
remedial purpose).
159. Oliver, 343 N.C. at 208-09, 470 S.E.2d at 20 (quoting Drennan, supra note 35, at
117 (internal citations omitted)).
160. Id. at 209, 470 S.E.2d at 21 (quoting Henry v. Edmisten, 315 N.C. 474, 495, 340
S.E.2d 720,734 (1986)).
161. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.5(o) (1993) ("Proceedings under this section are civil
actions .... ).
162. See Oliver, 343 N.C. at 208, 470 S.E.2d at 20 (citing Henry, 315 N.C. at 495, 340
S.E.2d. at 734).
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legislative determinations of the civil nature of a penalty.1"
Therefore, the Oliver court's reliance on legislative intent seems
misguided.
The court conceded that the legislature's characterization of the
procedure as civil could not, by itself, prove that the license
revocation was remedial.1' Accordingly, the court emphasized that
because "[a]n impaired driver presents an immediate, emergency
situation... swift [remedial] action is required... in order to protect
the public."16 While keeping a drunk driver off the road does serve
this remedial purpose, it is difficult to understand how a ten-day
revocation would be solely remedial.'" For instance, the Halper
Court characterized a penalty as remedial when it compensated the
government for the damages incurred as a result of the violation.167
License revocation, however, does not serve to compensate the
163. See Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 777 (1994) ("Halper
thus decided that the legislature's description of a statute as civil does not foreclose the
possibility that it has a punitive character."); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610
(1993) ("Tlhe question is not ... whether forfeiture ... is civil or criminal, but rather
whether it is punishment."). But see George C. Thomas, II, A Blameworthy Act Approach
to the Double Jeopardy Same Offense Problem, 83 CAL. L REV. 1027, 1059 (1995) (stating
that Kurth Ranch was wrongly decided because it did not adequately focus on legislative
intent). Professor Thomas argues that the legislatures are responsible for defining double
jeopardy offenses because judges "relinquished to the legislature the role of defining and
refining the criminal law." Id. at 1050. Therefore, he concludes, legislative intent is "the
sole meaning of double jeopardy offense." Id. at 1049. By focusing on legislative intent, a
court must decide that if a legislature allovs" 'cumulative punishment under two statutes,
[then] regardless of whether those two statutes proscribe the same conduct,'" the statutes
comprise different offenses for double jeopardy purposes. Id. at 1051 (quoting Missouri v.
Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1983)). When inquiring into legislative intent, he concludes,
"one would assume that the legislature intended civil damages to be available in addition
to the criminal sanction, thus making them different double jeopardy offenses." Id. at
1058; see also Stephanie Ann Miyoshi, Comment, Is the DUI Double-Jeopardy Defense
D.O.A.?, 29 LOY. LA. L REV. 1273, 1315 (1996) (relying on case law and legislative
history to conclude that administrative license suspensions are not violations of double
jeopardy).
164. See Oliver, 343 N.C. at 208, 470 S.E.2d at 20 (stating that the "substance of the
law, not the label given to it by the legislature, govern[s]").
165. Id. at 209, 470 S.E.2d at 21. Other states have employed this rationale to uphold
automatic license revocations. See, e.g., State v. Fox, No. MV94-31-52-60, 1995 WL
559000, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 13, 1995); Jackson v. State, 462 S.E.2d 802, 803 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1995); State v. HIga, 897 P.2d 928, 933 (Haw. 1995); State v. Savard, 659 A.2d
1265,1268 (Me. 1995); State v. Hanson, 532 N.W.2d 598,601 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
166. See Cox, supra note 148, at 1285 ("Such logic must have limits, however, and does
not alone explain why disciplinary sanctions are not punishment. The most severe
sanctions, including incarceration or even death, would most completely protect the public
from dangerous actors, but are obviously punishment.").
167. See Halper, 490 U.S. 435,449 (1989).
government, so the Halper remedial test is difficult to apply." Oliver
is more similar to Austin or Kurth Ranch, in which the Supreme
Court looked to the purposes served by the penalties to determine if
they were solely remedial. 69 Certainly, an important purpose of
license revocation is to prevent the arrested individual from driving
while under the influence, but after a period of twenty-four to forty-
eight hours, it would seem that the driver would no longer pose an
immediate danger to the public safety. Revocation beyond the
time of this immediate hazard presents the double jeopardy problem
because once the driver is no longer an immediate hazard, the
suspension of the license is no longer solely remedial.' Because the
revocation is not solely remedial, the court was able to find that it
did not violate double jeopardy only by following a narrow
interpretation of Halper.'
This narrow interpretation seems inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's broader interpretation of the Halper rule. For instance, in
Austin, the Court was concerned with the fact that the forfeiture
could "only be explained as serving in part to punish." 73 The Court
went further in Kurth Ranch and concluded that "Halper's method of
determining whether [a sanction is] remedial or punitive simply does
not work" in every case.'74 Therefore, even though the drug tax had
a remedial purpose, its deterrent purpose was "at least consistent
with a punitive character."' 75 Thus, the tax was "fairly characterized
as punishment" for purposes of double jeopardy analysis. 6  In
reaching this conclusion, the Court seemed to analyze the case from
a multiple prosecution standpoint by stating that the tax appeared to
168. See Cox, supra note 148, at 1283 (noting that the Halper rule may need some
adjustment outside the monetary fines context).
169. See id. at 1307 (stating that the Court has expanded Halper's application in Austin
and Kurth Ranch); see also supra notes 112-14, 127-29 and accompanying text (discussing
the expanded application of Halperin Austin and Kurth Ranch).
170. Many defense lawyers feel that a 48-hour license suspension would be a better
remedy to ensure that the person is sober. See Joseph Neff, Revoking License for DWI
Ruled OK, NEws & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), May 11, 1996, at Al.
171. See Cox, supra note 148, at 1285 (stating that because license revocations do more
than protect the public from immediately foreseeable harm, they become hard to justify as
non-punishment).
172. See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
173. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602,610 (1993).
174. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 784 (1994) (citations
omitted).
175. Id. at 780.
176. Id. at 784.
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be "the functional equivalent of a successive criminal prosecution."' 1
Under this broader reading of Halper, the possible deterrent effects
of a license revocation could qualify it as punishment. 8
Despite the broad reading of Halper in Kurth Ranch, the North
Carolina Supreme Court justified its contrary decision in Oliver by
distinguishing the two situations. 9  Halper had faced a sanction
"'overwhelmingly disproportionate to the damages he ha[d]
caused,' ,,* whereas in Oliver the license revocation was "neither
[an] excessive nor overwhelmingly disproportionate" response to
driving while impaired.8 Thus, the court was "not persuaded in
light of Halper, Austin, or Kurth Ranch to depart from [its own]
holdings characterizing the purpose of drivers' license revocations as
remedial,"'' This narrow interpretation of Halper, focusing on the
excessiveness of the punishment, demonstrates that the court was
analyzing the case from a multiple punishment standpoint."n By
analyzing the case from this standpoint, the court was able to dismiss,
without much discussion, the broader readings of Halper that had
been applied in Austin and Kurth Ranch."8
Perhaps recognizing that a broad reading of Halper would
contradict its analysis focused on the excessiveness of the
proceeding, the court further justified its holding by stating that the
license revocation could not be punishment because it was merely
revoking a privilege that had been granted by the state.'8 However,
177. Id.
178. See McCurdy, supra note 140, at 21 (noting that after Kurth Ranch, some DWI
defendants have argued successfully that license revocations are punishment, "resulting in
dismissal of the criminal charges").
179. See Oliver, 343 N.C. at 209,470 S.E.2d at 21.
180. Id. (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435,449 (1989)).
181. See id.
182. Id.
183. See supra note 149 (comparing the relevance of excessiveness in multiple
punishment and multiple prosecution analysis).
184. See Oliver, 343 N.C. at 209, 470 S.E.2d at 21. After stating the narrow rule
expressed by Halper, the court did not discuss its broader application in Austin or Kurth
Ranch. See id.; cf. Todd A. LaSala, Comment, The Decisive Blow to the Double Jeopardy
Defense in Kansas Drunk Driving Prosecutions: State v. Mertz, 44 U. KAN. L RL. 1009,
1043 (1996) (nbting that characterizing the deterrence as punitive from the perspective
only of the defendant merely "sidesteps any problems presented by ... the ... expansive
definition of punishment [and] overlook[s] the obvious retributive and deterrent aspects of
administrative license suspension").
185. See Oliver, 343 N.C at 210, 470 S.E.2d at 21 ("[A] driver's license 'is not a natural
or unrestricted right, nor is it a contract or property right in the constitutional sense. It is a
conditional privilege, and the General Assembly has full authority to prescribe the
conditions upon which licenses may be issued and revoked.'" (quoting Joyner v. Garrett,
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when the United States Supreme Court was confronted with a due
process challenge to license revocation in Mackey v. Montrym,1" the
state had conceded that an individual's property interest in his
driver's license is a protected one.87 The Court had previously
concluded, in Bell v. Burson,' that license revocations were subject
to constitutional restraints whether a license was deemed a right or a
privilege.'8 Despite this precedent, the North Carolina Supreme
Court stated in Oliver that a driver's license revocation could not be
punishment because it was merely the revocation of a conditional
privilege.' ° In light of the Supreme Court's due process decisions,
the North Carolina court's conclusion appears unfounded to the
extent that it relied on the proposition that a driver's license was not
"a property right in the constitutional sense."9'
However, the fact that a license is a property right for due
process purposes does not mean that revoking the privilege giving
rise to the property right necessarily constitutes punishment for
purposes of double jeopardy analysis.' In the double jeopardy
context, "the disciplinary proceedings best able to support an
argument that loss of privileges does not constitute punishment are
cases which involve specialized government licensing or regulation of
an entire specialized profession."' In contrast, if the privilege "is
one that inheres to the public at large, and the deprivation does
more than is necessary to protect the rest of the public from
279 N.C. 226, 235, 182 S.E.2d 553, 559 (1971))). Several other states have held that
because a driver's license is a privilege granted by the state, its revocation is not
punishment. See, e.g., State v. Zerkel, 900 P.2d 744, 753 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995)
(comparing driver's licenses to professional licenses); State v. Savard, 659 A.2d 1265, 1268
(Me. 1995) (analogizing to professional license cases); State ex rel. Schwartz v. Kennedy,
904 P.2d 1044,1056 (N.M. 1995) (holding that failure to abide by license terms allows the
government to revoke the license); cf. Allen v. State Attorney Gen., 896 F. Supp. 220, 222
(D. Me. 1995) (finding that the state has a right to revoke the privilege of having a license
from those who have not obeyed the conditions for keeping it).
186. 443 U.S. 1 (1979).
187. See i& at 10; see also supra note 87 (discussing the Supreme Court's due process
analysis of license revocation).
188. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
189. See id. at 539.
190. See Oliver, 343 N.C. at 210,470 U.S. at 21.
191. Id.
192. See Cox, supra note 148, at 1289 (stating that revocation of specialized privileges
would not be a violation of double jeopardy).
193. Id. at 1290. Professor Cox notes that this rationale perhaps is strongest in cases
such as the revocation of medical or legal licenses where the licensing agency is a self-
regulating group. See 1d. at 1291. In these cases, "[t]he loss of privilege confirms the
qualifications to continue operating, and only derivatively 'penalizes' the particular
operator who has broken the rules." Id.
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immediately foreseeable harm, then such deprivation should be
viewed as punishment."'' Because the court in Oliver felt that a
driver's license was not a constitutionally protected property right, it
did not consider whether a driver's license was a specialized privilege
or one that was available to the public at large.' If it had done so, it
would have been more difficult to claim that license revocation was
not punishment on the grounds that it was just withdrawing a
privilege.
96
After considering the legislative intent, the nonexcessiveness of
the sanction, and the idea that license revocation was merely the
withdrawal of a privilege, the court concluded that the procedure was
remedial and did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause."
However, because of the weaknesses in each of these arguments, the
court's conclusion does not rest on solid ground-even though the
court was able to characterize the revocation as remedial, it was able
to do so only because it narrowly interpreted Halper.'
By adopting this narrow interpretation, the court ignored the
deterrent effects of license revocation and stated that the revocation
was not an excessive response to the crime of drunk driving."'
194. Id. at 1290 ("The more general the right to the type of 'property' or status which
the government attempts to take away, the more the deprivation smacks of punishment.").
The idea that the generality of the privilege is important for constitutional purposes was
apparent in the Supreme Court's analysis in Bell, in which the Court stated that the license
revocation was subject to constitutional restraints because the license was an entitlement.
See Bell, 402 U.S. at 539.
195. See Oliver, 343 N.C. at 210,470 S.E.2d at 21.
196. See Cox, supra note 148, at 1291 (stating that license revocation cases "bring this
issue most squarely into focus," leading a minority of courts to conclude that these civil
penalties cannot be protected from double jeopardy analysis); Max Kravitz, Ohio's
Administrative License Suspension: A Double Jeopardy and Due Process Analysis, 29
AKRON L REv. 123, 138 (1996) (stating that reliance on the characterization of a license
as a privilege, "creating formalistic rather than substantive distinctions in language, could
defeat constitutional guarantees"); J. Linwood Smith, Note, Drunk Driving, Administrative
License Suspension, and Double Jeopardy in Virginia: Tench v. Commonwealth, 4 GEO.
MASON L REv. 521,545 (1996) (citing Johnson v. State Hearing Exam'r's Office, 838 P.2d
158, 175 n.12 (Wyo. 1992), for the proposition that a casual acceptance in cases that the
right to drive in modem American society is not fundamental lacks both economic and
logical foundation in the real world).
197. See Oliver, 343 N.C. at 210,470 S.E.2d at 21.
198. See supra notes 154-72 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 173-84 and accompanying text. Although recognizing that license
revocation may have some deterrent effect, the court dismissed this effect as irrelevant
because "whether a particular sanction constitutes punishment need not be determined
from the defendant's perspective." Oliver, 343 N.C. at 209, 470 S.E.2d at 21. While this
statement was first made by the U.S. Supreme Court in Halper in order to limit its holding,
see United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447 n.7 (1989), subsequent cases have read the
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However, this narrow focus on the excessiveness of the punishment
is inconsistent with later cases, such as Kurth Ranch, which applied
the rule in Halper more broadly." If the United States Supreme
Court continues to broaden the rule first expressed in Halper, the
North Carolina courts may have to re-evaluate the license revocation
proceedings under a broader multiple prosecution framework,
instead of the narrower multiple punishment standpoint that focused
on the excessiveness of the punishment.'
Even though the court did not analyze the case from a multiple
prosecution standpoint, its interpretation of the statutory procedures
governing chemical analysis of blood alcohol level implied that the
administrative license revocation and the subsequent criminal
prosecution were one proceeding."° If the revocation is truly part of
the same criminal proceeding, then it would not violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause even if the court should be required in the future to
reject its narrow multiple punishment analysis.' °
In Oliver, the court characterized the administrative revocation
and the criminal prosecution as one proceeding when it rejected the
defendant's argument that the statutes required an officer, other than
the arresting officer, to inform him of his rights regarding the
chemical analysis of the breath. " 4 Oliver's argument was based on
Nicholson v. Killens0' in which the North Carolina Court of Appeals
upheld the rescission of the revocation of the defendant's license
because the arresting officer had failed to take the defendant before
another officer who was to perform the chemical analysis.20
However, in Nicholson, the court limited its holding to the
proceedings surrounding the particular administrative revocation
rule in Halper more broadly, see supra notes 173-78 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 173-78 and accompanying text.
201. See Cox, supra note 148, at 1258 ("[R]idding double jeopardy jurisprudence of its
multiple punishments strand concomitantly places additional emphasis on the need to give
preclusive effect to prior civil proceedings which actually do seek to punish.").
202. See infra notes 204-18 and accompanying text.
203. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 450 (stressing that the finding that civil sanctions may
impose punishment for the purposes of double jeopardy analysis does not "prevent the
Government from seeking and obtaining both the full civil penalty and the full range of
statutorily authorized criminal penalties in the same proceeding").
204. See Oliver, 343 N.C. at 210-13, 470 S.E.2d at 21-23; see also supra notes 51-59 and
accompanying text (discussing this characterization).
205. 116 N.C. App. 473,448 S.E.2d 542 (1994).
206. See id. at 478, 448 S.E.2d at 544 ("[I]n the context of the statutorily mandated
twelve (12) month administrative revocation of driver's license for failure to submit to
breath analysis, the failure to take petitioner before another law enforcement officer to
advise petitioner of his rights pursuant to [§ 20-16.2] is a fatal flaw.").
19971 2341
NORTH CAROLINA LAWREVIEW
and noted that the failure of the charging officer to take the
defendant before another officer to notify the defendant of his rights
"has no adverse effect whatever on any subsequent criminal
prosecution for driving while impaired."'" In other words, while a
charging officer was required to take the defendant before another
officer in order for the administrative revocation to be valid, failure
to do so did not affect the validity of a criminal prosecution.
Rather than relying on this distinction between the procedures
surrounding administrative revocation and criminal prosecution to
reject the defendant's argument, the court in Oliver found it
necessary to reconcile the inconsistencies in the statutes governing
chemical analysis."°  The court noted that under the criminal
procedures, an arresting officer was qualified to administer the
chemical analysis, but under the revocation procedures, even though
an arresting officer could notify a defendant of his rights regarding
chemical analysis of the blood, the arresting officer was not qualified
to do this for chemical analysis of the breath.2"
Instead of focusing on the possible underlying purposes of this
distinction between the administrative and criminal proceedings,2"'
the court stated that all parts of a statute "should be construed
together and compared with each other[, and] [sluch statutes should
be reconciled with each other when possible."2 By comparing the
administrative procedures with the criminal procedures, the court
concluded that, with respect to any ambiguity contained in the
former, "the legislature intended to permit a qualified arresting
officer to notify [a] defendant of his rights ... regarding a chemical
analysis of the breath."' 2
207. Id.
208. See Oliver, 343 N.C. at 211-13, 470 S.E.2d at 22-23.
209. See id; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-139.1(bl) (1993) (the criminal procedure);
iU § 20-16.2 (the revocation procedure).
210. In Oldham v. Miller, 38 N.C. App. 178,247 S.E.2d 767 (1978), the court of appeals
stated that the statutory limitations that prevent an officer making an arrest from giving
the test assure that the arresting officer has reasonable grounds to believe the suspect is
drunk and that the test will be administered fairly and impartially. See iU at 182, 247
S.E.2d at 770; see also State v. Stauffer, 266 N.C. 358, 359, 145 S.E.2d 917, 918 (1966)
(holding that an officer who was present during the arrest was an "arresting officer" who
was precluded from administering the breathalyzer test); Reese I. Joye, Jr., Drunk
Driving: Recommendations for Safer Highways, TRIAL, June 1983, at 60 ("An arrest for
DLI is a judgment call .... An officer making an arrest is subject to the same human
emotions as the person arrested: the officer gets nervous, apprehensive, concerned that
the decision will be challenged, angry, upset, etc.").
211. Oliver, 343 N.C. at 212,470 S.E.2d at 23 (citation omitted).
212. Id. at 213, 470 S.E.2d at 23.
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However, this statutory ambiguity arises only if a comparison is
made between the provision governing the administrative revocation
and the provision governing the criminal proceeding.2" If the
statutes are interpreted separately, there is no inconsistency.214
Interpreting the statutes separately would have been consistent with
the court's earlier holding in Joyner v. Garre?5  that the
administrative and criminal revocations were the result of "separate
and distinct" proceedings.216 Therefore, by interpreting the statutes
together, it appears that the court was attempting to characterize the
administrative revocation and the criminal prosecution as
proceedings that are no longer separate and distinct.2 7 If so, any
weaknesses in the court's other arguments become irrelevant
because even under the broadest reading of Halper, if there is only
one proceeding, there can be no double jeopardy violation.1 8
Although characterizing the administrative revocation and
criminal prosecution as one proceeding solves the double jeopardy
problem, the court's interpretation of the statute governing the
administrative procedures could invalidate its due process analysis in
earlier cases.2" In Henry v. Edmistenl ° the court used a three-factor
balancing test to determine that the administrative license revocation
statute met the minimum standard of due process." 1 One of these
factors, the risk of erroneous deprivation, had originally been
213. See Nicholson v. Killens, 116 N.C. App. 473, 477, 448 S.E.2d 542, 544 (1994)
("[R]eading [§ 20-16.2] in conjunction with [§ 20-139.1] produces an ambiguous
result .... ).
214. See id. Even though the statutes read together produced an ambiguous result, the
court concluded "that the language of [§ 20-16.2], the statute at issue.... [was] clear and
unambiguous." Id. In Nicholson, the court stressed that the statutes should be read
separately because statutes imposing penalties ought to be interpreted strictly. See id. at
478, 448 S.E.2d at 544. Furthermore, the court stated if the legislature wanted the
procedures to be the same, it could amend the statutes. See id. at 478, 448 S.E.2d at 545.
215. 279 N.C. 226,182 S.E.2d 553 (1971); see also supra notes 76-81 and accompanying
text (discussing the case).
216. See .oyner, 279 N.C. at 238,182 S.E.2d at 561.
217. The North Carolina courts are not alone in trying to characterize administrative
and criminal procedures as one proceeding. See, e.g., State v. Blfrink, No. 95APC03-364,
1995 WL 584350, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 5, 1995) (arguing that an administrative
license suspension instituted in connection with an arrest for drunken driving is part of one
coordinated proceeding because of the similarity between the revocation hearing and a
pretrial motion in a criminal trial).
218. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text (discussing due process challenges to
administrative license revocation).
220. 315 N.C 474,340 S.E.2d 720 (1986).
221. See id. at 480-82,340 S.E.2d at 725-26.
NORTH CAROLINA LA W REVIEW
mitigated by requiring both the arresting officer and the chemical
analyst to file a revocation report.m After the court's ruling in
Oliver, however, an arresting officer is no longer required to take a
defendant before a chemical analyst who will administer the
breathalyzer test.m Because this interpretation could have some
effect on the risk of erroneous deprivation, the court's decision in
Oliver might lead to a revival of due process challenges to the
administrative revocation. Therefore, the court's strongest argument
in favor of its conclusion that administrative revocation does not
violate the protection against double jeopardy actually weakens its
earlier argument that the license revocation did not violate due
process of law. The court's willingness to weaken its earlier due
process analysis demonstrates the instability of the court's other
double jeopardy arguments grounded in its narrow interpretation of
Halper.
The court's narrow interpretation of Halper is not surprising,
though, because the court presumably was concerned that a different
ruling would prevent criminal prosecution of a large number of DWI
defendants who had already been subjected to civil punishment.'
However, a different ruling would not necessarily have forced an end
to the practice of civil license revocation followed by criminal
prosecution. Instead, it would have required only that the
revocation period be limited to one or two days, thus serving the
solely remedial purpose of keeping an immediate hazard off the
roads.'m
Limiting the civil sanction in this fashion would not result in
drunk drivers going unpunished. Instead, it would mean that they
would be punished only once-after the criminal proceeding. 6 Of
course, this solution might not be satisfactory because it was criticism
of the ineffectiveness of criminal proceedings which led to the
222. See id. at 484-88,340 S.E.2d at 727-30.
223. See Oliver, 343 N.C. at 213,470 S.E.2d at 23.
224. See Davies, supra note 143, at 167 (stating that state courts are unlikely to strike
license revocations down because they are effective deterrents); Todd Nelson, Friday
Court Takes Backlog of DWI Cases, NEws & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), June 8, 1996, at
B5 (reporting a backlog of DWI cases because judges had delayed hearing many cases
until the North Carolina Supreme Court made its ruling).
225. See supra notes 165-71 (discussing the remedial goal of keeping drunk drivers off
the road).
226. See Cox, supra note 148, at 1242 ("Those who do not like to see criminals go
unpunished need not insist that defendants be woodsheded twice, so long as the one who
first wields the belt really is in the best position to do so. That is all even a more logically
consistent Halper and its progeny require.").
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development of the more swift and certain civil license revocation.'
However, this very criticism of criminal proceedings illustrates the
inherent double jeopardy problem with civil license revocation. To
the extent that administrative license revocation is intended to
impose swift and certain sanctions against the drunk driver, the
revocation has deterrent effects and cannot be said to serve solely
remedial goals.'s
Because of this inherent deterrent purpose, none of the court's
double jeopardy arguments are convincing. If the United States
Supreme Court continues to interpret Halper broadly, the North
Carolina court's focus on the excessiveness of the punishment could
easily be rejected. Even though the Oliver court arguably protected
itself by interpreting the civil and criminal sanctions as one
coordinated proceeding, it remains to be seen whether the new
interpretation of the civil revocation statute will lead to new due
process challenges to administrative license suspension.
FELTON E. PARRISH
227. See Ross, supra note 2, at 121 (stating that because license suspension was
traditionally conditioned on a judicial finding of guilt, the punishment was too slow to
serve as an effective deterrent); Watts, supra note 4, at 30 (noting that the Governor's
Task Force on Drunk Driving concluded that a prompt civil license suspension procedure
would be a quick deterrent); Douglas Caiafa & A. Randall Farnsworth, Comment, Under
the Influence of California's New Drunk Driving Law: Is the Drunk Driver's Presumption
of Innocence on the Rocks?, 10 PEPP. L REV. 91, 132 (1982) (advocating shifting the
statutory emphasis to swift and certain penalties because of the ineffectiveness of stricter
criminal penalties).
228. The North Carolina Supreme Court's decision was praised, not because it provided
an adequate remedial purpose, but because it preserved the deterrent effects of license
revocations. For instance, a Mothers Against Drunk Driving spokesperson said that
"[l]icense revocation 'gets [the defendant's] attention that this is unacceptable and
something you don't do.... This teaches them a lesson. How would you feel if someone
took away your license for 10 days?'" Neff, supra note 170, at Al.
229. See supra notes 202-18 and accompanying text.
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Broken Police Promises: Balancing the Due Process Clause
Against the State's Right to Prosecute
The criminal justice system can be viewed as a battleground
between the state's interest in enforcing its laws and the defendant's
interest in asserting his constitutional rights! Plea bargains represent
a compromise of these competing interests in which concessions are
made by each party to achieve mutual benefits.' The defendant
waives his constitutional rights-e.g., his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination3 and his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel4 -in exchange for a reduced sentence or lesser charge The
state exchanges a lesser punishment to avoid a costly trial and to gain
1. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 315 (1959) (stating that the criminal justice
system represents a conflict between the state's "interest in prompt and efficient law
enforcement, and [the public's] interest in preventing the rights of its individual members
from being abridged by unconstitutional methods of law enforcement").
2. In Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), the Supreme Court discussed the
mutual advantages that plea bargains afford both the state and the defendant:
For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages of
pleading guilty and limiting the probable penalty are obvious-his exposure is
reduced, the correctional processes can begin immediately, and the practical
burdens of a trial are eliminated. For the state there are also advantages-the
more promptly imposed punishment after an admission of guilt may more
effectively attain the objectives of punishment; and with the avoidance of a trial,
scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources are conserved for those cases in which
there is a substantial issue of the defendant's guilt or in which there is substantial
doubt that the state can sustain its burden of prooL
Id. at 752. For a useful discussion of the nature of plea bargains, see Albert W. Alschuler,
The Supreme Cour4 the Defense Attorney, and the Guilty Plea, 47 U. COLO. L REV. 1
(1975). Professor Alschuler also has written an interesting article discussing the historical
development of plea bargains from English common law to modem American applications.
See Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 CoLUM. L. REV. 1 (1979).
3. The Fifth Amendment guarantees that "[n]o person... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself" U.S. CONST. amend. V. See generally
WAYNE R. LEFAVE & JEROLD IsRAEL, CRIVNAL PROCEDURE § 8.14, at 445-53 (2d
ed. 1992) (discussing the history of and rationales for the privilege against self-
incrimination); Eben Moglen, Taking the Fifth. Reconsidering the Origins of the
Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92 MICH. L REV. 1086 (1994)
(asserting that the traditional depiction of the Fifth Amendment as a fundamental right is
inconsistent with pre-Eighteenth Century practices).
4. The Sixth Amendment states that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
... have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CoNST. amend. VI. For a brief
overview of the origin and scope of a defendant's right to counsel under the Sixth
Amendment, see Laurie S. Fulton, Note, The Right to Counsel Clause of the Sixth
Amendment, 26 AM CIM. L. REV. 1599 (1989).
5. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 748-53.
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a quick resolution of the matter.6  For these reasons, the United
States Supreme Court in Brady v. United Statei upheld the
constitutionality of plea bargains,8 noting that a contrary conclusion
would invalidate a critical element of the criminal justice system that
accounts for "well over three-fourths of the criminal convictions in
this country."9
Non-prosecution agreements serve similar ends although they
are distinguishable from plea bargains in that they are less formal,
and, in some cases, less protective of a defendant's constitutional
rights."0 Nevertheless, like plea bargains, these agreements have
been enforced when the prosecutor's promise is given in exchange
for the defendant's confession or cooperation, and the defendant
thereafter relies on that promise to his detriment." However, courts
have struggled over whether such agreements are enforceable when
the promisor had no authority to make the deal.' This controversy
6. See . at 752.
7. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
8. See id. at 753.
9. Id. at 752-53. Currently, plea. bargains dispose of approximately 90% of all
criminal cases. See W. William Hodes, Lord Brougham, the Dream Team, and Jury
NulI'fication of the Third Kind, 67 U. COLO. L REV. 1075, 1078 (1996); Roland Acevedo,
Note, Is a Ban on Plea Bargaining an Ethical Abuse of Discretion? A Bronx County, New
York Case Study, 64 FORDHAM L REv. 987, 987 (1995); Eric R. Komitee, Note, Bargains
Without Benefits: Do the Sentencing Guidelines Permit Upward Departures to Redress the
Dismissal of Charges Pursuant to Plea Bargains?, 70 N.Y.U. L REV. 166,193 (1995).
10. See George E. Dix, Promises, Confessions, and Wayne LeFave's Bright Line Rule
Analysis, 1993 U. ILL. L REV. 207, 223-24 (recognizing that non-prosecution agreements,
particularly when conducted in a police station, differ from plea bargains in that they occur
in the "absence of immediate judicial supervision" and the defendant is afforded a "less
rigorous right to representation by counsel"); Welsh S. White, Confessions Induced by
Broken Government Promises, 43 DUKE LJ. 947, 968 (1994) (noting that from the
defendant's viewpoint, "[a]lthough the decision to plead guilty occurs in a more formal
setting... the two decisions are of comparable significance").
11. See infra notes 148-77 and accompanying text (discussing judicial treatment of
non-prosecution agreements).
12. Compare United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426, 428 (4th Cir. 1972) (holding that a
promise not to prosecute made by an assistant United States attorney for the District of
Columbia was binding in other federal jurisdictions), and People v. Fisher, 657 P.2d 922,
930-31 (Colo. 1983) (en banc) (holding that a defendant's due process rights were not
dependent upon a police officer's authority to make a promise), with People v. Gallego,
424 N.W.2d 470,473-74 (Mich. 1988) (noting that the enforcement of unauthorized police
promises undermines the proper administration of the criminal justice system), and
Commonwealth v. Stipetich, 652 A.2d 1294, 1295-96 (Pa. 1995) ("Police officers have no
authority to enter agreements limiting the power of the district attorney .... "). In Carter,
the Fourth Circuit was concerned that failure to enforce government promises in
neighboring districts would discourage defendants' use of plea bargains. See Carter, 454
F.2d at 428 (noting that a failure to enforce non-prosecution agreements in all jurisdictions
"would constitute a strong deterrent to the willingness of defendants accused of multistate
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is particularly evident in the context of station-house bargaining,
when the promise is made not by a prosecutor, but by a police
officer.'
In State v. Sturgill,'4 the North Carolina Court of Appeals
considered whether a defendant was entitled to a remedy when the
state failed to honor a police officer's promise not to prosecute."
The Sturgill court held that when a defendant detrimentally relies on
a broken police promise, any confession or evidence obtained by the
police as a result of that promise must be suppressed, whether or not
the police had authority to make the promise.16 Recognizing the
interest of the state in prosecuting the guilty, the court of appeals
denied specific enforcement of unauthorized police promises unless
the defendant could not be returned to the status quo ante-the
point before any detrimental reliance on the state's promise.' The
court's emphasis on fundamental fairness may be indicative of its
willingness to grant specific performance in less drastic
circumstances. 8  Nevertheless, Sturgill illustrates the court's
recognition of the competing interests inherent in the criminal justice
system, and its holding represents a careful balance between a
defendant's constitutional rights and the state's interest in
prosecuting the guilty.'
This Note first presents the facts of Sturgill and the opinion of
the appellate court.20  The Note next discusses the United States
Supreme Court's holding in Santobello v. New York," the leading
case on enforcement of plea-bargains, and examines the contractual
nature of plea-bargains and the manner in which such agreements
implicate the Due Process Clause.' Included in this discussion is a
crimes to cooperate in speedy disposition of their cases and in apprehending and
prosecuting codefendants").
13. See, e.g., Fisher, 657 P.2d. at 930; Gallego, 424 N.W.2d at 473-74; Stipetich, 652
A.2d at 1295-96. Fisher differs from Gallego and Stipetich because the court granted
specific performance of a police promise and implied that such a remedy was appropriate
even where the defendant did not detrimentally rely upon the promise by relinquishing a
constitutional right. See Fisher, 657 P.2d at 927-28; see also infra notes 153-77 (discussing
Fisher, Gallego, and Stipetich).
14. 121 N.C. App. 629,469 S.E.2d 557 (1996).
15. See id. at 630, 469 S.E.2d at 558.
16. See id. at 648, 469 S.E.2d at 568-69.
17. See id. at 648, 469 S.E.2d at 568.
18. See infra notes 206-13 and accompanying text.
19. See Sturgill, 121 N.C. App. at 647-48,469 S.E.2d at 568.
20. See infra notes 27-62 and accompanying text.
21. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
22. See infra notes 63-115 and accompanying text.
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brief review of the development of confession law, focusing in
particular on the voluntary and intelligent waiver requirements and
the totality of the circumstances test.' The Note then reviews North
Carolina courts' treatment of the enforceability of plea bargains and
the validity of confessions.24 The Note also discusses the courts'
application of contract law and due process principles to non-
prosecution agreements in the context of police promises, examining
the relationship between the authority of the promisor and the type
of remedy granted the defendant.2 Finally, the Note analyzes the
appellate court's decision in Sturgili, concentrating on the key issue
of whether a remedy is available to a defendant as a result of a
broken police promise, and, if so, whether a remedy of specific
performance is appropriate.6
On January 13, 1994, two City of Eden police officers arrested
Sturgill for felonious breaking or entering and larceny.' Sturgill was
placed in custody, advised of his Miranda rights, and interrogated.
Detective Moore, one of the arresting officers, told Sturgill that the
police were in possession of overwhelming evidence connecting him
with several other break-ins in the City of Eden, and that he
intended to charge Sturgill with those crimes in addition to the
charges for which he was under arrest.3° The police informed Sturgill
that unless he provided them with information relating to the break-
ins, his bond would be raised.3 As a result, Sturgill would be unable
to post bond and would remain in jail, preventing him from having
23. See infra notes 94-104 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 116-47 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 148-77 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 178-221 and accompanying text.
27. See Sturgill, 121 N.C. App. at 631,469 S.E.2d at 558.
28. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Fifth Amendment requires that
a defendant be warned "of the right to remain silent [and that] anything said can and will
be used against him in court." Id. at 468-69. Additionally, a defendant has the right to
consult with and have a lawyer present during interrogation since the right to counsel "is
indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 469. The defendant also
has the right to have counsel provided for him if he is unable to afford one and the right to
be so informed. See id. at 473. If a statement is taken from the defendant without a
lawyer, then "a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to
retained or appointed counsel." Id. at 475. For a general overview of Miranda's treatment
of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, see LEFAVE & ISRAEL, supra
note 3, § 6.5, at 313-17.
29. See Sturgill, 121 N.C. App. at 631,469 S.E.2d at 558.
30. See id. at 631, 469 S.E.2d at 558-59.
31. See id. at 631,469 S.E.2d at 559.
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surgery on a previously injured hand. 2 Sturgill initially indicated,
orally and in writing, that he did not commit any of the crimes.'
However, he subsequently asked what he could expect in return for
his cooperation, and Detective Moore responded that he would not
seek to indict Sturgill as a habitual felon?' Sturgill thereafter
confessed to the break-ins and signed a written statement describing
both the stolen items and the methods used.' Subsequently,
however, the state refused to honor the agreement between Sturgill
and Detective Moore. 6
The trial court declined to quash the habitual felon indictment,
the confession was admitted into evidence, and Sturgill was
convicted. 7 On appeal to the North Carolina Court of Appeals,
Sturgill argued that the state was bound by the promises made by
Detective Moore, upon which Sturgill relied to his detriment. 8 The
state responded that the confession was voluntary and admissible
because the defendant had initiated negotiations with the detective. 9
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 631-33, 469 S.E.2d at 559. At trial, Detective Moore testified as follows:
"[Police witness]: Obviously I told him that we were not able to promise him
anything, nor was anybody in a higher position able to promise him anything. I
told him that Iknew his record. I had run a criminal history on him. I told him
that he would probably qualify as an habitual felon. And all that I could tell him,
if he told the truth and helped us get back as much of the stolen property as we
could that we would not seek to indict him as a habirualfelon.
[Posecutor]: You mentioned about if he told you the truth and helped to get the
property back, you mentioned something about him not being charged as an
habitual felon?
[Police Witness]: I told him that I would not seek an indictment as an habitual
felon if he told the truth and helped to get as much of the stolen property as we
could.
[Prosecutor]: Did you promise that he would not be indicted as an habitual
felon?
[Police Witness]: No, sir, Ijust told him that I would not do it."
Id. at 632-33, 469 S.E.2d at 559 (alterations in original) (quoting trial transcript). The
court, however, noted that Detective Moore's testimony was substantially different at trial
than it was at the suppression hearing:
"[Prosecutor]: Did you promise [defendant] anything if he made those
statements?
[Detective Moore]: No, sir."
Id. at 638, 469 S.E.2d at 563 (alterations in original) (quoting trial transcript).
35. See id. at 631-32,469 S.E.2d at 559.
36. See id. at 630,469 S.E.2d at 558.
37. See id. at 630-32,469 S.E.2d at 558-59.
38. Seeid. at 632,469 S.E.2d at 559.
39. See id. at 639-40, 469 S.E.2d at 563-64. In support of its assertion, the State cited
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A unanimous appellate court held that a suspect's substantive
due process rights are violated when, to his detriment, he reasonably
relies on a broken police promise.' Such circumstances require a
curative remedy capable of affording the defendant substantial
justice.41 In this case, Sturgill had waived his Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel,
and he provided the police with a confession in return for the
promise not to indict him as a habitual felon.' The court determined
that the only appropriate remedy was a new trial in which the
confession and all evidence obtained as a result of that confession
would be suppressed.' The court also found for the defendant on
alternative statutory grounds,' ruling that two statutes' required the
State v. Richardson, 316 N.C. 594, 342 S.E.2d 823 (1986), which held that a confession is
admissible if the suspect initiates discussions regarding the effects of his cooperation prior
to the making of a police promise. See Sturgill, 121 N.C. App. at 639,469 S.E.2d at 563; see
also infra notes 126-38 and accompanying text (discussing Richardson).
40. See Sturgill, 121 N.C. App. at 631, 469 S.E.2d at 558. Judge Smith wrote the
opinion of the court and was joined by Judges Eagles and Wynn. See id. at 630, 648, 469
S.E.2d at 558,569.
41. See id. at 631, 469 S.E.2d at 558 ("Since defendant reasonably relied on police
promises not to prosecute, and those promises were disregarded by the state, we hold that
traditional notions of substantial justice and fair play, as well as defendant's substantive
due process rights, mandate a new trial, and suppression of defendant's confession.").
42. See id at 642, 469 S.E.2d at 565. The court was troubled by the bad faith
evidenced by the City of Eden Police Department. See id at 643, 645, 469 S.E.2d at 566,
567. Particularly, the court was disturbed by the Police Department's attempts to narrow
the scope of the comments made by Detective Moore; the court construed Detective
Moore's testimony as an attempt to "escape [the] resulting obligations" of his promise. Id.
at 643, 469 S.E.2d at 566; see supra note 34 (quoting Detective Moore's testimony). The
Sturgill court stated that the promise itself constituted "intolerable conduct" because "the
only conceivable purpose of the [promise] was to avoid constitutional protections due
defendant." Sturgill, 121 N.C. at 645, 469 S.E.2d at 567.
43. See Sturgill, 121 N.C. App. at 648,469 S.E.2d at 568-69.
44. See id. at 646-47,469 S.E.2d at 567-68.
45. North Carolina law provides that "[n]o person representing the State or any of its
political subdivisions may bring improper pressure upon a defendant to induce a plea of
guilty or no contest." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1021(b) (1996). Additionally,
[u]pon timely motion, evidence must be suppressed if:
(2) It is obtained as a result of a substantial violation of the provisions of this
Chapter [the Criminal Procedure Act]. In determining whether a violation is
substantial, the court must consider all the circumstances, including:
a. The importance of the particular interest violated;
b. The extent of the deviation from lawful conduct;
c. The extent to which the violation was willful;
d. The extent to which exclusion will tend to deter future violations of this
Chapter.
Id. § 15A-974. The Sturgill court's analysis under these two statutes was the same as its
due process analysis. See infra notes 179-203 and accompanying text. Therefore, a
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suppression of evidence obtained by a representative of the state
because undue pressure had been placed on a defendant.46  The
Court, however, refused to grant specific performance of the
promise, stating that principles of fundamental fairness required only
that the defendant be returned to the status quo ante.'
The court recognized that Sturgill was a case of first impression,
but noted that North Carolina courts, in plea bargain contexts, had
previously acknowledged a defendant's right to enforce promises
made by the state.' Analogizing to contract law principles, the
North Carolina Supreme Court has stated that plea agreements are
essentially unilateral contracts, in which a suspect's promise to plead
guilty serves as consideration given in exchange for a prosecutor's
promise, such as a reduced sentence or a lesser charge. 9 The court
found only two potentially distinguishable facts. First, the promise in
discussion in this Note of their application would be redundant. See Sturgill, 121 N.C. App.
at 646-47, 469 S.E.2d at 567-68. However, the court failed to justify the application of
§ 15A-1021(b) to instances where confessions, as opposed to guilty pleas, are induced by
"improper pressure." See id. Nonetheless, it noted that other jurisdictions evaluate the
enforceability of police promises under similar government misconduct statutes. See id. at
647,469 S.E.2d at 568 (citing State v. Reed, 879 P.2d 1000, 1002 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994)).
In Reed, the Washington Court of Appeals noted that contract law, by analogy, can be
used to determine the validity of plea agreements. See Reed, 879 P.2d at 1002. But where
the promisor exceeds his authority in making the promise, "such an agreement cannot be
enforced as a contract." Id. Although the Court ultimately declined to enforce a non-
prosecution agreement due to the lack of authority, it noted that "[d]epending on the
nature of the police conduct, an unenforceable agreement with police may be the basis for
dismissal under [Criminal Rule 8.3(b)]." Id. at 1003. Washington Criminal Rule 8.3(b)
states: "The court, in the furtherance of justice, after notice and hearing, may dismiss any
criminal prosecution due to arbitrary action or governmental misconduct when there has
been prejudice to the rights of the accused which materially affect the accused's right to a
fair trial." WASH. SUP. CT. CRIM. R. 8.3(b) (West 1997).
The critical difference between Criminal Rule 8.3(b) and North Carolina's § 15A-
1021(b) is that the former focuses on the defendant's right to a fair trial-its generality is
better suited to instances where a police officer makes and breaks a promise in bad faith.
In contrast, the Sturgill court's application of § 15A-1021(b) requires expanding its reach
beyond the language of the statute to encompass confessions as well as guilty pleas.
Washington Criminal Rule 8.3(b) can be read as aiming to discourage the improper
inducement of confessions through broken police promises. If § 15A-1021 has a similar
purpose, it is difficult to explain why the statute does not expressly prohibit government
agents from using undue pressure to obtain confessions.
46. See Sturgill, 121 N.C. App. at 646-47,469 S.E.2d at 567-68.
47. See id. at 647, 469 S.E.2d at 568.
48. See id. at 633-35, 469 S.E.2d at 560-61 (citing State v. Hudson, 331 N.C. 122, 147-
48, 415 S.E.2d 732, 745-46 (1992); State v. Collins, 300 N.C. 142, 148, 265 S.E.2d 172, 176
(1980); State v. Isom, 119 N.C. App. 225, 228, 458 S.E.2d 420, 422 (1995); State v.
Rodriguez, 111 N.C. App. 141,148,431 S.E.2d 788,792 (1993)).
49. See Collis, 300 N.C. at 149, 265 S.E.2d at 176 ("When viewed in light of the
analogous law of contracts, it is clear that plea agreements normally arise in the form of
unilateral contracts.").
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Sturgill was made by the police rather than a prosecutor' Second,
the promise was made during a police interrogation rather than
during plea negotiations.5' The court, however, did not find such
distinctions persuasive and cited federal and state cases that enforced
non-plea agreements made by investigating officers. Asserting that
those cases rested on "'settled notions of fundamental fairness,' "3
the court disregarded the fact that the police rather than the
prosecutor made the promise to Sturgill.T Though recognizing that
Detective Moore did not have actual, implied, or apparent authority
to make the deal, the court declared that the promise was
nonetheless valid because a defendant's due process rights are
implicated not by the promise itself but by his reliance on it." Thus,
"the appropriate consideration ... is not the power of the police to
bind ... [the] district attorney, but rather 'the scope of a defendant's
due process right to enforce a governmental promise not to use
evidence against him, upon which he detrimentally relied in
50. See Scurgill, 121 N.C. App. at 635,469 S.E.2d at 561.
51. See U4.
52. See id. at 635-37, 469 S.E.2d at 561-62 (citing United States v. Carrillo, 709 F.2d
35, 37 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Rodman, 519 F.2d 1058, 1059-60 (1st Cir. 1975);
United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426, 428 (4th Cir. 1972); People v. Fisher, 657 P.2d 922,
931 (Colo. 1983)).
53. Id. at 636, 469 S.E.2d at 562 (quoting Carrillo, 709 F.2d at 37, and citing Rodman,
519 F.2d at 1060); see also infra notes 153-59 and accompanying text (discussing Fisher).
The Sturgill court also cited People v. Gallego, 372 N.W.2d 640, 642-43 (Mich. Ct. App.
1985), aff'd, 424 N.W.2d 470 (Mich. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Stipetich, 652 A.2d 1294,
1295-96 (Pa. 1995). See Sturgill, 121 N.C. at 636, 469 S.E.2d at 562. Although both
Gallego and Stipetich granted the defendant a remedy for a broken promise, neither case
rested on "fundamental fairness" as implied by the Sturgill court; indeed, the Gallego
majority stressed that its decision rested "solely on the legal and policy ramifications of
specific enforcement of unauthorized, non-plea agreements made by the police." Gallego,
424 N.W.2d at 475; see also Stipetich, 652 A.2d at 1295 ("Affording police officers
authority to enter agreements that [bind the state] .... would create havoc in the
administration of justice .... "). Although the Sturgill court quotes Gallego as standing for
the proposition that "the Constitution's principles do not allow 'sacrific[ing] the standard
of fundamental fairness in our judicial system [and] damages [to] the integrity of our
criminal justice system,"' Sturgill, 121 N.C. App. at 637, 469 S.E.2d at 562 (quoting
Gallego, 424 N.W.2d at 478 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting) (alterations in original)), that
statement was not properly attributed to the dissenting judge, who argued that
fundamental fairness required a remedy of specific performance, see Gallego, 424 N.W.2d
at 478 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). The Sturgill court's use of the quote was made more'
misleading by the inclusion of Gallego's prior history in the citation---"aff'g Gallego I, 372
N.W.2d at 642"--a decision that made no mention of "fundamental fairness" in its
analysis. See Sturgill, 121 N.C. App. at 637, 469 S.E.2d at 562 (citing Gallego, 372 N.W.2d
at 642-43); see also infra notes 163-77 and accompanying text (discussing Gallego and
Stipetich).
54. See Sturgill, 121 N.C. App. at 639,469 S.E.2d at 563.
55. See id.
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furnishing incriminating evidence to police.' "6
In fashioning a remedy, the court found that specific
performance-enforcement of the promise not to indict Sturgill as a
habitual felon-was a drastic measure, particularly because the
mistrial was a result of a "constable's blunder." Although the court
did not foreclose the remedial use of specific performance in other
circumstances,58 it stated that it was not required "to place [the]
defendant in a better position than he enjoyed prior to making the
agreement with the police." ' Thus, the court recognized the state's
right to preserve the integrity of the criminal justice system; although
specific performance would be more likely to deter future police
trickery,' it would also offend the state's interest in prosecuting the
guilty. 61 Ultimately, the Sturgill court remanded the case for a new
trial and suppressed the confession."
A defendant's right to receive the benefit of his plea agreement
was first recognized by the United States Supreme Court in the
landmark case Santobello v. New York.0 In Santobello, the
56. Id. (quoting Fisher, 657 P.2d at 930). The court asserted that "[t]he preeminent
consideration is not whether the police had the authority to make the promise, but whether
the promise was in fact made." Id. at 643, 469 S.E.2d at 566.
57. See id. at 647,469 S.E.2d at 568.
58. See id at 648, 469 S.E.2d at 568. The court did not give specific examples of the
circumstances that might compel specific performance, but implied that where the
prosecutor makes the promise rather than the police, or where rescission is insufficient to
render substantial justice to the defendant, specific performance may be an appropriate
remedy. See id. at 647-48,469 S.E.2d at 568.
59. Id. at 647,469 S.E.2d at 568.
60. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-974 (1996) (stating that one of the considerations in
suppressing evidence is "the extent to which exclusion will tend to deter future violations
of this Chapter"). In search and seizure cases, the suppression of evidence serves "to
deter police officers from acting in violation of the Fourth Amendment; [and] therefore,
the rule should be applied only when suppression is likely to result in future deterrence."
Gretchan R. Diffendal, Note, Application of the Good-Faith Exception in Instances of a
Predicate Illegal Search: "Reasonable" Means Around the Exclusionary Rule?, 68 ST.
JoHN's L REV. 217, 221 (1994) (footnotes omitted). However, it is argued that the
rationale behind the exclusionary rule is not applicable in the Fifth Amendment context, in
which courts are not "concerned with the deterrence of future police misconduct, as is the
application of the exclusionary rule to evidence seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, but are concerned with the vindication of the important constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination." J. Thomas Sullivan, "Reforming" Federal Habeas
Corpus: The Cost to Federalism; the Burden for Defense Counsel" and the Loss of
Innocence, 61 UMKC L REV. 291, 303 (1992) (footnotes omitted) ("[Coerced confessions
compromise[] the integrity, though not necessarily the reliability, of the fact-finding
process.").
61. See Siurgill, 121 N.C. App. at 648,469 S.E.2d at 568.
62. See id. at 648,469 S.E.2d at 569.
63. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
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defendant agreed to plead guilty to a lesser offense in return for the
prosecutor's promise not to make a sentencing recommendation.6
At the sentencing hearing, a second prosecutor who was unaware of
the agreement recommended the maximum sentence of one year,
which the trial court imposed.6' The Court began its analysis by
endorsing plea bargains as an essential element of the criminal
justice system.6 However, despite the systemic benefits of plea
bargains, the Court stressed that a guilty plea must be voluntarily
and intelligently made,' and
must be attended by safeguards to insure the defendant
what is reasonably due in the circumstances. Those
circumstances will vary, but a constant factor is that when a
plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or
agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be
part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must
be fulfilled.g
Although the Court used contract terminology, a defendant's
right to enforce plea bargain agreements was not grounded solely in
contract law.6 Indeed, as Justice Douglas noted in his concurring
opinion, without a constitutional basis the Court would have lacked
jurisdiction over what was otherwise a state matter.0 Thus,
64. See id. at 258.
65. See id. at 259-60. The trial judge was made aware of the broken promise, but he
nonetheless imposed the one-year maximum sentence, claiming that the prosecutor's
recommendation had no effect on his final judgment. See id. The Supreme Court did not
question the judge's statement, but stated that the "interests of justice" required it to
remand the case for additional consideration. See id. at 262-63; see also State v.
Rodriguez, 111 N.C. App. 141, 147-48, 431 S.E.2d 788, 791-92 (1993) (stating that
prosecutor's remarks in breach of an agreement taint a trial judge's ability to render a fair
decision despite any deliberate attempts to exclude them from consideration).
66. See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260 ("The disposition of criminal charges by agreement
between the prosecutor and the accused ... is an essential component of the
administration of justice."). One year earlier, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of plea bargain agreements. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,753
(1970).
67. See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261.
68. Id. at 262.
69. See id. (listing the "interests of justice" as a factor in the Court's conclusion); id. at
266-67 (Douglas, J., concurring) (mentioning fairness and due process as bases for relief).
70. See id. at 266-67 (Douglas, J., concurring). In a separate opinion, Justice Marshall
asserted that a broken plea bargain undercuts a defendant's waiver of his constitutional
right to a trial See id. at 268 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). It
has been noted that the "majority adverted to the requirement that guilty pleas must be
voluntary and intelligent but analyzed the broken bargain in terms of contract law, in
contrast, the concurrences interpreted the broken promise as undermining the waiver of
constitutional rights implicit in a guilty plea." William M. Ejzak, Note, Plea Bargains and
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Santobello was viewed as creating a "constitutional contract."' Plea
agreements consequently were analogous to commercial contracts
and their validity could be evaluated by applying general principles
of contract law.' Accordingly, the answers to whether broken plea
bargains were enforceable were "found in the rules of offer and
acceptance, and in the doctrines of consideration and promissory
estoppel." Nevertheless, Santobello was problematic. The Court
Nonprosecudion Agreements: What Interests Should Be Protected When Prosecutors
Renege?, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 107,110-11.
71. Peter Westen & David Westin, A Constitutional Law of Remedies for Broken Plea
Bargains, 66 CAL. L. REV. 471,539 (1978).
72. See, e.g., Plaster v. United States, 720 F.2d 340, 352 (4th Cir. 1983) (evaluating the
validity of an agreement by examining questions of consideration and authority); United
States v. Mooney, 654 F.2d 482, 486 (7th Cir. 1981) ("A plea bargain is a contract ...
which necessarily must be interpreted in light of the parties' reasonable expectations ....
The resolution of each case depends upon the essence of the particular agreement and the
Government's conduct relating to its obligations in that case.").
In United States v. Arnen, 628 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1979), the prosecutor agreed not to
oppose the defendant's request for probation. See id. at 1163. The prosecution made no
objection, but the sentencing judge denied probation. See id. When the State subsequently
opposed the defendant's motion for a sentence reduction, the defendant claimed that the
State had breached their agreement. See hid In identifying the terms of the "contract," the
circuit court looked to the "intent of the parties at the time of the agreement." Id. at 1165.
The court concluded that the prosecution did not breach the agreement because all the
"essential elements of the bargain were fulfilled." Id. at 1166. The agreement required
only that the prosecutionnot oppose the request for probation, and the prosecution did not
in fact oppose that request. See id.
73. Ejzak, supra note 70, at 113. Promissory estoppel takes on added significance in
the context of broken police promises, where a police officer's lack of authority to make
the promise renders any "contract" with the defendant unenforceable. The Restatement
(Second) of Contracts states: "A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to
induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee ... which does induce such action
or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACrs § 90(1) (1979) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
Thus, promissory estoppel provides a means by which the non-breaching party may
"compel specific performance of an otherwise unenforceable contract." JOHN D.
CALAMAI & JOSEPH K. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CoNTRAcTs § 16-8, at 671 (3d ed. 1987).
In such cases, "[t]he remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires."
RESTATEMENT, supra, § 90(1).
William Ejzak asserts that contract principles are useful particularly in evaluating the
enforceability of plea bargains. See Ejzak, supra note 70, at 113. He asserts that both a
nonutilitarian and a utilitarian analysis can be used to evaluate the enforceability of such
agreements. See id. at 113-16. A nonutilitarian analysis analogizes a government promise
to a contractual firm offer, sufficient in and of itself to be binding on the promisor. See id.
at 114. This view should be distinguished from a plea bargain as a unilateral contract
because a firm offer protects the expectation interests of the promisee from the time the
promise is made and is not contingent on the promisee's performance. See i. A
utilitarian view asserts that "promises are enforceable on a sliding scale according to their
utility." Id. at 115. The promisee's reliance interest warrants greater protection than his
expectation interests because the latter interests are less damaged by a breach. See id.
Thus, the enforceability of plea bargains becomes dependent upon the importance of the
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indicated that a broken plea bargain entitled the defendant to some
relief, but it did not identify the constitutional basis of that right.'
Consequently, Santobello provided no "clear guidance to decide
what kinds of remedies are appropriate, and whether any particular
remedy is ever constitutionally required in any given case."75
It is generally agreed that the Due Process Clause 6 is the
promisee's interests as weighed against the prosecutor's interest in breaching the
agreement. See id.
74. See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262-63 (failing to specify the constitutional basis for the
remedy); Westen & Westin, supra note 71, at 476 (recognizing that the Court did not
specify "the actual source or nature of the constitutional right involved"); Ejzak, supra
note 70, at 111 ("Mhe Court did not directly address the constitutional source of its
decision."); Daniel Frome Kaplan, Comment, Where Promises End- Prosecutorial
Adherence to Sentence Recommendation Commitments in Plea Bargains, 52 U. CI. L
REV. 751, 754 (1985) (noting that Santobello's analysis had both contractual and
constitutional overtones, but that "[t]he Court's reasoning was made ... uncertain by the
fact that it did not cite any constitutional provision as the basis for its holding").
75. Westen & Westin, supra note 71, at 476. The Santobello court did not decide
which remedy was required as a result of a broken plea bargain, but instead remanded the
case and deferred to the discretion of the state court. See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263.
Peter Westen and David Westin have argued, however, that the Supreme Court did not
necessarily regard the issue of remedy as a matter of state law. See Westen & Westin,
supra note 71, at 514. Rather, the Supreme Court granted the state discretion in
determining whether the circumstances "'require"' specific performance or recission,
which implied the existence of some constitutional constraints. See iU. (quoting Santobello,
404 U.S. at 263). Thus,
[r]ather than leaving the choice of remedies to state law, [the Court] may have
merely intended to say that the state courts, being closer to the facts of the case,
were in a 'better position' to make the initial choice of remedies, subject always
to ultimate review in the Supreme Court.
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263).
76. The Due Process Clause is found in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law .... "); id. amend. XLV, § 1 (prohibiting states from depriving
"any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"). Due process has
both procedural and substantive components. See Glen R. Anstine, Comment, A House
Divided. Substantive Due Process in the Twentieth Century, 62 NEB. L REV. 316, 326
(1983).
Substantive due process limits the government's power to enact laws inhibiting
individual liberty: "By virtue of the substantive component, courts identify fundamental
values not explicit in the Constitution, translate them into substantive rights and then deny
to government ... the power to infringe those rights without some compelling
justification." Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 WIS. L REV. 941,
942. A detailed discussion of substantive due process is beyond the scope of this Note.
For a greater understanding of substantive due process and the Supreme Court's treatment
of that doctrine, see Robert L Clinton, Substantive Due Process, Selective Incorporation,
and the Late-Nineteenth Century Overthrow of John Marshall's Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 5 J.L. & POL 499 (1989) (examining the confusion and dilemmas raised by
the doctrine of substantive due process, and attempting to clarify common misconceptions
presented by due process analysis), and Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Substantive Due
Process Analysis, 26 U.SXF. L REV. 625 (1992) (setting forth a model of substantive due
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constitutional basis of the defendant's right to relief.' However, the
source of the defendant's due process interest remains unclear.
Some courts have focused on the equitable language in Santobello-
on notions of "fundamental fairness" and "substantial justice"78-- and
have asserted that a defendant's due process right arises from his
expectation interest-his right to receive the benefit for which he
bargained in good faith." Although contract principles are useful as
process analysis), and James W. Hilliard, To Accomplish Fairness and Justice: Substantive
Due Process, 30 J. MARSHA. L REV. 95 (1996) (discussing the application of substantive
due process, distinguishing the doctrine from the guarantees of equal protection, and
examining the standards used for determining when legislation violates substantive due
process).
77. See, e.g., Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 509 (1984); People v. Fisher, 657 P.2d
922, 930 (Colo. 1983) (en banc); People v. Gallego, 424 N.W.2d 470, 472 (Mich. 1988);
State v. Rodriguez, 111 N.C. App. 141,144-45,431 S.E.2d 788,790 (1993).
78. See, e.g., Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 18 & n.8 (4th Cir. 1979) (invoking
principles of fundamental fairness to enforce state promise "on the basis alone of
expectations reasonably formed in reliance upon the honor of the government"); Palermo
v. Warden, Green Haven State Prison, 545 F.2d 286, 296 (2d Cir. 1976) (asserting that
principles of "fundamental fairness" require enforcement of an unfulfilled promise);
United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426, 428 (4th Cir. 1972) (arguing that the enforceability
of plea bargains does not lie in contractual formalisms, but rests upon "the honor of the
government ... [and] the fair administration of justice"); In re James, 640 P.2d 18, 20
(Wash. 1982) (en banc) (per curiam) ("The law has over recent years created an
expectation that the State will keep its bargains unless the defendant has failed to keep his
or hers."); see also Fisher, 657 P.2d at 926-27 & n.7 (asserting in dicta that the
"'government [must] honor its firmly advanced proposals'" where its promise induces a
defendant's reasonable expectations (quoting Cooper, 594 F.2d at 17)).
Peter Westen and David Westin have argued that fundamental fairness demands
specific enforcement of the remedy because it is "strikingly cruel" to allow the state to
create and then destroy a defendant's expectations. See Westen & Westin, supra note 71,
at 526. Interpreting Santobello as protecting the defendant's expectation interest thus not
only satisfies "our intuitions of fairness," but is also consistent with "existing protection for
expectations in other areas of constitutional law." Id. As an example, Westen and Westin
discuss the Impairment Clause, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, which protects
"'expectations' created in persons by privately negotiated contracts," Westen & Westin,
supra note 71, at 526-27 (footnote omitted) (quoting United States Trust Co. v. New
Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.17 (1977)); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 470 (1978) ("[A] powerful argument may be advanced that the
most basic purposes of the impairment clause, as well as notions of fairness that transcend
the clause itself, point to a simple constitutional principle: government must keep its
word.").
79. See, e.g., Cooper, 594 F.2d at 18 & n.8 (stating that the defendant's right to
enforcement can arise prior to formation of a contract and arguing that specific
performance of a plea bargain "can only be explained if the constitutional right protected
is... one deriving... from government-induced expectations of a proposal's fulfillment");
Fisher, 657 P.2d at 927 (asserting that enforceability of government promises is dependent
upon the defendant's "reasonably induced expectations"); see also Westen & Westin,
supra note 71, at 524 (arguing that courts are using Santobello to "provide constitutional
protection for the legitimate expectations the state creates in defendants when it enters
into plea agreements with them"). In such cases, the enforceability of the plea "contract"
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an analogy, these courts reject a strict application of commercial
contract law and maintain that those principles do not govern
exclusively the enforceability of plea bargains.s'
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Cooper v. United States"1 is the
most extreme example of the protection of a defendant's expectation
interest. In Cooper, a United States attorney proposed a plea
agreement that was later withdrawn before the defendant could
accept.8 The court observed that contractual analogies worked in
most cases only because the defendant had either fully performed by
pleading guilty or substantially performed by providing the
information requested by the prosecutors prior to the plea.'
However, in Cooper, the court ignored contractual analogies because
the prosecutor withdrew the offer before it was accepted.' 4
Moreover, the court did not rely on promissory estoppel principles
because the defendant did not rely to his detriment on the plea
proposal, even though he knew its terms and intended to accept."
Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the defendant's
constitutional rights were violated and a remedy was required,s
stating that when the government attempts "anticipatory
repudiation,"' the enforceability of the plea bargain is not
is not necessarily dependent on or limited to violations of a specific constitutional right.
See Ejzak, supra note 70, at 117.
80. See, e.g., Cooper, 594 F.2d at 17 (stating that "[]ust because the elements of
express contract or promissory estoppel have not been realized in particular plea
negotiations cannot mean exclusively that there has been no unfairness in the
constitutional sense"); Carter, 454 F.2d at 428 (arguing that the enforceability of plea
bargains does not lie in contractual formalisms, but rests upon "the honor of the
government ... [and] the fair administration of justice"); Fisher, 657 P.2d at 927
("Although contractual analogies will most often provide a reliable inclusive test ... they
do not necessarily provide an equally reliable exclusive test .... "). Some courts have
rejected the application of contract principles entirely. See, e.g., United States ex rel.
Selikoff v. Commissioner of Correction, 524 F.2d 650, 654 (2d Cir. 1975) ("[Contract]
principles, borrowed from the commercial world, are inapposite to the ends of criminal
justice."); People v. Reagan, 235 N.W.2d 581, 585 (Mich. 1975) ("The standards of
commerce do not govern, and should not govern, the administration of cfiminaljustice.").
81. 594 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1979).
82. See id. at 15.
83. See id. at 16.
84. See iU The Fourth Circuit noted that when a plea is entered, a subsequent breach
by the state violates a defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights by rendering the plea
involuntary or unintelligent. See id at 18 n.8. But since the plea proposal in Cooper was
withdrawn prior to entry of the plea, such reasoning could not form the basis for protecting
the defendant's expectation interest. See id.
85. See id. at 16.
86. See id.
87. Anticipatory repudiation occurs "[w]here a party repudiates his obligations under
the contract before the time for his performance arises under the terms of the contract."
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dependent on substantial performance by a defendant.' Thus,
relying on principles of fundamental fairness, the Fourth Circuit held
that a defendant's reasonable expectations formed in reliance on a
government promise are protected by substantive due process: "[A]
constitutional right to enforcement of plea proposals may arise
before any technical 'contract' has been formed, and on the basis
alone of expectations reasonably formed in reliance upon the honor
of the government in making and abiding by its proposals.""
In contrast, some courts have held that a broken plea bargain
entitles a defendant to relief because it results in an unintelligent,
and therefore invalid, waiver of a defendant's Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination and, to a lesser extent, his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.' These cases rest on the general rule
CALAMARI & PERI.LO, supra note 73, § 12-3, at 521.
88. See Cooper, 594 F.2d at 17 n.6. Although the Fourth Circuit expressed
reservations about the use of purely contractual theory as the basis for relief, its language
implied that the state made Cooper a firm offer. See id. at 17 ("[C]onstitutional decisions
cannot be made to turn in favor of the government ... on a refusal to accord any
substantive value to reasonably induced expectations that [the] government will honor its
firmly advanced proposals.") (emphasis added); see also Ejzak, supra note 70, at 121-22
(arguing that the firm offer analogy was overlooked in Cooper). Ejzak asserts that the
Fourth Circuit's analysis was nonutilitarian because the prosecutor's promise itself was
sufficient to bind the state. See i. at 123. However, the decision also had a utilitarian
aspect in that it weighed the burden of enforcing the plea bargain against depriving the
defendant of his expectation interest. See id. The Cooper court stated:
[T]he defendant's constitutional entitlement here is only to that process
"reasonably due" under the circumstances ... and the limits of reasonableness
are to be found precisely in a weighing of the practical burdens imposed on
government by its recognition against the practical consequences for this
defendant and others similarly situated resulting from its non-recognition.
Cooper, 594 F.2d at 19-20 (citation omitted) (quoting Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S.
257, 262 (1971)); see also supra note 73 (discussing Ejzak's distinction between non-
utilitarian and utilitarian analysis of promises).
89. Cooper, 594 F.2d at 18. The Fourth Circuit also held that, to a lesser extent, the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel also was violated. See id. It
further asserted that the alternative conclusion would lead to potential avenues of abuse
by police and prosecutors alike. See iU at 20 (suggesting that possibilities of abuse exist
where prosecutors can indiscriminately withdraw plea proposals "as a means of testing the
wills and confidence of defendants and their counsel"). The Fourth Circuit subsequently
limited the scope of the Cooper decision, stating that the court did not repudiate
traditional contract and agency principles "where the content of a plea bargain and the
authority for its offer are at issue." United States v. McIntosh, 612 F.2d 835, 837 (4th Cir.
1979); see also Plaster v. United States, 720 F.2d 340, 352 (4th Cir. 1983) (stating that
"principles of fundamental fairness are satisfied by the application of normal contract
principles in the plea bargain context where the contested issues involve the content of the
agreement").
90. See, e.g., Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508-09 (1984) (declaring that a plea is
not voluntary and knowing when a prosecutor breaches a plea agreement); Jones v.
Estelle, 584 F.2d 687, 689 (5th Cir. 1978) (recognizing that a plea induced by an
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that guilty pleas and confessions are invalid if they are not
voluntarily and intelligently made.9' A voluntary plea or confession
is one that the defendant makes freely and that is not obtained by
"actual or threatened physical harm or by mental coercion
overbearing the will of the defendant."'  An intelligent plea or
confession is made when the defendant admits his guilt with "a full
understanding of the charges against him and the possible
consequences of his plea. ' 'n
The modem voluntary confession rule evolved from English
common law, which viewed confessions obtained by threat or
"flattery of hope" as inherently unreliable.' In 1897, the United
States Supreme Court in Brain v. United States' held that the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination requires that
confessions "'not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor
obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by
unfulfillable promise results in an involuntary waiver of defendant's constitutional rights);
Gamble v. State, 604 P.2d 335, 337 (Nev. 1979) (holding that a guilty plea induced by a
broken promise is not valid because defendant's waiver was not voluntarily and
intelligently made); State v. Tourtelotte, 564 P.2d 799, 802 (Wash. 1977) (en banc)
(stating that an unkept promise "undercuts the basis for the [defendant's] waiver of
constitutional rights implicit in the plea"); see also Cooper, 594 F.2d at 18.n.8 (noting that
in cases where the state reneges after the plea is entered the defendant's Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights are violated).
91. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) ("Waivers of constitutional
rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences."); Culombe v.
Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961) (stating that the "ultimate test .... [is whether] the
confession [is] the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker").
92. Brady, 397 U.S. at 750.
93. Id. at 749 n.6. In the plea bargain context, Peter Westen and David Westin argue
that the intelligent waiver requirement involves three sorts of disclosure:
First, the defendant must be made aware of the elements of the offense in order
to ensure that he will not admit guilt through mistake. Second, he must be
apprised of the constitutional alternatives to pleading guilty .... Third, the court
must inform the defendant of all reasonably foreseeable consequences of
conviction in order to respect the defendant's right to choose. Further, once the
state provides a defendant with material information about the consequences of
conviction.., the state must make a meticulous effort to see that the information
is accurate.
Westen & Westin, supra note 71, at 507-08 (footnote omitted).
94. See The King v. Warickshall, 168 Eng. Rep. 235 (K.B. 1783) ("[A] confession
forced from the mind by the flattery of hope... comes in so questionable a shape when it
is to be considered as the evidence of guilt, that no credit ought to be given to it; and
therefore it is rejected."). The rule was applied "rigorously and held confessions
inadmissible on the basis of what today would be generally regarded as quite innocuous
references to possible benefits." Dix, supra note 10, at 212.
95. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
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the exertion of any improper influence.' ,96 However, reliance on
Brain diminished as plea bargain agreements became more
prevalentY In Brady v. United States,9 the Supreme Court
recognized that the widespread use of plea bargaining alone was not
sufficient to justify the admissibility of a confession so obtained, but
asserted that a bright-line application of the promise rule should not
deprive the state and the defendant of the mutual advantages
provided by plea bargains.'
Although Brady distinguished Brain only in the specific context
of plea bargaining, the promise rule was expressly repudiated by the
Supreme Court in Arizona v. Fulminante.W In Fulminante, the
Court stated in dicta that Brain was no longer the standard and held
that the admissibility of confessions should instead be determined by
applying a "totality of the circumstances" test."'1 The test assesses
96. Id. at 542-43 (quoting 3 RuSSELL ON CRIMES 478 (Horace Smith & A.P.P. Keep
eds., 6th ed. 1896)). Brain was rarely applied by the Courts during the first half of the
twentieth century largely because the Fifth Amendment did not yet apply to the states.
See White, supra note 10, at 952 n.36. However, in 1964, the Supreme Court stated that
the Brain test was the appropriate state standard for determining the admissibility of
confessions. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1964).
97. See White, supra note 10, at 953 & n.44 (noting that between 1966 and 1991 the
Supreme Court cited Brain only once).
98. 397 U.S. 742 (1970). In Brady, the defendant contended that his plea was
involuntary because it was obtained by the government's promise of a reduced sentence.
See id. at 744.
99. See id. at 752-53 ("But we cannot hold that it is unconstitutional for the State to
extend a benefit to a defendant who in turn extends a substantial benefit to the State and
who demonstrates by his plea that he is ready and willing to admit his crime ... ."). The
abandonment of a per se interpretation was also a result of the state courts' recognition
that a strict application of the promise rule handcuffed law enforcement officials, giving
them little leeway when seeking to convince a defendant to confess. See Dix, supra note
10, at 219.
100. 499 U.S. 279, 285 (1991). One commentator asserts that by subjecting the
admission of coerced confessions to "harmless error analysis" in Fulminante, the Supreme
Court has relaxed "its traditional concern about police interrogation practices and the
implications for the integrity of the criminal justice system." Sullivan, supra note 60, at
304 n.78.
101. See FUninante, 499 U.S. at 285 (stating that Brain "under current precedent does
not state the standard for determining the voluntariness of a confession"). Prior to
Fulminame, state and lower federal courts had rejected a per se application of the promise
rule and had implemented a "totality of the circumstances" test. See, e.g., United States v.
Ferrara, 377 F.2d 16, 17 (2d Cir. 1967); United States v. Williams, 447 F. Supp. 631, 637
(D. Del. 1978); Sprague v. State, 590 P.2d 410,413 (Alaska 1979); State v. Tapia, 767 P.2d
5, 8 (Ariz. 1988); People v. Mounts, 784 P.2d 792, 796 (Colo. 1990) (en banc); People v.
Veal, 500 N.E.2d 1014, 1017 (II. App. Ct. 1986); State v. Wilson, 719 S.W.2d 28, 31 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1986); State v. Hutson, 537 S.W.2d 809, 813 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); State v.
Beckley, 600 A.2d 294, 295-96 (Vt. 1991); State v. Setzer, 579 P.2d 957, 959 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1978).
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whether a confession was voluntarily and intelligently made by
considering the "factors that relate both to the nature of the police
practices and to the individual characteristics of the defendant" in an
effort to determine if the defendant's "'will was overborne.' "10
Some of the factors considered under the test include "the duration
and conditions of detention ... , the manifest attitude of the police
toward him, his physical and mental state, [and] the diverse pressures
which sap or sustain his powers of resistance and self-control."'"m
Under this test, a promise is likely to take on greater significance if it
is indicative of police misconduct or bad faith on the part of the
investigator." '
In Mabry v. Johnson,"' the Supreme Court clarified its views
regarding the nature of the due process violation in broken plea
bargains.'m In Mabry, the prosecution withdrew a plea agreement
after the defendant accepted the deal but before he entered a guilty
pleaY The Court held that the plea bargain was not enforceable
because "[a] plea bargain standing alone is without constitutional
significance; in itself it is a mere executory agreement which, until
embodied in the judgment of a court, does not deprive an accused of
liberty or any other constitutionally protected interest. It is the
ensuing guilty plea that implicates the Constitution."" Although
102. White, supra note 10, at 951 (quoting Fulninante, 499 U.S. at 288).
103. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568,602 (1961).
104. See, e.g., People v. Fisher, 657 P.2d 922, 930 (Colo. 1983) (en banc) (characterizing
police attempts to narrow the scope of the promise as indicative of bad faith). One
commentator has noted that, in some cases, the courts seem less concerned with "the
defendant's free choice in an empirical or metaphysical sense than ... with the source and
the nature of the pressure exerted on the defendant at the time he confessed." White,
supra note 10, at 951. Professor White suggests that the court is more concerned with bad
faith interrogation techniques than with the defendant's decision-making process itself.
See id. He supports his conclusion by citing Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959),
where the police officer, a childhood friend of the defendant, said that he would lose his
job if the defendant did not confess. See White, supra note 10, at 951 n.29. In Spano, the
Supreme Court put "considerable emphasis on the fact that the defendant's sympathy was
'falsely aroused.'" Id. (quoting Spano, 360 U.S. at 323).
105. 467 U.S. 504 (1984).
106. The Court noted the conflicting interpretations of the Third and Fourth Circuits.
See id. at 507 n.2. Compare Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 18 (4th Cir. 1979)
(enforcing plea proposal before a "technical 'contract"' has been formed), with Virgin
Islands v. Scotland, 614 F.2d 360, 365 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that without reliance, a
defendant cannot enforce a withdrawn plea proposal prior to entry of the plea).
107. See Mabry, 467 U.S. at 506. The prosecutor had promised the defendant a
sentence of 21 years that would be served concurrently with sentences from previous
convictions, but thereafter would propose only that the sentences be served consecutively.
See id.
108. Id. at 507-08. Mabry implies that the plea bargain is like a unilateral contract,
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plea bargains are not themselves unconstitutional,'9 the Court
asserted that when a prosecutor breaches a plea agreement, the
defendant "pleads guilty on a false premise" and hence the waiver of
his privilege against self-incrimination is not valid.1 ' In other words,
an intelligent waiver of a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination and Sixth Amendment right to counsel
cannot be made if the defendant is unaware of the consequences of a
guilty plea and the circumstances under which that plea was made."'
The Court's decision does not mean that a defendant is left without a
remedy for broken promises;" but the intelligent waiver
requirement of Mabry is distinguishable from the expectation test in
that it "does not extend to protection of injurious reliance that does
not already implicate constitutional rights."'"
Both the defendant's expectation interest and the defendant's
which has no effect until the defendant performs. See iU; Kaplan, supra note 74, at 756;
see also State v. Collins, 300 N.C. 142, 149, 265 S.E.2d 172, 176 (1980) (recognizing that a
plea agreement is essentially a unilateral contract).
109. See Mabry, 467 U.S. at 508 ("[P]lea agreements are consistent with the
requirements of voluntariness and intelligence-because each side may obtain advantages
when a guilty plea is exchanged for sentencing concessions, the agreement is no less
voluntary than any other bargained-for exchange."); see also supra notes 91-104 and
accompanying text (discussing the voluntary and intelligent waiver requirements).
110. Mabry, 467 U.S. at 509. One commentator states that most interrogated suspects
are not represented by an attorney and are unable to judge the value of the promise being
made. See White, supra note 10, at 982. In such circumstances, Professor White argues
that the "suspects should be afforded the same protection from empty promises as they are
from broken ones." Id.
111. See Mabry, 467 U.S. at 509; Kaplan, supra note 74, at 754-55. One commentator
argues that Santobello's enforcement of plea bargains rests solely on principles of fairness
because the Supreme Court's decision in Mabry explicitly referred to fairness principles
and lacked "any reference to the requirement of an intelligent waiver." White, supra note
10, at 968. However, the argument misinterprets Mabry. For example, Mabry identified
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970), as setting the applicable standard for a
valid guilty plea: that it be "voluntary and intelligent." Mabry, 467 U.S. at 508-09. The
Court continued. "Thus, only when it develops that the defendant was not fairly apprised
of its consequences can his plea be challenged under the Due Process Clause." I& at 509.
The Court concluded that since Mabry was "fully aware of the likely consequences" of his
plea, iU at 511, and his plea was not a result of deception, the plea "fully satisfied the test
for voluntariness and intelligence," id. at 510. Additionally, the Court referred to fairness
only in the context of examining the holding of Santobello. See id. at 509.
112. See Ejzak, supra note 70, at 133.
113. Id. (emphasis added). Mabry thus implicitly overruled the Fourth Circuit's
decision in Cooper. See United States v. Hernandez, 948 F.2d 316, 320 (7th Cir. 1991)
(recognizing overruling of Cooper by Mabry); see also Ejzak, supra note 70, at 129-30
(stating that Mabry did not constitutionalize the "doctrine of promissory estoppel for plea
bargains," and that "due process protection for defendants ... is limited to previously
recognized constitutional rights such as the requirement that waiver of constitutional rights
must be voluntary and intelligent" (footnote omitted)).
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interest in making an intelligent waiver of constitutional rights
require a remedy for a broken plea bargain. However, a defendant
has the constitutional right to specific performance only if the source
of the due process right is an expectation interest; specific
performance in such circumstances would be the only way for the
defendant to get the benefit of the bargain."4  In contrast, an
unintelligent waiver of a defendant's constitutional rights can be
remedied by either specific performance or by vacating the plea and
returning the parties to the status quo ante:
[E]xcept in cases where the defendant has relied to his
detriment, [vacating the plea] adequately protects the
defendant's interest in making an intelligent plea. By
affording the defendant an opportunity to choose again on
the basis of accurate information, the court fully protects
the defendant's opportunity to make a meaningful choice
between the alternatives that are open."
North Carolina is in accord with the Supreme Court's analysis
regarding the validity and enforceability of plea agreements. In State
v. Slade,," the North Carolina Supreme Court acknowledged the
systemic benefits of plea bargains. 7 In State v. Collins,"" the
supreme court adopted Santobello and held that the state may
withdraw from a plea bargain anytime prior to the defendant's actual
guilty plea unless the defendant relies on the agreement to his
detriment." Although Collins was decided prior to Mabry, the
supreme court recognized that a plea agreement is essentially a
unilateral contract, where "[t]he consideration given for the
prosecutor's promise is not defendant's corresponding promise to
plead guilty, but rather is defendant's actual performance by so
pleading.""' Like Mabry, the Collins court rejected the Fourth
114. See Westen & Westin, supra note 71, at 512-13.
115. Id. at 511 (footnote omitted).
116. 291 N.C. 275,229 S.E.2d 921 (1976).
117. See idU at 277-78, 229 S.E.2d at 923 (recognizing the efficiency benefits of plea
bargaining).
118. 300 N.C. 142,265 S.E.2d 172 (1980).
119. See id. at 148, 265 S.E.2d at 176; see also State v. Fox, 34 N.C. App. 576, 579, 239
S.E.2d 471, 473 (1977) (determining that the state is not bound to a plea bargain if the
defendant declines to fulfill it). The North Carolina Court of Appeals adopted Santobello
two years prior to Collins, asserting that Santobello is "predicated upon the defendant's
surrender of fundamental constitutional rights ... in reliance upon the prosecutor's
promise." Northeast Motor Co. v. North Carolina State Bd. of Alcoholic Control, 35 N.C.
App. 536,538,241 S.E.2d 727,729 (1978).
120. Collins, 300 N.C. at 149, 265 S.E.2d at 176. North Carolina courts have
consistently relied on Collins to invalidate broken plea bargains or to uphold the State's
1997] 2365
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Circuit's liberal use of an expectations test in Cooper.' The court
instead endorsed and emphasized the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in
United States v. McIntosh,' which advocated the strict use of agency
and contract principles when evaluating "'the content of a plea
bargain and the authority for its offer.' "" North Carolina courts
have not discussed whether specific performance of a broken plea
bargain is required, but the language in Collins clearly suggests that
specific performance would be appropriate where a defendant relies
to his detriment on a broken plea bargain."u
In evaluating whether a plea or confession is voluntarily and
intelligently made, North Carolina courts employ the "totality of the
circumstances" test." The North Carolina Supreme Court's decision
in State v. Richardson26 provides an illustration of the test. In
Richardson, the defendant was arrested for attempted burglary of a
drug store in Hendersonville, Tennessee."' He was informed of his
Miranda rights," the nature of the charges against him, the possible
punishments, and, at his request, the effect his cooperation may have
on sentencing."9 The detective told him that the police could make
no promises on behalf of the district attorney, but that the
defendant's cooperation might affect the results of any plea
right to withdraw from them. See, e.g., State v. Hudson, 331 N.C. 122, 149, 415 S.E.2d 732,
746 (1992) (finding no detrimental reliance where the state withdrew its offer prior to
judicial approval); State v. Isom, 119 N.C. App. 225, 228, 458 S.E.2d 420, 422 (1995)
(allowing defendant to withdraw where the state broke its promise to sentence defendant
as a youthful offender); State v. Rodriguez, 111 N.C. App. 141, 146-48, 431 S.E.2d 788,
791-92 (1993) (enforcing plea bargains where the defendant pled guilty in exchange for
prosecutor's promise not to recommend a sentence).
121. See Collins, 300 N.C. at 148,265 S.E.2d at 176.
122. 612 F.2d 835 (4th Cir. 1979).
123. Collins, 300 N.C. at 148, 265 S.E.2d at 176 (quoting McIntosh, 612 F.2d at 837).
Cooper granted specific enforcement of the broken plea proposal even though the Fourth
Circuit found no detrimental reliance on the part of the defendant. See Cooper v. United
States, 594 F.2d 12, 18 (4th Cir. 1979). However, the Cooper court stated that its holding
was applicable only where the prosecutor had apparent authority to make the bargain and
the proposal was "specific and unambiguous in form." Id. at 19. Thus, the Fourth Circuit's
holding in McIntosh should not be construed as a reversal of its decision in Cooper, but as
an affirmation of the validity of contract principles in evaluating the existence and terms of
a plea proposal.
124. See Collins, 300 N.C. at 148, 265 S.E.2d at 176.
125. See, e.g., State v. Reese, 319 N.C. 110, 127, 353 S.E.2d 352, 361 (1987); State v.
Jackson, 308 N.C. 549, 581, 304 S.E.2d 134, 152 (1983); State v. Carter, 296 N.C. 344, 353,
250 S.E.2d 263, 269 (1979); Sturgill, 121 N.C. App. at 644, 469 S.E.2d at 566.
126. 316 N.C. 594,342 S.E.2d 823 (1986).
127. See id. at 596,342 S.E.2d at 826.
128. See supra note 28 (discussing Miranda's requirements).
129. See Richardson, 316 N.C. at 596, 342 S.E.2d at 826.
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negotiation." Additionally, the Tennessee police made no promises
regarding the possibility of indictment in other jurisdictions."
Thereafter, the defendant voluntarily attended a meeting with a
Tennessee police officer and North Carolina law enforcement
officials, during which he confessed to several crimes committed in
North Carolina."
2
On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the
confession was voluntarily and intelligently made."3 The court found
no evidence of implied threats indicating that the confession was
given involuntarily'" and rejected the defendant's argument that the
confession was induced by the threat of being prosecuted as a
habitual felon.' Central to the court's determination were the
defendant's initiation of the discussion regarding the effects of
cooperation and the lack of a promise for anything in return."6
Moreover, the court said that the defendant's confession was
intelligently made because he was "a mature adult with considerable
experience in the criminal justice system due to his prior felony
convictions. He clearly engaged in hard-headed bargaining with the
Tennessee authorities to obtain leniency and to avoid
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 597, 342 S.E.2d at 826.
133. See id. at 604,342 S.E.2d at 831.
134. See id. at 603, 342 S.E.2d at 830. The court distinguished the case from other
North Carolina decisions that involved a "police dominated atmosphere." Id.; see also
State v. Pruitt, 286 N.C. 442,458,212 S.E.2d 92,102-03 (1975) (suppressing the confession
where the interrogation was conducted in a "police-dominated atmosphere" and the
defendant was told by police that his sentence would be more extreme if he did not
cooperate); State v. Stevenson, 212 N.C. 648, 649-50, 194 S.E. 81, 81-82 (1937) (excluding
the confession where the defendant was led to believe that evidence in the possession of
the police was sufficient to convict).
135. See Richardson, 316 N.C. at 603-04, 342 S.E.2d at 830-31.
136. See Id. at 602, 342 S.E.2d at 830 ("Defendant had asked [the police] what
additional charges might be brought against him, and the officer can hardly be faulted for
answering his question."). A detective had said that he would testify on Richardson's
behalf as to his cooperation in the investigation, but the supreme court refused to consider
the promise as determinative even though a previous supreme court decision had
invalidated a confession obtained by a similar statement. See id. at 604, 342 S.E.2d at 830
(distinguishing State v. Fuqua, 269 N.C. 223, 228, 152 S.E.2d 68, 72 (1967), which
invalidated a confession induced by an officer's promise to testify as to defendant's
cooperation). Similarly, other courts have held that the defendant voluntarily waives his
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights when he initiates negotiations. See, e.g., People v.
Wright, 469 N.E.2d 351, 354 (IM. App. Ct. 1984); Drew v. State, 503 N.E.2d 613, 617 (Ind.
1987); State v. Harwick, 552 P.2d 987, 990 (Kan. 1976); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 461
S.W.2d 920, 922 (Ky. 1970); State v. Hutson, 537 S.W.2d 809, 813-14 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976);
State v. Starling, 456 A.2d 125,129 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983).
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prosecution." ' 7 Because the confession satisfied both the voluntary
and knowing requirements for admissibility, the court upheld its use
at trial.3
8
The North Carolina Supreme Court illustrated its concern with
police misconduct and bad faith interrogation techniques in State v.
Jackson," in which the police obtained a confession from a
defendant by confronting him with falsified evidence.14 In Jackson,
the defendant was interrogated in connection with the stabbing
murder of a woman.'4' Police investigators had found a kitchen
knife, unbloodied and with no fingerprints, alongside railroad
tracks." The police subsequently placed a bloody fingerprint on an
identical knife and confronted the defendant with the so-called
evidence.' 3 In a four-to-three decision, the supreme court held that
Jackson's confession was both voluntarily and intelligently made.
4
137. Richardson, 316 N.C. at 604,342 S.E.2d at 831.
138. See id. Note, however, that some North Carolina decisions have not always
treated the voluntary and intelligent requirements as distinct. See, e.g., State v. Stephens,
300 N.C. 321, 327, 266 S.E.2d 588, 592 (1980) (holding that a confession obtained as a
result of police trickery was involuntary because the defendant did not knowingly waive
his rights). In still other cases, North Carolina courts focused solely on the voluntary
prong of the test while ignoring the issue of whether the suspect intelligently waived
privilege against self-incrimination. See, e.g., State v. Carter, 296 N.C. 344, 352-53, 250
S.E.2d 263, 268-69 (1979) (concluding that a confession was admissible even though the
suspect was not aware of the nature of the investigation). But see iU at 355-56, 250 S.E.2d
at 270 (Exum, 3., dissenting) (arguing that the defendant could not make a valid waiver
where he was "misled... to believe (1) that the matter to which his waivers would pertain
was far less serious than in fact it was and (2) that it was a matter in which he was not at all
implicated when in fact it was a matter in which he was seriously involved"). Of course,
the distinction between a voluntary confession and an intelligent one is often difficult to
make. Arguably, the Supreme Court in Brady struggled to make the two requirements
factually distinct. Compare Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 754 (1970) (stating that
the guilty plea was voluntary because defendant had "full opportunity to assess the
advantages ... attending a plea of guilty; there was no hazard of an impulsive and
improvident response to a seeming but unreal advantage"), with id at 756 (stating that the
plea was also intelligently made because defendant was "advised by competent counsel
[and] was made aware of the nature of the charge against him"). One commentator notes
that Miranda did not use the terms clearly, at times stating that the waiver need only be
voluntary and at other times suggesting that "voluntary" and "knowing" were
interchangeable. See George E. Dix, Mistake, Ignorance, Expectation of Benefit, and the
Modern Law of Confessions, 1975 WASH. U. LQ. 275, 310-11. Other scholars, however,
note that the term "voluntary" is often used broadly "as an umbrella word to encompass
two otherwise separate kinds of problems." Westen & Westin, supra note 71, at 501 n.109.
139. 308 N.C. 549,304 S.E.2d 134 (1983).
140. See id. at 553, 304 S.E.2d at 137.
141. See id. at 551-52, 304 S.E.2d at 135-36.
142. See id. at 553-54, 304 S.E.2d at 137.
143. See id. at 557, 304 S.E.2d at 139.
144. See i. at 585, 304 S.E.2d at 154. The supreme court considered the following
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The three dissenters argued that the due process rights of the
defendant were violated by "fundamentally unfair" interrogation
techniques.' The deciding vote was cast by Justice Mitchell, who
concurred with the majority opinion only because Jackson was not in
custody at the time of the interrogation and therefore was not
entitled to a reading of his constitutional rights.' Had the defendant
been arrested formally, Justice Mitchell argued, he would have been
entitled to full protection of his constitutional rights, and the falsified
evidence would have been a sufficient factor to find the confession
inadmissible.'47
In addition to plea bargains, courts have evaluated the validity
of non-prosecution agreements and similar compacts by applying a
contract law and due process analysis.' The central issue is often
factors determinative:
[The d]efendant was not in custody. He was not deceived or tricked about the
nature of the crime involved or the possible punishment. His Miranda rights
were not violated. He was not held incommunicado. He was not subjected to
prolonged uninterrupted interrogation. He was not subjected to physical threats
or shows of violence. No promises were made to him in return for his confession.
He was experienced in the criminal justice system and was not retarded,
feebleminded, or emotionally upset. [His] independent will was not overcome, so
as to induce a confession he was not otherwise disposed to make, by mental or
psychological coercion or pressure.
Id. at 582, 304 S.E.2d at 152-53 (citations omitted).
145. See id. at 602,304 S.E.2d at 164 (Exum, j., dissenting).
146. See id. at 585-86, 304 S.E.2d at 154-55 (Mitchell, J., concurring). The Jackson
court acknowledged that a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights are violated if he is
taken into custody on less than probable cause; under such circumstances, any confession
obtained thereafter would be inadmissible. See id. at 583, 304 S.E.2d at 153. However,
since Jackson voluntarily submitted to questioning and was free to leave at any time, the
court concluded that he was not in custody. See id. The dissent argued that although the
defendant was not under formal arrest, the "'[t]est to determine custody is whether a
reasonable person in the suspect's position would believe himself to be in custody.'" See
id. at 600, 304 S.E.2d at 163 (Exum, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 576, 304 S.E.2d at 149).
In applying a "totality of the circumstances" test, Justice Exum concluded that the
defendant was in custody because the police told him they had "overwhelming evidence of
his guilt." Id, at 601, 304 S.E.2d at 163 (Exum, J., dissenting).
147. See id. at 585-86,304 S.E.2d at 154-55 (Mitchell, J., concurring).
148. See, e.g., United States v. Carrillo, 709 F.2d 35, 37 (9th Cir. 1983) (enforcing Drug
Enforcement Agent's promise not to prosecute where defendant fully cooperated with the
investigation); United States v. Rodman, 519 F.2d 1058,1059-60 (1st Cir. 1975) (dismissing
an indictment where the Securities Exchange Commission had promised not to prosecute
and defendant thereafter provided substantial evidence); United States v. Wolf, 601 F.
Supp. 435, 443 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (suppressing evidence where tax authorities broke promise
made to defendant that they would not give evidence to the Internal Revenue Service);
United States v. Pascal, 496 F. Supp. 313, 318 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (dismissing an indictment
where a Drug Enforcement Agent broke a promise to recommend that defendant not be
indicted); In re Doe, 410 F. Supp. 1163, 1165-66 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (enforcing promise of
narcotics officer that defendant would not be questioned in exchange for turning over 500
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whether the promisor had the authority to bind the state by making
the promise.149 Police promises are particularly troubling because in
many states the district attorney's office alone is empowered to
decide whether and when to prosecute."0 Although courts generally
have agreed that the police lack the authority to make binding
agreements without the consent of the prosecuting attorney,"1 some
courts have argued nevertheless that the defendant's reliance on the
agreement itself is sufficient to grant specific performance. "
grams of cocaine); People v. Gallego, 424 N.W.2d 470, 475 (Mich. 1988) (excluding
evidence of a non-prosecution agreement after a broken police promise); People v.
Reagan, 235 N.W.2d 581, 587 (Mich. 1975) (granting specific performance of the
prosecutor's promise to dismiss charges if defendant passed a lie detector test, which the
defendant subsequently passed); Commonwealth v. Stipetich, 652 A.2d 1294, 1295-96 (Pa.
1995) (suppressing evidence because police lacked authority to make a non-prosecution
agreement).
149. See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426, 428 (4th Cir. 1972) (dismissing the
government's argument that a United States Attorney lacked authority to bind United
States Attorneys in other jurisdictions, stating that "[the] United States government is the
United States government throughout all of the states and districts"); Gallego, 424 N.W.2d
at 473 (finding the absence of authority "significant" because of its impact on the
accountability of the criminal justice system and the possibility that unauthorized promises
will lead to increased litigation).
150. See, e.g., United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 551 F.2d 1106, 1112 (8th
Cir. 1977) (stating that government prosecutors "have the sole power and responsibility to
institute criminal proceedings"); Winkles v. State, 392 A.2d 1173, 1175 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1978) ("The discretion as to whether to prosecute is solely in the State's Attorney,
and only that official ... [could] make valid the alleged agreement."); Sturgill, 121 N.C.
App. at 637-38, 469 S.E.2d at 562 (noting that the district attorney has the sole authority to
determine which defendants to prosecute); St/peich, 652 A.2d at 1295 ("[I]he ultimate
discretion to fie criminal charges lies in the district attorney."); State v. Reed, 897 P.2d
1000, 1002 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) ("The police have no authority to make prosecutorial
decisions. The county prosecutor is charged with prosecution of all criminal actions in
which the state is a party." (citation omitted)).
151. See, e.g., Yarber v. State, 375 So. 2d 1212, 1227 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977) ("[L]aw
enforcement officers are utterly without power and authority to grant an accused
immunity from arrest and prosecution .... "); Green v. State, 857 P.2d 1197, 1201 (Alaska
Ct. App. 1993) ("[P]olice officers, acting on their own, cannot enter into a binding
immunity or non-prosecution agreement with a suspect or defendant."); In re Parham, 431
P.2d 86, 88 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967) (holding that non-prosecution agreements made by
police officers are not enforceable because the police lack authority to make such
promises); Gallego, 424 N.W.2d at 473 ("[P]olice possess neither the authority to withhold
prosecution nor to grant immunity.. . ."); Supetich, 652 A2d at 1295 (holding that a non-
prosecution agreement made by the police was invalid because the "police did not have
authority to bind the [district attorney]"); State v. Cox, 253 S.E.2d 517, 521 (W. Va. 1979)
("[L]aw enforcement officers do not have authority to promise immunity from prosecution
in exchange for information .... "). The Cox court stated that an exception to the general
rule of unenforceability of unauthorized police promises might be warranted when an
"unsophisticated person would ... perceive the words of a law enforcement officer being
spoken as the voice of a unitary state." Cox, 253 S.E.2d at 521 n.2.
152. See, e.g., People v. Fisher, 657 P.2d 922, 930 (Colo. 1983) (en banc) (concluding
that no remedy short of specific performance would "render substantial justice to the
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For example, in People v. Fisher,'3 an Oklahoma City detective
promised the defendant that a videotaped interview in which the
defendant discussed his burglary activities would not be used against
him.' Prosecutors in Colorado subsequently charged the defendant
with several counts of burglary and theft and sought to introduce the
videotape into evidence."'5 In holding that the defendant's due
process rights were implicated when he reasonably relied on the
promise to his detriment, the Colorado Supreme Court applied both
contract principles and traditional notions of fairness. 6 The court
stated that the defendant's waiver of his privilege against self-
incrimination and the right to the presence of counsel was not by
itself determinative because the "violation of an independent
constitutional right is not essential to an accused's entitlement to
fulfillment of related promises."' In fashioning an appropriate
remedy, the supreme court concluded that only specific performance
could "render substantial justice."'"'  The court stated that the
detective's lack of authority to make the promise was
inconsequential because the promise itself implicated the defendant's
constitutional rights; the "appropriate consideration ... is not the
power of [the police] to bind [the] state, but, rather, the scope of a
defendant's due process right to enforce a governmental promise not
to use evidence against him, upon which he detrimentally relied in
defendant"); Gallego, 424 N.W.2d at 477 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting) (asserting that the
police promise was specifically enforceable despite lack of authority); see also
Commonwealth v. Stipetich, 621 A.2d 606, 611 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (finding Justice
Cavanagh's dissent in Gallego persuasive and concluding that the promise was specifically
enforceable even though police were not authorized to make it), rev'd, 652 A.2d 1294 (Pa.
1995).
153. 657 P.2d 922 (Colo. 1983) (en banc).
154. See id. at 923-24.
155. See id. at 925.
156. See id. at 931; see also id. at 925 (citing the trial court's admonition that societal
integrity is undermined if the state is not bound by its agreements).
157. Id. at 928-29. The Fisher court in dicta endorsed the Fourth Circuit's holding in
Cooper and implied that proof of an impairment of defendant's constitutional rights is not
a crucial element of his constitutional right to relief. See id. at 927. Unlike Cooper,
however, Fisher had detrimentally relied on the police promise at issue, and therefore the
court declined to examine the "outer limits" of a defendant's due process rights. See id. at
927-28.
158. Id. at 930. The Fisher court granted specific performance because it was the only
form of relief available; that is, the promise made by the police was that they would not
use the evidence, and therefore, suppression of the evidence achieved the same result as
specific performance. See Id. at 931. Nonetheless, the Fisher court's use of specific
performance, rather than suppression of the evidence, as a remedy is telling, particularly
because the court sought to protect the "accused's legitimate expectation engendered by
the governmental promise." Id.
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furnishing incriminating information to the police." 9
In contrast, when evaluating the validity and content of
agreements, other courts have demanded adherence to strict
contractual requirements for enforceability and have denied specific
performance because the police are incapable of making a binding
non-prosecution agreement.'16 Instead, these courts have opted to
suppress the evidence obtained by the police on due process
grounds, holding that the broken promise results in an unintelligent
waiver of the defendant's constitutional rights. When courts have
denied specific performance, they have emphasized the legitimate
interests of the state in prosecuting the guilty; if the authority to
prosecute is vested solely in the district attorney's office, that office
should not be deprived of its power, and a potentially guilty
defendant should not be set free, merely because an official
overstepped authorized bounds."'
159. Id at 930. The court noted that the problems posed by police promises could be
avoided by training police officers to refrain from making unauthorized promises. See id
at 930 n.12 (arguing that proper training is "a relatively simple solution within the power
of any state whereas ... a criminally accused cannot realistically be expected to know or to
discover the extent of a law enforcement officer's authority").
160. See, e.g., Green v. State, 857 P.2d 1197, 1201 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993); People v.
Gallego, 424 N.W.2d 470, 473 (Mich. 1988); Commonwealth v. Stipetich, 652 A.2d 1294,
1295 (Pa. 1995).
161. See, e.g., Green, 857 P.2d at 1201; Gallego, 424 N.W.2d at 475-76; Spetich, 652
A.2d at 1296.
162. See Yarber v. State, 375 So. 2d 1212, 1227 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977) ("To clothe
[police] with such .power and authority would strike at the very heart of our system of
criminal justice .... "); Winkles v. State, 392 A.2d 1173, 1176 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978)
(stating that enforcement of police promises could lead to "corruption, abuse, and
substantial mischief and uncertainty in the prosecution of criminal cases"); Gallego, 424
N.W.2d at 474 (declining to grant specific performance in such cases because "[b]y doing
so, we would implicitly recognize the propriety of allowing non-elected, non-prosecutorial
public officials to administer an ad hoc system of criminal justice"); Sipedch, 652 A.2d at
1295 (noting that enforcement of unauthorized police promises "would create havoc in the
administration of justice by creating unbridled and decentralized decisions about which
cases will be prosecuted"); see also United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255 (1966)
(holding in a case where the defendant had been compelled to file statements that were
later used by the prosecution that defendant is at most entitled to suppression of the
evidence). The Supreme Court in Blue stated:
Our numerous precedents ordering the exclusion of such illegally obtained
evidence assume implicitly that the remedy does not extend to barring the
prosecution altogether. So drastic a step might advance marginally some of the
ends served by exclusionary rules, but it would also increase to an intolerable
degree interference with the public interest in having the guilty brought to book.
Id. at 255. In response to these concerns, other courts have noted that both the structure
and integrity of the criminal justice system can be protected by adequately training law
enforcement officials to avoid obtaining confessions in violation of a defendant's rights.
See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426, 428 (4th Cir. 1972) (recognizing the
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The two leading cases advocating suppression rather than
specific performance are People v. Gallego... and Commonwealth v.
Stipetich.'64 In Gallego, the Drug Enforcement Agency (the "DEA")
and the Oakland County Police entered into a written agreement
with the defendant and promised that they would not prosecute if
the defendant returned hidden "buy" money.' The defendant
returned the money, but several months later was charged with
delivery of cocaine.'" The Michigan Supreme Court suppressed the
defendant's confession because the government's promise not to
prosecute induced the statement in violation of his Fifth Amendment
rights." The court denied specific performance, however, because
the police lacked actual or apparent authority to make the promise."
The court was concerned particularly that enforcement of such
promises "would undermine the accountability built into the
prosecutorial function."' ' Such enforcement "raises the question of
the logical limits of the power of the police to control the criminal
justice system."'7  Ultimately, the court concluded that the
possibility that enforcement of an individual prosecutor's promise allows the prosecutor to
"bargain away" criminal prosecution, but stating that "the solution lies in the
administrative controls which [the government] may promulgate to regulate and control
the conduct of cases"); Fisher, 657 P.2d at 930 n.12 ("The problem created by this case is
easily avoided by responsible governmental officials instructing and requiring law
enforcement officers to refrain from making promises beyond their ability to perform.").
163. 424 N.W.2d 470 (Mich. 1988).
164. 652 A.2d 1294 (Pa. 1995).
165. See Gallego, 424 N.W.2d at 471. DEA agents and Oakland County Police officers
purchased $33,000 worth of cocaine from the defendant, who was able to bide the money
prior to arrest. See id. at 470-71.
166. See id. at 470.
167. See i at 475. The Michigan Supreme Court also held that suppression cared the
defendant's surrender of his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and
seizure. See id.
168. See id. at 473. The Michigan Court of Appeals noted that the agreement would
have been binding had the prosecutor made the promise rather than the police. See People
v. Gallego, 372 N.W.2d 640, 642 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985), aff'd, 424 N.W.2d 470 (Mich.
1988); see also People v. Reagan, 235 N.W.2d 581, 587 (Mich. 1975) (holding that a non-
prosecution agreement made by a prosecutor is binding on the state). The Michigan
Supreme Court distinguished Reagan as a case involving a prosecutor's promise, without
commenting on the legitimacy of its specific performance holding. See Gallego, 424
N.W.2d at 473.
169. Gallego, 424 N.W.2d at 473. A related concern of the court was the potential for
endless litigation over the terms of unauthorized promises. See id. at 473-74 (citing cases
and describing unauthorized promises as a "bountiful source of litigation"); see also State
v. Hargis, 328 So. 2d 479, 481 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) ("The recollection of the parties
will be imperfect. Misconstruction is easy. A careless word, a misconstrued statement, or
a distorted expression will erupt into litigation.").
170. Gallego, 424 N.W.2d at 474. For example, the court questioned whether specific
enforcement would consequently empower the police to negotiate plea bargains or
2374 NORTH CAROLINA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 75
availability of an alternative remedy-suppression of the written
agreement and any evidence obtained as a result-adequately
protected the defendant's constitutional rights by returning him to
his former position."'
In Stipetich, a police officer promised the defendants, husband
and wife, that they would not be charged with possession of
controlled substances if the husband-defendant answered all
questions regarding the source of the contraband.Y However, the
defendants were prosecuted despite the husband-defendant's full
cooperation with the investigation. 3  The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court, finding
dispositive the officer's lack of authority to make the promise.'74
Focusing on the district attorney's "'general and widely recognized
power to conduct criminal litigation ... and to decide whether and
when to prosecute,' "75 the court asserted that such power could not
be usurped by police officers who may "in any given case, deem it
sentence agreements as well. See id.
171. See id at 475. The supreme court did not address whether a police promise, in
other circumstances, could bind the state, but a reasonable reading of its decision would
support the granting of specific performance where an alternative remedy does not exist.
See i. In dissent, Justice Cavanagh argued that the appropriate consideration was the
agreement itself "not whether the police had the authority to make the promise, but
whether the promise was in fact made." Id. at 477 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted). Justice Cavanagh argued that the case rested on a policy decision that involved
the "integrity of our criminal justice system." Id. (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). He
concluded. "'When mistakes of significant proportion are made, it is better that the
consequences be suffered than that civilized standards be sacrificed.'" Id. at 478
(Cavanagh, J., dissenting) (quoting Reagan, 235 N.W.2d 581, 587 (Mich. 1975)) (footnote
omitted).
172. See Commonwealth v. Stipetich, 652 A.2d 1294,1294 (Pa. 1995).
173. See id. at 1295.
174. See id. The Pennsylvania Superior Court recognized no substantive difference
between a non-prosecution agreement made by a prosecutor and one made by the police.
See Commonwealth v. Stipetich, 621 A.2d 606, 608 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993), rev'd, 652 A.2d
1294 (Pa. 1995). It determined that in each instance there is a formal agreement upon
which a defendant detrimentally relies. See ia Relying upon the Colorado Supreme
Court's decision in Fisher, the superior court asserted that notions of "equity and
fundamental fairness," required specific performance of the agreement. See i. at 612.
The court also sought to rely on the Colorado Supreme Court's decision in People v.
Manning, 672 P.2d 499 (Colo. 1983) (en banc), but it misapplied the case. See id. at 610.
In Manning, the court found that the police had apparent authority to make the promise,
unlike the officer in Sn'petich. Compare Mannihg, 672 P.2d at 506-07 (finding that the
officer had authority from the district attorney's office to grant immunity to potential
witnesses), with Stipetich, 652 A.2d at 1295 (finding no authorization by district attorney of
promise made by police officer).
175. Stipetich, 652 A.2d at 1295 (quoting Commonwealth v. DiPasquale, 246 A.2d 430,
432 (Pa. 1968) (emphasis omitted)).
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worthless or ill-advised to prosecute.' '176 The court concluded that
the appropriate remedy was suppression of all evidence obtained as
a result of the promise.'
Although Sturgill raises some concerns, 8 its reasoning is largely
consistent with North Carolina precedent and with the results
reached by courts in other jurisdictions. The North Carolina Court
of Appeals acknowledged that Detective Moore had no apparent,
implied, or actual authority to make the promise, but held
nonetheless that the defendant's due process rights were violated,
and as a result, he was entitled to a remedy. 9  Although Sturgill
never argued that his confession was involuntary, the court found
that Sturgill had unknowingly and unintelligently waived his Fifth
and Sixth Amendment rights in exchange for the government's
promise not to prosecute him as a habitual felon."
In reaching its conclusion, the court of appeals dismissed the
state's reliance on State v. Richardson.' The state asserted that
Sturgill voluntarily and intelligently waived his rights because he
initiated negotiations with Detective Moore.'2 The court, however,
dismissed as dicta the supreme court's comment in Richardson that a
defendant who initiates the discussion voluntarily waives his
privilege against self-incrimination'" and focused on the fact that the
defendant in Richardson was "'not promised some benefit in
176. Id.
177. See id at 1296 (citing People v. Gallego, 424 N.W.2d 470 (1988)). The dissent,
similar to that of Justice Cavanagh in Gallego, see supra note 171, argued that the validity
of the promise was irrelevant. See Stipetich, 652 A.2d at 1296 (Cappy, J., dissenting).
Instead, the guarantees of "fundamental fairness and substantial justice" were controlling.
Id. (Cappy, J., dissenting). Although Justice Cappy criticized the majority's interpretation
of Michigan law as vesting the district attorney with the sole power to prosecute, he agreed
that binding a district attorney to a non-prosecution agreement made by the police was
"absurd." See id. at 1296 (Cappy, J., dissenting).
178. See infra notes 206-13 and accompanying text.
179. See Sturgill, 121 N.C. App. at 638-39, 469 S.E.2d at 563. The North Carolina
Constitution provides that "[t]he District Attorney shall ... be responsible for the
prosecution on behalf of the State of all criminal actions in the Superior Courts." N.C.
CONST. art. IV, § 18.
180. See Sturgill, 121 N.C. App. at 643-44,469 S.E.2d at 566.
181. See id. at 641-42,469 S.E.2d at 564-65 (distinguishing State v. Richardson, 316 N.C.
394, 602, 342 S.E.2d 823, 830 (1986)).
182. See id. at 639, 469 S.E.2d at 563. As Detective Moore was leaving the
interrogation room, Sturgill asked "what would be in it for him" if he cooperated. Id. at
631, 469 S.E.2d at 559.
183. See id. at 640, 469 S.E.2d at 564; see supra notes 126-38 and accompanying text
(discussing Richardson).
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exchange for his cooperation.' "'84 Such a characterization is not
entirely accurate, however, because had the Richardson court found
that the promise was made prior to the defendant's confession,
precedent would have required the court to rule otherwise."
Nevertheless, the Sturgill court recognized that the state's reliance on
Richardson was inappropriate because unlike Sturgill, Richardson
was well aware of the consequences of his confession; he had been
warned that the police could not guarantee the effect of his
cooperation.'86 In contrast, Sturgill knew the nature of the charges
against him, but he apparently was unaware that Detective Moore
could not deliver on his promise not to indict or that Detective
Moore was deliberately misleading him."
After setting aside- Richardson, the appellate court examined
more closely the issue of whether the way in which Sturgill's
confession was obtained violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment
184. Sturgill, 121 N.C. App. at 640, 469 S.E.2d at 564 (quoting Richardson, 316 N.C. at
604, 342 S.E.2d at 830).
185. Richardson had argued that the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in State
v. Fuqua, 269 N.C. 223, 152 S.E.2d 68 (1967), was controlling. See Richardson, 316 N.C. at
604, 342 S.E.2d at 830. In Fuqua, a defendant's confession was held to be involuntary
when a police officer promised he would testify on defendant's behalf. See Fuqua, 269
N.C. at 228,152 S.E.2d at 72.
186. See Sturgill, 121 N.C. App. at 641, 469 S.E.2d at 564. In contrast to Sturgill,
Richardson was informed of
the specifics of the charges against him, the range of punishment, and the effect
of his cooperation. He was informed that the officers had no authority to make
any arrangements concerning the charges against him and that the Tennessee
authorities had no control over what other states might do concerning crimes
committed within their jurisdiction.
Richardson, 316 N.C. at 596, 342 S.E.2d at 826. When discussing Richardson, the Sturgill
court used the term "involuntary" to embody both prongs of the voluntary and intelligent
waiver requirements. See Sturgill, 121 N.C. App. at 639-42, 469 S.E.2d at 563-65. But
Sturgill's reliance on the broken promise constituted an unintelligent waiver of his
constitutional rights because he was not informed that Detective Moore lacked authority
to make the deal. See id at 644, 469 S.E.2d at 566. However, the court expressly stated
that Sturgill's confession failed both the knowing and intelligent requirements discussed in
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). See Sturgill, 121 N.C. App. at 644, 469
S.E.2d at 566. The court also asserted that Richardson was largely irrelevant because
Sturgill did not argue that his confession was induced by threats and thus involuntary. See
id. at 642, 469 S.E.2d at 564. However, the court's lengthy discussion of that case in
combination with its analysis of State v. Jackson, 308 N.C. 549, 304 S.E.2d 134 (1983),
evidences a much greater concern with that issue than it admitted. See Sturgill, 121 N.C.
App. at 639-46, 469 S.E.2d at 563-67 (discussing Richardson, Brady, and Jackson).
187. See Sturgill, 121 N.C. App. at 641, 469 S.E.2d at 564-65 ("Simply put, the level of
duplicity in the instant case pales in comparison with the unambiguous and clearly
qualified promises made in Richardson.").
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rights."s After acknowledging that North Carolina case law employs
the "totality of the circumstances" test for evaluating the
admissibility of confessions,'9 the court focused on the bad faith
elements of the interrogation.' The court relied heavily on State v.
Jackson,"' in which the police obtained a confession from a
defendant by confronting him with falsified evidence.' In applying
Jackson, the Sturgill court asserted that the minority analysis of the
Jackson dissenters was controlling because Sturgill was in custody at
the time Detective Moore elicited his confession.' It concluded that
"[h]ad defendant known the police promises were a product of bad
faith or fraud, it is unlikely the defendant would have relinquished
his constitutional rights."' In fact, the court asserted that the
promise made by Detective Moore "had no purpose" but to deceive
and thereby circumvent Sturgill's due process rights.' Therefore,
because the confession was given in exchange for and in reliance
upon the promise not to prosecute as a habitual felon and was
elicited falsely under circumstances indicative of bad faith, the
Sturgill court held that the defendant's Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination and Sixth Amendment right to counsel
were violated.""
The court of appeals next concluded that the only appropriate
remedy was suppression of the confession and any other evidence
obtained as a result of the broken promise.19 The court's denial of
188. See id. at 642-46,469 S.E.2d at 565-67.
189. See id. at 644,469 S.E.2d at 566.
190. See id at 645-46, 469 S.E.2d at 566-67. See generally supra notes 101-04 and
accompanying text (discussing the "totality of the circumstances" test and the tendency of
courts to focus on intolerable police conduct as a determinative factor in enforcing the
promise).
191. 308 N.C. 549,304 S.E.2d 134 (1983).
192. See Sturgill, 121 N.C. App. at 645, 469 S.E.2d at 566 (citing Jackson, 308 N.C. at
582, 304 S.E.2d at 152-53); see also supra notes 139-47 and accompanying text (discussing
Jackson).
193. See Sturgill, 121 N.C. App. at 645, 469 S.E.2d at 567. Unlike the defendant in
Jackson, Sturgill had been formally arrested. See id. at 631, 469 S.E.2d at 558. The court
of appeals in Sturgill stated that it is "manifest" that the promises were made in a custodial
setting, therefore, "inasmuch as the police could not follow through with their promise not
to prosecute, defendant's Sixth Amendment right was not validly waived." Id at 643, 469
S.E.2d at 565.
194. Id. at 645, 469 S.E.2d at 567.
195. Id. at 646, 469 S.E.2d at 567 ("Due Process would become a meaningless right, if
deception might circumvent its guarantees. Due Process is a durable right though, not so
easily eviscerated.").
196. See id. at 643-44,469 S.E.2d at 565-66.
197. See id. at 647,469 S.E.2d at 568.
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specific enforcement of the promise was based on the Michigan
Supreme Court's policy-based analysis in People v. Gallego.193 The
result, therefore, implicitly asserts the concerns of the Gallego court:
that by enforcing unauthorized police promises, courts undermine
the accountability of prosecutors, who are often elected officials. 9"
The checks within the justice system on the government's use of plea
bargains and promises are weakened if police-unelected officials-
could make those decisions."' More importantly, as the Sturgill
court expressly acknowledged, specific enforcement would nullify an
otherwise valid prosecution."1 Though specific performance would
serve as a deterrent to abuse of police promises, the court stated that
"'it would also increase to an intolerable degree interference [with
the public interest] in having the guilty brought to book.' ,,2 This
concern not only reflects situations in which a police officer
mistakenly or even knowingly induces a confession by promise, but it
anticipates the difficulty courts often have in deciding whether a
promise was in fact made.l 3
Given its use of both Richardson and Jackson, the court's
reasoning is reminiscent of Mabry because Sturgill confessed on a
19& See i& at 647-48, 469 S.E.2d at 568; see also oupra notes 165-71 and accompanying
text (discussing Gallego); supra notes 172-77 and accompanying text (discussing Stipetich).
199. See People v. Gallego, 424 N.W.2d 470,473 (Mich. 1988).
200. See id. (noting that there is a "potential for abuse" where there is no check on the
"potentially unbridled discretion the police would possess if allowed to make binding
promises precluding prosecution").
201. See Sturgill, 121 N.C. App. at 648,469 S.E.2d at 568.
202. Id (quoting Gallego, 424 N.W.2d at 472 (quoting United States v. Blue, 384 U.S.
251, 255 (1966)), but omitting the words "with the public interest" between "interference"
and "in"). One jurisdiction has held that a prosecutor is not capable of making a binding
agreement with a defendant until it is judicially approved, even where the defendant has
substantially performed in reliance upon the promise. See State v. Hargis, 328 So. 2d 479,
480 (Fa. Dist. Ct. App. 1976). Acknowledging that the result initially seems
"reprehensible," the Florida court argued that expanding the prosecutor's power to make
agreements would give rise to "a prolific source of litigation." IM at 480-81. Some
commentators have argued, however, that specific performance is the appropriate remedy.
See Comment, Specific Enforcement to Ensure Due Process in Plea Bargains, 21 WM. &
MARY L REV. 521, 531-36 (1979); see also Raymond E. Dunn, Jr., Note, Enforcing
Unfulfillable Plea Bargaining Promises, 13 WAKE FOREST L REV. 842, 850 (1977)
(arguing that fundamental fairness requires specific enforcement of plea despite
promisor's lack of authority).
203. Some courts have struggled with the issue of determining the terms of the promise,
if in fact it was made. See, e.g., United States v. Weiss, 599 F.2d 730, 735-38 (5th Cir.
1979); United States v. Stevens, 543 F. Supp. 929, 947-48 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Bowie v. State,
287 A.2d 782, 789-90 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972); see also White, supra note 10, at 976
(stating that "in the highly charged atmosphere of the interrogation room the suspect and
interrogating officers are likely to have reasonable differences concerning both the
existence and the terms of promises made by the police").
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false promise.2 ' Sturgill is entitled to relief not because the promise
was made but because he unintelligently relinquished his
constitutional rights as a result of the promise.2  However, despite
the Sturgill court's proper and persuasive application of the
intelligent waiver test, its reasoning does raise some concerns. For
example, rather than relying solely on cases like Gallego and
Stipetich to support its analysis, the Sturgill court principally relied
upon the Colorado Supreme Court's due process analysis in Fisher.'"
Reliance on that decision is itself an oddity because while the
Colorado Supreme Court, albeit in dicta, endorsed the Fourth
Circuit's decision in Cooper, the North Carolina Supreme Court
rejected Cooper one year after it was decided in State v. Collins.
2 7
Nevertheless, the Fisher court argued that the issue of authority was
irrelevant, and held that specific enforcement of a promise is an
appropriate remedy when the defendant reasonably relies on the
promise to his detriment, and "no other remedy is appropriate to
effectuate the accused's legitimate expectation engendered by the
governmental promise."208
Despite its emphasis on the defendant's expectation interest,
Fisher does lend support to the result reached in Sturgill, allowing
for suppression of the evidence when it reasonably protects the
expectations of the defendant.20' However, in its use of case law to
support the fundamental fairness rationale, the Sturgill court
construed case holdings far more broadly than those cases allowed.
For example, the court quoted a Ninth Circuit decision which stated
that "[g]enerally, 'fundamental fairness requires that promises made
204. Compare Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 509 (1984) (holding that a broken plea
agreement results in an invalid waiver of defendant's constitutional rights), with Sturgill,
121 N.C. App. at 644, 469 S.E.2d at 566 (stating that defendant's confession was not
knowingly or intelligently made as a result of a broken police promise).
205. See Sturgill, 121 N.C. App. at 644, 469 S.E.2d at 566 (determining that since the
police promise could not be fulfilled "defendant's confession was not a 'knowing,
intelligent [act] done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances'" (quoting
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,748 (1970))).
206. See id. at 639, 469 S.E.2d at 563. The Sturgill court also cited Justice Cavanagh's
dissent in Gallego, which characterizes a police promise as a firm offer. See id at 637, 469
S.E.2d at 562; see also supra note 171 (discussing Justice Cavanagh's dissent). Justice
Cavanagh concluded that the honor of the government required specific performance of
the promise. See People v. Gallego, 424 N.W.2d. 470, 478 (Mich. 1988) (Cavanagh, J.,
dissenting).
207. See supra note 157 (discussing Fisher's endorsement of Cooper); see also supra
note 121 and accompanying text (discussing Collins's rejection of Cooper).
208. People v. Fisher, 657 P.2d 922,931 (Colo. 1983) (en banc) (emphasis added).
209. See id.
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during plea-bargaining and analogous contexts be respected.' ,','o But
the court failed to acknowledge the two exceptions noted by the
Ninth Circuit in the very next sentence: "[T]he agent must be
authorized to make the promise; and.., the defendant must rely to
his detriment on that promise. 211  The Sturgill court also cited
language in Collins that employed terms of fairness,12 but failed to
mention that the North Carolina Supreme Court also had stated:
"'[W]here the content of a plea bargain and the authority for its
offer are at issue ... traditional precepts of contract and agency
should apply.' ""
However, contrary to the cases that invoked principles of
fundamental fairness and considered as paramount a defendant's
expectation interests, the Sturgill court rejected specific performance
as a remedy.2 4 Hesitant to deprive the state of the opportunity to
prosecute merely because a law enforcement official overstepped his
authority, the court of appeals granted only suppression of the
confession and all related evidence obtained as a result of the
21promise.
Because the Sturgill court's reasoning is more consistent with
Gallego and Stipetich, its association with Fisher remains a
curiosity. 16 Nevertheless, in the context of police promises, the
210. Sturgill, 121 N.C. App. at 635, 469 S.E.2d at 561 (alteration in original) (quoting
Johnson v. Lumpkin, 769 F.2d 630,633 (9th Cir. 1985)).
211. Lumpkin, 769 F.2d at 633 (emphasis added). Thus, assuming that the act of
confessing constituted detrimental reliance, the promise was nonetheless unenforceable
for want of proper authority.
212. See Sturgill, 121 N.C. App. at 639, 469 S.E.2d at 563 (stating that plea agreements
.may not be avoided to the prejudice of defendants as those 'defendants have a
constitutional right to be treated with "fairness" throughout the [prosecutorial] process'"
(quoting State v. Collins, 300 N.C. 142,146,265 S.E.2d 172,174 (1980))).
213. Collins, 300 N.C. at 148,265 S.E.2d at 176 (quoting United States v. McIntosh, 612
F.2d 835, 837 (4th Cir. 1979)).
214. See Sturgill, 121 N.C. App. at 647,469 S.E.2d at 568.
215. See id. at 648,469 S.E.2d at 568-69.
216. The court's emphasis on fairness principles may only reflect concerns about the
possibility of abuse; that is, if a police officer knew that specific enforcement of a promise
would not be granted, he may more freely use such promises in an attempt to induce
confessions or uncover evidence. But such a concern is misplaced because exclusion of
such evidence is a sufficient deterrent of police misconduct. See Recent Cases, HARV. L
REV. 539, 54.3 (1988) (arguing that suppression is a sufficient deterrent, "[p]articularly...
where the only harm to the defendant was the creation and destruction of an expectation,
dismissal of charges is disproportionate to the magnitude of the police misconduct"). In
fact, the Sturgill court recognized this when it stated that "suppression will 'tend to deter
future violations' of this type." Sturgill, 121 N.C. App. at 648, 469 S.E.2d at 568 (quoting
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-974 (1996)). Additionally, it is unlikely that police officers will be
encouraged to make such promises because the district attorney's office will not want to
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Sturgill court's emphasis on fundamental fairness, as well as its
disregard of contractual principles as a guide in determining the
enforceability of non-prosecution agreements,21 7 may be academic.
Specific performance will be appropriate only in drastic
circumstances, where the defendant detrimentally relies on a promise
and cannot be returned to the status quo ante.218 Regardless of the
source of the defendant's due process interest, that interest is limited
by public policy concerns.2 Thus, even if Sturgill represents a
greater willingness to grant specific performance as a remedy for
broken promises, such a willingness would most likely arise only in
traditional plea bargain contexts where the authority of the promisor
is less in question.'m In such cases, given its rejection of authority as
a primary consideration in determining whether a promise is
enforceable, Sturgill will likely serve as support for criminal
defendants seeking to enforce agreements made by unauthorized
prosecutors. To this extent, Sturgill may serve as a warning that the
balance between the state's interest in enforcing its laws and the
defendant's interest in asserting his constitutional rights is shifting.
However, to the extent that Sturgill recognizes the public injustice of
allowing a single unauthorized individual to frustrate the criminal
justice system and thereby grant a potentially guilty suspect freedom,
the decision represents a careful balance between due process
concerns and the state's right to prosecute.
DAVID J. LEKICH
jeopardize the strength of its case, and suppression of evidence induced by police promises
would have that effect.
217. See supra notes 210-13 and accompanying text.
218. See Sturgill, 121 N.C. App. at 647-48, 469 S.E.2d at 568. At the very least, Sturgill
will have an effect on a defendant's ability to enforce cooperation agreements induced by
police promises, whether or not such agreements were authorized. In such circumstances,
a defendant who fully performs cannot be returned to the status quo ante and only specific
performance can protect the defendant's reliance on the promise. See Ejzak, supra note
70, at 135-36 ("[D]efendants who perform under a cooperation agreement should be
protected because they provide actual consideration, even though they waive no
constitutional rights by their action.").
219. See supra notes 198-202 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 150, 168.
221. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying tekt.
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Bedrick v. Travelers Insurance Co.: The Fourth Circuit's
Continued Attempt to Work with the "Doctrinal Hash" of the
Standard of Review in ERISA Benefit-Denial Cases
In an effort to ensure that employees receive the benefits
promised them under their employers' pension and health programs,
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)' allows an
employee to bring a civil action "to recover benefits due to him
under the terms of his plan."2 The statute does not set forth a
standard under which such actions should be reviewed, and from the
outset federal courts universally adopted a highly deferential
"arbitrary and capricious" standard as the appropriate one to apply
when reviewing a plan administrator's decision to deny benefits."
During the 1980s, however, some circuits expressed increasing
concern regarding whether such a deferential standard was always
appropriate,4 and in 1989 the Supreme Court attempted to resolve
the issue.5 The Court's holding in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Bruch6 provided that if a plan granted an administrator discretion to
determine benefits, then the administrator's decision would be
reviewed for abuse of discretion; otherwise, it would be reviewed de
novo.7 Because a large number of plans provide for administrative
discretion in making benefit determinations, courts are very often
limited to reviewing only for abuse of discretion.! Thus, courts are in
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(1994).
2. Id. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
3. See, e.g., Bayles v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 602
F.2d 97, 99 (5th Cir. 1979); Bueneman v. Central' tates, Southeast & Southwest Areas
Pension Fund, 572 F.2d 1208, 1209 n.3 (8th Cir. 1978); Riley v. MEBA Pension Trust, 570
F.2d 406, 413 (2d Cir. 1977); Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d 1362,1371 (9th Cir. 1976).
4. See, e.g., Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134, 139-40 (3d Cir.
1987), affid in part, rev'd in part, 489 U.S. 101 (1989); Dockray v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 801
F.2d 1149, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 1986); Jung v. FMC Corp., 755 F.2d 708, 711-12 (9th Cir.
1985); Dennard v. Richards Group, Inc., 681 F.2d 306, 314 (5th Cir. 1982). For a
discussion of these and related cases, see infra notes 127-53 and accompanying text.
5. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
6. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
7. See U at 115. For a discussion of Bruch, see infra notes 154-71 and accompanying
text.
8. See, e.g., Exbom v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Health &
Welfare Fund, 900 F.2d 1138, 1141.42 (7th Cir. 1990); Jordan v. Cameron Iron Works,
Inc., 900 F.2d 53, 55-56 (5th Cir. 1990); Stoetzner v. U.S. Steel Corp., 897 F.2d 115, 119 &
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a situation similar to the one they were in prior to Bruch,9 and some
are again expressing doubt as to whether plan administrators'
decisions warrant such deference in all cases."
The Fourth Circuit is among the courts whose opinions indicate
discomfort with the universal application of a highly deferential
abuse of discretion standard." Like some other courts, the Fourth
Circuit has been willing to apply a "modified"' or heightened abuse
of discretion standard when reviewing the decisions of administrators
who may be acting under a conflict of interest.' The latest Fourth
Circuit case to employ such an approach is Bedrick v. Travelers
Insurance Co.,'4 in which the court determined that an insurer who
served as the administrator of an ERISA plan was acting under a
conflict of interest because the insurer was responsible both for
determining benefit eligibility and for paying claims out of premiums
it collected from the employer who instituted the plan.' Viewing the
insurer's administrative determination with less deference than it
would apply in a conflict-free situation, 6 the court concluded that the
n.5 (3d Cir. 1990); Richards v. United Mine Workers Health & Retirement Fund, 895 F.2d
133,135-36 (4th Cir. 1990); Guy v. Southeastern Iron Workers' Welfare Fund, 877 F.2d 37,
39 (11th Cir. 1989); Lakey v. Remington Arms Co., 874 F.2d 541, 544 (8th Cir. 1989).
9. See, e.g., Gust v. Coleman Co,, 740 F. Supp. 1544,1548 (D. Kan. 1990) ("While the
Bruch case addressed some of the conflicts and disagreements over the standard of review
.... new ones have emerged primarily as a result of efforts to apply the Bruch ruling.").
10. See, e.g., Pitman v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 24 F.3d 118, 122-23 (10th Cir. 1994);
Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 898 F.2d 1556, 1563-64, 1566-67 (11th Cir. 1990);
Boland v. King County Med. Blue Shield, 798 F. Supp. 638, 642-43 (W.D. Wash. 1992);
Wilson v. Group Hosp. & Med. Servs., 791 F. Supp. 309,312 (D.D.C. 1992).
11. See, e.g., Bernstein v. Capitalcare, Inc., 70 F.3d 783,788-89 (4th Cir. 1995); Bailey
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 67 F.3d 53,56-57 (4th Cir. 1995); Doe v. Group Hosp. & Med.
Servs., 3 F.3d 80, 86-87 (4th Cir. 1993).
12. See, e.g., Bernstein, 70 F.3d at 788 (referring to the applicable standard of review
as "Doe's modified abuse of discretion standard"). For a list of other courts that advocate
a stricter review, see infra notes 231-32.
13. See, e.g., Bernstein, 70 F.3d at 788; Bailey, 67 F.3d at 56-57; Doe, 3 F.3d at 87; see
also infra notes 188-209 and accompanying text (discussing these three cases). Several
situations commonly give rise to a conflict of interest. One occurs when an employer
administers an unfunded plan, and any payments made under the plan come directly out of
the employer's general assets. See infra note 146. Another situation in which a conflict is
present is when an insurance company that administers a plan pays claims out of the fixed
premiums that it charges the employer. See infra note 44. A conflict also may arise when
an employer pays claims out of a funded plan if the payments will affect how much the
employer has to contribute to the plan. See W. Douglas Holdren, Comment, Denial of
Benefit Clains Under ERISA: The Rise and Fall of De Novo Review, 36 VIL. L REV.
1219,1220-21 n.12 (1991).
14. 93 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 1996).
15. See id. at 152.
16. See id.
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insurer had abused its discretion in denying benefits because the
evidence in the case did not support or justify the insurer's
conclusion that a young child's therapy was not medically necessary.17
This Note first discusses the facts of Bedrick and the Fourth
Circuit's application of the heightened abuse of discretion standard
in that case."8 It then examines the history of the deferential
standard of review in ERISA benefit-denial cases, 9 the Fourth
Circuit's early application of the standard," the cases leading up to
Bruch,' and the Supreme Court's attempted resolution of the issue.'
The Note next discusses the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of Bruch
and its struggle to define and provide substance to the modified
abuse of discretion standard it has adopted for application to conflict
of interest cases.' Finally, the Note discusses the implications and
ramifications of a flexible standard of review, the viability of
proposals to discard the flexible approach and subject all ERISA
benefit-denial claims to de novo review, and other possible
approaches to balance practicality and the need for a meaningful
level of review of denied claims.'
Ethan Bedrick is the child of an employee covered by an
ERISA plan.?' His birth in 1992 was accompanied by
complications,26 leaving him with severe cerebral palsy' and "spastic
quadriplegia," a condition characterized by impaired motor
functioning in both the arms and legs.' The impaired motor
functioning was caused by "an abnormal resistance to passive
stretching of the muscles" known as hypertonia, ' which, if not
17. See L at 153-55.
18. See infra notes 25-65 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 66-98 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 99-126 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 127-53 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 154-76 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 177-227 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 228-91 and accompanying text.
25. See Bedrick, 93 F.3d at 151.
26. See id at 150.
27. See id. Cerebral palsy is "any of a group of persisting, nonprogressive motor
disorders appearing in young children and resulting from brain damage caused by birth
trauma or intrauterine pathology. They are characterized by delayed or abnormal motor
development, such as spastic ... [quadri]plegia ...." DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED
MEDICAL DICIIONARY 1217 (28th ed. 1994).
28. See Bedrick, 93 F.3d at 151; DORLAND's ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY,
supra note 27, at 1231,1398,1550.
29. Bedrick, 93 F.3d at 151; see DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICIONARY,
supra note 27, at 802 (defining hypertonia as "a condition of excessive tone of the skeletal
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treated by regularly stretching the muscle, will lead to changes in the
muscle tissue itself and eventually to a curled-up limb known as a
"contracture." ' Because an infant naturally will resist stretching,
Ethan was put on a program under which he received physical
therapy twice a week."
Travelers Insurance Company ("Travelers"), the administrator
of the ERISA plan at Ethan's father's place of employment, sharply
reduced Ethan's therapy schedule when he was just over a year old."
A Travelers representative,33 after speaking with the child's
pediatrician and pediatric neurologist, concluded that the benefits of
the therapy were minimal.' 4 Although Ethan's two doctors contacted
Travelers to protest the reduction in therapy, the company did not
reinstate the previous schedule of treatment.' Six months later, after
Ethan's father had threatened to sue, the benefit denial was reviewed
by a doctor in Travelers' home office.36 When this doctor upheld the
representative's decision to curtail the benefits, Ethan's parents
brought suit under ERISA 7 The District Court for the Eastern
muscles; increased resistance of muscle to passive stretching").
30. See Bedrick, 93 F.3d at 151; DoRLAND's ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICIONARY,
supra note 27, at 373 (defining a contracture as "a condition of fixed high resistance to
passive stretch of a muscle, resulting from fibrosis of the tissues supporting the muscles or
the joints, or from disorders of the muscle fibers").
31. See Bedrick, 93 F.3d at 151. He was also given occupational and speech therapy
bi-monthly. See id. at 151 n.2.
32. See id at 151. Travelers reduced the number of physical and occupational therapy
sessions to 15 per year and discontinued the coverage for speech therapy completely. See
id. The insurance company also denied claims for a bath chair and an upright stander that
had been prescribed. See i
33. The representative was employed by a subsidiary of Travelers known as
ConservCo. See id. One function of the subsidiary company was to investigate ways in
which Travelers could reduce expenses by discontinuing the provision of unnecessary
services. See id.
34. See id. The pediatrician told her that there was a "'50 150 chance that [the] child
will be able to walk by age [five],"' and that he had a "'poor prognosis[,] but [he] has
shown some improvement [and] has some evidences of socialization[.]'" Id. (alteration in
original) (quoting the pediatrician). The pediatric neurologist told her the child's
"'potential for progress is mild and that he would support whatever the physical therapist
feels is necessary as far as home therapy by the parents."' Id. (quoting the pediatric
neurologist). The Travelers representative did not speak with the physical therapist. See
id.
35. See id. The representative who had recommended reduction in coverage did not
see the correspondence from the doctors until their letters were produced at her
deposition. See iU.
36. See id. The court noted that "[although] many months had passed, [the doctor] did
not update the file or contact any of Ethan's physicians." Id.
37. See Ud ERISA allows a plan. participant or beneficiary to bring a civil action "to
recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)
(1994); see also infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text (discussing statutory provisions of
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District of North Carolina granted summary judgment in favor of
Travelers.
38
The Fourth Circuit disagreed with the deference the district
court had granted Travelers' decision and reversed the lower court's
decision in part.39 Initiating its analysis with a discussion of the
appropriate standard of review for denials of benefits under ERISA,
the court cited the Supreme Court's decision in Bruch" as mandating
an abuse of discretion standard if a plan gives discretionary authority
to an administrator." However, while determining that the plan did
in fact grant Travelers discretion to deny claims on the basis of its
conclusions as to medical necessity,4 the court stated that the abuse
of discretion standard would not be applied as deferentially as it
normally would since Travelers was acting under a conflict of
interest. 3  The conflict arose because Travelers not only
administered the plan, but also paid claims out of premiums that it
charged the employer." Thus, "[tihe problem ... is that every
ERISA).
38. See Bedrick, 93 F.3d at 152.
39. See id. at 155. For the specific benefit denials that the court upheld, see infra note
52.
40. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Brach, 489 U.S. 101 (1989). For a discussion of
Bruch, see infra notes 154-71 and accompanying text.
41. See Bedrick, 93 F.3d at 152. The Court in Bruch held that all benefit-denial claims
under ERISA should be reviewed de novo "unless the benefit plan gives the administrator
or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the
terms of the plan." Bruch, 489 U.S. at 115. If the plan does give the administrator such
discretion, the reviewing court presumably should use an abuse of discretion standard. See
id. at 111, 115.
42. See Bedrick, 93 F.3d at 152 ("Here, there is no plan-wide grant of discretion to
Travelers; however, the 'medically necessary' restriction on benefits does involve an
exercise of discretion."). The plan read in relevant part: "The Travelers determines, in its
discretion, if a service or supply is medically necessary for the diagnosis and treatment of
an accidental injury or sickness." Id. Factors to be considered in making the
determination included whether the treatment was "appropriate and required," whether it
was "safe and effective according to accepted clinical evidence," and whether there was
"not a less intensive or more appropriate diagnostic or treatment alternative." Id.
43. See id.
44. See id. The court noted that there were two basic types of ERISA healthcare
plans: "(1) employer-funded plans, where the 'insurance company' acts merely as a
[claims] processor and independent fiduciary administrator of the plan, and (2) insurer-
funded plans, where, in exchange for a premium from the employer, the insurer processes
and pays claims and acts as plan administrator." Id. The latter type creates a potential
conflict of interest. See id.; see also Egert v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 900 F.2d 1032,
1035 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that insurance company "may have reason to minimize
benefits payments"); Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 898 F.2d 1556, 1561 (11th Cir.
1990) ("Because an insurance company pays out to beneficiaries from its own assets rather
than the assets of a trust, its fiduciary role lies in perpetual conflict with its profit-making
role as a business."); George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: The Arbitrary and Capricious Rule
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exercise of ... discretion has a direct financial effect upon
Travelers."' The court explained that "[i]nasmuch as the law is
highly suspect of 'fiduciaries' having a personal interest in the subject
of their trust, the 'abuse of discretion' standard is not applied in as
deferential a manner to such plans."4
The court noted that Bruch allows a conflict of interest to be
considered as a "factor" in determining whether an administrator has
abused its discretion,4 and that the less deferential standard that the
Fourth Circuit had employed in previous conflict of interest casese
indicated its interpretation of the role this "factor" should play in an
abuse of discretion review. In analyzing a case in which a conflict of
Under Siege, 39 CATH. U. L REV. 133, 180 (1989) ("The more claims payments are made
from the pool of contributions, the smaller the insurance company's profits on servicing
the plan."); Jocelyn Hunter, The Arbitrary and Capricious Standarc Reviewing Benefits
Denial Decisions Under ERISA, 16 EMPLOYEE REL. LJ. 403, 403 (1991) ("Typically, the
[conflict of interest] issue arises when an insurance company pays benefits from its own
assets .... "); Denise S. Wolf, Who Should Pay for "Experimental" Treatments? Breast
Cancer Patients v. Their Insurers, 44 AM. U. L REV. 2029, 2075 (1995) ("[T]he plan
administrator, who is employed by the insurance company, can maximize the insurer's
profits by exercising discretion to not pay claims, and thus operates under a conflict of
interest."); Holdren, supra note 13, at 1221 n.12 ("[C]onflicts may arise where benefits are
paid out of an insurance fund to which the employer has paid a premium for coverage.").
One commentator has warned, however, that a conflict in this situation should not be
automatically presumed: "Many group insurance policies are experience rated, have
retrospective premium provisions, are excess risk, or involve some combination of the
foregoing." Richard G. Mandel, Must Claims Denials Be Upheld Unless Arbitrary and
Capricious-What Standard of Review Applies to Group Policies Issued to ERISA Plans?,
19 FORUM 457, 464 n.43 (1984). The author explained that "[a]ll of these arrangements
can readily lead to situations where an insurer has no direct financial interest in whether it
pay[s] or denies a claim, but really functions more as a claim administrator and means for
regulating cash flow." Id.
45. Bedrick, 93 F.3d at 152.
46. Id.
47. See id. The Bruch Court held that benefit-claim denials should be reviewed under
a de novo standard if no discretion was given to the plan administrator, and under an abuse
of discretion standard if discretion was given. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch,
489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989); infra notes 154-71 and accompanying text. However, the Bruch
Court also stated that "[o]f course, if a benefit plan gives discretion to an administrator or
fiduciary who is operating under a conflict of interest, that conflict must be weighed as a
'facto[r] in determining whether there is an abuse of discretion.'" Bruch, 489 U.S. at 115
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTRUSTS § 187 cmt. d (1959)).
48. See Bailey v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 67 F.3d 53, 58 (4th Cir. 1995); Doe v.
Group Hosp. & Med. Servs., 3 F.3d 80, 87 (4th Cir. 1993). For a discussion of these two
cases, see infra notes 188-204 and accompanying text.
49. See Bedrick, 93 F.3d at 152. The parties disagreed on the substance of the Fourth
Circuit's less deferential standard of review. See id. Travelers conceded that it was
operating under a conflict of interest but, relying on the language from Bruch, urged that
the court consider this only as a "factor" in determining whether it had abused its
discretion. See id. Bedrick asserted that the existence of the conflict "change[d] the
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interest exists, the court stated that it would "' "review the merits of
the [plan administrator's] interpretation [of the plan] to determine
whether it is consistent with an exercise of discretion by a fiduciary
acting free of the interests that conflict with those of the
beneficiaries."' ,"0 Thus, the court will give "some deference" to a
conflicted administrator's decision, "'"but this deference will be
lessened to the degree necessary to neutralize any untoward
influence resulting from the conflict." .,..
Using this less deferential standard of review, the court found
that Travelers had abused its discretion with regard to some aspects
of its benefit denials. 2 First, it attacked Travelers' position that the
physical therapy program "'did not reach a level of potential for
significant progress which would allow the therapies to be provided
on a medically necessary basis.' ,, The court noted that Travelers'
internal guidelines did not require a finding of significant progress in
order to continue treatment.," Moreover, the goal of the treatment
was not solely to attempt to improve the child's condition, but also to
prevent it from worsening.5 The court opined that the prevention
element alone should have rendered the treatment medically
necessary. 6  Additionally, the court stated that Travelers had
insufficient medical evidence on which it could base its "finding" that
the child was unlikely to show significant progress, as the statements
of Ethan's doctors tended to conflict with such a conclusion.'
standard of review," citing the Fourth Circuit's earlier decisions in Bailey and Doe. Id.
The court responded that "[tihe premise of this dispute is that there is some difference
between [Bmch] and Bailey/Doe. There is not. Our cases are interpretations of [Bruch]
..... Id.o
50. Id. (quoting Bailey, 67 F.3d at 56 (quoting Doe, 3 F.3d at 87)).
51. Id. (quoting Bailey, 67 F.3d at 56 (quoting Doe, 3 F.3d at 87)).
52. See i at 154. The court found that Travelers had abused its discretion in
curtailing the physical and occupational therapy treatment and denying the upright
stander. See id. at 154-55. However, it affirmed the denial of the bath chair, see id. at 155
n.5, as well as the denial of speech therapy, see U at 154. The plan stated that it would
cover therapy to "restore speech," and since Ethan had never been able to speak, the
therapy could not serve to "restore" it. See id.
53. Id. at 153 (quoting Travelers' answer to an interrogatory).
54. See iU
55. See id. ("It is as important not to get worse as to get better.").
56. See i& ("If, as his doctors and therapists believe, intensive therapy is necessary to
prevent harm (e.g., contractures), then it is medically necessary 'treatment' for his cerebral
palsy.").
57. See id. The court noted that both the pediatrician and the pediatric neurologist
whom the Travelers representative had contacted "reported 'progress."' Id.
Additionally, the court stated that "the implication that walking by age five would not be
'significant progress' for this unfortunate child is simply revolting." Id.
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The court also expressed concern over the expertise of the
administrators who had made the decision and the degree to which
they had made a legitimate and unbiased inquiry into the child's
condition. 8 Although the representative who initially recommended
the reduction in treatment was a doctor, she had limited experience
with the treatment of cerebral palsy 9 and had not personally
examined the child.' The doctor in the home office who reviewed
the claim denial likewise lacked expertise regarding cerebral palsy,
had not treated patients for a number of years,6' and failed to update
the file before reviewing it.62 In addition, he conceded that his job
entailed "'support for the legal department,' "which made the court
skeptical of the fairness of the review he provided.63
The court concluded by noting that an administrator acting
under a conflict of interest, even if diligently trying to maintain
neutrality, "'may unconsciously favor its profit interest over the
interests [of the beneficiaries] of the "plan.' "64 To neutralize this
58. See id. at 153-54. Calling the benefit denial "the precipitous decision to give up on
Ethan," the court noted that the Travelers representative could provide "scant support for
[her decision] at deposition." L.
59. See id. The representative had practiced medicine for 20 years before joining
Travelers, but she explained that the procedure in the area where she worked was to send
cerebral palsy patients to other medical facilities. See id.
60. See id. at 154. Quoting from the representative's deposition, the court placed
heavy emphasis on the following response she gave when asked whether she had any
medical basis for determining that the child's treatment was inappropriate: "'I have no
idea. I have not examined the patient whether it is appropriate or inappropriate [sic]. But
that isn't a decision I was asked to make."'" Id. (quoting the representative's deposition).
61. See id. ("[The doctor] has not seen patients in seven years, and he admitted he is
not familiar with textbooks or treatises on cerebral palsy. His opinion was based on a
single medical journal article, which is uncited here."). There is only one article listed
under Cerebral Palsy in the 1988 index to the New England Journal of Medicine.
Frederick B. Palmer et al., The Effects of Physical Therapy on Cerebral Palsy: A
Controlled Trial in Infants with Spastic Diplegia, 318 NEw ENG. I. MED. 803 (1988). The
authors of that article conducted a study of two groups of infants who were suffering from
cerebral palsy. Group A received physical therapy, while Group B received "infant
stimulation treatment" consisting of "cognitive, §ensory, language, and motor activities"
utilizing puzzles, crayons, building blocks, and the like. Id. at 804. The authors found that
the Group B infants showed more improvement, and concluded that "this clinical trial
offers no support for the idea that neurodevelopmental physical therapy ... is a preferred
intervention in infants with mild to severe diplegia." Id. at 807. However, the authors
cautioned that "[b]ecause of the limited scope of the trial, our conclusions favoring infant
stimulation are preliminary." Id. at 803. Also, the authors found "no significant
differences between the [two] groups in the incidence of contractures." Id.
62. See Bedrick, 93 F.3d at 153.
63. Id. (quoting the doctor's deposition).
64. Id. at 154 (quoting Doe v. Group Hosp. & Med. Servs., 3 F.3d 80, 86-87 (4th Cir.
1993)).
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effect, such an administrator will be held to a higher standard of
review: "A fiduciary with a conflict of interest must act as if he is
'free' of such a conflict. 'Free' is an absolute. There is no balancing
of interests; ERISA commands undivided loyalty to the plan
participants."
Enacted in 1974, ERISA" brought comprehensive federal
regulation to the field of pensions and benefits for the first time.67
Among other things, it sought to provide interstate uniformity in the
administration of programs and to provide workers with "a level of
protection which will adequately protect their rights and just
expectations. 6 9 Prior to ERISA, there was concern as to the degree
that employees could rely on actually receiving the benefits of
pension plans to which they had long contributed.0
65. Id. (citation omitted).
66. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(1994).
67. See Charles B. Blakinger, Note, Fiduciary Standards Under the Employee
RetirementIncome Security Act of 1974, 63 GEo. LT. 1109, 1109 (1975) ("Until passage of
[ERISA], theo assets [of private welfare and pension plans] comprised the largest
accumulation of substantially unregulated assets in this country." (footnote omitted)).
Federal legislation regarding certain limited aspects of pension and benefit plans existed
prior to ERISA. See Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 § 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C.
§ 186(c)(5) (1994); Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1994); see also Jay Conison,
Foundations of the Common Law of Plans, 41 DEPAUL L REV. 575, 575-76 n.4 (1992)
[hereinafter Conison, Foundations] (discussing these and other statutes); infra notes 80-84
and accompanying text (discussing regulation under the Labor Management Relations Act
of 1947).
68. See I-LR. REP. No. 93-533, at 17 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4655
("Because of the interstate character of employee benefit plans, the committee believes it
essential to provide for a uniform source of law .... "); id. at 12, reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4650 (stating that ERISA was intended to "bring a measure of uniformity
in an area where decisions under the same set of facts may differ from state to state").
69. Id. at 9, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4647; see 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1994); see
also Jay Conison, Suits for Benefits Under ERISA, 54 U. PiTr. L REv. 1, 2 (1992)
[hereinafter Conison, Suits for Benefits] ("The central policy of [ERISA] is that employees
should receive the pensions and other benefits they were led to believe they would get."
(footnote omitted)); Blakinger, supra note 67, at 1112 ("[ERISA was] designed to reduce
significantly the number of people who pay money into private pension plans expecting to
receive retirement income, 'only to have their hopes dashed and end up getting nothing.'"
(quoting 120 CONG. REC H-29,192 (1974) (statement of Rep. Perkins))); Jamie L
Johnson, Comment, Judicial Review of ERISA Plan Administration Under the Arbitrary
and Capricious Standard of Review, 10 INDus. REL. L.T. 400, 422 (1988) ("One of the
primary purposes of [ERISA] is to infuse reliability into private pension schemes and
protect the expectations of workers .... ).
70. See Conison, Foundations, supra note 67, at 576 ("Congress had determined that
employee rights to anticipated benefits were woefully underprotected and concluded that
the threats to employees' interests demanded an expansive and thorough legislative
response.").
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Although not apparent from its name, ERISA applies not only
to pension plans, but also to "employee welfare benefit plan[s]."'
This latter type of plan describes certain health care benefit plans
commonly offered by employers to their employees, as well as
vacation plans and other non-pension benefits.72 In an effort to
ensure that employees receive the benefits of these welfare plans, the
statute places the plan administrator in the role of a fiduciary73 and
designates that the administrator "shall discharge his duties.., solely
in the interest of participants and beneficiaries ... for the exclusive
purpose of ... providing benefits ... and defraying reasonable
expenses of administering the plan."74
The statute also specifically gives a participant or beneficiary an
affirmative right to bring a civil action "to recover benefits due to
him under the terms of his plan." 5 However, ERISA is silent as to
the standard of review courts should use in hearing such cases. 6
71. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).
72. See id. The section provides in relevant part:
The terms "employee welfare benefit plan" and "welfare plan" mean any plan,
fund, or program... established or ... maintained for the purpose of providing
for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or
otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the
event of sickness, accident, disability, death, or unemployment, or vacation
benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care centers,
scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services ....
Id.
73. See i § 1102(a)(1) ("Every employee benefit plan shall be established and
maintained pursuant to a written instrument. Such instrument shall provide for one or
more named fiduciaries who jointly or severally shall have authority to control and
manage the operation and administration of the plan."). The fiduciary is not required to
be independent of the plan sponsor. See id § 1108(c)(3). Thus, a company employee may
serve as administrator of an employer-funded plan, or, as in Bedrick, an insurance
company may both administer the plan and pay claims out of funds it has received from
the employer as premiums.
74. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(A). This is sometimes referred to as the "exclusive benefit" rule.
See Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental Contradiction:" The
Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. Ci. L REV. 1105, 1108 (1988). In addition to imposing the
duty of loyalty under § 1104(a)(1)(A), the statute further provides for the other traditional
duty of a fiduciary-that of care. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) ("[The fiduciary shall
discharge his duties] with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence ... that a prudent man
acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an
enterprise of a like character and with like aims....").
The term "participant" describes employees and former employees who become or
may become eligible for benefits under a plan. See id. § 1002(7). A "beneficiary" is "a
person designated by a participant, or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or
may become entitled to a benefit thereunder." Id. § 1002(8).
75. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
76. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109 (1989) ("ERISA
does not set out the appropriate standard of review for actions under § 1132(a)(1)(B)
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Rather than providing a standard in the statute, Congress intended
that the courts should develop a body of federal common law to
apply to such claims. ' Somewhat surprisingly, given ERISA's broad
goals of employee empowerment and access to benefits, 78 the federal
common law that the courts developed quickly settled on a highly
deferential "arbitrary and capricious" standard to apply when
reviewing denials of plan benefits.79
The arbitrary and capricious standard originated in the review
of pension cases' arising under the Labor Management Relations
Act of 19471 (LMRA). Section 302 of the LMRA provides that trust
funds can be established by an employer in a collective bargaining
relationship for the purpose of providing pension and welfare
benefits to employees, with the disbursement of funds from these
trusts being controlled by a board of trustees.' Soon after the Act's
challenging benefit eligibility determinations.").
77. See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 55-57 (1987) (stating that a
"federal common law of rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated plans" was
intended to be developed by the courts); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers
Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24 n.26 (1983) (same); 120 CONG. REC S29,942 (1974)
(statement of Sen. Javits) ("A body of Federal substantive law will be developed by the
courts to deal with issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare and
pension plans."); see also Conison, Foundations, supra note 67, at 577 ("Much of ERISA
was intended to be experimental, to consist of regulatory first approximations, later to be
refined through experience and in the courts. Congress wished the federal courts to work
out the ramifications and details of the statute's principles and approaches .... " (footnote
omitted)).
78. See Conison, Foundations, supra note 67, at 579 ("ERISA clearly instructs courts,
in developing plan-related law, to treat as paramount the goal of protecting employee
rights and expectations relating to benefits from plans."). As another commentator writes:
Inasmuch as the statute is designed " 'to promote the interests of employees and
their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans,"' [Bruch, 489 U.S. at 113 (quoting
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983))], and specifically creates a right
of action by employees to sue to recover plan benefits, it might have been
supposed that the courts would have elected to develop a federal common law by
adopting the more liberal line of state law cases allowing recovery by employees
under the usual standards applicable to a breach of contract action. This did not
happen.
Joseph R. Weeks, Continuing Liability Under Expired Collective Bargaining Agreements
(pt. 1), 15 OKLA. CrrU. L REv. 1,141-42 (1990) (footnote omitted).
79. See, e.g., Bayles v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 602
F.2d 97, 99 (5th Cir. 1979); Bueneman v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas
Pension Fund, 572 F.2d 1208, 1209 n.3 (8th Cir. 1978); Riley v. MEBA Pension Trust, 570
F.2d 406,413 (2d Cir. 1977); Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d 1362,1371 (9th Cir. 1976).
80. See John A McCreary, Jr., Comment, The Arbitrary and Capricious Standard
Under ERISA: Its Origins and Application, 23 DUQ. L. REV. 1033,1037 (1985).
81. 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
82. See id. § 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1994). Congress's passage of this
section was purportedly in response to the demands of John L Lewis, the president of the
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passage, several suits were brought in the District Court for the
District of Columbia by disappointed beneficiaries who had been
denied benefits, forcing the court to struggle with the proper
standard with which to review such denials by the trustees.' When
the first case of this kind reached the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, that court settled on the arbitrary and
capricious standard.'
By the time ERISA was enacted, courts were universally
applying the arbitrary and capricious standard to LMRA cases.'
When the early ERISA cases arose, the courts simply transported
the arbitrary and capricious standard from LMRA jurisprudence,
largely without questioning the propriety of doing so. 6 The
United Mine Workers of America, that mine operators contribute money to a welfare fund
for union laborers. See McCreary, supra note 80, at 1036-37. Concerned that a fund
controlled solely by labor representatives might be used for improper purposes by labor
leaders, see id., Congress imposed strict guidelines and safeguards in the statute, see Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947 § 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5). Specifically,
employers and employees would appoint an equal number of trustees to serve on the
board, any deadlocks would be resolved by an impartial arbitrator, and all funds would be
used "for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees ... and their families and
dependents." Id.; see also McCreary, supra note 80, at 1037 (discussing the history of the
statute).
83. See, e.g., Kennet v. United Mine Workers, 183 F. Supp. 315 (D.D.C. 1960); Ruth v.
Lewis, 166 F. Supp. 346 (D.D.C. 1958); Hobbs v. Lewis, 159 F. Supp. 282 (D.D.C. 1958);
Van Horn v. Lewis, 79 F. Supp. 541 (D.D.C. 1948). For extensive discussions of these and
related cases, see Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134, 142-43 (3d Cir.
1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 489 U.S. 101 (1989), and Conison, Suits for Benefits, supra
note 69, at 41-46, and Flint, supra note 44, at 163-65.
84. See Danti v. Lewis, 312 F.2d 345, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1962). Given that the makeup of
the board of trustees under an LMRA trust consisted of an equal number of appointees by
both employees and the employer, courts had fairly minimal concerns regarding bias or
partiality in the administration of the trust and thus considered a deferential standard of
review appropriate. See Bruch, 828 F.2d at 143-45, aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 489 U.S. 101
(1989).
85. See Michael S. Beaver, The Standard of Review in ERISA Benefits Denial Cases
After Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch: Revolution or Diid Vu?, 26 TORT & INS.
.J. 1, 3 (1990).
86. See Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1052 (7th
Cir. 1987) ("This [arbitrary and capricious] standard was taken over for use in reviewing
benefit denials under ERISA ... apparently without the courts' noticing that employers
often held the whip hand in ERISA trusts as they did not with the joint employer-union
trust funds authorized by [the LMRA]."); Beaver, supra note 85, at 3 ("Finding no
controlling standard within the language of ERISA, courts determining benefits cases
under the new federal statute simply reasoned by analogy that the arbitrary and capricious
standard should be transplanted from LMRA actions to ERISA actions."); Flint, supra
note 44, at 144 (noting that "courts assumed that the rule from the IMRA cases applied in
ERISA disputes" without justifying its application in ERISA).
Two commentators note that the arbitrary and capricious standard under the LMRA
arose in response to that statute's "exclusive benefit" rule: "The reasoning is that when
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adoption of the deferential standard was indeed questionable,8 since
ERISA was intended to provide increased levels of protection to
employees' and since ERISA plans lack some features that serve as
inherent safeguards in an LMRA trust.8 Nevertheless, the courts
were familiar with the standard and appeared to be comfortable with
its applicability in the ERISA context."
Under the arbitrary and capricious standard, a reviewing court
would conduct a very narrow review.' No standardized formulation
plan fiduciaries deny benefits unreasonably, they are not acting 'for the sole and exclusive
benefit of the employees' as [the LMRA] requires." Fischel & Langbein, supra note 74, at
1130. Since BRISA contains a very similar rule, see supra note 74 and accompanying text,
"it was a simple step [for federal courts hearing ERISA claims] to adopt this rubric as the
basis of review." Fischel & Langbein, supra note 74, at 1130.
Another commentator suggests that courts might have misconstrued a Conference
Report stating that ERISA actions "'are to be regarded as arising under the laws of the
United States in similar fashion to those brought under section 301 of the [LMRA].'" See
Conison, Suits for Benefits, supra note 69, at 16 (quoting LR. CONF. REP. No. 93-1280, at
377 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 5037). According to this commentator,
the "reference to section 301 of the LMRA was meant only to clarify the federal common
law character of the applicable law," and was not intended to mean "that courts should
import into ERISA the specific rules that [had] been developed under section 301." Id. at
17.
87. See, e.g., Conison, Foundations, supra note 67, at 635-36 (stating that use of
deferential standard of review is "a doubtful rule" that allows plan sponsors to "evade the
fundamental purpose of ERISA"); Conison, Suits for Benefits, supra note 69, at 3 (arguing
that using the deferential standard "pays little attention to ERISA's central purpose of
safeguarding benefit expectations" and "often seems perversely designed to thwart benefit
expectations"); Astrid Meghrigian, ERISA's Impact on the Provision of Health Care,
HEALTH LAW., Spring 1992, at 9, 12 (arguing that the deferential standard "fall[s] short of
protecting the interests of [plan beneficiaries] obtaining necessary medical care").
88. The Supreme Court in Bruch noted that "ERISA was enacted 'to promote the
interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans,'" Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101,113 (1989) (quoting Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S.
85, 90 (1983)), and "'to protect contractually defined benefits,'" id (quoting
Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134,148 (1985)).
89. See Johnson, supra note 69, at 415 (stating that courts applied the LMRA standard
to ERISA "without examining the underlying institutional relationships between the
employer, fiduciary, and participant which may have justified the discretion afforded
fiduciaries under the LMRA"); id. at 416 (noting that LMRA boards consist of an equal
number of appointees by employees and employer, arbitration is mandatory in the event of
deadlock, and LMRA trusts are always funded whereas employer ERISA plans may be
unfunded and paid out of the employer's general assets). See generally Conison, Suits for
Benefits, supra note 69, at 17-20 (discussing the difference between LMRA and ERISA
plans); Hint, supra note 44, at 155-56 n.100 (same). But cf. Fischel & Langbein, supra note
74, at 1135 (expressing doubt as to the neutrality of the administration of LMRA trusts,
despite the equal number of appointees by employees and employers).
90. See, e.g., Conison, Suis for Benefits, supra note 69, at 46-49 (discussing early cases
and their adoption of the arbitrary and capricious standard).
91. One court characterized the standard as follows:
Although it is an overstatement to say that a decision is not arbitrary or
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of a test existed, however, and different courts considered various
factors in conducting their reviews9 Commonly, courts sought to
determine if trustees or administrators had based their decisions on
"substantial evidence,"'93 or if they erred on a question of law.'
Generally, a court would not substitute its own judgment for that of
the trusteel even if the reviewing court concluded that the trustee's
decision was less reasonable than an alternative decision. 96 Also,
courts would review only the evidence that the administrators had
before them at the time of their decision' and would not overturn
any decision that could be considered even marginally reasonable
based on that evidence.?
The Fourth Circuit joined the other circuits in its adoption and
application of the arbitrary and capricious standard. In Horn v.
Mullins.' a 1981 suit for benefits brought pursuant to both ERISA
and the LMRA, the court did not differentiate between the two
statutes but proclaimed that "[t]he standard for reviewing a decision
capricious whenever a court can review the reasons stated for the decision
without a loud guffaw, it is not much of an overstatement. The arbitrary or
capricious standard is the least demanding form of judicial review of
administrative action. Any questions of judgment are left to the agency, or here
to the administrator of the Plan.
Pokratz v. Jones Dairy Farm, 771 F.2d 206, 209 (7th Cir. 1985).
92. See Flint, supra note 44, at 147-50; Bradley R. Duncan, Note, Judicial Review of
Fiduciary Claim Denials Under ERJSA: An Alternative to the Arbitrary and Capricious
Test, 71 CoRNELL L REV. 986,994-95 (1986); Johnson, supra note 69, at 405-06.
93. See, e.g., Dockray v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 801 F.2d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 1986);
Jung v. FMC Corp., 755 F.2d 708,711 (9th Cir. 1985); Wolfe v. J.C. Penney Co., 710 F.2d
388, 393 (7th Cir. 1983); Dennard v. Richards Group, Inc., 681 F.2d 306, 314 (5th Cir.
1982); Maggard v. O'Connell, 671 F.2d 568,570-71 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Rehmar v. Smith, 555
F.2d 1362, 1371 (9th Cir. 1976). The requirement of "substantial" evidence may be
misleading. See infra text accompanying note 107.
94. See Wolfe, 710 F.2d at 393; Harm v. Bay Area Pipe Trades Pension Plan Trust
Fund, 701 F.2d 1301, 1304 (9th Cir. 1983); Peckham v. Board of Trustees, 653 F.2d 424,
426 (10th Cir. 1981).
95. See, e.g., Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003,1008 (4th Cir. 1985).
96. See Johnson, supra note 69, at 408-09 ("It is irrelevant whether a court or an
administrative agency would construe the term differently."); McCreary, supra note 80, at
1051 ("The decision reached by the fiduciary need not be the 'correct' one as determined
by the reviewing court.").
97. See Berry, 761 F.2d at 1007; Wolfe, 710 F.2d at 394; Phillips v. Kennedy, 542 F.2d
52,54 (8th Cir. 1976).
98. See Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 846 F.2d 416, 420 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983));
Shull v. State Mach. Co. Employees Profit Sharing Plan, 836 F.2d 306, 308 (7th Cir. 1987);
Holland v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 772 F.2d 1140, 1149 (4th Cir. 1985), aff'd sub norn.
Brooks v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 477 U.S. 901 (1986).
99. 650 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1981).
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of the trustees is whether it is arbitrary or capricious.""1 ' In applying
the standard, the court noted that the initial inquiry required
determining "whether the trustees' decision was supported by
substantial evidence."'0 ' In an uncharacteristic result under the
standard, however, the court held that in this case the trustees'
decision was not supported by substantial evidence and was thus
arbitrary and capricious.'02
Horn, however, did not portend a system of strict review under
the arbitrary and capricious standard. In LeFebre v. Westinghouse
Electric Corp.,13 a "pure" ERISA case with no LMRA elements
decided three years after Horn, the Fourth Circuit stressed that the
standard of review was a very narrow one."° In reversing the district
court's finding that a benefit denial was arbitrary and capricious, the
court stated that it was "obvious from the district court opinion that
it did not understand its narrow scope of review and it substituted its
judgment of the facts for that of the trustees.""r Citing Horn, the
LeFebre court applied the substantial evidence test and found that
under this test the trustees' decision was justifiable. 6 The court this
100. Id. at 37 (citing Seafarers Pension Plan v. Sturgis, 630 F.2d 218, 221 (4th Cir.
1980)).
101. Id. (citing Danti v. Lewis, 312 F.2d 345,348-50 (D.C. Cir. 1962)).
102. See id The United Mine Workers Health and Retirement Funds had denied
benefits to a disabled worker, contending that his injuries did not result from a mine
accident but were suffered at some point after the accident. See hL The court noted that a
Social Security Administrative Law Judge had determined the worker to be totally
disabled as of the date that he was first treated for the injury, which was less than 48 hours
after the accident; given this finding, the court held that the administrators' decision to
deny benefits was not based on substantial evidence. See iUi
103. 747 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1984).
104. See id. at 204. Tn determining the meaning of "arbitrary and capricious," the
district court had relied on a passage from the Supreme Court's decision in Bowman
Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974). See
LeFebre, 747 F.2d at 204. The Fourth Circuit explained that the district court erred by not
considering the full text of the passage, particularly its emphasis on the narrowness of
review:
"Under the 'arbitrary and capricious' standard the scope of review is a narrow
one. A reviewing court must 'consider whether the decision was based on a
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of
judgment .... Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful,
the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to
substitute its judgment for that of the agency."'
Id. (quoting Bowman, 419 U.S. at 285) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
105. LeFebre, 747 F.2d at 204.
106. See id. at 207. The plaintiff was claiming total disability due to blindness. See id.
at 205. Among other evidence the trustee had available in determining whether the
claimant was eligible for benefits was information that showed that "the claimant could see
well enough to drive his automobile through congested traffic to the apartment of his
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time elucidated the meaning of "substantial evidence," noting that it
"consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be
somewhat less than a preponderance. If there is evidence to justify a
refusal to direct a verdict were the case before a jury, then there is
'substantial evidence.' "10
In Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., ° the Fourth Circuit again
reversed a district court's finding of arbitrary and capricious action
by administrators and remanded the case for "reconsideration under
the narrow standard recently delineated by this court in
[LeFebre]."''  The district court was held to have erred by
considering evidence that was "not before the plan administrator" at
the time he made his decision. ° The consideration of such evidence
constituted an impermissible de novo review, as the "sole question
before the court was whether the plan fiduciary's decision was
arbitrary and capricious, e.g.[,] whether supported by substantial
evidence." '' As it had in LeFebre, the Fourth Circuit stressed that a
court "may not ... substitute its judgment for that of the trustee,"1 2
and it "may reverse only where 'there has been a clear error of
judgment.' ""
The Beny court justified its establishment of such a deferential
standard of review by explaining that "the standard exists to ensure
that administrative responsibility rests with those whose experience
is daily and continual, not with judges whose exposure is episodic
wife's lover and there he could see well enough to kill this individual with a firearm." Id.
107. Id. at 208 (quoting Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640,642 (4th Cir. 1966)).
108. 761 F.2d 1003 (4th Cir. 1985).
109. Id. at 1005.
110. Id. at 1007. The district court also erred by submitting the matter to a jury. See id.
at 1006. The court noted that "[w]hether a fiduciary has violated the arbitrary and
capricious standard is a matter for the court. The significance of the standard, while
second-nature to a judge, is not readily communicated to jurors." Id. at 1006-07.
111. Id. at 1007.
112. Id. at 1008.
113. Id. (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S.
281, 285 (1974)). The claimant in Berry was declared to be totally disabled after suffering
a nervous breakdown, and was receiving payments from the company's Long Term
Disability Plan. See id. at 1005. As the plan defined "disability" as a condition rendering
the person unable to work, see id., Ciba-Geigy's administrator chose to discontinue the
benefit payments after the claimant made a written request to be re-hired and furnished a
letter from his physician stating that he was able to resume work, see id at 1005-06. The
Fourth Circuit held that these letters, along with a separate letter from the claimant's
lawyer to the same effect, were "reliable evidence that [the] claimant was not, in fact,
disabled," id. at 1008, and that the district court erred by considering the physician's
"after-the-fact testimony explaining his letter to [the administrator]," id. at 1007.
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and occasional."114 On a related note, it was improper for the district
court to examine evidence that was not considered by the
administrator when making his decision because "[t]o review de novo
all the evidence trustees might have considered is to transfer the
administration of benefit and pension plans from their designated
fiduciaries to the federal bench."' 5 According to the court, "[s]uch
substitution of authority is plainly what the formulated standards in
this field are intended to prevent." '16
Shortly after its decision in Berry, the Fourth Circuit decided
Holland v. Burlington Industries, Inc.1 7 Holland was significant in a
number of respects,' but of particular interest for the purposes of
this Note was that it, like Bedrick, involved a potential conflict of
114. Id. at 1006. The reliance on the expertise of administrators is one of two common
justifications courts have offered for the use of the arbitrary and capricious standard. See,
e.g., Johnson, supra note 69, at 424 (discussing the presumption of expertise as a rationale
for the deferential standard of review); cf. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 74, at 1132
("While judges may be more disinterested than nonneutral fiduciaries, they are also less
informed and have weaker incentives to maximize the value of the firm to the benefit of
employers and employees alike."). But see Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828
F.2d 134, 144 (3d Cir. 1987) (rejecting the expertise rationale on the basis that questions
courts are commonly asked to review are not questions that administrative expertise would
aid in answering, and on the basis of the "significant danger that the plan administrator
will not be impartial"), affd inpart, rev'd inpart, 489 U.S. 101 (1989). The other common
justification for using the standard is that administrators are more able than courts to
"balance the interests of the plan beneficiaries." Julia Field Costich, Note, Denial of
Coverage for "Experimental" Medical Procedures: The Problem of De Novo Review Under
ERISA, 79 KY. L.T. 801, 812 (1990-91); see also Flint, supra note 44, at 144-47 & n.48
(discussing the justifications and citing illustrative cases); Duncan, supra note 92, at 999-
1000 (discussing the justifications and arguing that they "conflict with the fundamental
policies and goals of ERISA").
115. Berry, 761 F.2d at 1007.
116. Id. In a footnote, the court explained that "ERISA was designed to promote
'internal resolution of claims,' to permit 'broad managerial discretion' on the part of
pension plan trustees in formulating claims procedures, and to encourage informal and
non-adversarial proceedings." Id. at 1007 n.4 (citing Grossmuller v. International Union,
715 F.2d 853, 857 (3d Cir. 1983)).
117. 772 F.2d 1140 (4th Cir. 1985), aff'd sub nom. Brooks v. Burlington Indus., 477 U.S.
901 (1986).
118. One of the holdings of Holland was that an employer's severance pay plan
qualifies as an "employee welfare benefit plan" under ERISA and thus is subject to the
statute's provisions. See id. at 1144. The court also held that because the plan was subject
to ERISA, North Carolina laws on severance plans were preempted and could not coexist
with BRISA regulations. See i at 1146. The preemption issue was the only issue that was
affirmed by the Supreme Court in Brooks. A petition for certiorari on the issue of whether
the arbitrary and capricious standard was appropriate was denied in Slack v. Burlington
Industries, Inc., 477 U.S. 903 (1986). See Bruch, 828 F.2d at 138 n.4 (discussing the issues
in Holland), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
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interest situation." The potential conflict in Holland arose because
the employer administered a plan that was unfunded-that is, rather
than establishing a formal trust fund from which funds would be
withdrawn to pay benefits, any payment of benefits came directly out
of the employer's general assets."
The court rejected the plaintiff's contention that the potential
conflict of interest justified a stricter standard of review than the
arbitrary and capricious standard."' Reiterating Berry's justification
for the deference that should be given to plan administrators due to
their expertise and experience,' the court asserted that the arbitrary
and capricious standard was appropriate and that "[t]o vary the
standard of judicial review for general asset welfare plans [as
opposed to funded trusts] would only sow confusion in ERISA,
which we decline to do.""' The court stressed the importance of
having a "single standard of review [for] questions of claim
eligibility"'us and stated that if there were "procedural violations
indicating bad faith, ... such [cases could] be adequately resolved
under the traditional standard."' '  Proceeding to apply the
traditional standard to the facts, the court concluded that the
employer had not acted arbitrarily or capriciously.
26
Cases that raised the same issues as Holland-the possibility of
119. See Holland, 772 F.2d at 1148.
120. See id.; Bruch, 828 F.2d at 138 ("[A] conflict of interest may occur if the plan
administrator is also the employer and the plan is unfunded, so that any benefits provided
by the plan are paid directly by the employer out of its general corporate funds."), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 489 U.S. 101 (1989); Holdren, supra note 13, at 1220 n.12 ("[Clonflicts
may arise when benefits are paid out of an employer's general funds under a plan managed
by the employer.").
121. See Holland, 772 F.2d at 1148 (stating that despite the absence of a formal trust




124. Id. at 1149.
125. Id. The court explained that "[w]here procedural violations evidence a 'wholesale
and flagrant' flouting of ERISA, the actions of administrators will not be insulated from a
finding of arbitrariness." Id.
126. See id. In this case, Burlington had sold a plant to another company, Kayser-Roth
Corporation, who offered employment to "virtually all" of the former Burlington
employees. See id. at 1143. The plaintiffs, who were among those hired by Kayser-Roth,
argued that their change in employer constituted "job termination" under Burlington's
plan, and thus they were entitled to severance pay. See id. at 1144. The court held that
although the administrators' reading of "job termination" to exclude this situation was
"not compelled by the plan's language, [it was] certainly a reasonable [interpretation of
the plan]." Id. at 1149.
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bad faith or potential conflicts of interest-also were arising in other
circuits. The Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and District of Columbia
Circuits were among those who questioned the notion of applying a
single, highly deferential "arbitrary and capricious" standard to all
such cases.' The earlier decisions of these circuits took fairly
tentative steps toward amending the standard or requiring it to
accommodate irregular facts. For example, the Fifth Circuit in
Dennard v. Richards Group, Inc." stated that, in addition to making
the normal limited inquiries under a review for arbitrary and
capricious action, it would specifically consider several factors
bearing on the good faith of the plan administrators, including the
"factual background of the determination [made by administrators]
and inferences of lack of good faith, if any."'' In Harm v. Bay Area
Pipe Trades Pension Plan Trust Fund," the Ninth Circuit noted that
if plan administrators made a rule that "exclude[d] a
disproportionate number of employees from receiving benefits,"'"
the burden may be shifted to the administrators to show their action
was not arbitrary and capricious."
The Ninth Circuit in the mid-1980s expanded on its holding in
Harm and continued moving away from the universal application of
a completely deferential standard. In Jung v. FMC Corp.,' a case
decided in the same year as Holland and on similar facts, the Ninth
Circuit held, as had the Fourth Circuit, ' that the arbitrary and
capricious standard would still apply despite a potential conflict of
127. See, e.g., Maggard v. O'Connell, 671 F.2d 568, 571 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (stating that
"'[mI]ore exacting scrutiny'" is appropriate "'where the [decision-maker] has
demonstrated undue bias towards particular private interests,"' and that a review under
the arbitrary and capricious standard "must be contextually tailored" (quoting Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1049 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1979)));
McLaughlin v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 434, 447 & n.9 (N.D. Cal.
1983) (expressing doubt, in dicta, about whether the arbitrary and capricious standard
should be applied when ERISA fiduciary was insurance company acting under conflict of
interest).
128. 681 F.2d 306 (5th Cir. 1982).
129. Id. at 314.
130. 701 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1983).
131. Id. at 1305 (citing Miranda v. Audia, 681 F.2d 1124, 1125-27 (9th Cir. 1982); Ponce
v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 628 F.2d 537, 543-45 (9th Cir. 1980)).
132. See id. The level of deference, however, remained fairly high. The court noted
that "[a]lthough we described the burden that shifts as the burden of proof, the trustees
can meet this burden by showing 'any reasonable basis' for their action." Id. at 1306
(citations omitted). For a more recent application of the burden-shifting approach, see
infra note 192.
133. 755 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1985).
134. For a discussion of Holland, see supra notes 117-26 and accompanying text.
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interest due to an employer-funded plan.'s However, the Jung court
stated that if a benefit denial "avoids a very substantial outlay," 6
that fact should be taken into account in reviewing the denial under
the arbitrary and capricious standard and "[1]ess deference should be
given."" 7 A year later the Ninth Circuit went further in Dockray v.
Phelps Dodge Corp.,' stating that a "lesser degree of deference"
under the arbitrary and capricious standard could be appropriate in
other cases involving a conflict of interest, even in the absence of a
"very substantial outlay" of money.'-
In 1987, the Seventh Circuit noted the "growing skepticism
about the orthodox approach"' 40 to the arbitrary and capricious
standard of review in Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension
Trust.4' Judge Posner, writing for the court, recounted the history of
the standard and suggested that its importation into ERISA may
have been "inapt, [or] a historical mistake."'4" The court further
suggested, however, that the standard could be saved by applying it
in a flexible manner: "[T]he arbitrary and capricious standard may
be a range, not a point. There may be in effect a sliding scale of
judicial review ... [that is] more penetrating the greater is the
suspicion of partiality, less penetrating the smaller that suspicion
135. See Jung, 755 F.2d at 711 ("We see no reason why ERISA calls for a different
standard of review here. Courts have applied [the arbitrary and capricious standard] to
actions administering unfunded employee welfare benefit plans like this one." (citing Sly v.
P.R. Mallory & Co., 712 F.2d 1209 (7th Cir. 1983))).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 711-12. As in Holland, Jung involved a claim for severance pay by
employees who were re-hired by a company that bought the business of their former
employer. See id. at 709-10. Despite the Jung court's less deferential application of the
standard of review, it reached the same result that the Fourth Circuit reached in Holland,
concluding that the administrators' determination that the employees had not been
"terminated" was "a reasonable interpretation, made in good faith, and therefore not
arbitrary or capricious." Id. at 713.
138. 801 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1986).
139. Id. at 1152. Dockray involved a situation in which the plan administrator was a
senior manager of Phelps Dodge, see id. at 1153, and the employee-claimant was a
participant in an acrimonious strike that had lasted for three months, see i. at 1152. The
court noted the "tugs of divided loyalty pulling at [the plan administrator]," id. at 1152,
and stated that "[g]iven this highly charged atmosphere, we think it unrealistic to grant the
same substantial deference ... as we would to the decision of a wholly independent fund
trustee in similar circumstances," id. at 1153.
140. Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1049 (7th Cir.
1987).
141. 836 F.2d 1048 (7th Cir. 1987).
142. Id. at 1052; cf. Varhola v. Doe, 820 F.2d 809,813 (6th Cir. 1987) (implying that if it
were not confined by precedent to applying an arbitrary and capricious standard, it might
apply a less deferential standard in certain cases).
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is. ' ' 4s Going well beyond the approaches the Ninth and Fifth
Circuits had taken, the Van Boxel court indicated that in situations in
which there was a "serious conflict of interest, the proper deference
to give [the administrators'] decisions may be slight, even zero."'4'
It was the Third Circuit's decision in Bruch v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co.,45 however, that brought the controversy over the
arbitrary and capricious standard to a head. The court determined
that the administrators of Firestone's ERISA plan were acting under
a conflict of interest, 4' and cited one of its own previous opinions,47
as well as the decisions of the Ninth 48 and Fifth1 49 Circuits, for the
inappropriateness of a highly deferential standard in such
situations.'5° However, rather than retaining the arbitrary and
capricious standard and flexibly applying it with "less deference," the
court noted that established trust law principles required treating the
decisions of a conflicted trustee with no deference at all" and called
143. Van Boxel, 836 F.2d at 1052-53.
144. Id. at 1052. The court recognized that there was a conflict in the case before it,
but even applying "careful judicial scrutiny," the court determined that the administrators'
decision to deny benefits was a reasonable one. See iUL at 1053. The claimant had applied
for a pension based on 20 years of service; however, while a collective bargaining
agreement had resulted in his name being put on a list of employees who were guaranteed
their jobs until the age of 65, he had performed actual work for the company for only eight
years. See id. at 1049. The remainder of his working years had been spent serving as the
Secretary-Treasurer of his local union. See id.
145. 828 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1987), affd in part, rev'd in part, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
146. See id. at 138 ("[A]s in this case .... a conflict of interest may occur if a plan
administrator is also the employer and the plan is unfunded, so that any benefits provided
by the plan are paid directly by the employer out of its general corporate funds."). This
case involved Firestone's sale of one of its divisions to another company. See id. at 136.
Although the new company hired most of Firestone's former employees, the employees
contended that Firestone should provide them with severance pay under the company's
Termination Pay plan. See id.
147. See id at 139 (citing Struble v. New Jersey Brewery Employees' Welfare Trust
Fund, 732 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1984)).
148. See id. at 139-40 (citing Dockray v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 801 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir.
1986); Jung v. FMC Corp., 755 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1985); Harm v. Bay Area Pipe Trades
Pension Plan Trust Fund, 701 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1983)). Prefacing its discussion of these
cases, the Third Circuit noted that "even some courts that apply the label 'arbitrary and
capricious' to describe the scope of their review in fact subject plan administrators'
decisions to more rigorous review than that normally accorded ... under certain
circumstances, especially when the plan administrator possesses an adverse interest." Id.
at 139.
149. See id. at 140 (citing Dennard v. Richards Group, Inc., 681 F.2d 306 (5th Cir.
1982)).
150. See id at 139-40.
151. See id. at 141. The court noted that the ERISA standard of review had its
foundation in LMRA jurisprudence, which in turn drew many principles from trust law.
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for such decisions to be "scrutinized with the greatest possible
care."'' The court thus determined that in situations in which a plan
administrator is acting under a conflict of interest, the arbitrary and
capricious standard should be jettisoned and the decisions of that
administrator should properly be reviewed under a de novo
standard.'
Following this considerable break with precedent, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to consider Bruch" and "resolve the
conflicts among the Courts of Appeals as to the appropriate standard
of review."'5 ' The Court began its analysis with the recognition that
the arbitrary and capricious standard had been imported from the
LMRA cases, and noted that a primary reason for its development in
those cases was to allow courts to assert jurisdiction over benefit-
denial claims. 6 The Court reasoned that since ERISA expressly
See id at 140-41. The court therefore undertook a review of trust law doctrines in order to
determine the proper standard of review. See id. at 141. Citing the Restatement (Second)
of Trusts, the court explained that when a settlor provides that trust assets are to be
distributed but does not prescribe the method for distribution, courts will defer to the
trustee's discretion in making distributions and review the trustee's decisions only for an
abuse of that discretion. See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187
(1959)). "Comment (g) to Restatement § 187 explains, however, that courts will not defer
to a trustee's judgment when a conflict of interest threatens the trustee's impartiality .. .
Id. (emphasis added).
152. Id. at 145. The court buttressed its conclusion with a quote from then-Judge
Cardozo's famous opinion in Meinhard v. Salmon, explaining that "'[u]ncompromising
rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of
undivided loyalty' which governs a trustee in the execution of his fiduciary duty." Id.
(quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545,546 (N.Y. 1928)).
153. See id. Although the plaintiffs contended that the court's conclusions about
conflicted fiduciaries should result in a rule of construing all ambiguities of the plan in
favor of the beneficiaries, the court declined to adopt such a rule. See id. Instead, since
the Termination Pay plan resembled a contract, the court "[thought] it best to take as our
starting point the principles governing construction of contracts between parties
bargaining at arms' length." Id. Thus, a de novo standard of review was adopted, with the
contract interpretation principles of looking to industry practice and past practice between
the parties aiding in the interpretation of the plan. See id.
154. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
155. Id. at 108. Travelers Insurance Company, the defendant in Bedrick, was among
those who filed an amicus curiae brief urging a reversal of the Third Circuit's decision. See
iU at 104.
156. See id. at 109. A student comment, cited by the Court in Bruch, see id. at 110, and
by the Seventh Circuit in Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d
1048, 1049, 1052 (7th Cir. 1987), examined the history of the standard of review and
explained that:
The theory employed by the courts in developing the arbitrary and capricious
standard [under the LMRA] utilized a bootstrap approach to assert jurisdiction
... : because section 302 requires that a trust fund be established "for the sole
and exclusive benefit of the employees," the administration of such a fund is
subject to judicial scrutiny to determine whether in fact the trust satisfies the
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allows participants and beneficiaries to bring suit under the act, the
standard is not necessary for jurisdictional purposes under ERISA"7
and thus "the wholesale importation of the arbitrary and capricious
standard into ERISA [was] unwarranted."' "a
Turning to a determination of the appropriate standard of
review, the Court noted that "ERISA abounds with the language
and terminology of trust law"'59 and thus trust law principles should
govern in deciding what standard to use.' The Court determined
that whether deference should be given to a trustee's decisions turns
on whether the trust instrument grants the trustee discretionary
authority in making such decisions."' If the instrument grants
discretion, then the trustee's decisions will be overturned only for an
abuse of that discretion.' If the instrument does not grant
statutory standard-the so-called "structural violation" analysis. This analysis
began with the premise that a provision of a plan which has the effect of denying
beneficiaries their right to benefits under the plan, with no reasonable purpose
for so doing, is not established "for the sole and exclusive benefit of the
employees." Once an initial determination is made that the plan as structured
has such an effect, the court then had jurisdiction to review the trustees' actions
in denying benefits, utilizing the arbitrary and capricious standard.
McCreary, supra note 80, at 1038-40 (footnotes omitted).
Other commentators have disagreed with this analysis:
A student Note concluded, on the basis of an inaccurate reading of the labor
cases, that the deferential standard for [LMRA] plans arose as a means by which
federal courts could assert jurisdiction over suits challenging benefit denials. The
[LMRA] cases that originated the approach for such plans, however, did not
concern themselves with jurisdictional issues, and predated by many years ... the
case that first sought to link federal court jurisdiction over claims with a
deferential review approach to them. Regrettably, the erroneous analysis of that
Note has been relied on by [the Supreme Court in Bruch and others].
Conison, Suits for Benefits, supra note 69, at 35 n.117 (citations omitted); see also Flint,
supra note 44, at 177 (opining that the Bruch Court was mistaken in indicating that the
arbitrary and capricious standard was adopted for jurisdictional reasons).
157. See Bruch, 489 U.S. at 110 ("Mhe raison d're for the LMRA arbitrary and
capricious standard-the need for a jurisdictional basis in suits against trustees-is not
present in ERISA.").
158. Id. at 109; see i. at 110 ("Without [the] jurisdictional analogy, LMRA principles
offer no support for the adoption of the arbitrary and capricious standard insofar as
§ 1132(a)(1)(B) is concerned.").
159. Id. at 110.
160. See id. at 111.
161. See kL (" 'Where discretion is conferred upon the trustee with respect to the
exercise of a power, its exercise is not subject to control by the court except to prevent an
abuse by the trustee of his discretion."' (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 187 (1959))).
162. See id. ("A trustee may be given power to construe disputed or doubtful terms,
and in such circumstances the trustee's interpretation will not be disturbed if reasonable."
(citing G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 559 (2d rev. ed.
1980))).
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discretion, then the trustee's decisions Will be reviewed de novo.'6'
The Court reasoned that a de novo standard of review was
appropriate in ERISA cases;' 6" since the de novo standard had been
applied in judicial benefit determinations prior to ERISA,'" any
lesser standard of review "would afford less protection to employees
and their beneficiaries than they enjoyed before ERISA was
enacted."'" Such a result would be inconsistent with the clear
purposes of the statute.67
Thus, the Court's holding began with the proclamation that
163. See i& at 112 (stating that if a plan does not give an administrator discretion,
"other settled principles of trust law ... point to de novo review"). Professor Langbein
contends that the Court's analysis of trust law is seriously flawed. See John H. Langbein,
The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, 1990 Sup. CT. REV. 207, 219. In contrast to the
Supreme Court's interpretation that a trustee does not have discretion unless it is explicitly
granted to him or her in the trust instrument, Professor Langbein points out that the
correct rule under trust law is that a trustee always has discretion unless the trust
instrument expressly denies it. See id (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187
cmt. c (1959)). Thus, if the instrument is silent as to whether the trustee has discretion,
discretionary powers should be presumed and the trustee's decisions should be reviewed
for abuse of discretion. See id "Discretion is the norm. What the Supreme Court in
Bruch calls 'the trust law de novo standard of review' is simply nonexistent in trust law."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
However, while heightened review should not turn on the absence of discretion-
granting language in the instrument, it should turn on whether the trustee is acting under a
conflict of interest. See id at 214, 217. "[jTrust-law tradition [calls for] scrutinizing
fiduciary conduct more closely when conflict of interest is suspected." Id. at 217. Thus,
Professor Langbein contends that the Third Circuit's "learned and thoughtful opinion" in
Bruch followed established trust law principles, see hi at 214, 217, 223, while the Supreme
Court's opinion in Bruch "made such a tangle of the trust law it purported to apply ... that
the informed observer will have difficulty understanding what the Court's purposes really
were," i. at 223.
Another commentator has argued that trust law supplies a "competing analogy" to
the one on which the Court settled. See Conison, Suits for Benefits, supra note 69, at 51-52.
"For instance, a rule of trust law provides that: 'If the trustee is under a duty to pay
money immediately and unconditionally to the beneficiary, the beneficiary can maintain
an action at law against the trustee to enforce payment."' Id. at 51 (quoting
RESTATRMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 198(1) (1959)) (alteration in original). Thus, if
administrators were seen as having a duty to pay claims, trust law could supply principles
that would force payment, rather than providing for discretionary decision-making that
would be reviewed with the utmost deference.
164. See Bruch, 489 U.S. at 112-14.
165. See id. at 112.
166. Id. at 114.
167. See id at 113-14. The Court noted that a bill had been introduced in Congress in
1982 proposing to provide a statutory de novo standard of review in ERISA benefit-denial
claims and that the bill had not passed. See id. at 114. The Court did not, however,
interpret the failure of the bill to mean that Congress was satisfied with the arbitrary and
capricious standard that was widely used in the courts, and thus did not consider the
adoption of a de novo standard to be contrary to congressional intent. See id.
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benefit-denial claims under ERISA should be reviewed de novo."
However, the impact of this statement was lessened significantly by
the remainder of the Court's holding. Consistent with its prior
discussion as to the interplay between deference and a trustee's grant
of discretion, the Court stated that the de novo standard would not
apply if the plan instrument granted the plan administrator
discretion to make benefit determinations.69 Furthermore, the Court
disagreed with the Third Circuit's conclusion that the existence of a
conflict of interest determined the standard of review, and thus the
above guidelines as to which standard to apply would be unaffected
by whether there was a conflict or not."' The Court added in dicta,
however, that if a plan administrator with discretionary powers was
acting under a conflict of interest, "that conflict must be weighed as a
'facto[r] in determining whether there is an abuse of discretion.' ,,7
Although the Supreme Court intended Bruch to bring
uniformity to the circuits and settle the controversy over the standard
of review, it did not succeed in doing so; rather, it appeared to
engender considerable confusion.' There was some uncertainty as
168. See id. at 115.
169. See id
170. See id. The Court explained that "[b]ecause we do not rest our decision on the
concern for impartiality that guided the Court of Appeals, we need not distinguish between
types of plans or focus on the motivations of plan administrators and fiduciaries." Id.
(citations omitted). Thus, the de novo standard would apply "regardless of whether the
plan at issue is funded or unfunded and regardless of whether the administrator or
fiduciary is operating under a possible or actual conflict of interest." Id.
171. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. d (1959)). One
commentator has suggested that the presence of a conflict should be the factor "requiring
de novo review in order to sufficiently guard beneficiary rights," and the fact that the
Court has "relegated consideration of any conflict of interest to a subsidiary analysis
within the framework of a deferential standard of review" will prove detrimental to
ERISAjurisprudence. Holdren, supra note 13, at 1234.
172. See Beaver, supra note 85, at 26 ("Developments in the lower courts since Bruch
make clear that much confusion remains .... "); Flint, supra note 44, at 157 n.106
("[Following Bruch], the circuit courts are presently groping for the correct standard of
review for discretionary plan administrator decisions."); Norman Stein, ERISA and the
Limis of Equity, 56 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 99 (1993) ("[Bruch] leaves in its wake
considerable doctrinal uncertainty."); Jon C. Bruning, Note, ERISA Plan Fiduciaries
Beware: The Abuse of Discretion Standard of Review Is No Longer a Guarantee of Judicial
Deference-Salley v. EI. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 73 NEB. L. REV. 932, 943 (1994)
("Since [Bruch], lower federal courts have struggled to define the abuse of discretion
standard of review.").
One commentator calls the passage stating the Bruch holding "certainly complex, not
particularly well-written, hardly memorable, and not especially accessible to the one who
is not an ERISA specialist." Frederick Schauer, Opinions As Rules, 62 U. CHI. L REV.
1455, 1469 (1995). Professor Schauer goes on to maintain, however, that it nevertheless
"seems to have served its function quite well. In one lower court decision, for example,
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to what kind of plan language was sufficient to grant an
administrator or trustee "discretion," thus lowering the standard
from de novo to abuse of discretion.'73 Other courts were unsure
how to undertake a de novo review,174 and many were confused as to
whether the new abuse of discretion standard was less or more
stringent than the previous arbitrary and capricious standard, or
whether it was the same. 75 Perhaps the area of most uncertainty lay
the judge noted that [Bruch had changed the law] and proceeded seemingly without angst
or uncertainty to employ the [holding] to the case before him." Id. Interestingly, in the
case to which he refers, the district court applied a minority interpretation of Bruch and
was reversed on appeal for erroneously finding a conflict of interest and granting too little
deference. See Kotrosits v. GATX Corp. Non-Contributory Pension Plan for Salaried
Employees, 757 F. Supp. 1434 (E.D. Pa. 1991), rev'd, 970 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1992).
173. See Gust v. Coleman Co., 740 F. Supp. 1544, 1548 (D. Kan. 1990) (noting that
"decisions from [the] circuits are far from uniform on what particular language [regarding
the granting of discretion] is necessary to trigger the Bruch exception [to de novo
review]"), affd, 936 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1991); see also Block v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 952
F.2d 1450, 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (discussing the issue at length and concluding that the
word "discretion" did not need to appear in the plan instrument); De Nobel v. Vitro Corp.,
885 F.2d 1180, 1187 (4th Cir. 1989) (examining plan instrument and concluding that "no
magic words" are required to grant discretion); Beaver, supra note 85, at 1 (noting that
one of "two critical issues, unresolved by Bruch," will be "[h]ow will the courts ascertain
whether plan language confers discretionary power[?]"); Noel Christian Capps, Note,
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch. Are Lower Courts Following the United States
Supreme Court Decision in ERISA Benefit Determinations?, 31 WASHBU1RN .,. 280, 281
(1992) (noting that "the Court failed to specify what type of plan language is necessary to
grant administrators and fiduciaries sufficient discretion to trigger a deferential standard
of review").
174. See Beaver, supra note 85, at 17 ("Early lower court decisions after Bruch
unfortunately reflect a confused approach to de novo review. Some courts seem unsure of
guiding principles and tend to treat trust and contract construction principles as
interchangeable." (citing, inter alia, Miller v. Eichleay Eng'rs, Inc., 886 F.2d 30 (3d Cir.
1989); Schultz v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 872 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1989); Garavuso v.
Shoe Corps. of Am. Indus., Inc., 709 F. Supp. 1423 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd mem., 892 F.2d 79
(7th Cir. 1989))).
175. See Bernstein v. Capitalcare, Inc., 70 F.3d 783, 787 n.4 (4th Cir. 1995) ("Whether
there is any significant difference under ERISA between the 'arbitrary and capricious'
standard and the 'abuse of discretion' standard is unclear in this circuit."); Abnathya v.
Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 2 F.3d 40, 45 n.4 (3d Cir. 1993) ("The 'arbitrary and capricious'
standard is essentially the same as the 'abuse of discretion' standard."); Block, 952 F.2d at
1454 ("The distinction, if any, between 'arbitrary and capricious review' and review for
'abuse of discretion' is subtle."); Lowry v. Bankers Life & Cas. Retirement Plan, 871 F.2d
522, 525 (5th Cir. 1989) ("[W]e find it unnecessary at this point to determine whether the
abuse of discretion standard envisioned by the Bruch [C]ourt is equivalent to or less strict
than our circuit's preexisting arbitrary and capricious standard."); Weeks, supra note 78, at
146 n.436 ("The Court's decision in Bruch did not discuss the difference, if any, between
an 'arbitrary and capricious' standard and an 'abuse of discretion' standard .... It is not
clear, however, that there exists any meaningful distinction between the standards of
review in this, or any other, context."); Bruning, supra note 172, at 943 ("It is ... clear the
abuse of discretion standard of review is meant to be similar to the arbitrary and
capricious standard. It is not yet clear whether it is equivalent to the old standard or
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in how much weight to give a conflict of interest as a "factor" under
an abuse of discretion analysis. 6
Initially, the Fourth Circuit appeared to apply Bruch somewhat
perfunctorily, giving it little discussion and applying it almost as if it
had effected no change in the law.'" However, in De Nobel v. Vitro
Corp.,y the Fourth Circuit displayed a new perspective on Bruch
and perhaps foreshadowed the direction in which its opinions would
head. Although ultimately holding that the plan administrators in
the case had not abused their discretion,'" the court discussed in
great length the standard of review. 8' It noted that pre-Bruch courts
had considered the standard to be extremely narrow,' but that some
slightly more or less deferential.").
176. See Ebom v. Central States Health & Welfare Fund, 900 F.2d 1138, 1142 (7th Cir.
1990) ("But the Court did not tell what standard should be used in situations like this,
where de novo review is improper, other than to say that it should be 'deferential.' "); see
also Taft v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 9 F.3d 1469, 1474 (9th Cir. 1993) (applying
"more stringent" version of abuse of discretion standard in presence of conflict, but noting
that "[t]he precise nature of the less deferential review in this context is not clear");
Boland v. King County Med. Blue Shield, 798 F. Supp. 638, 643 (W.D..Wash. 1992) ("[IThe
standard of review when an ERISA plan administrator has both discretionary authority
and is operating under a conflict of interest is more stringent than purely abuse of
discretion, but the degree of stringency is not clear."); Hunter, supra note 44, at 405
(stating that "[c]ourts continue to grapple with the issue" of what standard to apply when
discretion is conferred but a conflict is present); Holdren, supra note 13, at 1250 ("Adding
still further to the confusion following Bruch is the diversity of opinion concerning the
appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied in cases where discretion is granted, but a
conflict is present.").
177. See, e.g., Boyd v. Trustees of the United Mine Workers Health & Retirement
Funds, 873 F.2d 57, 59 (4th Cir. 1989). In Boyd, the court briefly mentioned the holding of
Bruch, found that the plan in question granted the administrators discretion, and
proceeded to review the benefit determination under an abuse of discretion standard. See
id. While ultimately determining that the administrators in fact had abused their
discretion, the court insinuated that the administrators' decision would have been reversed
under the pre-Bruch arbitrary and capricious standard as well. See i. at 60 (noting that
"to the extent it would be arbitrary and capricious under our pre-Bruch standard ... it
would be an abuse of discretion... under the Bruch standard").
178. 885 F.2d 1180 (4th Cir. 1989).
179. See i. at 1192. The court determined that the plan granted the administrators
discretion in making benefit determinations, see id. at 1186, and that there was no conflict
of interest present because benefits were paid from a funded trust, see id. at 1191. Given
these two determinations, the court could apply only the highly deferential abuse of
discretion standard, and, since the administrator's interpretation of the plan could be
characterized as "at least a 'reasonable' one," id. at 1190, the administrators could not be
said to have abused their discretion. See i. at 1192.
180. See Id. at 1184-88.
181. "At the time the district court decided this case [prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Bruch], it was thought well-settled that an extremely narrow standard of review
applied where the beneficiaries of an ERISA-qualified retirement plan challenged in the
courts unfavorable benefits determinations by plan fiduciaries." Id. at 1184.
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courts, including the Fourth Circuit, had been less than satisfied with
such a narrow approach in cases of possible bad faith or conflicts of
interest," and that the Supreme Court in Bruch had subsequently
"swept the standard of review board clear."1  The court then
reviewed the discussion of the de novo standard from Bruch in
considerable detail, explaining the necessity of its displacement of
the arbitrary and capricious standard in order not to "frustrate" the
objectives of ERISA.1" However, because it found that the plan
granted the administrators discretion to interpret the plan's terms,
the court stated that it was "compelled under Bruch's express
mandate to apply the deferential 'abuse of discretion' standard."' '
The court nevertheless conducted a lengthy analysis of the plan and
suggested that if it were free to conduct a de novo review rather than
being "constrained" to an abuse of discretion standard,86 it might
have found for the plaintiffs rather than the administrators.
In Doe v. Group Hospitalization & Medical Services," decided
four years after De Nobel, the Fourth Circuit had an opportunity to
apply its interpretation of Bruch in the context of a conflict of
182. See id. ("Without abandoning the 'arbitrary and capricious' formulation, these
courts were willing to apply it somewhat less deferentially when they perceived the
possibility of bias or conflict of interest on the plan fiduciary's part." (citing Jung v. FMC
Corp., 755 F.2d 708,711-12 (9th Cir. 1985); Dennard v. Richards Group, Inc., 681 F.2d 306,
314 (5th Cir. 1982))). The Fourth Circuit then offered its 1985 decision in Holland as
advocating a less deferential application of the arbitrary and capricious standard in some
situations: "Reflecting the same concern [as the courts in Jung and Dennard], this court
and the Seventh Circuit expressly espoused a 'flexible approach' under which judicial
deference would vary in application of this single standard depending upon the apparent
degree of impartiality in the fiduciaries' decisionmaking process." Id. (emphasis added)
(citing Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048 (7th Cir. 1987);
Holland v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 772 F.2d 1140 (4th Cir. 1985), affd sub nor. Brooks v.
Burlington Indus., Inc., 477 U.S. 901 (1986)). For a discussion of Holland, see supra notes
117-26 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Van Boxel, see supra notes 140-44 and
accompanying text.
183. De Nobel, 885 F.2d at 1185.
184. See id.
185. Id. at 1187.
186. See id. at 1188 (stating that "it is precisely because we are constrained by this rule
of 'considered deference' that we cannot now interfere with the Vitro fiduciaries' ultimate
decision to deny the retirees' claims").
187. See Ui The court explained that it had devoted so much discussion to the
appropriate standard of review "for the simple reason that, were we to consider de novo
review appropriate, we might well hold for the retirees. Indeed, the [retirees] have offered
an interpretation of the Plan which could be considered not only 'reasonable,' but 'more
reasonable' than Vitro's." Id. One commentator, writing in 1989, offered De Nobel as an
example of how circuit courts were "groping" for the proper standard of review after
Bruch. See Flint, supra note 44, at 157.
188. 3 F.3d 80 (4th Cir. 1993).
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interest case" and to establish the flexible standard that it would
later apply in Bedrick. Noting at the outset that the Bruch Court had
"recognize[d] that a conflict of interest could lower the level of
deference to be applied,"' 0 the court concluded that the presence of
a conflict in the present case meant that "we must therefore alter our
standard of review. '"" Citing the Eleventh Circuit decision of Brown
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield' for comparison, the court held that in
conflict of interest cases it would "not act as deferentially as would
otherwise be appropriate"' and would hold the administrator to the
standard of a neutral administrator who was acting "free" from
conflict.' The court then went on to apply the maxim of construing
ambiguous terms against the drafter1" and concluded that the plan
189. Blue Cross both administered the plan and paid claims out of premiums that it
charged the employer. See id. at 86. The court noted that "[t]o the extent that Blue Cross
has discretion to avoid paying claims, it thereby promotes the potential for its own profit.
That type of conflict flows inherently from the nature of the relationship entered into by
the parties .... " Id.
190. Id. at 85; see Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989)
(stating that a conflict of interest "must be weighed as a 'facto[r] in determining whether
there is an abuse of discretion'" (quoting RFSTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt.
d (1959))).
191. Doe, 3 F.3d at 87.
192. 898 F.2d 1556 (11th Cir. 1990). Brown provides one of the more radical post-
Bruch approaches to modifying the abuse of discretion standard in conflict situations,
holding that nothing less than a burden shift is appropriate:
[W]e hold that when a plan beneficiary demonstrates a substantial conflict of
interest on the part of the fiduciary responsible for benefits determinations, the
burden shifts to the fiduciary to prove that its interpretation of plan provisions
committed to its discretion was not tainted by self-interest. That is, a wrong but
apparently reasonable interpretation is arbitrary and capricious if it advances the
conflicting interest of the fiduciary at the expense of the affected beneficiary or
beneficiaries unless the fiduciary justifies the interpretation on the ground of its
benefit to the class of all participants and beneficiaries.
Id. at 1566-67 (citation omitted).
The Brown decision has been criticized by several commentators. See Mark A. Hall
& Gerard F. Anderson, Health Insurers' Assessment of Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L
REV. 1637, 1669 n.124 (1992) ("The Brown court errs ... by erecting impossibly complex
burdens of proof that fiduciaries must meet in order for their group-based decisions to be
sustained."); id at 1698 n.219 ("[Brown's] complex, ten-page discussion of burden-shifting
presumptions boils down to the result-oriented rule that the court will use intensive
scrutiny if it disagrees with the [administrator's] decision, but will defer if it agrees.");
Hunter, supra note 44, at 407 (characterizing the Brown court's reasoning as being "[i]n
stark contrast to the wisdom imparted by [Bruch]"); Capps, supra note 173, at 310 ("The
[Bruch] Court's promise of deference is illusory under the Brown analysis.").
193. Doe, 3 F.3d at 87.
194. See id.
195. See id. at 88-89. While the Supreme Court in Bruch suggested that contract
interpretation principles were appropriate when reviewing a plan under the trust law de
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administrators had abused their discretion by interpreting the plan in
such a way as to deny certain benefits to the plaintiff. 6
In Bailey v. Blue Cross & Blue ShieldW decided two years later,
the Fourth Circuit invoked the principles it had outlined in Doe.'
Again applying the contract maxim of construing ambiguous terms
against the drafter,' and noting that the presence of a conflict meant
that the administrators' decision was " 'not entitled to the deference
we might otherwise accord,' "' the Fourth Circuit upheld the district
court's finding that the administrators had abused their discretion in
interpreting the terms of the plan so as to deny certain benefits.''
novo standard of review, see Bruch, 489 U.S. at 112-13, it did not mention the applicability
of such principles when conducting a more deferential review. The Fourth Circuit implied
that it was proper to use the contract maxim of contra proferentum even in reviewing for
abuse of discretion, citing a Ninth Circuit case that had found the maxim to be "not
inconsistent with review for abuse of discretion," Doe, 3 F.3d at 89 (citing Kunin v. Benefit
Trust life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 534, 539 (9th Cir. 1990)), and three other cases that had
applied it in the process of conducting a de nova review, see id. (citing Phillips v. Lincoln
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 302, 314 (7th Cir. 1992); Glocker v. W.R. Grace & Co., 974
F.2d 540, 544 (4th Cir. 1992); Masella v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 936 F.2d 98, 107 (2d
Cir. 1991)). But cf. Bernards v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 987 F.2d 486, 488 (8th Cir.
1993) (arguing that the contract maxim of contra proferentum is inappropriate in ERISA
context (citing Finley v. Special Agents Mut. Benefits Ass'n, 957 F.2d 617, 619 (8th Cir.
1992))).
196. See Doe, 3 F.3d at 89. The court held that Blue Cross was within its rights to deny
coverage for a bone marrow transplant, since that procedure was expressly excluded from
coverage in the contract. See i& However, Blue Cross abused its discretion in denying
payment for chemotherapy and radiation treatment on the basis that they were "'services
or supplies for or related to' the transplant." Id. (quoting the insurance contract). The
court stated that the "exclusion for 'services or supplies for or related to' the bone marrow
transplant... does not reach back to eviscerate the underlying coverage for chemotherapy
and radiation treatments of cancer" that were expressly included in coverage in another
part of the contract. Id.
197. 67 F.3d 53 (4th Cir. 1995).
198. See id. at 56-57. Bailey was very similar to Doe on its facts. The plaintiff was
seeking payment for treatment of cancer that included chemotherapy and "peripheral
stem cell rescue" (PSCR), a process that achieves a result similar to autologous bone
marrow transplants by "harvesting" healthy cells prior to chemotherapy and reinfusing
them into the patient afterwards. See id. at 55. The contract expressly excluded from
coverage "'[PSCR] with high dose chemotherapy or radiation.'" Id. Blue Cross
contended that this language excluded coverage of the plaintiff's chemotherapy due to its
relation to the PSCR. See i& However, chemotherapy was expressly included in coverage
in a different section of the contract. See id.
199. See id. at 57. Since the contract excluded coverage of PSCR "with" chemotherapy,
but expressly provided for coverage of chemotherapy elsewhere, see supra note 198, the
contract could be characterized as ambiguous. See Bailey, 67 F.3d at 57-58. Applying the
contract maxim, the court stated that "[w]e have held repeatedly that ambiguous language
must be construed against the drafter." Id. at 58 (citing Doe, 3 F.3d at 89; Glocker, 974
F.2d at 540); see supra note 195.
200. Bailey, 67 F.3d at 58 (quoting Doe, 3 F.3d at 87).
201. See id. As in Doe, the court held that the underlying cell harvesting procedure was
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Blue Cross, apparently unclear as to the substance of the standard
that the court had adopted, asserted that the district court had erred
"by not articulating the degree of (lessened) deference it accorded
Blue Cross's decision."'2" The court conceded that a "more extensive
analysis might have been helpful,"2 but concluded that the conflict
in this case was so "total" that a more thorough explanation was not
necessary."2
Perhaps in response to Blue Cross's expressed confusion as to
the standard being applied in conflict cases, the Fourth Circuit in
Bernstein v. Capitalcare, Inc. 12 yet another conflict of interest case,
attempted to formulate a definition. Describing the appropriate
standard as "the modified abuse of discretion standard of Doe,",20
the court said it required that an administrator's decision be upheld
if "reasonable," and that a decision would be reasonable "'if it is the
result of a deliberate, principled reasoning process and if it is
supported by substantial evidence.' " 7 However, the clarity of the
test was sacrificed to some degree by the court's admonition that the
conflict of interest should be "weigh[ed] ... as a factor in analyzing
the reasonableness of the decision. ' '2's The Fourth Circuit then held
that although the district court had purported to apply the equivalent
of this test, it actually had applied a de novo standard instead and
had thus erred.2"
properly excluded but that Blue Cross had abused its discretion in denying payment for the
chemotherapy treatment. See id. at 57-58.
Although the conflict-heightened level of review applied in Doe and Bailey was liberal
and led to determinations of abuses of discretion in both cases, the application of the
standard was not fatal or outcome determinative in all cases. See Hickey v. Digital Equip.
Corp., 43 F.3d 941, 948 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that administrators' interpretation of plan
was "the more reasonable [one] despite the fact that the [administrators] operated under a
conflict of interest," and thus administrators did not abuse their discretion); Aliff v. BP
Am., Inc., 26 F.3d 486, 489 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that although administrator was acting
under a conflict, there was no abuse of discretion because the conflict was "outweighed"
by the administrator's reliance on an actuary report and detailed findings of an associate).
202. Bailey, 67 F.3d at 56-57.
203. Id. at 57.
204. See ia (noting that "Blue Cross stood as the single beneficiary of a substantial sum
based on its denial of benefits").
205. 70 F.3d 783 (4th Cir. 1995).
206. Id. at 788.
207. Id. (quoting Baker v. United Mine Workers of Am. Health & Retirement Funds,
929 F.2d 1140,1144 (6th Cir. 1991)).
208. Id.
209. See id at 789. The district court had considered evidence that was not before the
plan administrators at the time they made the determination to deny benefits. See i. at
788-89. The Fourth Circuit stated that consideration of additional evidence is proper only
when conducting a de novo review, and even then should be done only in exceptional
ERISA STANDARD OF REVIEW
The confusion regarding the proper standard of review surfaced
again in Haley v. Paul Revere Life Insurance Co."° While the district
court in Bernstein had conducted a de novo review when it should
have applied the modified abuse of discretion standard, the district
court in Haley reviewed for abuse of discretion when it should have
applied the de novo standard."' The Fourth Circuit noted that the
de novo standard was required under the first part of the Bruch
holding because the plan did not grant proper discretion to the
administrator in making the type of benefit determination at issue."2
The plaintiff did assert that the district court erred by using the abuse
of discretion standard, but not because the plan failed to give
discretion.2" Rather, his assertion was that the plan administrator
was acting under a conflict of interest and that Doe required a de
novo review in such situations.2 4
The Haley court conceded that "[t]he question of when it is
appropriate for courts to show deference to the decisions of ERISA
plan administrators continues to cause confusion."' S The court then
proceeded to review the initial inquiry that should be made under
Bruch-that is, ascertaining whether the plan grants the
administrator discretion.2"6 If it does not, a de novo standard should
be used, and if it does, an abuse of discretion standard should be
used.21 However, rather than repeating the formulation of the test
from Bailey and Doe that should be applied under the abuse of
discretion standard in conflict cases, the court turned to the
Restatement (Second) of Trusts to enumerate five discrete factors to
consider when reviewing for abuse of discretion: "(1) the scope of
situations. See i at 788 n.5 (citing Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 987 F.2d 1017,
1025 (4th Cir. 1993)). Although the conflict of interest in the case triggered less
deference, the standard was still technically abuse of discretion rather than de novo, and
thus the consideration of the additional evidence was improper. See id. at 789.
210. 77 F.3d 84 (4th Cir. 1996).
211. See i. at 87. Covering all bases, the district court had "concluded that [the
administrator's] decision was supported by 'substantial evidence in the Administrative
Record under a reasonable interpretation of the plan' and that [the administrator's] denial
of benefits was 'not arbitrary and/or capricious, and did not result from an abuse of
discretion."' Id. (quoting the lower court opinion).
212. See id at 89; Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989)
(holding that "a denial of benefits ... is to be reviewed under a de novo standard unless
the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine
eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan").
213. See Haley, 77 F.3d at 87.
214. See id.
215. Id.
216. See id at 89.
217. See id
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the discretion conferred; (2) the purpose of the plan provision in
which the discretion is granted; (3) any external standard relevant to
the exercise of that discretion; (4) the administrator's motives; and
(5) any conflict of interest under which the administrator operates in
making its decision. '  In a case decided one day after Haley,
however, this formulation did not appear; rather, a different panel of
the Fourth Circuit in Jenkins v. Montgomery Industries, Inc.
219
referred to the standard to be applied in a conflict case simply as a
"less deferential" one," citing the language of Bailey and Doe in a
footnote. 1
Given this history of conflict of interest cases in the Fourth
Circuit, it is not surprising that both parties in Bedrick were
uncertain as to the substance of the standard that would be
applied.' Both apparently interpreted the prior cases in the circuit
as applying some sort of heightened standard of review in conflict of
interest cases, rather than following Bruch's directive to use an abuse
of discretion standard with the conflict considered as a "factor.""
The Bedrick court maintained that it was in fact applying Bruch's
standard, and that the lesser deference it gave to conflict cases, as
well as the requirement that a conflicted fiduciary act as if he or she
were "free" of such conflict, simply reflected the Fourth Circuit's
interpretation of what Bruch's "factor" entails.'
Taking into account the Bedrick court's description of the
standard it applied, what has emerged in the Fourth Circuit is a
218. Id. (citing RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. d (1959)). Perhaps
relevant to the court's explanation was the fact that the lack of discretion granted to the
administrator mandated a de novo review, and thus the specific issue of how to
compensate for a conflict of interest did not need to be addressed. See id.
219. 77 F.3d 740 (4th Cir. 1996).
220. Id. at 742.
221. See id. at 742 n.2.
222. See Bedrick, 93 F.3d at 152.
223. See id. In addressing the impact that a conflict of interest has on the standard of
review, the court noted:
Travelers concedes that it has a conflict of interest, but the parties debate what
the conflict means. Travelers says its conflict is merely a "factor," citing the
passage from [Bmch], while the plaintiffs say that it changes the standard of
review, citing this court's cases [of Bailey and Doe]. The premise of this dispute
is that there is some difference between [Bruch] and BaileylDoe. There is not.
Our cases are interpretations of [Bruch], and we apply [Buch's] "factor" in [the
manner set forth in Bailey and Doe].
Id. (citations omitted); cf. Aliff v. BP Am., Inc., 26 F.3d 486, 489 (4th Cir. 1994) ("Doe
worked no sea change in the law .... A conflict of interest had been noted as a factor to
be considered in [Bruch] ....").
224. See Bedrick, 93 F.3d at 152.
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flexible abuse of discretion standard that allows for additional
scrutiny in conflict cases.'m The confusion arises because the
additional scrutiny is characterized as only a factor to be considered
while remaining within the abuse of discretion standard, and thus
this additional scrutiny does not have the effect of substituting a
heightened standard of review for the abuse of discretion standard z6
However, the very fact that "less deference" is given would seem, in
one sense at least, to "heighten" the standard of review. But
regardless of the name given to the additional scrutiny, it is clear at
the very least that the Fourth Circuit's abuse of discretion standard
can be accurately characterized as having some degree of flexibility.
This characterization is buttressed by the fact that the district court in
Bedrick was found to have erred by applying an "ordinary" abuse-of-
discretion analysis.'
The idea of a flexible abuse of discretion standard is not novel
or without support.m The Bedrick court's approach is essentially an
adaptation of the pre-Bruch approach taken by, most notably, the
Ninth Circuit, under which the court would consider factors
indicating bad faith or a conflict of interest in determining whether
an administrator had made an arbitrary or capricious decision."m
Post-Bruch courts outside the Fourth Circuit are showing increasing
225. See Hunter, supra note 44, at 405, 406 (maintaining that some courts-in contrast
to those that "have followed the specific mandate of [Bruch]"---"have employed a
'flexible' arbitrary and capricious standard to factor a conflict of interest into the
determination of whether an administrator or fiduciary abused its discretion in denying
benefits").
226. Cf. Capps, supra note 173, at 304 (arguing that "the application of a more
stringent standard of review just because a conflict of interest is present is not technically
in accord with the Bruch holding"). The author distinguishes between using a conflict as a
"factor," and actually raising the standard of review: "While a conflict of interest is a
factor to be weighed in determining whether the trustee has abused his discretion, the
language of the plan documents, and only the language of the plan documents, determines
the proper standard of judicial review." Id.
227. See Bedrick, 93 F.3d at 152-53.
228. See, e.g., Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 898 F.2d 1556, 1563-64 (11th Cir.
1990) (noting that within the deferential standard, "[t]he degree of deference exercised in
review of a fiduciary's decision ranges from slight to great, depending upon the dynamics
of the decisionmaking process"); Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836
F.2d 1048, 1053 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Flexibly interpreted, the arbitrary and capricious
standard ... allows the reviewing court to make the necessary adjustments for possible
bias in the trustees' decision.").
229. See Dockray v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 801 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1986); Jung v. FMC
Corp., 755 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1985); Harm v. Bay Area Pipe Trades Pension Plan Trust
Fund, 701 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1983).230. For a discussion of Dockray, Jung, and Harm, see supra notes 130-39 and
accompanying text.
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interest in the approach, advocating in conflict cases "more
stringent" review"M or the application of a "heightened" standard. 2
In a more general context, Judge Friendly has written that "[s]tudy
has led me to conclude that the differences [in the application of an
abuse of discretion standard] are not only defensible but essential.
Some cases call for application of the abuse of discretion standard in
a 'broad' sense and others in a 'narrow' one. '233
The attraction of the flexible abuse of discretion standard in the
post-Bruch era is that it appears to be the only way in which a court
will be able to conduct a meaningful level of review when it suspects
bad faith or a conflict of interest has wrongly led to a denial of
benefits.' While Bruch held that ERISA claims should be reviewed
de novo, it made clear that plan administrators could escape this
stringent level of review and be reviewed only for abuse of discretion
merely by drafting a plan that granted them discretion in making
benefit determinations. z5 It is thus likely that nearly all plans are
now written to give discretion,26 which constrains courts to reviewing
231. Taft v. Equitable life Assurance Soc'y, 9 F.3d 1469, 1474 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting
that because it found a conflict of interest, it would "therefore 'impose a more stringent
version of the abuse of discretion standard"' (alteration in original) (quoting Bogue v.
Ampex Corp., 976 F.2d 1319,1325 (9th Cir. 1992))).
232. See Pitman v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 24 F.3d 118, 123 (10th Cir. 1994) ("[W]e
would offer on remand the Fourth Circuit's application of [Bruch] and its amplification in
Doe v. Group Hospitalization."); Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 534, 541
(9th Cir. 1990) (applying less deference and the contract maxim of contra proferentum in
presence of conflict); Brown, 898 F.2d at 1566-67 (shifting the burden in presence of
conflict); Boland v. King County Med. Blue Shield, 798 F. Supp. 638, 643 (W.D. Wash.
1992) (" '[Tihe court will review ... for an abuse of discretion, but take particular note of
the obvious potential for bias that is present and afford the decision little, if any,
deference."' (quoting Poole v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 741 F. Supp. 837, 846 (E.D. Wash.
1990))); Wilson v. Group Hosp. & Med. Servs., 791 F. Supp. 309, 312 (D.D.C. 1992)
(stating that existence of conflict "requires that the Court scrutinize the carrier's
interpretation with great care to determine whether the carrier acted free of self-
interest").
233. Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY LJ. 747, 764 (1982).
Judge Friendly was writing in the context of an appellate court's review of a trial court
judge's decision, but the principles may be comparable to the ERISA context in which
courts review decisions of administrators.
234. Cf. Holdren, supra note 13, at 1261 ("Because ERISA permits a conflict of
interest to exist ... ERISA's policy of providing increased protection for beneficiaries ...
demands the application of a standard of review that ensures protection of beneficiary
rights despite the presence of a conflict.").
235. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989) (holding that
all benefit denials are "to be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan
gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for
benefits or to construe the terms of the plan").
236. See Flint, supra note 44, at 136 ("Most plans do provide for, or soon will provide
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them under an abuse of discretion standard. 7  If there were no
flexibility within this standard to account for bad faith or a conflict of
interest, courts would be largely powerless to rectify clearly
inequitable decisions. Thus, courts reviewing benefit denials like
those in Bedrick would be forced to approve such denials, despite
their discomfort over the "highly suspect" situation of a conflicted
fiduciary making benefit determinations."
Perhaps the Supreme Court in Bruch intended that such a
flexible standard would emerge, or that courts would exercise their
discretionary powers to achieve equity on the various facts of
individual cases. 9 A basic premise of the Bruch Court's argument
for de novo review was that ERISA was designed to give employee
benefit claims more protection than an arbitrary and capricious
standard of review affords them.' Thus the arbitrary and capricious
standard was replaced with the de novo standard, unless the review is
of a plan that gives the administrator discretion.241 It would not seem
unfair to assume that the Court could foresee the consequences of
this rule-all plans would grant discretion and thus no ERISA claims
would be reviewed under the very de novo standard that the Court
had declared to be appropriate.242 By adding that conflicts of interest
could be considered as a "factor," perhaps the Court was
for, administrator discretion."); Weeks, supra note 78, at 145 ("After Bruch, only the
occasional unwary and poorly advised employer will make the [mistake of not including
discretionary language in the plan].").
237. See, e.g., De Nobel v. Vitro Corp., 885 F.2d 1180, 1187 (4th Cir. 1989) (noting that
the presence of discretion-granting language meant that the court was "compelled under
Bruch's express mandate to apply the deferential 'abuse of discretion' standard").
238. See Bedrick, 93 F.3d at 152.
239. See Langbein, supra note 163, at 222 ("[T]he Supreme Court appears to invite the
use of a conflict-sensitive standard of the sort the Third Circuit [in Bruch] tried to devise,
once plan drafters have inserted the necessary boilerplate to claim deferential review.");
Holdren, supra note 13, at 1264 n.193 (arguing that "the Supreme Court's approach
concerning the existence of a conflict of interest permits a court to fashion its own
standard of review when a conflict is present").
240. See Bruch, 489 U.S. at 113-14.
241. See id. at 115.
242. See Beaver, supra note 85, at I ("At least one lesson from Bruch is obvious: Plan
sponsors and drafters should craft new plans, and review and amend existing ones, to
incorporate [discretion and] this elective deferential review of benefit claim decisions.");
Conison, Foundations, supra note 67, at 636 (noting that lower courts applying Bruch have
concluded that "a plan sponsor can unilaterally insert magic language into the plan
document, and thereby evade the fundamental purpose of ERISA"); David L Gregory,
ERISA Law in the Rehnquist Court, 42 SYRACUSE L REv. 945, 952 (1991) ("Prudently
drafted pension plans will often reserve [discretion] for the plan administrator ... thus
avoiding de novo judicial review in almost all circumstances."); Langbein, supra note 163,
at 208 ("[Ihe Supreme Court in Bruch dealt with the problem so awkwardly that plan
drafters have been able to evade the Court's decision.").
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deliberately attempting to leave some degree of play in the standard
in the interest of obtaining equity in particular cases.
On the other hand, the Bruch Court also made clear that it was
the absence of discretionary powers in plan instruments, not the
presence of a conflict of interest, that would trigger de novo review. '
The fact that the Court de-emphasized the importance of a conflict of
interest may be seen to detract from the theory that the Court
intended a conflict to support any significant added scrutiny under
the abuse of discretion standard.2 However, if the Court did not
contemplate a fairly flexible abuse of discretion standard that could
give significant weight to factors such as bad faith or conflicts of
interest, then Bruch is open to a rather cynical interpretation: that
all ERISA claim denials actually should be reviewed with the highest
deference, which would make the Court's extensive discourse on the
rights of employees and the necessity of de novo review meaningless
pomp.,
Regardless of whether Bruch implicitly advocated a flexible
abuse of discretion standard, there are drawbacks to employing such
an approach. One drawback is that circuits may apply the flexible
standard differently, ' 6 or not at all,.47 thereby sacrificing the goal of
interstate uniformity that ERISA sought to achieve.r8 Inconsistency
between the circuits could lead to forum shoppinge9 and could force
243. See Bruch, 489 U.S. at 115; supra note 170.
244. Cf. Capps, supra note 173, at 304 (arguing that Bruch made clear that the standard
of review should turn on "the language of the plan documents, and only the language of
the plan documents," and that the presence of a conflict of interest is merely a factor to be
considered within a deferential abuse of discretion standard).
245. Cf. Langbein, supra note 163, at 223 (arguing that if the Bruch Court truly
considered the de novo standard the appropriate one to apply in order to protect
employees' interests in keeping with the goals of ERISA, then "the Court's willingness to
allow plan drafters to reinstitute the less searching arbitrary-and-capricious standard by
means of a few pen strokes seems inexplicable").
246. Compare Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 898 F.2d 1556,1566 (11th Cir. 1990)
(holding that the presence of conflict shifts the burden to the plan administrator to prove
the decision was not influenced by conflict), with Doe v. Group Hosp. & Med. Servs., 3
F.3d 80, 87 (4th Cir. 1993) (judging a conflicted administrator's decision against the
decision of an administrator who is acting "free" of any conflict), and Lowry v. Bankers
Life & Cas. Retirement Plan, 871 F.2d 522, 525 n.6 (5th Cir. 1989) (utilizing a "sliding
scale" of judicial review within the deferential standard). See generally Hunter, supra note
44, at 405-09 (discussing courts' different approaches when a conflict is present).
247. See Davis v. Kentucky Fm. Cos. Retirement Plan, 887 F.2d 689, 694-95 (6th Cir.
1989); Steever v. Bristol-Meyers Co., 727 F. Supp. 986, 988-89 (D. Md. 1989); Bowman v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 724 F. Supp. 493,501 (N.D. Ohio 1989).
248. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing the uniformity goals of
ERISA outlined in the House Report).
249. See Holdren, supra note 13, at 1264 n.193.
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companies or insurers who operate in more than one circuit to
adhere to differing guidelines in making benefit determinations,
depending on the location of the beneficiary whose claim they are
processing."o
Another drawback of using a flexible abuse of discretion
standard is that some degree of predictability is sacrificed."5 As is
evident by the Fourth Circuit cases, some insurers and employers are
uncertain regarding the precise standards to which they will be
held."2  With such a loosely-and often variously--defined
approach, the danger arises that outcomes will be strongly influenced
by the sympathetic facts of a particular case. 3 As one judge has
said, "[d]espite rumors to the contrary, those who wear judicial robes
are human beings, and as persons, are inspired and motivated by
compassion as anyone would be. ... The temptation to ... make
things less difficult for those who come before us, regardless of the
law, is strong."'  In light of such sentiments, a loosely defined
standard conceivably could become overly flexible in certain cases,
even if such expansion of the standard were unintentional.s Cases
such as Bedrick, in which a disabled child has his therapy benefits
sharply reduced, provide fact patterns especially solicitous of
sympathy, whether such sympathy is given consciously or not.
Yet it would appear that certain goals of ERISA require a more
250. Cf. McMahan v. New Eng. Mut. lIfe Ins. Co., 888 F.2d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 1989)
(noting that ERISA preemption of state law is necessary because otherwise an insurance
company could be subject to "inconsistent obligations under the laws of various states").
251. Cf. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
HARV. L REV. 22, 62 (1992) ("[Riules [as opposed to more flexible standards] afford
certainty and predictability to private actors, enabling them to order their affairs
productively.").
252. See Bedrick, 93 F.3d at 152; Haley v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 77 F.3d 84, 87 (4th
Cir. 1996); Bailey v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 67 F.3d 53, 56-57 (4th Cir. 1995); supra
notes 202-14,223 and accompanying text.
253. Cf. Wolf, supra note 44, at 2054-55 (discussing the possibility that sympathies may
influence courts' decisions in benefit-denial claims, especially in cases involving denials
based on "experimental" status of potentially lifesaving treatments).
254. Harris v. Mutual of Omaha, No. 92-1089-C, 1992 WL 421489, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Aug.
26,1992).
255. As "[e]ven the most careful and sensitive" plan administrator "may unconsciously
favor its profit interest" when construing a plan that is subject to more than one
interpretation, Doe v. Group Hosp. & Med. Servs., 3 F.3d 80, 86-87 (4th Cir. 1993), it
would appear that courts could be equally susceptible to unconscious motivations when
applying a standard of review capable of embodying varying degrees of scrutiny. These
motivations may be particularly strong in light of the parties commonly involved. Cf.
Mandel, supra note 44, at 461 ("As some defense counsel have been heard to comment,
the equitable maxim that 'equity abhors an insurance company' is widely applied, although
rarely mentioned on the record by judges.").
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stringent review of benefit denials than the highly deferential abuse
of discretion and arbitrary and capricious standards provide,"S which
are the standards that Bruch is interpreted as prescribing for
reviewing discretionary plans.' ERISA was designed to protect
employee expectations and to ensure that employees receive the
benefits contractually promised to them."s As one commentator has
argued, when a court hears an employee's claim for benefits, there
should be "only one substantial issue: whether the terms of the plan
entitle the claimant to the benefits sought.' 't 9 From this standpoint,
it would appear that a de novo standard of review would be the
appropriate standard and should be applied regularly when
reviewing ERISA claims. 62
However, while reviewing all ERISA benefit-denial claims
under a de novo standard might be the optimal course to take in
furthering certain ERISA goals,'61 there are practical concerns in
regard to such an approach. One particular concern is that a flood of
litigation would follow the implementation of such a standard, 62
which could result in increased legal and administrative costs and the
256. See, e.g., Conison, Suits for Benefits, supra note 69, at 60 ("The rule of deferential
review is an anachronism. It is an artifact of a different legal framework and it serves no
apparent function other than to impede [ERISA's goals of] protection of employee benefit
rights.").
257. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111, 115 (1989). There is
some confusion among courts as to which of these deferential standards Bruch actually
prescribed, and whether they mean the same thing. See supra note 175 and accompanying
text.
258. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1994); supra note 69.
259. Conison, Suits for Benefts, supra note 69, at 3.
260. See id. at 57 (arguing that envisioning benefit denial as a proceeding for review is
an incorrect approach and that "[a]n action to enforce ... [a claim should be] a direct
action for benefits, in which the court (or a jury) determines the claimant's rights on the
basis of the evidence presented"); Bruning, supra note 172, at 952 ("Ultimately, a de novo
standard of review for every contested benefit claim decision would create the fairest
forum for beneficiaries of ERISA plans."); cf. Flint, supra note 44, at 174 (arguing that
courts should use de novo review in all circumstances except in the case of a disinterested
plan administrator acting with proper motives); Duncan, supra note 92, at 1013 (arguing
that a deferential standard "permits a fiduciary far too much discretion," which "conflicts
with the fundamental goals and policies of ERISA").
261. See Capps, supra note 173, at 312 (noting that "[t]he purposes behind ERISA
would be better served if a de novo review were applied in every instance," but arguing
that the interests of employers should be taken into account as well).
262. See Flint, supra note 44, at 181 (noting that plan administrators are concerned that
a higher standard of review would increase litigation); Holdren, supra note 13, at 1257
n.155 (noting that one court, in rejecting de novo review, "was apparently fearful that a
flood of litigation would result from the application of a higher standard of review in all
denial of benefit cases" (citing Questech, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 713 F.
Supp. 956, 963 (E.D. Va. 1989))).
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consequent reduction of plan assets available to pay benefits.26
Advocates of a de novo standard respond to these concerns by
arguing that ERISA was not intended to protect courts from excess
litigation,' 64 or that litigation would in fact increase only minimally, if
at all.2 While these responses have merit, the first fails to fully
address the possible decrease in plan formation due to increased
expenses and the second may be sufficiently conjectural so as to fail
to allay fears.
The adoption of a de novo standard of review in all cases also
may serve to discount the interests of employers in the scheme of
ERISA plan provision.2" Legislative history reveals that ERISA is
not completely one-sided, as Congress sought to balance the need to
protect employee benefits with "the interests of employers and labor
organizations in maintaining flexibility in the design and operation of
their pension programs." 67 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit in Jung
noted that "one of the goals of ERISA was to keep plans within
reasonable costs.""2 The suggestion is that if conditions become too
difficult or expensive under ERISA, employers will be discouraged
from creating plans.26  Thus, a higher standard of review for all
263. See Flint, supra note 44, at 182.
264. See Conison, Suits for Benefits, supra note 69, at 61 ("[C]aseload reduction is not a
value easily reconciled with ERISA."); Flint, supra note 44, at 147 ("ERISA's object was
not to reduce litigation but to provide remedies for employeelbeneficiaries.").
265. See Conison, Suits for Benefits, supra note 69, at 61. Professor Conison argues that
"[n]o one has offered any evidence to show that permitting benefits suits to go forward as
evidentiary proceedings would, as dreaded, increase the number of such suits." Id. It is in
fact possible, he argues, that a deferential standard is equally capable of increasing
litigation "by promoting slapdash decisionmaking and generating far more wrong decisions
for participants and beneficiaries to challenge." Id.
266. See Capps, supra note 173, at 312 (pointing out that the interests of employers
offering benefit plans would be best accommodated by using a highly deferential standard
of review in all cases). Professors Fischel and Langbein have argued that ERISA plans
should not be understood as being solely for the benefit of the employees, because "for
some purposes the employer is also a beneficiary of the ... plan." Fischel & Langbein,
supra note 74, at 1128; see id. at 1118-19. "Employers are not donors. Employers offer
plans for reasons of economic advantage, in the competition to attract and retain
employees." Langbein, supra note 163, at 211. Thus, "[iln truth, ERISA plans are not for
the exclusive benefit of the employees; they are for the joint benefit of employer and
employees." Id. at 212.
267. .R. REP. No. 93-533, at 9 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4647.
268. Jung v. FMC Corp., 755 F.2d 708, 714 (9th Cir. 1985). Another goal of ERISA
was to protect the interests of employers "from conflicting and inconsistent state and local
regulation of... plans." Meghrigian, supra note 87, at 9.
269. See, e.g., Moore v. Reynolds Metals Co. Retirement Plan for Salaried Employees,
740 F.2d 454, 457 (6th Cir. 1984) (maintaining that employers would be discouraged from
creating plans if the judiciary became too willing to interfere with the establishment of
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ERISA claims might come at a cost of "lowered levels of plan
formation and less generous funding. From the standpoint of the
protected persons, it seems unlikely that that is the optimal outcome.
Here, as elsewhere in the law, it is all too easy to overprotect." ' If
one subscribes to this viewpoint, then the judicially ordered coverage
of beneficiaries such as the child in Bedrick may come at the expense
of reduced or discontinued coverage for other employees.
Regardless of whether the de novo standard should or should
not be universally applied to ERISA benefit-denial claims, the fact
remains that it will not be applied under the current ERISA
jurisprudence unless a plan fails to give an administrator discretion
plan provisions). One commentator argues that it is desirable to allow an employer "to
bargain for some discretionary authority in making benefit determinations," because
"[a]ny rule denying such authority will make employers less likely to sponsor a benefit
plan and will reduce the employer's willingness to offer generous benefits." Stein, supra
note 172, at 95-96. Benefit plans clearly have social value, and nothing in ERISA makes it
mandatory for employers to provide them. See David Gregory, The Scope of EPJSA
Preemption of State Law: A Study in Effective Federalism, 48 U. PriT. L REV. 427, 448
(1987). Thus, the argument is that the interests of employers as plan providers merit some
consideration when developing ERISA legal guidelines by which the employers must
abide. Cf. ischel & Langbein, supra note 74, at 1127 (arguing that the proposal to
disallow nonneutral fiduciaries under ERISA should be carefully considered before being
adopted because "[e]mployees would not be well served by a legal rule that decreases the
incentive to form plans in the first instance").
270. Langbein, supra note 163, at 228; see also Capps, supra note 173, at 313
("Deference [in the standard of review] is good or bad, depending on whether one favors
the noble purposes behind ERISA, or offering enough incentives to employers and plan
insurers to ensure that such plans will be offered in the future.").
Professors Fischel and Langbein have also suggested that strict judicial oversight of
the decisions of even nonneutral fiduciaries may not be necessary because evidence
"suggests that the levels of abuse are very low. Especially under health care plans,
millions of benefit decisions are made every week. The fraction that remains contentious
is minuscule." Fischel & Langbein, supra note 74, at 1131. Additionally,
[m]ost plan decisionmaking occurs in the setting of long term or repeat player
relations. Employer-dominated fiduciaries have strong incentives not to acquire
a reputation for sharp practice in handling benefit claims, a reputation that would
harm employee morale and cause employees to devalue plan benefits.... This
seems to bespeak the sense that-ordinarily---employees do not have much to
fear from putting their heads in this particular lion's mouth.
Langbein, supra note 163, at 216; see also Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension
Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1051 (7th Cir. 1987) ("[Tihe impact on the company's welfare of
granting or denying an individual application for a [benefit] will usually be too slight to
compromise the impartiality of the trustees .... Nor is it in a company's long-run best
interest to alienate employees by dealing unfairly with ... claims .... "). But cf. id. at 1052
(noting that despite the court's earlier remarks, "pension rights are too important these
days for most employees to want to place them at the mercy of a biased tribunal subject
only to a narrow form of 'arbitrary and capricious' review, relying on the company's
interest in its reputation to prevent it from acting on its bias").
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to make benefit deterninations." However, a Bedrick-type
"flexible" or heightened abuse of discretion standard, which has
been alleged to effectively constitute a de novo standard ' 2 will be
applied in some circuits if there is a conflict of interest or possibly an
indication of bad faith.' The result is that ERISA, which was
designed to bring interstate uniformity to pension and benefit
plans.l 4 is currently being applied in a non-uniform manner and the
outcomes of certain claims actions will vary across circuits.'
One way to combat this non-uniformity in ERISA under the
current regime would be simply to encourage or require the
formulation and administration of plans under which no conflict of
interest can be inferred?. However, the uniformity this would bring
would be the universal application of the highly deferential abuse of
discretion standard, which would be unsatisfactory to some.' Also,
it would entail practical problems. Employers either would have to
establish funded plans or retain disinterested administrators, and the
type of arrangement seen in Bedrick-under which the insurance
company both accepts premiums and administers the plan-could no
271. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 P.S. 101,115 (1989).
272. "The majority recognizes that the district court must apply the arbitrary and
capricious standard .... However, by suggesting that the district court [apply additional
scrutiny and less deference] .... the majority is in fact encouraging de novo review of [the
plan administrator's] decision to deny ... benefits." Dockray v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 801
F.2d 1149,1156 (9th Cir. 1986) (Poole, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
273. For a discussion of cases applying the flexible standard, see supra notes 231-32 and
accompanying text.
274. See HR. REP. No. 93-533, at 12, 17 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4650,4655.
275. Cf. Duncan, supra note 92, at 998 (noting that interstate uniformity has suffered
because "the arbitrary and capricious test has taken so many forms and been so
inconsistently applied," and it "effectively permits courts to select whatever analysis they
deem appropriate"). Although these comments were made in reference to the pre-Bruch
standard, they would appear to be equally applicable to the post-Bruch standard. See Gust
v. Coleman Co., 740 F. Supp. 1544, 1551 (D. Kan. 1990) ("After Bruch, the courts are
unsure what is the proper deferential standard of judicial review."); Holdren, supra note
13, at 1247 ("[Tmhe Supreme Court's approach in Bruch has simply replaced the old
disputes over the appropriate standard of review in denial of benefit claims with new
ones.").
276. Cf. Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 898 F.2d 1556, 1565 (lth Cir. 1990)
("[O]ne reason for limiting the deference when the fiduciary suffers a conflict of interest is
to discourage arrangements where a conflict arises."); Fischel & Langbein, supra note 74,
at 1114-15 ("The duty of loyalty is prophylactic .... The idea is to prevent misbehavior by
erecting an irrebuttable presumption of wrongdoing whenever the trustee engages in
conflict tainted transactions.").
277. See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
2424 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75
longer be utilized."
Furthermore, even if the outward appearance of a conflict of
interest were not present, there conceivably could still be some
potential for conflict. For example, in a situation in which an
employer paid claims directly out of its general assets and hired an
insurance company as an impartial administrator, the insurance
company might still be motivated-of its own volition or at the
behest of the employer-to deny claims and save the employer
money in an effort to have its contract renewed279 While this would
not necessarily be the case in all or even most employer-insurance
company relationships, it is meant to show that employers who
desire to pay minimal claims could likely find an insurance company
to effectuate such desires, thus achieving indirectly what the law
would forbid them from achieving directly. The result of such a
situation would effectively be an "indirect" conflict.
278. See Bedrick, 93 F.3d at 152; cf. Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d
134, 137-38 (3d Cir. 1987) (noting that conflict exists when employer utilizes unfunded
plan and pays claims out of general corporate funds), affd in part, rev'd in part, 489 U.S.
101 (1989); Flint, supra note 44, at 181 ("The plan sponsor could greatly reduce the
possibility of de novo review.., by providing that the plan administrator is someone other
than the employer, a committee of management, or a risk-assuming service provider
.. "); Hunter, supra note 44, at 409 ("To avoid application of the heightened standard,
employers can employ an independent decisionnaker if the funds for the benefits derive
from the employer's 'pocketbook.' "); Wolf, supra note 44, at 2080 (suggesting that
insurers could avoid conflict by setting up independent decisionmaking committees or
"structurally detach[ing] the decisionmaking process from the insurer's assets").
However, it is possible that "[t]he effect of forbidding the firm to ... determine
benefits-[a] functionol for which the firm is liable-would be to lower the rate of plan
formation. The firm would be alarmed about assuming financial liabilities without
effective controls. Employers tend not to write blank checks." Fischel & Langbein, supra
note 74, at 1127. Speaking more generally about health insurance coverage disputes, two
commentators argue that courts are requiring insurers to pay certain claims by "refusing to
respect the mechanism the parties have chosen to define the scope of coverage," leading to
a situation in which "[t]wo forms of market failure result: pricing purchasers out of the
market altogether, or forcing them to buy more expensive insurance products than they
desire." Hall & Anderson, supra note 192, at 1711. Similar results theoretically could
obtain in an ERISA context if benefit determinations were placed completely beyond the
reach of employer control. Employers could possibly discontinue or reduce coverage, or
pass on substantial increases in costs to consumers.
279. See Hall & Anderson, supra note 192, at 1668 (noting the argument that an
insurance company that is acting only as a claims processor might still have "an incentive
to deny claims because a self-insured employer is more likely to renew an administrative
services contract if the insurer saves the employer money"); see also Reilly v. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield, 846 F.2d 416, 424 (7th Cir. 1988). In Reilly, Blue Cross argued that since it
was merely administering the employer's self-insured plan, there was "no risk [to Blue
Cross] and thus no incentive to deny claims." Id. The court rejected this argument, noting
that "[ijn the long run, if Blue Cross were to grant too many claims, as perceived by [the
employer], it might be replaced as the plan's administrator." Id.
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Were such "indirect" conflict situations to arise, courts who
suspected that an employee had been wrongly denied benefits
because of the conflict would be forced to do one of two things.
They could adhere to the letter of Bruch and apply a highly
deferential abuse of discretion standard without being able to add
any heightened scrutiny via the Bruch conflict of interest "factor"
because of the absence of a direct conflict. Under this approach,
courts would be effectively powerless to remedy situations that they
perceived to be unjust and contrary to the policies of ERISA.
Conversely, courts could find that an "indirect" conflict qualified as a
"conflict" under Bruch and could trigger a higher level of review
under the abuse of discretion standard. Once this step had been
taken, a large number of ERISA administrators would qualify as
conflicted and the vague "heightened abuse of discretion" standard
could be applied widely, most likely leading to even more
uncertainty.
Given the problems of judicial review of ERISA claims and the
debate over the appropriate standard of review, it is not surprising
that more structurally oriented changes to the ERISA system have
been proposed. In perhaps the most attractive proposal, two
commentators have suggested a binding arbitration model for health
coverage disputes in general,m under which a contract would specify
a permanent arbitration panel composed of doctors and public
representatives.2' As the name of the model suggests, panel
decisions would be binding and courts could review the panel's
decisions only on "'narrow technical grounds, including fraud,
duress, and procedural flaw.' "m An alternative approach has been
suggested by Professor Langbein, who suggests that it might be
appropriate to establish specialized ERISA courts due to the field's
complexity, importance, and relative delimitation from other areas of
280. See Hall & Anderson, supra note 192, at 1709.
281. See id. The authors explain that the function of the arbitration panels would be to
"review the information in the particular case, examine the insurance contract to assess
what type of coverage was intended, and review the available clinical information before
making a coverage determination." Id. Also, if "additional technical expertise [were]
required, the panel would be permitted to hire outside consultants to advise them on the
clinical facts involved." Id.
282. Id. at 1711 n.274 (quoting IRVING LADIMnE DEMoCRATIC PROCESSES FOR
MODERN HEALTH AGENCIEs 149-69 (1979)). The authors concede, however, that an
arbitration model is "not a panacea. Convening a panel in each case is more cumbersome
for the insurer or employer than simply vesting the authority with a single medical director
or benefits manager, and airing disputes in this fashion also raises problems of patient
confidentiality." Id. at 1711 n.275.
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law.' A similar solution has been suggested by another
commentator in response to concerns of "bloated federal dockets"
caused by making available a more strict review of claim denials.'
Although it has been suggested that the Supreme Court should
re-hear the issue of the proper standard of review,2 the more
appropriate solution would be congressional amendment of ERISA
to provide either for a binding arbitration system or specialized
tribunals. The law of ERISA benefit claim denials is currently
unsettled because the statute does not provide an adequate
framework for achieving its equitable goals.' By asking the courts
to develop a federal common law for reviewing claims, the drafters of
ERISA essentially put the courts themselves into a conflict of
interest situation: While many courts recognize the need for the
protection of benefits that ERISA purports to offer, protecting those
interests via a meaningful level of review has the potential to lead to
a significant increase in cases' that seem to present state law issues
of contractsm or trusts.
The Fourth Circuit in Bedrick appears to be continuing its
283. See Langbein, supra note 163, at 228-29. Discussing the Supreme Court's decision
in Bruch, Professor Langbein has written that "[tihe Court may increasingly view itself as
having become a supreme constitutional court, resembling the specialized constitutional
courts on the Continent. If so, the time may have come to recognize a corollary." Id.
Thus, "thought should be given to having [the job of supervising complex bodies of
statutory law] done by a court that would take it seriously." Id.
284. Conison, Suits for Benefits, supra note 69, at 61. For an in-depth discussion of
specialized tribunals in general, see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication,
1990 BYU L RE . 377 (discussing the feasibility of creating specialized courts with
limited jurisdiction over specific areas of law in the interest of easing crowded federal
dockets).
285. See Abnathya v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 2 F.3d 40, 46 n.5 (1993) (discussing the
problems resulting from Bruch and suggesting that "[p]erhaps the Supreme Court will
have an opportunity to reconsider the issue").
286. The prospect of arbitration in ERISA did not go unconsidered by Congress when
initially molding the legislation; "[ijndeed, the bill containing the Senate version of
[ERISA] mandated arbitration for disputes over benefits." Johnson, supra note 69, at 419
(citing 120 CONG. REC. $29,941 (1974) (statement of Sen. Javits)).
287. See Stein, supra note 172, at 100. Professor Stein argues that the "blame for the
analytic quagmire that [Bruch] reflectsf is found less in the words of the Supreme Court
than in the silence of Congress. In enacting ERISA, Congress failed to answer, or even to
frame, the question of what a fiduciary may consider when it interprets a plan." Id.
288. Cf. Costich, supra note 114, at 815 (contending that Bruch's potentially less
deferential standard immediately resulted in increased litigation).
289. See Conison, Suits for Benefits, supra note 69, at 31. "Courts reflexively think of
claims for benefits as contract claims. Because contract disputes are primarily state-law
disputes, courts also tend to think of benefit claims as lacking in any true federal interest
.... Courts, thus, tend to treat benefit suits... as state law claims in federal court." Id.
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attempt to accomplish ERISA's goal of protecting employee benefit
expectations. However, due to the Supreme Court's holding in
Bruch' and Congress's silence as to the standard of review, it must
try to accomplish this through the use of an imprecise and vaguely
defined standard of review that sacrifices predictability and threatens
to discourage plan formation, both of which run counter to other
ERISA goals. The objectives of ERISA perhaps could be better
achieved by relieving the lower federal courts of the burden of trying
to balance these competing goals, and by transporting the duty of
review to specialized courts or panels that could apply uniform
standards and give their undivided attention to the resolution of
ERISA benefits disputes.'
JONATHAN P. HEYL
290. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989). Professor
Langbein asserts that the Supreme Court's opinion in Bruch, which of course governs and
provides the foundation for lower court review of ERISA benefit-denial claims,
garbles long-settled principles of trust law, confuses trust and contract rubrics,
and invites plan drafters to defeat the stated objectives of the decision. Bruch is
such a crude piece of work that one may well question whether it had the full
attention of the Court. I do not believe that either Justice O'Connor or her
colleagues who joined this unanimous opinion would have uttered such doctrinal
hash if they had been seriously engaged in the enterprise.
Langbein, supra note 163, at 228.
291. Cf. Langbein, supra note 163, at 229 (arguing that specialized courts "would treat
these matters with respect, which is more than can be said for the U.S. Supreme Court in
Bruch").
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Limiting Relief for Injured Working Inmates: Richardson v.
North Carolina Department of Correction and the Exclusive
Remedy Provision
In the state of North Carolina prison inmates are encouraged,
and often required, to perform assigned and available employment
duties.' Though in many respects "[a]l the external features and all
the risks of ordinary employment are present, 2 for the working
inmate, when it comes to compensation for work-related injury,
prisoners continue to receive disparate treatment in comparison to
non-inmates.3 The North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act4
1. The State encourages inmates to perform work duties by providing for
compensation and sentence reduction credits. Section 148-18(a) of the North Carolina
General Statutes states that prisoners shall be compensated for their labor and limits the
amount of daily compensation to $3.00 for work in a prison enterprise and to $1.00 for
work in maintenance and housekeeping of the prison. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-18(a)
(1994 & Supp. 1996). The State also allows prisoners to gain sentence reduction credits for
work performed. See N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, r. 2B.0113 (Nov. 1994). Prisoners may
gain "earned time" toward their sentence up to a maximum of four days per month. See
id. Additionally, the state legislature has vested the Department of Corrections with the
"full power and authority to provide for employment of... convicts, either in the prison or
on farms ... or elsewhere." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-6 (1994). Furthermore, "[ilt is
declared to be the public policy of the State of North Carolina that all able-bodied prison
inmates shall be required to perform diligently all work assignments provided for them.
The failure of any inmate to perform such a work assignment may result in disciplinary
action." Id. § 148-26(a). Numerous justifications have been posited as reasons for the
existence of prison employment. See Josephine R. Potuto, The Modem Prison: Let's Make
It a Factory for Change, 18 U. TOL. L REV. 51, 52 (1986) ("[R]easons given for prisoner
employment range from punishment ... to correctional department economic necessity, to
boredom... [to] violence control, [and] to rehabilitation." (footnotes omitted)); Jamie T.
Campbell, Comment, The Prisoner's Paradox: Forced Labor and Uncompensated Injuries,
10 NEW ENG. J. ON CRnM. & Civ. CONFINEMENT 123,123 (1984) ("[T]he offender should
have the potential to be self-supportive, thus reducing the incentive to return to crime.").
North Carolina's stated justifications are "to reduce the cost of maintaining the inmate
population while enabling inmates to acquire or retain skills and work habits needed to
secure honest employment after their release." N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, r. 2D.0701
(June 1984).
2. 1B ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 47.31(e), at
8-327 (1996); see also Campbell, supra note 1, at 124 ("[The] role of the working inmate is
comparable to that of the free laborer.").
3. See 1B LARSON, supra note 2, § 47.31(e), at 8-327 to 8-328 (noting that "the basic
rule denying compensation to prisoners ... may in some circumstances be out of tune with
the conditions of modem society" and that upon discharge, a permanently injured inmate
presents the same social problems as if he had been injured while free).
4. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to -143 (1991 & Supp. 1996).
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specifically permits inmates to recover for work-related injury5 but
places strict monetary limits on recoveries.6 However, in some
instances working inmates have been allowed to pursue tort claims
against the State and the Department of Corrections in the same
manner as a non-working prisoner.7 These dual avenues of relief for
working prisoners have existed since the advent of the Tort Claims
Act in the 1950s,9 but only recently did the North Carolina Supreme
Court expressly prohibit relief in tort.0
5. SeeN.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-13(c) (1991).
6. See id. ("[T]he maximum compensation to any prisoner or to the dependents or
next of kin of any deceased prisoner shall not exceed thirty dollars ($30.00) per week
.... "). Notably, this amount reflects the minimum compensation allowed under the
Workers' Compensation Act for total incapacity. See id. § 97-29.
7. See, e.g., Ivey v. North Carolina Prison Dep't, 252 N.C. 615, 620, 114 S.E.2d 812,
815-16 (1960) (holding that the Tort Claims Act of 1951 gives working prisoners the right
to sue the state in tort despite the wording of the Workers' Compensation Act's exclusive
remedy provision); Lawson v. North Carolina State Highway & Pub. Works Comm'n, 248
N.C. 276,280,103 S.E.2d 366,369-70 (1958) (maintaining the right of an administrator of a
decedent inmate's estate to sue in tort because the rights granted to prisoners under the
Tort Claims Act were not repealed by the Workers' Compensation Act); Brewington v.
North Carolina Dep't of Correction, 111 N.C. App. 833, 839, 433 S.E.2d 798, 801 (1993)
(upholding a decision by the Industrial Commission regarding a claim by an injured
working prisoner made under the Tort Claims Act); Baker v. North Carolina Dep't of
Correction, 85 N.C. App. 345, 347, 354 S.E.2d 733, 734 (1987) (allowing a claim for
damages under the Tort Claims Act by a prisoner injured while washing windows).
8. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-291 to -300.1 (1996). The Act created the North Carolina
Industrial Commission to hear tort claims against the departments and agencies of the
State and provided for state liability up to a maximum of $150,000. See id. § 143-291(a).
9. As early as 1958 the North Carolina Supreme Court noted the discrepancy
between the Tort Claims Act and the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers'
Compensation Act. See Lawson, 248 N.C. at 280, 103 S.E.2d at 369-70. Through court
decisions such as Gould v. North Carolina State Highway and Public Works Commission,
245 N.C. 350, 95 S.E.2d 910 (1957), the Tort Claims Act was interpreted to apply to
prisoners injured through the negligence of prison employees. See id. at 350-51, 95 S.E.2d
at 910-11 (supporting right of administratrix of deceased non-working prisoner to sue state
in tort for negligence of prison officials). The Lawson court noted that the language of the
Tort Claims Act does not except working prisoners but that the language of the Workers'
Compensation Act explicitly limits working prisoners from relief in tort. Thus, the court
recognized the statutory discrepancy between the permissive coverage of the Tort Claims
Act and the restrictive language of the Workers' Compensation Act. See Lawson, 248
N.C. at 280,103 S.E.2d at 369-70. In Lawson, the court stated:
[The] contention that .... because of G.S. 97-10, ... [working prisoners] have
only such rights as are conferred by G.S. 97-13(c) while other prisoners,
unimpeded by [the exclusive remedy provision], have the full benefit of the Tort
Claims Act is not, in our opinion, in reasonable accord with the intent of the 1951
General Assembly.
Id.
10. See Richardson v. North Carolina Dep't of Correction, 345 N.C. 128, 137, 478
S.E.2d 501, 507 (1996) ("[W]e conclude that the exclusive source of remedy for a prisoner
injured while working is through the Workers' Compensation Act .... "); Blackmon v.
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The issue of the proper avenue for the compensation of a prison
inmate injured while working was addressed by the North Carolina
Supreme Court in Richardson v. North Carolina Department of
Correction." Specifically, the Richardson court examined "whether
workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for prisoners injured
while working on prison jobs."12  The court concluded that the
statutory language of the Workers' Compensation Act indicates that
the North Carolina legislature intended to limit the compensation of
working prisoners to workers' compensation, excluding a claim in
tort as a possible remedy.' The court stated that "with the statutory
amendments and the absolute right to compensation, there is no
basis for interpreting the statute as giving a prisoner the option to
sue under the Tort Claims Act."'14
This Note will examine Richardson in light of the previously
permitted dual avenue approach to compensation for working
inmates. The Note first outlines the pertinent facts and the holding
of Richardson, noting the major steps in the court's reasoning.' A
thorough analysis of the case requires a brief presentation of the law
of workers' compensation in North Carolina and a summary of the
development of the Workers' Compensation Act through both
legislative and judicial decision making. 6 The Note then highlights
the pertinent background law leading to Richardson'7 and concludes
by addressing Richardson's significance for the injured working
inmate seeking compensation."
In 1991, Percell Richardson was an inmate in the North Carolina
prison system.' While performing assigned labor at a prison-
operated farm, Richardson accidentally caught his legs in a silage
North Carolina Dep't of Correction, 343 N.C. 259,266,470 S.E.2d 8,12 (1996) ("[P]laintiff
is 'entitled to compensation' under N.C.G.S. § 97-13(c)[,] and... N.C.G.S. § 97-10.1 thus
applies to bar plaintiff's wrongful death action under the Tort Claims Act." (quoting N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 97-13(c)).
11. 345 N.C. 128,478 S.E.2d 501 (1996).
12. Id. at 130,478 S.E.2d at 503.
13. See id. at 129, 478 S.E.2d at 502. In so holding, the court concluded not only that
the statutory language limited working prisoners to workers' compensation but also that
such a limitation withstood equal protection analysis under the rational basis standard. See
id at 134, 478 S.E.2d at 505.
14. Id. at 133, 478 S.E.2d at 505.
15. See infia notes 19-65 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 66-89 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 90-142 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 143-226 and accompanying text.
19. See Richardson v. North Carolina Dep't of Correction, 118 N.C. App. 704, 705,
457 S.E.2d 325,326 (1995), aff'd, 345 N.C. 128, 478 S.E.2d 501 (1996).
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cutter, causing permanent disability." Soon thereafter Richardson
filed a complaint with the North Carolina Industrial Commission
under the Tort Claims Act, alleging that the Department of
Correction was negligent in failing to adequately train and supervise
his operation of the farm machinery and that this negligence
proximately caused his injury. The Department of Correction
answered Richardson's allegations and filed a motion to dismiss
based "on the ground that workers' compensation was plaintiff's
exclusive remedy."2 The Industrial Commission heard Richardson's
case and granted the Department of Correction's motion to dismiss.'
The dismissal was appealed to the North Carolina Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the Industrial Commission's order. 4 In its
20. See Richardson, 345 N.C. at 129, 478 S.E.2d at 502. Richardson was imprisoned in
fllery, North Carolina and was working at the Caledonia Farm. See i At the direction
of the farm superintendent, he "was operating a tractor with an attached silage harvesting
machine." Id. A silage cutter is a cutting device consisting of rollers with jagged teeth
designed to pull silage into the machine where it is cut by a rotating drum with metal
blades embedded in the surface. See Answer to Plaintiff's Affidavit at 2, Richardson v.
North Carolina Dep't of Correction, I.C. No. TA-12230 (Mar. 31, 1994). When he
attempted to clear a jam in the silage cutter, Richardson's legs became caught in the
machinery. See Richardson, 345 N.C. at 129, 478 S.E.2d at 502. As a result, Richardson's
right leg was partially severed and later amputated below the knee; his left leg was
permanently and seriously injured. See id.
21. See Richardson, 345 N.C. at 130, 478 S:E.2d at 502-03. Richardson's claim under
the Tort Claims Act was filed pursuant to §§ 143-191 to -300.1 of the North Carolina
General Statutes. See id. at 130, 478 S.E.2d at 502. Section 143-291 vests the Industrial
Commission with the power to hear tort claims against the State and gives it the authority
to "determine whether or not each individual claim arose as a result of the negligence of
any officer, employee, involuntary servant or agent of the State." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-
291(a) (1996).
22. Richardson, 345 N.C. at 130, 478 S.E.2d at 503. Initially, the Department of
Correction denied that it had been negligent and asserted alternatively that Richardson
had been contributorily negligent in his operation of the silage cutter. See id. The
Department of Correction subsequently modified its answer to include the motion to
dismiss. See id.
23. When the Deputy Commissioner of the Industrial Commission heard Richardson's
case, she granted the motion to dismiss and stated that prisoners "are afforded the benefits
of the Workers' Compensation Act" and that "§ 97-13(c) bars plaintiff's Tort Claim Act
action." Richardson v. North Carolina Dep't of Correction, I.C. No. TA-12230, 2, 3 (Jan.
6, 1993), aff'd, I.C. No. TA-12230 (Mar. 31,1994) (Full Commission), aft'd, 118 N.C. App.
704, 457 S.E.2d 325 (1995), aff'd, 345 N.C. 128, 478 S.E.2d 501 (1996). Section 143-292
authorizes appeals to the full Industrial Commission. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-292
(1996). Thus the dismissal was appealed to the full Commission, which upheld the order of
the Deputy Commissioner after a de novo hearing. See Richardson v. North Carolina
Dep't of Correction, 118 N.C. App. 704, 705, 457 S.E.2d 325, 326 (1995), affid, 345 N.C.
128, 478 S.E.2d 501 (1996). The full Commission voted two-to-one to uphold the Deputy
Commissioner's decision. See id.
24. See Richardson v. North Carolina Dep't of Correction, 118 N.C. App. 704, 705,
457 S.E.2d 325, 326 (1995), aff'4 345 N.C. 128, 478 S.E.2d 501 (1996). Section 143-293
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opinion, the court of appeals noted that because § 97-13(c) of the
North Carolina General Statutes mandates that working prisoners be
treated in the same manner as other employees under § 97-10.1 (the
exclusive remedy provision), a working prisoner is barred from
bringing suit in tort and instead is compensated through operation of
the Workers' Compensation Act.' Richardson appealed the
appellate court's holding to the North Carolina Supreme Court. 6
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Lake began the opinion
with a brief recitation of the facts and a summary of the case's
procedural history.27 At the outset, Justice Lake noted that "[t]he
sole issue on appeal is whether workers' compensation is the
exclusive remedy for prisoners injured while working on prison
jobs," and began the examination of the issue by analyzing the
applicable provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act.' Section
97-13(c) of the North Carolina General Statutes establishes the
circumstances under which an injured working prisoner may receive
workers' compensation benefits.2 The statute allows a prisoner
injured while working to apply for workers' compensation benefits
should his injury persist after his date of discharge, and it limits the
amount of these benefits to thirty dollars per week." Furthermore,
the provision explicitly mandates that § 97-10.1, the exclusive remedy
provision, applies to all prisoners entitled to compensation under the
Workers' Compensation Act. 1 The exclusive remedy provision
forecloses any additional remedy if an injured employee is entitled to
creates a right to appeal the decision of the full Commission to the North Carolina Court
of Appeals. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-293 (1996).
25. See Richardson v. North Carolina Dep't of Correction, 118 N.C. App. 704, 705,
457 S.E.2d 325,326 (1995), aff'd, 345 N.C. 128, 478 S.E.2d 501 (1996).
26. See Richardson, 345 N.C. at 130,478 S.E.2d at 503.
27. See id. at 129-30,478 S.E.2d at 502-03.
28. Id. at 130, 478 S.E.2d at 503. The applicable provisions are §§ 97-13(c) and 97-
10.1 of the North Carolina General Statutes, as they operate together. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 97-13(c), -10.1 (1991).
29. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-13(c). The statute provides in pertinent part:
Whenever any prisoner ... shall suffer accidental injury or accidental death
arising out of and in the course of the employment to which he had been assigned,
if there be death or if the results of such injury continue until after the date of the
lawful discharge of such prisoner... then such discharged prisoner ... may have
the benefit of this Article by applying to the Industrial Commission as any other
employee.
Id.
30. See id. The statute further mandates that the discharged prisoner must apply for
benefits within twelve months following the date of discharge. See id.
31. See id.
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receive benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act."
Therefore, the court found that §§ 97-13(c) and 97-10.1, when
read together, operate to bar a working inmate from statutory relief
under anything but the Workers' Compensation Act.33 Hence, "the
language of the statute[s] establishes that workers' compensation is
the exclusive remedy for prisoners injured while working for the
State." The court noted that given this reading and the facts of the
case, Richardson should be entitled to workers' compensation
benefits upon his release."
Having reached this conclusion, the court next turned its
attention to Richardson's claims against the Department of
Correction.3 6 Richardson asserted that he should be able to sue the
Department of Correction under the Tort Claims Act for its
negligence in causing his injuries 7  In support of this claim,
Richardson offered a two-part argument: first, that relevant case law
and historical practice supported his position,3 3 and second, that
should the exclusive remedy provision operate to bar his tort claim,
its operation would violate the Equal Protection Clauses of both the
United States and North Carolina Constitutions.39
32. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.1 (1991). Section 97-10.1 provides:
If the employee and the employer are subject to and have complied with the
provisions of this Article, then the rights and remedies herein granted to the
employee, his dependents, next of kin, or personal representative shall exclude
all other rights and remedies of the employee ... against the employer at
common law or otherwise on account of such injury or death.
Id.
33. See Richardson, 345 N.C. at 130, 478 S.E.2d at 503. The court summarized the
operation of the statutes as follows: First, § 97-13(c) creates a right to compensation for
the injured prisoner and imposes certain limits on the amount and procedure for granting
such compensation. See id Second, it also makes applicable the mandates of § 97-10.1,
which excludes all other forms of remedy where the "'employee and the employer are
subject to and have complied with the provisions of this Article.'" Id. at 131, 478 S.E.2d at
503 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.1).
34. Id.
35. See id. at 131, 478 S.E.2d at 504. Justice Lake stated that "[t]here is little doubt
under the circumstances of this case that plaintiff will be found disabled and that his injury
will be found compensable." Id.
36. See id. at 131-32, 478 S.E.2d at 504.
37. See id.
38. See id. ("[H]is argument [is] that statutes and case law give prisoners the right to
file claims under the Tort Claims Act for injuries suffered on prison jobs.").
39. See id. at 134, 478 S.E.2d at 505 (asserting that the operation of the exclusive
remedy provision created a classification irrationally discriminating between working and
non-working prisoners and between working prisoners and other employees). The
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution requires that:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
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The court first addressed Richardson's argument based upon
North Carolina precedent. 0 His claim that he could maintain an
action in tort was based on two assertions, the first being that
"statutes and case law give prisoners the right to file claims under the
Tort Claims Act for injuries suffered on prison jobs," and the second
that "the Industrial Commission and courts have adjudicated
prisoner tort claims ... without distinguishing between prisoners
negligently injured on prison jobs and other prisoners negligently
injured.'"' Richardson cited a string of cases in support of these
propositions, and the court addressed each case in turn.
2
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. The North Carolina Constitution provides:
No person shall be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties, or
privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner deprived of his life, liberty, or
property, but by the law of the land. No person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws; nor shall any person be subjected to discrimination by the
State because of race, color, religion, or national origin.
N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 19.
40. See Richardson, 345 N.C. at 132,478 S.E.2d at 504.
41. Id. at 131-32,478 S.E.2d at 504.
42. See id. at 132-33,478 S.E.2d at 504-05. As to Richardson's first assertion, Gould v.
North Carolina State Highway and Public Works Commission, 245 N.C. 350, 95 S.E.2d 910
(1957), established that the representative of a deceased non-working prisoner could
recover under the Tort Claims Act. See id at 351, 95 S.E.2d at 911. Furthermore, in
Lawson v. North Carolina State Highway and Public Works Commission, 248 N.C. 276,103
S.E.2d 366 (1958), the state supreme court concluded that at the time of the adoption of
the Tort Claims Act, the North Carolina legislature did not intend that its reach be limited
so as to exclude prisoners. See id at 280, 103 S.E.2d at 369-70. Finally, in Ivey v. North
Carolina Prison Department, 252 N.C. 615, 114 S.E.2d 812 (1960), the court held that
because the right of working prisoners to sue under the Tort Claims Act had not been
expressly repealed within the Tort Claims Act itself, the representative of a deceased
working prisoner could maintain an action in tort against the prison department. See id. at
620, 114 S.E.2d at 815.
Following the Ivey case, the few cases that involved the exclusive remedy provision as
applied to prisoners allowed working prisoners to sue in tort, but did not expressly address
the remedy issue. See, e.g., Brewington v. North Carolina Dep't of Correction, 111 N.C.
App. 833,839,433 S.E.2d 798,801 (1993); Baker v. North Carolina Dep't of Correction, 85
N.C. App. 345, 347, 354 S.E.2d 733, 734 (1987); Tanner v. State Dep't of Correction, 19
N.C. App. 689, 691-92, 200 S.E.2d 350, 351-52 (1973). In Brewington, Baker, and Tanner,
an injured prisoner's suit in tort proceeded through the court system, arising on appeal on
an issue different than that of exclusive remedy, without any mention by the court of the
application of the Workers' Compensation Act or its exclusive remedy provision. In
Brewington, the plaintiff challenged several rulings of the Industrial Commission's decision
in his case under the Tort Claims Act for an injury received while working in the prison
kitchen. See Brewington, 111 N.C. App. at 835-36, 433 S.E.2d at 799-800. In Baker, the
court reversed a finding of the Industrial Commission that a fellow employee was not
negligent in shutting a window on Baker's fingers while the two were in the process of
cleaning the window. See Baker, 85 N.C. App. at 347, 354 S.E.2d at 734. In Tanner, an
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Justice Lake dispensed with the majority of these cases by
distinguishing them on their facts or citing substantive differences in
the workers' compensation statutes existing at the time they were
decided. '3 Thus, because the present Workers' Compensation Act
provides adequate compensation and makes applicable the exclusive
remedy provision, the court was able to conclude that the Act is the
exclusive remedy for working prisoners despite prior case law
seemingly to the contrary"
The court continued its analysis by considering the issue of
deferred payment under the workers' compensation plan and
concluded that deferment does not bar remedy-it simply postpones
it.' Furthermore, as the purpose of workers' compensation is to
compensate for loss of earning power, not to punish a negligent
employer,4 6 and because a prisoner has no need to earn money to
support himself while in prison, the deferral of compensation does
not harm the injured prisoner.
inmate was injured when he fell out of a truck that was carrying him from a prison labor
site. See Tanner, 19 N.C. App. at 691,200 S.E.2d at 351. The court of appeals upheld the
Industrial Commission's finding that Tanner was contributorily negligent in falling off the
truck and thus was barred from recovering from the State in tort. See id. at 692, 200 S.E.2d
at 352.
43. The court dispensed with Gould because it did not involve a working prisoner and
with Lawson because the injury in question occurred prior to the 1957 amendment to § 97-
13(c) that made the exclusive remedy provision applicable to prisoners. See Richardson,
345 N.C. at 132, 478 S.E.2d at 504. As for Ivey, the court recharacterized the holding in
light of the version of the Workers' Compensation Act applicable in 1960. See id. at 132-
33, 478 S.E.2d at 504. In 1960, the Act provided for compensation to deceased working
prisoners only in the form of burial expenses. See id at 133, 478 S.E.2d at 504. As the
exclusive remedy provision of workers' compensation applies only to individuals entitled
to compensation, and as burial expenses alone did not constitute "compensation," the
court characterized the Ivey holding as allowing a remedy in tort due to the inadequacy of
the compensation available to deceased inmates under the 1960 version of the Workers'
Compensation Act. See id. The court easily dispensed with Brewington and Baker because
"[n]either of these cases addressed directly the issue of whether a working prisoner was
precluded from filing a tort claim." Id.
44. See id. at 133, 478 S.E.2d at 505.
45. See id. at 133-34, 478 S.E.2d at 505. An injured working prisoner must wait until
after discharge to file for benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 97-13(c) (1991). Thus, a prisoner who is injured while imprisoned and whose
injuries heal before discharge will not be entitled to compensation. See id.
46. See Richardson, 345 N.C. at 133-34, 478 S.E.2d at 505; see also LEONARD T.
JERNIGAN, JR., NORTH CAROLINA WORKERS' COMPENSATION § 1-2, at 3 (2d ed. 1995)
(describing workers' compensation statutes as a trade-off between employers and
employees whereby "[o]ne gave up the right to common law damages in exchange for
guaranteed, though limited, compensation [while] the other gave up liability in exchange
for damages being limited to the employee's loss of earning capacity").
47. See Richardson, 345 N.C. at 133, 478 S.E.2d at 505 ("Prisoners have all of their
daily needs met while in prison. Since they do not have to purchase these on the open
NOR TH CAR OLINA LAW REVIEW
Next, the court turned to Richardson's claims that the
application of the exclusive remedy provision would violate the
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and of the North Carolina Constitution. s
Richardson's equal protection argument alleged two different
violations: first, that the exclusive remedy provision
unconstitutionally discriminates between working and non-working
prisoners, and second, that it unconstitutionally discriminates
between working prisoners and other employees or free laborers.4"
In addressing these claims, the court began by setting out the
applicable North Carolina requirements for an equal protection
violation and then considered each alleged violation in turn."0 North
Carolina uses the same test used by the federal courts in their equal
protection analyses." Accordingly, "[i]f the statute does not impact
upon a suspect class or a fundamental right, it is necessary to show
only that the classification created by the statute bears a rational
relationship to some legitimate state interest."" Here there was no
showing that working prisoners were a suspect class or that the
exclusive remedy provision infringed upon a fundamental right, so
the Richardson court evaluated the equal protection claims under the
rational basis test.53 Noting several possible justifications which the
government could invoke in limiting a prisoner's right to sue in tort,
Justice Lake concluded that "there are numerous legitimate
governmental interests that are rationally addressed by the exclusive
market with what otherwise would be their earned wage like other workers, prisoners have
no need for immediate compensation.").
48. See id. at 134, 478 S.E.2d at 505; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or
shall any State ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."); N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 19 ("No person shall be denied the equal protection of the
laws .... ).
49. See Richardson, 345 N.C. at 134, 478 S.E.2d at 505. Richardson claimed that these
classes were similarly situated and that the distinctions drawn did not bear any rational
relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. See id.
50. See id. at 134-35,478 S.E.2d at 505-06.
51. See id. at 134,478 S.E.2d at 505; see also, e.g., Duggins v. North Carolina State Bd.
of CPA Exam'rs, 294 N.C. 120, 131, 240 S.E.2d 406, 413 (1978) ("The North Carolina
cases applying the equal protection clause of the state and federal constitutions to
challenged classifications have used the same test the federal courts used .... "). As a
result, only one analysis was necessary to decide both constitutional claims. See
Richardson, 345 N.C. at 134-35, 478 S.E.2d at 505-06.
52. Richardson, 345 N.C. at 134, 478 S.E.2d at 505; see also, e.g., State ex rel. Utils.
Comm'n v. Carolina Utils. Customers Ass'n, 336 N.C. 657, 681, 446 S.E.2d 332, 346 (1994)
("[A classification] 'need bear only a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental
objective in order to withstand an equal protection challenge."' (quoting State ex rel.
Utils. Comm'n v. Edmisten, 294 N.C. 598,611,242 S.E.2d 862,870 (1978))).
53. See Richardson, 345 N.C. at 134, 478 S.E.2d at 505.
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remedy [provision]."
Justice Lake did not address whether the classes in question
were "similarly situated," but chose instead to outline several
governmental interests that the court felt were rationally served by
treating working prisoners differently from their non-working
counterparts." Primary among these interests, Justice Lake stated,
was the state's goal of limiting its liability in the same way that
workers' compensation limits the liability of employers in relation to
free laborers. 6
Having thus addressed the issue of differentiation between
working and non-working prisoners, the court turned its attention to
the alleged discrepancy between working prisoners and free
laborers.Y The court stated that "the differential impact between
working and non-working prisoners mirrors the effect of workers'
compensation upon private individuals injured at work and those
who are injured elsewhere."58 In other words, a free laborer can
sustain injury while employed at a low-wage weekend job, and he or
she will only be entitled to receive compensation based on the wage
rate of the job at which he or she was injured. Injured working
54. Id. at 135, 478 S.E.2d at 506. Justice Lake noted three governmental interests
served by the denial: First, that prisoners need no compensation while imprisoned since
they are cared for by the state; second, that the state should have limited liability such as
that enjoyed by private employers; and third, that the exclusive remedy provision should
apply across the board so as to preserve the exclusive nature of workers' compensation.
See id.
55. See id. Justice Lake stated that the principle of equal protection "requires that all
persons similarly situated be treated alike." Id. at 134, 478 S.E.2d at 505 (citing Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). Justice Lake found it unnecessary to address this "prong"
of the equal protection argument. See id. at 135, 478 S.E.2d at 506. Evidently, the court
felt that the outcome of such an inquiry would be moot in light of the legitimate interests
rationally served by the classification. See id. ("Without regard to whether plaintiff has
shown the classes designated to be similarly situated, there are numerous legitimate
governmental interests that are rationally addressed by the exclusive remedy effect .... ).
56. See id. Justice Lake also noted that compensation to prisoners should be deferred
because their daily needs are provided for while incarcerated and that the state had a
legitimate interest in preserving the exclusiveness of workers' compensation as a remedy




59. See id.; see also Joyner v. A.J. Carey Oil Co., 266 N.C. 519, 521, 146 S.E.2d 447,
449 (1966) ("When an employee who holds two separate jobs is injured in one of them, his
compensation is based only upon his average weekly wages earned in the employment
producing the injury."); Barnhardt v. Yellow Cab Co., 266 N.C. 419, 429, 146 S.E.2d 479,
486 (1966) (holding that "in determining plaintiff's average weekly wage, the Commission
had no authority to combine his earnings from the employment in which he was injured
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inmates occupy a position analogous to the injured weekend worker
because "[b]y virtue of their choice to break the law, prisoners have
placed themselves in the position of receiving a lower wage than they
would be afforded in civil society."6  Furthermore, during
imprisonment prisoners receive the "compensation" of having their
daily needs met, which substantially decreases their need for
compensation during incarceration.61 Because the court was able to
identify numerous legitimate interests to which the State's
classification bore a rational relationship, it concluded that
application of the exclusive remedy provision to injured working
prisoners did not violate either the Federal or State Equal Protection
Clauses.62
The court concluded its analysis by addressing whether the
exclusivity provision and the low level of compensation for injured
prisoners would decrease the incentive for prisons to provide safe
working conditions for their inmates.' Justice Lake noted the
absence of evidence indicating this phenomenon and stated that,
"like all other employers, prisons are subject to regulatory oversight
and the close scrutiny of advocacy groups concerned with such
issues."6 Furthermore, he asserted that the ability of a prisoner to
sue in tort for injury caused by intentional conduct of prison
employees would operate as a check on deteriorating working
conditions.'
An adequate evaluation of these policy concerns, as well as
Richardson's other claims, requires a basic understanding of
workers' compensation law as it has developed in the twentieth
century." Prior to the advent of statutory workers' compensation
with those from any other employment"). Joyner and Barnhardt both interpreted § 97-
2(5) of the North Carolina General Statutes, which defines the average weekly wages upon
which compensation is based. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(5) (1996).
60. Richardson, 345 N.C. at 136, 478 S.E.2d at 506.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 134, 478 S.E.2d at 505.
63. See id. at 136-37, 478 S.E.2d at 507.
64. Id. at 137, 478 S.E.2d at 507.
65. See id The case of Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 407 S.E.2d 222 (1991),
established that the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act does
not apply where the injury in question is caused by intentional, rather than negligent,
conduct on the part of the employer. See id at 340-41, 407 S.E.2d at 228.
66. See Melissa F. Ross, Comment, Ripples in Treacherous Waters: A Consideration of
the Effects of North Carolina's Intentional Tort Exception to Workers' Compensation, 31
WAKE FoREST L REv. 513, 515 (1996) (stating that the movement toward workers'
compensation in America began in the late 19th century and came to fruition early this
century).
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schemes, the spread of the Industrial Revolution in the nineteenth
century led to a great increase in work-related injury, and the injured
laborer was left to pursue compensation in tort at common law
against his or her employer.67 Yet for a number of reasons these
claims were largely unsuccessfulY. Generally, the "burden of proof
as to fault was on the employee; however, often no one was at fault,
the injury being merely a risk inherent in the industry." 69
Furthermore, fellow employees were reluctant to testify against their
employer, and the common-law defenses of contributory negligence,
assumption of risk, and the fellow servant rule often operated to bar
the injured laborer's claim."
67. See JERNIGAN, supra note 46, § 1-1, at 1 ("Prior to [the North Carolina Workers'
Compensation Act], disputes between employer and employee were governed by the
common law."); Campbell, supra note 1, at 127 ("Workers injured in the course of
employment were virtually without remedy unless negligence by the employer could be
shown."); David L Lambert, Comment, From Andrews to Woodson and Beyond: The
Development of the Intentional Tort Exception to the Exclusive Remedy Provision-
Rescuing North Carolina Workers from Treacherous Waters, 20 N.C. CENT. L.J. 164, 167
(1992) ("[Tjhe basis for the economy of the United States had moved from agricultural to
industrial production with a concomitant increase in injuries to workers who were working
in factories, mills, and mines.").
68. See Leslie Hertz Kawaler, Intentional Torts Under Workers' Compensation
Statutes: A Blessing or a Burden, 12 HOFSTRA L REV. 181, 182-83 (1983) (noting that the
burden of proof was on the employee, that often no negligence was involved, that
employees did not like to testify against their employers, and that the employer could
claim a number of common law defenses); see also Campbell, supra note 1, at 127 ("More
importantly, most job related accidents were the inevitable consequence of working with
industrial machinery. The absence of negligence by the employer barred recovery by the
injured worker. The burden then fell upon the injured worker 'who was least able to
support it.'" (quoting WLLAM PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 80, at 530 (4th ed. 1971)
(footnotes omitted))). Prosser notes that employee tort claims were also hindered by "a
social philosophy and an attitude toward labor, which are long since outmoded."
PROSSER, supra, § 80, at 526. This attitude held that the worker was a "free agent," able
to voluntarily enter into and accept the normal risks of employment. See id. The employer
was under no duty to ensure the safety of the employee as long as the employer exercised
reasonable care. See iU This view of the employee increased her difficulty in establishing
that her injury had in fact been the fault of the employer. See id.
69. Kawaler, supra note 68, at 182-83.
70. See id. at 183; see also PROSSER, supra note 68, § 80, at 528 (stating that the fellow
servant rule provided that an employer was not responsible for injuries resulting solely
from the negligence of a fellow employee, the rationale being that employees assumed the
risk of negligence on the part of fellow employees and that an employer could not be
expected to protect against this risk). By the end of the nineteenth century, these defenses
and the attitude of the courts produced a rate of industrial accidents that had reached
"alarming proportions," and "[i]ndustrial towns found it necessary to support 'large
numbers of maimed workers and their families as public charges."' Kawaler, supra note
68, at 183 (quoting HERMAN MILES SOMERS & ANNE RAMSEY SOMERS, WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION: PREVENTION, INSURANCE, AND RE-ABILITATION OF OCCUPATIONAL
DISABILITY 21 (1954)); see also 3 FOWLER V. HARPER Er AL., THE LAW OF TORTS
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As a result, states began to consider alternate strategies for
compensating injured workers, and by 1963, all fifty states had
passed some sort of workers' compensation legislation.7' The general
idea behind workers' compensation schemes was that the industry
itself should shoulder the burden for injuries to its laborers,
ultimately passing this cost on to the consumer in the form of higher
prices. In the words of the North Carolina Supreme Court, the
thrust of the workers' compensation statutes was "to compel industry
to take care of its own wreckage."73  North Carolina passed its
Workers' Compensation Act in 1929,' which comprised a "bargain
which represented concessions by the employee of the right to a jury
trial and less than full compensation for the concession that the
employer would pay claims where in the past it had acknowledged
no liability at all." 75
§ 11.2, at 69 (2d ed. 1986) (noting that the inability to earn wages as a result of death or
permanent disability due to accident may ultimately force family members to become
public charges).
71. See PROSSER, supra note 68, § 80, at 530 (noting that the first state workers'
compensation statute was enacted in New York in 1910 and that Hawaii was the last state
to enact workers' compensation in 1963). Workers' compensation can be traced to Prussia,
where a law required railroads to assume liability for injuries to their employees and
passengers. See Catherine A. Hale, Comment, Workers' Compensation-A Proposal to
Protect Injured Workers from Employers' Shield of Immuniy, 20 ST. MARY'S LJ. 933, 939
n.36 (1989). In fact, the American schemes were largely based on those created in
Europe, the first of which appeared in Germany in 1884. See id.; see also PROSSER, supra
note 68, § 80, at 530 n.35 (noting that workers' compensation in Germany "[p]assed in
1884, [was] amended from time to time, and finally [was] codified in ... 1911"). The
Germans developed a three-part plan consisting of a Sickness Fund, an Accident Fund, and
Disability Insurance. See Lambert, supra note 67, at 168.
72. See HARPER ET AL., supra note 70, § 11.2, at 69 ("The basic philosophy of such
legislation was originally that loss from these accidents is a cost of the enterprises or their
beneficiaries."); JERNIGAN, supra note 46, § 1-2, at 2 ("The cost of an industrial accident
was to be treated as a cost of production, just as the wear and tear of machinery has always
been treated as a cost." (footnote omitted)); PROSSER, supra note 68, § 80, at 530-31
("The human accident losses of modem industry are to be treated as a cost of production,
like the breakage of tools or machinery."); Ross, supra note 66, at 515 (explaining that the
theory behind placing the cost of injury on the industry itself was that the members of the
industry would be required to purchase insurance, and the cost of the insurance premiums
would be reflected in the ultimate price paid to the industry by the consumer).
73. Barber v. Minges, 223 N.C. 213,216,25 S.E.2d 837, 839 (1943). Barber also called
the system "'an economic system of trade risk,'" id. (misquoting Mackin v. Detroit-
Timkin Axle Co., 153 N.W. 49,51 (Mich. 1915) ("economic principle of trade risk")), that
allows compensation to injured laborers "to be treated as 'overhead,' absorbed in the sales
price," ia
74. The North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act, ch. 120, 1929 N.C. Sess. Laws
117 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to -143 (1991 & Supp. 1996)).
75. Ross, supra note 66, at 516; see also Conrad v. Cook-Lewis Foundry Co., 198 N.C.
723, 725, 153 S.E. 266, 268 (1930) (noting the "mutual concessions" represented by
workers' compensation); JERMNGAN, supra note 46, § 1-1, at 1 ("These statutes were a
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In brief, the Workers' Compensation Act provides a "no-fault"
compensation scheme under which an injured employee may receive
payment for injury without having to show negligence on the part of
her employer.7 6 The employee need only prove that her injury
occurred in the course of and arose out of his employment duties."
In exchange for the relative ease with which an employee can receive
compensation, as compared to the past, the employee is precluded
from pursuing any claims against her employer based in tort.78 This
exclusivity requirement represents the benefit to the employer under
the Act-the employer is required to compensate injured employees,
but has the assurance that once compensation is given, it will not
have to defend itself against any additional claims by the employee.79
Section 97-13(c) of the North Carolina General Statutes made
the Act applicable to prisoners, and it provides in relevant part:
This Article shall not apply to prisoners being worked by
trade-off of rights and remedies between the employer and the employee.").
76. See Lambert, supra note 67, at 169; see also JERNIGAN, supra note 46, § 1-2, at 2
(characterizing workers' compensation as a "no-fault" system where employer negligence
need not be shown to allow recovery). In Branham v. Denny Roll and Panel Co., 223 N.C.
233, 25 S.E.2d 865 (1943), the court stated:
The general purpose of the Act ... is to substitute ... for common-law or
statutory rights of action and grounds of liability a system of money payments
based upon the actual loss of wages by way of relief for workers for injuries
received in the course of and arising out of their employment.
Id. at 236,25 S.E.2d at 867. Section 97-3 of the North Carolina General Statutes presumes
that all employers and employees have accepted the provisions of the Workers'
Compensation Act and that they will pay and accept, respectively, compensation for injury
arising out of and in the course of employment. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-3 (1991).
77. See JERNIGAN, supra note 46, § 5-1, at 35 ("In order to recover benefits under the
Workers' Compensation Act, the employee must prove three elements: (1) that he
suffered an injury by accident, (2) that the injury arose out of employment, and (3) that
the injury was sustained in the course of employment." (citing Hollar v. Montclair
Furniture Co., 48 N.C. App. 489, 490, 269 S.E.2d 667, 669 (1980))). Section 97-2 of the
North Carolina General Statutes defines "injury" to mean "only injury by accident arising
out of and in the course of the employment." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(6) (1991 & Supp.
1996).
78. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.1 (1991) ("If the employee and the employer are
subject to ... the provisions of this Article, then the rights and remedies herein granted to
the employee... shall exclude all other rights and remedies of the employee ... as against
the employer at common law or otherwise .... ").
79. Section 97-9 of the North Carolina General Statutes mandates that employers
shall compensate their employees as required under the Act. See id. § 97-9 ("Every
employer subject to the compensation provisions of this Article shall secure the payment
of compensation to his employees in the manner hereinafter provided .... "). Section 97-
18 sets up the payment scheme and requires prompt payment of compensation to the
employee. See id. § 97-18. In addition, § 97-24 creates a two-year statute of limitations
within which an employee must file a claim in order to be entitled to compensation. See Id.
§ 97-24.
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the State or any subdivision thereof, except to the following
extent: Whenever any prisoner assigned to the State
Department of Correction shall suffer accidental injury or
accidental death arising out of and in the course of the
employment to which he had been assigned, if there be
death or if the results of such injury continue until after the
date of the lawful discharge of such prisoner to such an
extent as to amount to a disability as defined in this Article,
then such discharged prisoner or the dependents or next of
kin ... may have the benefit of this Article by applying to
the Industrial Commission as any other employee; provided
... that the maximum compensation to any prisoner or to
the dependents or next of kin of any deceased prisoner
shall not exceed thirty dollars ($30.00) per week and the
period of compensation shall relate to the date of his
discharge rather than the date of the accident.... The
provisions of G.S. 97-10.1 and 97-10.2 shall apply to
prisoners and discharged prisoners entitled to
compensation under this subsection and to the State in the
same manner as said section applies to employees and
employers."
Additionally, the text of § 97-10.1, triggered by the operation of
§ 97-13(c), provides as follows:
If the employee and the employer are subject to and have
complied with the provisions of this Article, then the rights
and remedies herein granted to the employee, his
dependents, next of kin, or personal representative shall
exclude all other rights and remedies of the employee, his
dependents, next of kin, or representative as against the
employer at common law or otherwise on account of such
injury or death.8'
At first blush, these two provisions appear straightforward,
putting the laboring prisoner on the same footing as the free laborer
and allowing compensation for the injured prisoner upon her release
from prison. However, in practice, the operation of the two
provisions has not received consistent interpretation." Specifically,
much of the inconsistency can be attributed to prior interpretations
by North Carolina courts of how the Tort Claims Act and the
exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act apply
80. Id. § 97-13(c).
81. Id. § 97-10.1.
82. See infra notes 152-90 and accompanying text (discussing the inconsistent
interpretations).
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to prisoners."
Twenty-two years after the advent of workers' compensation in
North Carolina, the state legislature adopted the Tort Claims Act?'
It was a response to "the antiquated and oft criticized doctrine of
sovereign immunity,"' which shielded the state from liability for the
negligent acts of its agencies and employees. 6 The Tort Claims Act
resulted in a partial waiver of immunity by the State and vested the
Industrial Commission with power to hear and pass upon claims
brought under it.' The Industrial Commission may hear claims that
arise "as a result of the negligence of any officer, employee,
involuntary servant or agent of the State while acting within the
scope of his ... employment." ' Furthermore, the State may be held
liable only under circumstances where the State, if it were a private
person, could be found liable.'
In Gould v. North Carolina State Highway and Public Works
Conmmission,"° the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the Tort
Claims Act allowed recovery when the representative of a deceased
prisoner sued the state of North Carolina. The court upheld the
Industrial Commission's decision that employees at the Women's
Prison in Raleigh negligently caused the death of an inmate.9' In the
course of restraining a boisterous prisoner, guards negligently caused
83. See, e.g., Lawson v. North Carolina State Highway & Pub. Works Conm'n, 248
N.C. 276,280,103 S.E.2d 366,369-70 (1958) (holding that the representative of a deceased
working prisoner was allowed to recover under Tort Claims Act despite objections based
on the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act); Gould v. North
Carolina State Highway & Pub. Works Comm'n, 245 N.C. 350, 351-52, 95 S.E.2d 910, 910-
11 (1957) (holding that the representative of a deceased prisoner was allowed to recover
under the Tort Claims Act for negligence of prison personnel).
84. Tort Claims Act, ch. 1059, 1951 N.C. Sess. Laws 1051 (current vdrsion at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 143-291 to -300.1 (1996)).
85. Torts, A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1951, 29 N.C. L REV.
416,416 (1951).
86. See PROSSER, supra note 68, § 131, at 975-77.
87. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291(a) (1996). In Teachy v. Coble Dairies, Inc., 306
N.C. 324,293 S.E.2d 182 (1982), the court said:
The effect of the Tort Claims Act was twofold: First, the State partially waived
its sovereign immunity by consenting to direct suits brought as a result of
negligent acts committed by its employees in the course of their employment.
Second, the Act provided that the forum for such direct actions would be the
Industrial Commission, rather than the State courts.
Id. at 329, 293 S.E.2d at 185.
88. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291(a).
89. See id.
90. 245 N.C. 350,351, 95 S.E.2d 910, 911 (1957).
91. See id. at 351-52,95 S.E.2d at 911.
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a fatal compression of her spinal cord.9 Suing on the decedent's
behalf, Gould alleged that the prison officials had negligently caused
the prisoner's death and that her estate was entitled to compensation
under the Tort Claims Act. The Industrial Commission found that
the prison officials had been negligent and that the prisoner's own
actions did not contribute to her death.' The case was appealed to
the supreme court on a claim of insufficient evidence, but Chief
Justice Winborne found sufficient evidence to support the
Commission's findings.' Gould stands for the proposition that a
prisoner may successfully sue the state under the Tort Claims Act."6
However, while Gould addressed the broader issue of prisoner
compensation for the negligence of prison employees, it did not
specifically address the case of a working prisoner injured during the
course of employment. This issue arose in Lawson v. North Carolina
State Highway and Public Works Commission,' in which a prisoner
was electrocuted while working on a road crew.9  Lawson's
administratrix sued the state Highway and Public Works Commission
on his behalf, alleging negligence under the Tort Claims Act.9 The
North Carolina Supreme Court addressed the case and reversed a
superior court holding that prohibited Lawson from filing a tort
claim against his supervisors."'
92. See idU at 352-53, 95 S.E.2d at 912 (Parker, J., dissenting). While serving a
sentence in the women's prison, Eleanor Rush was confined to an isolated cell for
violations of certain prison rules. See id. at 352, 95 S.E.2d at 912 (Parker, J., dissenting).
Rush became enraged during her solitary confinement, and she and another inmate "began
yelling and cursing in a loud and boisterous manner." Id. (Parker, J., dissenting). After
refusing to quiet down, Rush was placed in a restraining belt, but she continued her
previous actions and was subsequently gagged with a towel. See id. (Parker, J., dissenting).
She violently resisted the gagging and was able to remove the towel from her mouth and
continue to yell. See ia (Parker, J., dissenting). Prison officials again entered her cell and
gagged her with two towels, tying them behind her head and injuring her neck in the
process. See id. at 352-53, 95 S.E.2d at 912 (Parker, J., dissenting). The court established
that the tying of the towels caused a dislocation of Rush's neck, which caused a
compression on her spinal cord and, when she turned her head, subsequently death. See .
(Parker, J., dissenting).
93. See id. at 350, 95 S.E.2d at 910.
94. See id. at 350-51, 95 S.E.2d at 910-11.
95. See id. at 351, 95 S.E.2d at 911.
96. See id.
97. 248 N.C. 276,103 S.E.2d 366 (1958).
98. See id. at 277, 103 S.E.2d at 367. Following Hurricane Hazel, a work crew was
sent from Prison Camp Number 204 to aid in cleaning up. See id. As part of this crew,
Lawson was asked by his supervisor to clear a tree limb from the side of the road, and he
was electrocuted when he came in contact with a hidden live power line. See id.
99. See id. at 276,103 S.E.2d at 367.
100. See id. at 281-82, 103 S.E.2d at 370. The Industrial Commission awarded $6,000 to
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The Lawson court explored the relationship between the Tort
Claims Act and the exclusive remedy provision of workers'
compensation, beginning with a historical inquiry into the
development of the two statutes. 1 ' At common law, the State
retained near-absolute sovereign immunity, from which the
legislature carved statutory exceptions to subject the State to liability
for the acts of its employees.' 2 The Workers' Compensation Act
conferred limited rights to working prisoners prior to the enactment
of the Tort Claims Act."° At the same time, the state legislature had
not passed any statute conferring a general right of prisoners to sue
the State in tort.'" Hence, "it was held that a prisoner, injured by the
negligence of the overseer under whom he was placed, had no cause
of action against the State, his sole remedy being against the overseer
as an individual."' 5
According to the Lawson court, when enacting the Tort Claims
Act, the legislature considered not only its general sovereign
immunity but also the right it had granted prisoners to recover under
the Workers' Compensation Act.' Nevertheless, the legislature did
not except prisoners as a general class from the provisions of the
Tort Claims Act."° Thus, the court was forced to decide the proper
Lawson's administratrix, and the State appealed the ruling to superior court. See id. at
278, 103 S.E.2d at 368. The superior court reversed the Industrial Commission's award,
sustaining the two exceptions upon which the State based its appeal. See id. In sum, the
superior court held that workers' compensation should be Lawson's exclusive remedy and,
alternatively, that a claim under the Tort Claims Act could not be based on a negligent
omission. See id. As to the issue of negligent omission, Lawson's administratrix had
alleged that Lawson's supervisor failed to "ascertain whether the prisoners under his
supervision could work in safety in the area to which he assigned them." Id. at 281, 103
S.E.2d at 370.
101. See id. at 279,103 S.E.2d at 368-69.
102. See id. at 279, 103 S.E.2d at 369 (finding that because negligence cannot be
imputed to the sovereign, a plaintiff cannot sue the state in tort absent some statutory
authority); see also PROSSER, supra note 68, § 131, at 975 ("IT]here is no state liability in
tort unless consent is given. The immunity... rest[s] upon public policy; the absurdity of a
wrong committed by an entire people; the idea that whatever the state does must be lawful
..... (footnotes omitted)).
103. See Lawson, 248 N.C. at 280,103 S.E.2d at 369 ("G.S. § 97-13(c) conferred limited
rights upon prisoners in a special classification, to wit, those assigned to work .... ).
104. See id. Non-working injured prisoners would have to wait for the adoption of the
Tort Claims Act 22 years later to gain a right in tort against the state. See supra note 84
and accompanying text.
105. Lawson, 248 N.C. at 279,103 S.E.2d at 369.
106. See id. at 280, 103 S.E.2d at 369 ("With knowledge, actual or presumed, of the
limited rights theretofore conferred upon prisoners... [under workers' compensation], the
General Assembly of 1951 enacted the Tort Claims Act.").
107. See id.
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interpretation of the two statutes given that working prisoners
appeared able to recover under both the Tort Claims Act and the
Workers' Compensation Act."l Based on the statutory right created
by the Tort Claims Act still extant at the time of his suit, the Lawson
court concluded that Lawson had a right to sue the State in tort.10°
The court again upheld a prisoner's right to sue the State under
the Tort Claims Act in Ivey v. North Carolina Prison Department.!"0
In Ivey, a prisoner died as a result of a car wreck that occurred
during the course of assigned prison employment."' Ivey's personal
representative filed a claim against the prison department, alleging
negligence on the part of the prison employee who drove the truck."'
A divided North Carolina Supreme Court found that Ivey's
representative could maintain a suit in tort against the North
Carolina Prison Department."
The question confronting the Ivey court was whether the 1957
amendment to the Workers' Compensation Act, making the
108. See id. It should be noted that after Lawson's death, but before his case reached
the North Carolina Supreme Court, the legislature amended the exclusive remedy
provision of the Workers' Compensation Act, § 97-10.1, to apply to working prisoners in
the same manner as other employees. See id. at 280, 103 S.E.2d at 369-70. Despite this
manifestation of legislative intent, Justice Bobbitt, writing for the court, focused on the
fact that the statutory right created under the Tort Claims Act had not itself been limited
so as to except prisoners from using its provisions. See id. at 280, 103 S.E.2d at 369.
Notwithstanding the 1957 amendment to the Workers' Compensation Act, the court was
only "concerned with the intent of the 1951 General Assembly at the time it enacted the
Tort Claims Act, and on that question the 1957 Act casts no light." Id. at 280, 103 S.E.2d
at 370.
109. See id. at 281-82, 103 S.E.2d at 370. Lawson's death occurred in 1954, his claim
was filed with the Industrial Commission one year later, and thus the Lawson court
correctly noted that "we are concerned with the intent of the 1951 General Assembly at
the time it enacted the Tort Claims Act, and on that question the 1957 Act [amending the
workers' compensation statute] casts no light." Id. at 280,103 S.E.2d at 370.
110. 252 N.C. 615,620,114 S.E.2d 812, 815-16 (1960).
111. See id. at 616-17, 114 S.E.2d at 813. Ivey was ordered to assist with the
transportation of a fellow inmate to a nearby hospital. See id. at 616, 114 S.E.2d at 813.
During the drive to the hospital, the driver, a regular employee of the prison, negligently
failed to slow down for an intersection. See id. The driver lost control of the prison truck,
and the resulting accident killed Ivey. See id. at 617,114 S.E.2d at 813.
112. See id. at 617,114 S.E.2d at 814.
113. See id. at 620, 114 S.E.2d at 815-16. Justice Higgins wrote for the majority. See id.
at 617,114 S.E.2d at 813. Justice Rodman dissented and was joined by Justice Denny. See
id. at 620-26, 114 S.E.2d at 816-20 (Rodman, J., dissenting). The claim, filed under the
Tort Claims Act, was dismissed by the Industrial Commission on the ground that workers'
compensation provided the exclusive remedy to a working prisoner, and this ruling was
upheld by the superior court. See id at 617, 114 S.E.2d at 813. Even so, the Commission
still made findings of fact indicating that the prison employee was negligent in his
operation of the prison track. See id.
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exclusive remedy provision applicable to working prisoners in the
same manner as other employees, abrogated a working prisoner's
right to sue in tort." The court opined:
If the Legislature intended to withdraw altogether a
prisoner's right to pursue a tort claim, the logical procedure
would be by amendment to the section of the Tort Claims
Act which gave the right. No valid reason is suggested why
the withdrawal, if such were intended, should be by an
amendment tucked away in a jumbled and confusing
subsection which is an exception followed by two provisos
to the section of the Workmen's Compensation Act,
entitled, "Exceptions from provisions of article.""
Because the Workers' Compensation Act made no reference to
the Tort Claims Act, the court concluded that it would not assume
that a repeal of the right to sue in tort had been intended when an
alternative reasonable construction could be formulated."6 Such an
alternative construction was available due to the inadequate level of
compensation provided for by the Workers' Compensation Act in
1960." Justice Higgins undertook an examination of the meaning of
compensation within the workers' compensation statute and
concluded that burial expenses alone could not constitute
compensation.' Therefore, the exclusive remedy provision did not
114. See iU at 619, 114 S.E.2d at 815. Writing for the majority, Justice Higgins began
by noting the general right of a prisoner to sue in tort for injuries sustained through the
negligence of state employees. See id. at 617, 114 S.E.2d at 814. Given this right, the court
affirmed "the plaintiff's right to assert this claim on behalf of his intestate unless some
other provision of law withdraws the right." Id. The court built on its earlier analysis in
Lawson. It noted the fact that workers' compensation predated the Tort Claims Act, that
the 1951 Tort Claims Act did not except prisoners in general, and that Lawson concerned
only the interpretation of the 1951 Act as it stood, given that the 1957 amendment to the
Workers' Compensation Act occurred after Lawson's injury. See id at 618-19, 114 S.E.2d
at 814-15. As Ivey's case arose following the 1957 amendment, the court felt it could
directly address the conflict created between the language in § 97-13(c) and the
inclusiveness of the Tort Claims Act. See id. at 619, 114 S.E.2d at 814-15 ("The purpose
and meaning of the 1957 amendment [to § 97-13] were not directly involved in [Lawson].
Here it is involved.").
115. Id. at 619,114 S.E.2d at 815 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-13 (1991)).
116. See id. at 619-20, 114 S.E.2d at 815. The court stated that "'[t]he presumption is
against the intention to repeal where express terms are not used, and will not be indulged
if by any other reasonable construction the statutes may be reconciled and declared to be
operative without repugnance."' Id. at 619, 114 S.E.2d at 815 (quoting Spaugh v. City of
Charlotte, 239 N.C. 149,158,79 S.E.2d 748,755 (1954)).
117. See d The Act provided for burial expenses in the event of death. See d at 618,
114 S.E.2d at 814. The court noted that the exclusivity provision was only triggered when
prisoners were "entitled to compensation" under § 97-13. Id. at 619, 114 S.E.2d at 815.
118. See d at 620, 114 S.E.2d at 815. Justice Higgins noted that compensation as
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apply to Ivey, and the court was able to uphold his tort claim.119
Taking a historical perspective on the analysis, Justice Rodman's
dissent argued that the court had misinterpreted the legislative intent
behind the Tort Claims Act.12  Justice Rodman suggested that the
court had misinterpreted the broad language of the Tort Claims Act
to mean not only that individuals could recover from the State for
the negligent acts of prisoners, but that prisoners as well were able to
recover.12' Furthermore, he could not
conceive [that] the Legislature intended to give prisoners
the right to choose between the Workmen's Compensation
and Tort Claims Act. If it did not and the Tort Claims Act
repealed the right of prisoners to claim the benefit of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, [the 1957 application of the
exclusive remedy provision to prisoners] was and is
meaningless."
As the case was decided according to the court's rule against
defined in the Workers' Compensation Act meant the compensation for lost wages payable
to the injured employee or his dependents, and that this compensation includes funeral
benefits. See id. at 619-20, 114 S.E.2d at 815. Given this definition, Justice Higgins
concluded that "the definition [of compensation] includes burial expenses, but it takes the
whole to constitute compensation and not one of its parts." I/d at 620, 114 S.E.2d at 815.
Therefore, burial expenses alone cannot constitute compensation as defined by the
Workers' Compensation Act. See id.
119. See id. at 620,114 S.E.2d at 815-16.
120. See id. at 622-26,114 S.E.2d at 817-20 (Rodman, J., dissenting).
121. See ia at 623-24, 114 S.E.2d at 818 (Rodman, J., dissenting). Justice Rodman
stated that
the 1955 Act changed to authorize compensation for injuries which "arose as a
result of a negligent act or omission of any officer, employee, voluntary or
involuntary servant or agent of the State." The legislature clearly expressed its
intent to enlarge the class for whose acts the State would be liable and for the
character of the acts, whether acts of commission or omission, but it did not
intimate that it intended to enlarge the class of those entitled to receive
compensation and to shift those entitled to compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation Act to claimants under the Tort Claims Act.
Id. (Rodman, J., dissenting) (quoting Act of Mar. 31, 1955, ch. 400, 1955 N.C. Sess. Laws
348 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291(a) (1996))). The broad language of the
Tort Claims Act did not itself preclude a suit by a working prisoner, but the claims in
response to which the Act was created did not involve injured prisoners seeking
compensation from the State. See iU at 623, 114 S.E.2d at 817 (Rodman, J., dissenting)
("There is no suggestion in those claims that the State should compensate a prisoner for
injuries sustained by him."). The courts initially refused to categorize a prisoner as an
employee of the State. See iU at 623-24, 114 S.E.2d at 818 (Rodman, J., dissenting). But
the legislature explicitly responded by expanding the Tort Claims Act to waive immunity
for the acts of" 'any officer, employee, voluntary or involuntary servant or agent of the
State.'" Id. (Rodman, J., dissenting) (quoting Act of Mar. 31, 1955, ch. 400, 1955 N.C.
Sess. Laws 348 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291(a) (1996))).
122. Id. at 625,114 S.E.2d at 819 (Rodman, J., dissenting).
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repeal by implication, Ivey left open the issue of whether the Tort
Claims Act or Workers' Compensation Act would take primacy in a
case in which they both clearly applied.' However, it was not until
1995-thirty-five years after Ivey-that the North Carolina Supreme
Court addressed this issue.' In the interim, the court of appeals
heard several cases brought by injured working prisoners, but never
reached the issue of the exclusive remedy provision and workers'
compensation.' Two of these cases, Baker v. North Carolina
Department of Correction2 6 and Brewington v. North Carolina
Department of Correction,' involved injuries to prisoners sustained
while engaged in assigned labor.
The Court in Baker found a fellow inmate negligent and allowed
recovery where a window was shut on Baker's fingers while he was
cleaning it.' Brewington presented a similar situation in which an
inmate was injured in a slip-and-fall while working in the prison
kitchen." The Baker and Brewington decisions did not directly
address the issue of the exclusive remedy provision, but they are
important in that they represent two instances in which the court of
appeals upheld a working prisoner's right to sue under the Tort
Claims Act. In fact, in affirming the Industrial Commission, the
Brewington court endorsed the position that even though
Brewington's tort claim failed, he could apply for workers'
compensation upon discharge." Additionally, the North Carolina
123. See id. at 620, 114 S.E.2d at 815 ("The rule against repeal by implication requires
us to hold the plaintiff's right to have the tort claim heard and passed on has not been
withdrawn.").
124. See Blackmon v. North Carolina Dep't of Correction, 343 N.C. 259, 470 S.E.2d 8
(1995).
125. See supra note 42 (reviewing these court of appeals cases).
126. 85 N.C. App. 345,354 S.E.2d 733 (1987).
127. 111 N.C. App. 833, 433 S.E.2d 798 (1993).
128. See Baker, 85 N.C. App. at 347, 354 S.E.2d at 734. Baker challenged an Industrial
Commission finding that a fellow prisoner was not negligent when he shut a window on
Baker's fingers. See id. at 346, 354 S.E.2d at 734. Both men were working to clean the
window at the time, and Baker sued for injury compensation under the Tort Claims Act.
See id. at 345, 354 S.E.2d at 733. The court reversed the Industrial Commission, finding
that Baker's counterpart was negligent in shutting the window. See d. at 347, 354 S.E.2d
at 734.
129. See Brewington, 111 N.C. App. at 834, 433 S.E.2d at 799. The Industrial
Commission found that the prison was not negligent in maintaining the drain cover over
which Brewington tripped, but stated that Brewington would be entitled to compensation
under § 97-13(c) upon discharge should he still be injured. See d. at 837, 433 S.E.2d at
800. The court of appeals affirmed the Commission's ruling denying Brewington
compensation under the Tort Claims Act. See Ed. at 839,433 S.E.2d at 801.
130. See id. at 837,433 S.E.2d at 799 (" 'After discharge from prison, plaintiff may seek
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Supreme Court denied discretionary review of the Brewington
case,11 leaving intact the lower court's statements that allowed dual
avenues of relief for working prisoners.
The North Carolina Supreme Court finally addressed the issue it
had left unresolved in Ivey-whether the Workers' Compensation
Act or Tort Claims Act took precedence in a situation in which both
applied fully-in Blackmon v. North Carolina Department of
Correction. z The court held that the exclusive remedy provision of
the Workers' Compensation Act barred the wrongful death action of
an inmate killed while performing assigned prison labor.'
Blackmon's administratrix sued the Department of Correction
for wrongful death under the Tort Claims Act, seeking $100,000 in
compensation.' The supreme court began its examination of the
case by noting the structure of workers' compensation as it applies to
prisoners, and it stated that when § 97-13(c) operates to provide
compensation to an injured prisoner, § 97-10.1 also operates to
foreclose any additional remedies that may have been available."
As Blackmon was killed in an accident arising out of and in the
course of his assigned labor, he was entitled to workers'
compensation, and the exclusive remedy provision operated to
exclude his wrongful death claim. 6
The court addressed its earlier holding in Ivey and distinguished
relief for any disability related to the injury per G.S. 97-13(c)."' (quoting the Industrial
Commission's order)).
131. See 335 N.C. 552, 439 S.E.2d 142, denying cert. to 111 N.C. App. 833, 433 S.E.2d
798 (1993).
132. 343 N.C. 259,470 S.E.2d 8 (1996).
133. See id. at 260, 470 S.E.2d at 8-9. In doing so, the court affirmed the decision by the
court of appeals to reverse the Industrial Commission which had stated that the plaintiff's
representative could sue under the Tort Claims Act. See id. Blackmon was killed while
removing road salt from a storage bin, a task to which he had been assigned by the
Department of Correction. See id. at 261, 470 S.E.2d at 9. The salt in the storage bins was
piled about fourteen feet high and had crusted over on the top. See id. Blackmon was in
the process of breaking through the crust at the top of a pile when the crust gave way, and
he was sucked into the salt pile. See id. ("The salt... tended to crystallize and often would
not flow through the chute. The standard DOT procedure for dealing with this
circumstance was to have workers stand ... on top of the salt and break [it] up ... with
crowbars .... "). Despite rescue efforts by the supervisor and his fellow inmates,
Blackmon was drawn under the pile of salt and suffocated. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 263,470 S.E.2d at 10.
136. See id. In so holding, the court took careful note of its holding in Ivey that mere
funeral expenses do not constitute compensation under the Workers' Compensation Act.
See id. The court noted that the "Court of Appeals concluded that the monetary benefit
afforded to plaintiff... entitles her to 'compensation' and that [§ 97-10.1] thus applies to
bar plaintiff's wrongful death action." Id. (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-13(c) (1991)).
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it on the fact that at the time of Ivey's claim, the workers'
compensation statute did not provide adequate compensation for
injured prisoners. 7 Thus, because the exclusive remedy provision of
§ 97-10.1 was only triggered when § 97-13(c) entitled the prisoner to
"compensation," it was inapplicable in Ivey." However, because the
legislature amended the workers' compensation statute in 1971,
repealing the burial expenses limitation on compensation for
deceased working prisoners, the problem posed in Ivey did not arise
in Blackmon." Furthermore, the court noted that the legislature's
1971 amendment was sufficient to withdraw a working prisoner's
right to bring a tort claim, even though it did not specifically
withdraw that right by an amendment to the Tort Claims Act itself.'4
The Blackmon court also addressed the adequacy of limiting
recovery to a maximum of thirty dollars a week and concluded that
the limit was adequate given the fact that an individual's earning
137. See id. at 263-64, 470 S.E.2d at 10-11 (noting that the statute provided only for
burial expenses and no further monetary benefit).
138. See id. at 264,470 S.E.2d at 11.
139. See id. The amendment provided for additional compensation to the dependents
and next of kin of the deceased in the form of weekly monetary compensation. See id.; see
also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-13(c) ("Whenever any prisoner ... shall suffer ... accidental
death... then.., the dependents or next of kin... may have the benefit of this Article by
applying to the Industrial Commission as any other employee .... ).
140. See Blackmon, 343 N.C. at 264-65, 470 S.E.2d at 11. Justice Frye, by adopting
Justice Greene's dissent from the court of appeals' opinion, raised the issue of the Ivey
court's suggestion that the legislature specifically amended the Tort Claims Act to exclude
working prisoners. See id at 266, 470 S.E.2d at 12 (Frye, J., dissenting). Justice Greene
stated that
[d]espite the decision in Ivey which makes a clear call to the Legislature to
amend the Tort Claims Act if it wants to exclude prisoners from coverage, and
despite having amended both the Workers' Compensation Act and the Tort
Claims Act since Ivey, the Legislature, for more than thirty years since the Ivey
decision, has not acted to exclude prisoners from the provisions of the Tort
Claims Act.
Blackmon v. North Carolina Dep't of Correction, 118 N.C. App. 666, 675, 457 S.E.2d 306,
311 (1995) (Greene, J., dissenting), aff'd, 343 N.C. 259, 470 S.E.2d 8 (1996). The
Blackmon majority responded by stating that the legislature's 1971 amendment to provide
for compensation to the dependents of deceased working prisoners manifested its intent
that working prisoners should be limited to recovery under the Workers' Compensation
Act. See Blackmon, 343 N.C. at 265, 470 S.E.2d at 11. Because the Ivey court had stated
that a deceased prisoner who received compensation would fall within § 97-13(c), thus
triggering the operation of § 97-10.1, and because "we may 'assume that the legislature is
aware of any judicial construction of a statute,"' the Blackmon court understood the 1971
amendment to signify the legislature's intent to fully include injured working prisoners
within the Workers' Compensation Act. Id. (quoting Watson v. North Carolina Real
Estate Comm'n, 87 N.C. App. 637, 648,362 S.E.2d 294,301 (1987)).
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capacity is greatly reduced while he or she is incarcerated. 4  Finally,
the court concluded that it was unable to consider the equal
protection issues, raised later in Richardson, because it was limited to
the issues raised by Judge Greene's dissent at the appellate level. 42
Thus, in Richardson the court positioned itself to defend more
fully its decision in Blackmon, which had not addressed the equal
protection implications of the exclusive remedy provision, but only
the statutory issues of the Ivey decision as opposed to the entire line
of exclusive remedy jurisprudence." Justice Lake began his analysis
in Richardson with a thorough examination of the operation of the
workers' compensation statutes, first considering § 97-13(c).'
44
Strangely, the provision itself is entitled "Exceptions from
provisions of Article," and it states that it will "not apply to prisoners
being worked by the State or any subdivision thereof, except to the
following extent."'4 This introduction to the provision raises two
141. See Blackmon, 343 N.C. at 265, 470 S.E.2d at 11 ("A prisoner's earning capacity is
greatly limited by the fact of his incarceration. For this reason a benefit of thirty dollars
per week is more than sufficient to comport with the statutory definition of
'compensation.' ").
142. See iU at 266, 470 S.E.2d at 12. The court noted that under Rule 16(b) of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure, when the only ground for appeal is the existence of the
dissent in the court of appeals, the supreme court is limited to hearing the issues that arise
in that dissenting opinion. See id.; N.C. R. APP. P. 16(b).
143. See Richardson, 345 N.C. at 130-37, 478 S.E.2d at 503-07. Structurally, the court
first rendered its interpretation of §§ 97-13(c) and 97-10.1, then examined Richardson's
claim in light of this interpretation, and next considered the equal protection and policy
challenges not present in Blackmon. See id. Strangely, the Richardson court made no
reference to Blackmon, though it was decided less than a year earlier. See id. at 129-37,
478 S.E.2d at 502-07. Richardson itself sheds no light on the reason for this omission, but
presumably the equal protection issues raised in Richardson provided enough of a
difference that the court felt it unnecessary to mention Blackmon. See id at 134, 478
S.E.2d at 505. Even so, commentators saw Blackmon as representing a radical departure
from a long history of allowing working prisoners to sue in tort because they read Ivey as
indicative of the court's willingness to entertain either a workers' compensation or a tort
claim from an injured working prisoner. See, e.g., JERNIGAN, supra note 46, § 4-6, at 28.
Jernigan stated:
Because prisoners are not employed pursuant to a contract of hire, they are not
considered 'employees' as that term is defined within the Act, and, therefore,
they are not prohibited from bringing actions under the Tort Claims Act.
Accordingly, wrongful death actions filed pursuant to the Tort Claims Act are
valid.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Richard B. Conley, An Introduction to the North Carolina
Industrial Commission and the Worlnen's Compensation- Statutes, in Workmen's
Compensation Workshop 1, 8 (1977) (interpreting § 97-13(c) as "not [barring] an action by
a prisoner under the North Carolina Tort Claims Act").
144. See Richardson, 345 N.C. at 130-31, 478 S.E.2d at 503.
145. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-13(c) (1991) (emphasis added).
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issues. First, why would the legislature, intending to create a
statutory provision to benefit working prisoners and to serve as their
sole remedy for injury, begin the provision with a general exclusion
of the class they sought to advantage?' 6 Second, bearing in mind
that the Act does "not apply to prisoners being worked by the State,"
except to the extent that they satisfy the requirements of § 97-13(c),47
a theoretical class of working prisoners should exist who cannot
receive compensation for their injuries under workers'
compensation. In light of the general mandate that the Workers'
Compensation Act should be construed liberally so as to favor
compensation,' the exclusions under § 97-13(c) could be viewed as
146. Cf. Ivey v. North Carolina Prison Dep't, 252 N.C. 615, 619, 114 S.E.2d 812, 815
(discussing ambiguities in the exclusive remedy provision). The Ivey court hinted at this
point in its discussion of legislative intent with regard to amending the Workers'
Compensation Act in 1957. See Ud Specifically, the court examined whether the
legislature intended to repeal the rights granted to prisoners under the Tort Claims Act
when it amended the Workers' Compensation Act to make § 97-10.1, the exclusive remedy
provision, applicable to prisoners. See idL The court stated that "[i]f the legislature
intended to withdraw altogether a prisoner's right to pursue a tort claim, the logical
procedure would [not] be .... by an amendment tucked away in a jumbled and confusing
subsection which is an exception followed by two provisos." Id.
147. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-13(c) (emphasis added). Several answers may be posited
for why the Workers' Compensation Act categorically excepts working prisoners but then
includes a small portion that meet its statutory requirements. In his dissent in Ivey, Justice
Rodman explained the historical development of the Act as it relates to prisoners and
noted that initially it did not grant any rights to injured working inmates. See Ivey, 252
N.C. at 620-22,114 S.E.2d at 816-17 (Rodman, J., dissenting). Because the court had held
that sovereign immunity barred any compensation to prisoners and prison employees,
when drafting the Act in 1929 the legislature explicitly prohibited any claims by inmates
injured in prison labor. See id. at 621, 114 S.E.2d at 816 (Rodman, J., dissenting).
However, a decade later this stance softened, and the legislature amended the Act to allow
some prisoners the right to recover. See id (Rodman, J., dissenting). But the legislature
did so while leaving its initial prohibitory language intact. See id. (Rodman, J., dissenting).
On the other hand, the language of § 97-13(c) could be seen as an attempt to
distinguish between those inmates injured while performing assigned prison labor and
those injured as a result of "everyday prison life or from general housekeeping activities
not specially assigned." 1B LARSON, supra note 2, § 47.31(0, at 8-331. Larson asserts that
North Carolina's requirement that the inmate's injury arise out of and in the course of
employment is intended to achieve this distinction. See id. § 47.31(f), at 8-331 n.87.2.
148. See Barnhardt v. Yellow Cab Co., 266 N.C. 419, 427, 146 S.E.2d 479, 484 (1966)
("It is frequently said that the Workmen's Compensation Act must be liberally construed
to accomplish the human purpose for which it was passed, i.e., compensation for injured
employees."); see also Johnson v. Asheville Hosiery Co., 199 N.C. 38, 40, 153 S.E. 591, 593
(1930) ("It is generally held by the courts that the various Compensation Acts of the
Union should be liberally construed to the end that the benefits thereof should not be
denied upon technical, narrow and strict interpretation."); Dayal v. Provident Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 71 N.C. App. 131, 132, 321 S.E.2d 452, 453 (1984) ("In applying the
principles of workers' compensation law, it must be remembered that case law reflects a
long-settled policy that the provisions of the Act are to be construed liberally and in favor
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inapposite to the purposes of the statute.
However, as these issues hinge largely on semantics, they were
sidestepped by the Richardson court, which may in some way suggest
a tacit admittance that § 97-13(c) is a badly worded provision. 49
Notwithstanding, the court took a literal reading of §§ 97-13(c) and
97-10.1 to conclude that "[t]he effect of N.C.G.S. § 97-13(c) is that a
working prisoner whose injuries arise out of and in the course of his
work may get workers' compensation .... subject to § 97-10.1 ....
[,which] establishes that workers' compensation is the exclusive
remedy for prisoners injured while working for the State." ''  In this
way, the court was able to formulate a text-based interpretation of
the statutes before addressing the precedent cited by Richardson."1
The court separated the case law into two categories: those
cases indicating that working prisoners had a statutory right to sue
the state in tort, and those indicating that the Industrial Commission
and North Carolina courts "have adjudicated prisoner tort claims for
more than thirty years without distinguishing between prisoners
negligently injured on prison jobs and other prisoners negligently
injured.""2  Justice Lake placed Gould v. North Carolina State
Highway and Public Works Commission, 3 Lawson v. North
Carolina State Highway and Public Works Commission, 4 and Ivey v.
of the employee."). But see Deese v. Southeastern Lawn and Tree Expert Co., 306 N.C.
275, 277, 293 S.E.2d 140, 143 (1982) ("[S]uch liberality should not, however, extend
beyond the clearly expressed language of those provisions, and our courts may not enlarge
the ordinary meaning of the terms used by the legislature or engage in any method of
'judicial legislation.' "); Johnson, 199 N.C. at 40, 153 S.E. at 593 ("[I]t is generally held
that provisos excluding an employee from the broad and comprehensive definition of such
term ought to be strictly construed in order that the predominating purposes of the act
may be fully effectuated.").
149. See Richardson, 345 N.C. at 130-31, 478 S.E.2d at 503.
150. Id. at 131, 478 S.E.2d at 503. The court also noted that "[t]here is little doubt
under the circumstances of this case that plaintiff will be found disabled and that his injury
will be found compensable." Id. at 131, 478 S.E.2d at 504.
151. See id. Arguably, this approach to structure meant that the court did not examine
Richardson's collection of case law in order to ascertain the meaning of the workers'
compensation provisions. Instead, the court was able to focus its efforts on creating a
distinction between their interpretation and the cited body of precedent. It is debatable
whether this approach was deliberate as a matter of strategy or was a result of the fact that
the court of appeals utilized the same structure. See Richardson v. North Carolina Dep't
of Correction, 118 N.C. App. 704, 705-06, 457 S.E.2d 325, 326-27 (1995), aff'd, 345 N.C.
128, 478 S.E.2d 501 (1996).
152. Richardson, 345 N.C. at 131-32,478 S.E.2d at 504.
153. 245 N.C. 350, 95 S.E.2d 910 (1957); see supra note 43 (discussing the court's
treatment of Gould).
154. 248 N.C. 276, 103 S.E.2d 366 (1958); see supra note 43 (discussing the court's
treatment of Lawson).
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North Carolina Prison Department5 within the first category of
cases, and placed Baker v. North Carolina Department of
Correction 6 and Brewington v. North Carolina Department of
Correction' within the second category."s
The three cases in the first category represent the early
evolution of the court's struggle with allowing a working prisoner to
sue in tort. 9 This progression began with Gould, which Richardson
cited to support the proposition that prisoners as a group possessed
the ability to sue the State in tort under the Tort Claims Act.'
Justice Lake disagreed with Richardson's broad reading of Gould,
and he distinguished the case on two grounds: that "it dealt with the
death of a nonworking prisoner and did not address workers'
compensation."'' Hence, a non-working prisoner may still be able
to sue the State in tort, but Gould's holding does nothing to shed
light on the problem of compensating an injured working prisoner.62
On the other hand, Lawson addressed both the death of a
working prisoner and the issue of workers' compensation."
155. 252 N.C. 615, 114 S.E.2d 812 (1960); see supra note 43 (discussing the court's
treatment of Ivey).
156. 85 N.C. App. 345, 354 S.E.2d 733 (1987); see supra note 43 (discussing the court's
treatment of Baker).
157. 111 N.C. App. 833,433 S.E.2d 798 (1993); see supra note 43 (discussing the court's
treatment of Brewington).
158. See Richardson, 345 N.C. at 132-33,478 S.E.2d at 504.
159. See id. at 133,478 S.E.2d at 504-05.
160. See id. at 133, 478 S.E.2d at 504. The Gould decision standing alone seems to be
easily distinguished on its facts, as the deceased prisoner was not working at the time of
her death. See Gould v. North Carolina State Highway & Public Works Comm'n, 245 N.C.
350, 352-53, 95 S.E.2d 910, 911-12 (1957). Even the Lawson and Ivey courts had similarly
limited the court's holding in Gould. See Ivey, 252 N.C. at 618, 114 S.E.2d at 814 ("In
Gould ... this court held that a prisoner not in said special classification was entitled to
recovery under the Tort Claims Act." (citation omitted) (emphasis added)); Lawson v.
North Carolina State Highway & Public Works Comm'n, 248 N.C. 276,280,103 S.E.2d 366,
369 (1958) ("[In Gould] a prisoner not in said special classification [meeting the
requirements of § 97-13(c)] was entitled to recover under the Tort Claims Act.").
However, Richardson's attorneys cited Gould as standing for the general proposition that
any prisoner could sue under the Tort Claims Act. See Plaintiff Appellant's New Brief at
9, Richardson (No. 250A95) ("In Gould v. N.C. State Highway & P.W. Comm'n, this court
concluded, without commenting on the issue, that a prisoner was entitled to recover under
the Tort Claims Act." (citations omitted) (emphasis added)).
161. Richardson, 345 N.C. at 132, 478 S.E.2d at 504.
162. See id. ("That ruling is still good law, but it has no application to the case of a
working prisoner injured at work.").
163. See id. The importance of the Lawson decision rests in the court's examination of
legislative intent behind both the Tort Claims Act and the Workers' Compensation Act.
See Lawson, 248 N.C. at 280,103 S.E.2d at 369. As interpreted in Gould, the Tort Claims
Act did not exclude prisoners, and on the other hand the Workers' Compensation Act
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However, the Richardson court distinguished Lawson because its
holding did not take into consideration the legislature's 1957
amendment to § 97-13(c).1'  This amendment created a right to
compensation for representatives of decedents and ensured that the
exclusive remedy provision, § 97-10.1, would apply with equal force
to working prisoners as it did to other classifications of employees.'o
The Lawson court acknowledged this statutory change in its holding,
hinting that Lawson's claims would have been decided differently
under the 1957 version of the statute.'6 Hence, the Lawson court
provided the framework by which the Richardson court limited its
holding, making Lawson applicable only to the Workers'
Compensation Act as it existed prior to 1957.67
The court distinguished Ivey on similar grounds, noting that
Ivey was undercompensated because his injury preceded a 1971
amendment that increased benefits to the relatives of prisoners killed
while performing assigned labor."' Because any injured prisoner or
representative of a deceased prisoner may now pursue full
compensation under the Act, the court concluded that Ivey's
compensation argument was no longer applicable. 69 However, this
purported to limit prisoners to relief under its provisions. See id. In the face of ambiguity,
the Lawson court opted to follow the inclusive intent expressed in the Tort Claims Act.
See id. at 280, 103 S.E.2d at 369-70. In addition, the court felt it was anomalous to grant
the benefits of the Tort Claims Act to non-working prisoners while limiting working
prisoners to remedies under workers' compensation. See id.
164. See Richardson, 345 N.C. at 132,478 S.E.2d at 504.
165. See id. Prior to 1957, § 97-13(c) did not grant compensation to prisoners killed
while working, and § 97-10.1 did not contain the language making the exclusive remedy
provision applicable to prisoners in the same manner as other employees. See id. (citing
Lawson, 248 N.C. at 280,103 S.E.2d at 369).
166. See Lawson, 248 N.C. at 280, 103 S.E.2d at 370. In dicta, the Lawson court
suggested that had Lawson's accident occurred following the 1957 amendment to the
Workers' Compensation Act, his claim would be decided in favor of the State:
The 1957 Act reflects the intention of the General Assembly of 1957.... Mhe
1957 General Assembly concluded that prisoners at work on an assigned task
should be denied rights conferred by the Tort Claims Act on other prisoners. Be
that as it may, we are concerned with the intent of the 1957 General Assembly
Id.
167. See Richardson, 345 N.C. at 132, 478 S.E.2d at 504.
168. See id. at 132-33, 478 S.E.2d at 504. Prior to 1971, workers' compensation
provided only burial expenses as compensation for deceased prisoners, and the Ivey court's
holding can be read as primarily based on the fact that burial expenses did not constitute
compensation. See id. at 133, 478 S.E.2d at 504. Because "only prisoners 'entitled to
compensation' were [limited] by § 97-13(c) and former § 97-10, the statute did not bar tort
claims arising from the death of a prisoner." Id. (quoting Ivey v. North Carolina Prison
Dep't, 252 N.C. 615, 620, 114 S.E.2d 812, 815 (1960)).
169. See id (" '[S]ince Ivey was a pre-1971 amendment death case in which the dead
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conclusion did not address the major concerns of the Ivey court
relating to repeal by implication"
In examining the conflict between the Workers' Compensation
Act and the Tort Claims Act, the Ivey court echoed a universal rule
of statutory interpretation: if at all possible, courts will avoid using
repeal by implication to invalidate a statute.Y The court in Ivey
based much of its holding on the premise that "[i]f the legislature
intended to withdraw altogether a prisoner's right to pursue a tort
claim, the logical procedure would be by amendment to the section
prisoner was not entitled to workers' compensation, its holding does not apply to plaintiff
who is an injured employee who may elect to pursue compensation under the present
version of the Workers' Compensation Act."' (quoting Richardson v. North Carolina
Dep't of Correction, 118 N.C. App. 704, 706, 457 S.E.2d 325, 327 (1995), aff4 345 N.C.
128, 478 S.E.2d 501 (1996))). Notably, under Ivey's holding, a deceased prisoner entitled
to full compensation would present a different situation; namely that of deciding whether
the Tort Claims Act or Workers' Compensation Act takes precedence when both are
simultaneously applicable. See id.
170. See Ivey, 252 N.C. at 619-20, 114 S.E.2d at 815. The Ivey court was explicit in
noting that "[t]he rule against repeal by implication requires us to hold [that] the plaintiff's
right to have the tort claim heard ... has not been withdrawn." Id. at 620, 114 S.E.2d at
815. Justice Rodman's dissent further accentuated this point when he stated that
"[b]ecause recovery... is limited to funeral expenses is insufficient reason ... for casting
aside legislative language." Id. at 625, 114 S.E.2d at 819 (Rodman, J., dissenting); see also
Blackmon v. North Carolina Dep't. of Correction, 118 N.C. App. 666, 675, 457 S.E.2d 306,
311 (1995) (Greene, J., dissenting) ("Although the Worker's Compensation Act has been
amended to delete the burial expenses limitation when a prisoner is accidentally killed,
this amendment does not address the concerns expressed by the Court in Ivey or the
reasons for its decision."), aff'd, 343 N.C. 259, 470 S.E.2d 8 (1996).
171. See Ivey, 252 N.C. at 619, 114 S.E.2d at 815 (" 'Repeals by implication are not
favored by the law and will not be indulged if there is any other reasonable construction.'"
(quoting Victory Cab Co. v. City of Charlotte, 234 N.C. 572, 579, 68 S.E.2d 433, 438
(1951))). This maxim has operated at both the state and federal level. See, e.g., Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974) ("In the absence of some affirmative showing of an
intention to repeal, the only permissible justification for a repeal by implication is when
the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable."); State v. Greer, 308 N.C. 515, 518, 302
S.E.2d 774, 777 (1983) ("In this State 'repeal by implication' is not a favored rule of
statutory construction. However, if two statutes are truly irreconcilably in conflict it is
logical that the later statute should control, resulting in a repeal of the earlier statute."
(citations omitted)); Person v. Garrett, 280 N.C. 163, 166, 184 S.E.2d 873, 874 (1971)
("Repeal of statutes by implication is not favored in this jurisdiction."); see also Cass R.
Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement of Federal Law, 49 U. Cm. L REV.
394, 420 n.101 (1982) (favoring a presumption against repeals by implication). Professor
Sunstein noted:
A presumption against repeals by implication is preferable to one favoring them
for two reasons. First, to favor implied repeals would force the legislature
explicitly to preserve preexisting rights and duties in every case.... Second, a
presumption of repeal would force litigants to prove in particular cases a
congressional desire to preserve existing rights-an almost impossible task.
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of the Tort Claims Act which gave the right. 172 The court stated that
where one statute evinces an intent to repeal another, either that
intent must be clearly expressed or there must be no alternative
construction available through which both statutes could continue to
exist. 3 The court avoided an examination of legislative intent and
found an alternative construction in the lack of adequate
compensation under the Workers' Compensation Act, thus allowing
both statutes to remain operative. 4  Furthermore, the Ivey court
explicitly invited the legislature to solve the conflict by direct
amendment to the Tort Claims Act. 5
Therefore, the Richardson court somewhat misconstrued Ivey's
holding by not focusing on the issue of repeal by implication, instead
choosing to emphasize the inadequacy of compensation. 6 The Ivey
court made clear that absent a specific amendment to the Tort
Claims Act itself, it was unwilling to rule that §§ 97-13(c) and 97-10.1
repealed a working prisoner's right to sue the state in tort.1"
172. Ivey, 252 N.C. at 619, 114 S.E.2d at 815. Evidently, the court was troubled by the
lack of express language in either the Workers' Compensation Act or the Tort Claims Act
to the extent that the exclusive remedy provision should withdraw a working prisoner's
right to sue in tort. See id. (calling the language in § 97-13(c) "an amendment tucked away
in a jumbled and confusing subsection which is an exception followed by two provisos").
173. See id. (citing Spaugh v. City of Charlotte, 239 N.C. 149, 158, 79 S.E.2d 748, 755
(1954)).
174. See id. at 619-20, 114 S.E.2d at 815. The inadequacy of compensation for the
survivors of deceased working prisoners rendered § 97-10.1, through operation of § 97-
13(c), inapplicable, allowing the prisoner's representative to sue the state in tort. See
supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
175. See Ivey, 252 N.C. at 620,114 S.E.2d at 815. The court stated:
If the legislature intended to exclude prisoners, all it had to do was pass a simple
amendment to the Tort Claims Act .... Intention to withdraw a prisoner's right
to assert a tort claim cannot be presumed as a result of the amendment to the
Workmen's Compensation Act in its present form and setting.
Id. Judge Greene focused on this point in his dissent in Blackmon, stating that
[d]espite the decision in Ivey which makes a clear call to the Legislature to
amend the Tort Claims Act if it wants to exclude prisoners from coverage, and
despite having amended both the Worker's Compensation Act and the Tort
Claims Act since Ivey, the Legislature, for more than thirty years since the Ivey
decision, has not acted to exclude prisoners from the provisions of the Tort
Claims Act.
Blackmon, 118 N.C. App. at 675, 457 S.E.2d at 311 (Greene, J., dissenting).
176. See Richardson, 345 N.C. at 133, 478 S.E.2d at 504 ("The court in Ivey held that
burial expenses did not meet the applicable definition of compensation.").
177. See Ivey, 252 N.C. at 620, 114 S.E.2d at 815; see also Blackmon, 118 N.C. App. at
675, 457 S.E.2d at 311 (Greene, J., dissenting) ("Although our Supreme Court did
determine that burial expenses are not compensation, this determination was not the basis
for the Supreme Court's decision in Ivey to allow a prisoner who accidentally died while on
assigned work to bring a claim under the Tort Claims Act.").
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However, the Richardson court believed that the 1971 amendment to
the Workers' Compensation Act-providing full benefits for
deceased working prisoners-had solved the repeal issue addressed
in Ivey
78
In fact, the 1971 amendment could be interpreted to produce the
opposite effect. 79 The compensation issue that provided an
alternative construction for the Ivey court disappeared pursuant to
the 1971 amendment to the Act.'" Therefore, the Richardson court
should have been faced with the problem that Ivey was able to avoid,
namely, whether §§ 97-13(c) and 97-10.1 repealed by implication a
working prisoner's right to sue in tort."'
In addition, the Richardson court applied a narrow construction
to the second category of precedent in order to distinguish
Brewington v. North Carolina Department of Correction"n and Baker
v. North Carolina Department of Correction."" The court stated that
"[n]either of these cases addressed directly the issue of whether a
working prisoner was precluded from filing a tort claim, and thus
they are not instructive to the issue at hand."'' 4 While this
characterization may be true, it ignores the fact that both cases
allowed injured working prisoners to recover under the Tort Claims
Act.'"
While these two cases did not address the exclusive remedy
provision of the Workers' Compensation Act,'86 they can be seen as
underscoring the claim that both the North Carolina Legislature and
178. See Richardson, 345 N.C. at 133,478 S.E.2d at 504.
179. See Blackmon, 118 N.C. App. at 676, 457 S.E.2d at 312 (Greene, J., dissenting)
("Because the Legislature has not amended the Tort Claims Act ... and the treatment of
working prisoners under the Workers' Compensation Act as an exception is still in place,
the concerns expressed by the Court in Ivey continue to exist.").
180. See Richardson, 345 N.C. at 132-33,478 S.E.2d at 504.
181. Cf. Blackmon, 118 N.C. App. at 675, 457 S.E.2d at 311 (Green, J., dissenting)
(noting the unresolved concerns remaining after Ivey).
182. 111 N.C. App. 833,433 S.E.2d 798 (1993).
183. 85 N.C. App. 345,354 S.E.2d 733 (1987).
184. Richardson, 345 N.C. at 133, 478 S.E.2d at 504. Brewington addressed "whether
there was any competent evidence to support the findings [of fact of the Industrial
Commission] and whether those findings support the conclusions of law" in the tort claim
of an inmate injured in a slip-and-fall in a prison kitchen. Brewington, 111 N.C. App. at
835, 433 S.E.2d at 799. Baker addressed whether the evidence found by the Industrial
Commission supported its conclusion that a fellow inmate was not negligent when he shut a
window on Baker's fingers while it was being cleaned. See Baker, 85 N.C. App. at 346, 354
S.E.2d at 734.
185. See Brewington, 111 N.C. App. at 838-39, 433 S.E.2d at 801; Baker, 85 N.C. App.
at 347, 354 S.E.2d at 734.
186. See Richardson, 345 N.C. at 133, 478 S.E.2d at 504.
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judiciary have continually permitted working prisoners to sue the
state in tort.!" Presumably, had the exclusive remedy provision been
operable, the court would have dismissed the claims asserted by
Brewington and Baker." Thus, it is hard to see why the Richardson
court- felt that Brewington and Baker were "not instructive to the
issue at hand."'"1 Ironically, Brewington and Baker addressed issues
in tort deriving from a statute under which the Richardson court
stated that a claim for relief could not be upheld if brought by a
working prisoner.19
Richardson also discussed the issue of deferral as it is presented
by the statutory discharge rule built into the workers' compensation
provisions."9 The court rejected any contentions based on deferral
for two reasons: first, that the purpose of workers' compensation is
187. In Blackmon, Judge Greene noted that "despite having amended both the
Worker's Compensation Act and the Tort Claims Act since Ivey, the Legislature, for more
than thirty years ... has not acted to exclude prisoners from the provisions of the Tort
Claims Act." See Blackmon v. North Carolina Dep't of Correction, 118 N.C. App. 666,
675, 457 S.E.2d 306, 311 (1995) (Greene, I., dissenting), aff'd, 343 N.C. 259, 470 S.E.2d 8
(1996). This inaction underscores the notion that where the legislature does not change a
statute following an interpretation by the supreme court, the legislature may be said to be
"satisfied with the [court's] interpretation." Hewett v. Garrett, 274 N.C. 356, 361, 163
S.E.2d 372, 375 (1968); see also Andersen v. Baccus, 109 N.C. App. 16, 22, 426 S.E.2d 105,
108 (1993) ("When the legislature acts, it is always presumed that it acts with full
knowledge of prior and existing law; and where it chooses not to amend a statutory
provision... we may assume that it is satisfied with that interpretation."), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part on other grounds, 335 N.C. 526, 439 S.E.2d 136 (1994).
188. Cf. Richardson, 345 N.C. at 133, 478 S.E.2d at 504 (discussing Brewington and
Baker). If workers' compensation is the sole remedy available to injured working inmates,
then Brewington and Baker are anomalies. Judge Greene posited that Brewington and
Baker's existence may be explained in part by the statutory discharge rule in the Workers'
Compensation Act. See Richardson v. North Carolina Dep't of Corrections, 118 N.C. App.
704, 708-09, 457 S.E.2d 325, 328 (1995) (Greene, J., dissenting), aff'd, 345 N.C. 128, 478
S.E.2d 501 (1996). Section 97-13(c) confers compensation only on discharged prisoners.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-13(c) (1991). As such, a prisoner who is still incarcerated is not
entitled to compensation under the Workers' Compensation Act. See Richardson v. North
Carolina Dep't of Corrections, 118 N.C. App. 704,708-09, 457 S.E.2d 325, 328 (Greene, J.,
dissenting), affd, 345 N.C. 128, 478 S.E.2d 501 (1996). Where a person is not entitled to
compensation under the Act, she is not limited by the operation of § 97-10.1 and thus is
free to pursue a claim in tort. See id at 709, 457 S.E.2d at 328 (Greene, J., dissenting).
Therefore, as both Brewington and Baker were incarcerated at the time they brought their
cases before the Industrial Commission, the fact that the exclusive remedy provision was
not used to bar their claim suggests that the court has accepted that "[an inmate's] only
remedy while he is in prison is under the Tort Claims Act." Id. (Greene, J., dissenting).
189. Richardson, 345 N.C. at 133,478 S.E.2d at 504.
190. See id.
191. See iU at 133-34, 478 S.E.2d at 505. The statutory discharge rule defers the
benefits to prisoners under workers' compensation until their lawful discharge from prison.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-13(c).
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to compensate injured employees "for their loss ofearning capacity
at approximately their present standard of living, not to compensate
for pain and suffering," and second, that a prisoner is merely barred
from compensation while incarcerated.' However, these
justifications raise several points that render the court's reasoning
somewhat suspect.
Under the court's interpretation of the statutory discharge rule,
two categories of working prisoners will be wholly denied from
recovering for their injuries: the prisoner whose injuries heal before
discharge and the prisoner incarcerated for life.o In either case, the
prisoner may be seriously injured by the negligence of prison
officials, but will be denied compensation for the prison's act of
negligence.' Apparently ignoring this discrepancy, the court
dismissed this point as not germane because "the deferment of
compensation until discharge rule does not act as a bar against
remedy. ' ' m
Moreover, by the plain language of the applicable workers'
compensation provisions, one could argue that a prisoner should be
entitled to choose between a remedy in tort or workers'
compensation. 6 Section 97-13(c) states that "such discharged
prisoner or the dependents or next of kin of such discharged prisoner
may have the benefit of this Article by applying to the Industrial
192. Richardson, 345 N.C. at 133-34, 478 S.E.2d at 505 (citing JERNIGAN, supra note
46, §§ 1-1 to -3, at 1-7).
193. See Plaintiff Appellant's New Brief at 11, Richardson (No. 250A95) ("The
Workers' Compensation Act does not apply to any incarcerated prisoners; to prisoners
whose disabling injuries have healed by the time of their release from prison ... or to
prisoners who are statutorily disabled, but never released."). The statutory discharge rule
mandates that to be entitled to receive compensation, a prisoner must be discharged from
prison and must still be injured. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-13(c). Therefore, any prisoner
whose injuries heal before discharge, or any prisoner who is never discharged will be
unable to receive any compensation for his injuries. See id. The court justified this point
by stating that "[t]he statutory discharge rule merely sets forth the premise that a prisoner,
who by operation of law does not have the right to earn wages, should not have the right to
receive payments made in lieu of wages." Richardson, 345 N.C. at 133-34, 478 S.E.2d at
505.
194. See Richardson, 345 N.C. at 133, 478 S.E.2d at 505.
195. Id. at 134, 478 S.E.2d at 505.
196. See id.; see also Plaintiff Appellant's New Brief at 12, Richardson (No. 250A95)
("Section 97-13(c) appears to extend the exclusive remedy provision of Section 97-10.1
only in those limited situations where the Workers' Compensation Act applies to
discharged or deceased prisoners who are statutorily disabled and elect to apply for
benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act."); Oxendine v. North Carolina Dep't of
Correction, I.C. No. TA-12513, at 19-20 (1992) ("G.S. § 97-13(c) is read to offer the
plaintiff and those similarly situated an alternative to a TCA claim, which he may elect,
but is the exclusive remedy per G.S. § 97-10.1 only if he so elects.").
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Commission."' However, the court concluded that the use of the
word "may" could not reasonably be construed to indicate an intent
to give prisoners a choice of remedy.'" In doing so, the court
adopted much of the language it had used in Blackmon,' but
unfortunately did not give this issue as much concern as it deserved.
Given the apparent inconsistencies in the court's treatment of
Ivey,20 D resolving the issue via choice of remedy provided the court
with its strongest argument against allowing a prisoner to sue in
tort.01 The court of appeals explored this issue in more detail and
stated that it did "not believe ... that the legislature, through use of
the word 'may' in § 97-13(c), intended to vest prisoners with a
greater election of remedies than available to those employees not
serving prison sentences. ,2' An interpretation that granted such an
election of remedies to prisoners and not to free laborers would be
insupportable.2' Furthermore, this argument best supports the court
in its distinguishing of Ivey since a literal reading of Ivey would
produce the unfounded proposition that the legislature intended
working prisoners to have greater access to benefits than injured free
laborers.2°
Turning to an issue not addressed by the exclusive remedy
precedent, the court utilized rational basis review to evaluate
Richardson's equal protection claims.2  Under this test, the court
197. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-13(c) (emphasis added). Interpreting this language as
permissive would mean that a prisoner could elect to pursue compensation under tort
rather than under workers' compensation. See Richardson, 345 N.C. at 134, 478 S.E.2d at
505.
198. See Richardson, 345 N.C. at 134,478 S.E.2d at 505 ("The use of word 'may' merely
establishes that plaintiff is permitted to file a workers' compensation claim.").
199. See Blackmon v. North Carolina Dep't of Correction, 343 N.C. 259, 266, 470
S.E.2d 8, 12 (1996) ("The use of the word 'may' merely permits plaintiff to file a workers'
compensation claim and cannot reasonably be construed as granting plaintiff the option of
filing a claim under the Tort Claims Act.").
200. See supra notes 168-81 and accompanying text.
201. See Richardson, 345 N.C. at 134, 478 S.E.2d at 505.
202. Richardson v. North Carolina Dep't of Correction, 118 N.C. App. 704, 707, 457
S.E.2d 325,327 (1995), affd, 345 N.C. 128,478 S.E.2d 501 (1996).
203. See id, The court of appeals went on to note that because a prisoner already
receives food, lodging, and medical care not available to free laborers, an election of
remedies for prisoners could result in "a 'double recovery' not available to employees
generally." Id.
204. See Ivey v. North Carolina Prison Dep't, 252 N.C. 615, 620, 114 S.E.2d 812, 815-16
(1960) ("The claimant administrator is entitled to have the North Carolina Industrial
Commission hear and pass on his tort claim against the Prison Department.").
205. See Richardson, 345 N.C. at 134-36, 478 S.E.2d at 505-06; see also supra notes 50-
52 and accompanying text (describing the federal and North Carolina equal protection
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first considered the distinction drawn between working and non-
working prisoners.2 6 The court noted the existence of "numerous"
legitimate governmental interests served by applying the exclusive
remedy provision to working prisoners.' Chief among these
interests were denying compensation to prisoners during
incarceration, since the state provides for their needs, limiting the
liability of the state in the same way as that of a private employer by
tying compensation to wages, and "protecting the exclusiveness of
workers' compensation as a remedy by treating work-injured
prisoners the same as work-injured private employees.""
Additionally, and perhaps of greater force, the court argued that
treating working and non-working prisoners differently mirrors the
way workers' compensation differentiates between working and non-
working private individuals."
Richardson's other equal protection claim alleged that working
prisoners were treated differently than other employees by virtue of
the monetary limitation placed on their available remedies. 1' The
court responded first by noting the considerable benefits a prisoner
receives aside from purely monetary compensation:
While in prison, all of the inmate's personal and medical
needs are paid by the State. After discharge, workers'
standards). Because it was not argued that prisoners were a suspect class or that the right
to sue in tort is fundamental, the court proceeded directly to an evaluation of the claims
under rational basis scrutiny. See Richardson, 345 N.C. at 135, 478 S.E.2d at 505-06.
206. See Richardson, 345 N.C. at 135,478 S.E.2d at 506.
207. See id. ("[Tihere are numerous legitimate governmental interests that are
rationally addressed by the exclusive remedy effect of sections 97-13(c) and 97-10.1.").
208. Id.; see also Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 243-44 (1917)
(upholding generally the right of a state to establish exclusive compensation schemes,
binding as to both employer and employee). The court's proffered justifications appear to
stem from the general purpose behind workers' compensation-to compensate laborers for
the loss of wages while limiting the liability of the employer. See supra notes 72-73 and
accompanying text (noting the general purpose behind the enactment of workers'
compensation statutes).
209. See Richardson, 345 N.C. at 135, 478 S.E.2d at 506 ("People injured at work are
limited to workers' compensation, whereas those injured elsewhere are excluded from
workers' compensation but can sue in tort."). The United States Supreme Court upheld
the ability to limit the remedies available to workers by using workers' compensation as a
valid exercise of the police power. See Mountain Timber Co., 243 U.S. at 239. Therefore,
"D]ust as the limiting of remedies is not violative of the Constitution with regard to
differential treatment of work-injured and nonwork-injured citizens, likewise the limitation
of remedies to work-injured prisoners as opposed to nonwork-injured prisoners is not
violative." Richardson, 345 N.C. at 135-36, 478 S.E.2d at 506.
210. See Richardson, 345 N.C. at 136, 478 S.E.2d at 506. Section 97-13(c) of the North
Carolina General Statutes fixes the maximum amount of compensation available to a
discharged prisoner at $30.00 per week. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-13(c) (1991).
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compensation provides medical care and vocational training
to prepare the worker for another job field. These medical
and vocational benefits may, over the course of a lifetime,
amount to far more than the $150,000 allowed under the
Tort Claims Act for some prisoners."'
The court noted that the possible variance between
compensation under the Tort Claims Act and the Workers'
Compensation Act is the same for private individuals and has been
upheld as to working nonprisoners."2 Thus, according to the court,
allowing a prisoner to elect between workers' compensation and tort
would place him in a position superior to that of a working
nonprisoner limited to a remedy under workers' compensation.2"
Interestingly, under the court's analysis, the benefits received in
prison by all inmates, such as food, shelter, and medical care, become
compensation upon injury."1 In other words, the necessities of life
provided by the prison, which are essentially the same for a prisoner
injured while working as for a prisoner injured while not working,
can be considered as compensation when applied to the injured
working prisoner, but not for the injured non-working prisoner.2"
211. Richardson, 345 N.C. at 136, 478 S.E.2d at 506. But see Whitted v. Palmer-Bee
Co., 228 N.C. 447, 453, 46 S.E.2d 109, 112-13 (1948) (stating that compensation as defined
in § 97-2 of the Workers' Compensation Act refers to the "money allowance payable to an
employee or to his dependents, including funeral benefits," but not including medical
expenses). In Hyler v. GTE Products Co., 333 N.C. 258, 425 S.E.2d 698 (1993), the court
said:
Medical and hospital expenses which employers must provide pursuant to
N.C.G.S. § 97-25 are not a part of "compensation" as it always has been defined
in the Workers' Compensation Act. We previously have determined that the
General Assembly intended medical ... payments ... to "be in addition to the
compensation to which [the employee] is entitled under the Act."
Id. at 264, 425 S.E.2d at 702 (citation omitted) (quoting Morris v. Chevrolet Co., 217 N.C.
428, 432, 8 S.E.2d 484, 486 (1940)) (alteration in original). Therefore, the Richardson
court's discussion of additional benefits may have no bearing on the issue of actual
monetary compensation that is limited to $30 per week. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-13(c).
212. See Richardson, 345 N.C. at 136,478 S.E.2d at 506.
213. See id.
214. See id. at 133,478 S.E.2d at 505 ("Prisoners have all of their daily needs met while
in prison.... [and] do not have to purchase these on the open market with what otherwise
would be their earned wage .... ).
215. See id. at 136, 478 S.E.2d at 506. This appears to be what the court suggests when
it speaks of the personal and medical needs of the injured inmate as part of "the full
benefits granted to an injured prisoner while incarcerated and the benefits afforded under
workers' compensation after discharge over and above the wage benefit." Id. However,
following this reasoning produces a discrepancy. Suppose prisoner A, serving a 10-year
sentence, is injured while working and remains injured until the date of his discharge, at
which time his injury heals. Under the court's analysis, he received benefits under
workers' compensation because he received his daily needs and medical care from the
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On the other hand, the court also responded to this equal
protection claim by noting that an injured laborer always is limited to
compensation based on the wages he was receiving at the time of
injury. 16 The court posited the example of an employee who is
injured while working a weekend-only job and whose compensation
is based not on his regular weekly job, but on the average weekly
wage from the weekend-only job. 17 The court continued by stating
that "[b]y virtue of their choice to break the law, prisoners have
placed themselves in the position of receiving a lower wage than they
would be afforded in civil society."' Given the shortfalls of the
court's argument based on a prisoner's benefits during incarceration,
this second treatment of Richardson's equal protection claim proves
stronger.
Finally, the court addressed whether the exclusive remedy
provision lowers the Department of Correction's incentive to
provide its prisoners with safe working conditions."" The court
dismissed this suggestion, finding no evidence to support the
contention." It noted the ability of an employee to sue in tort if the
employer's violation amounted to one involving substantial certainty
or intent and suggested that this option would provide some level of
safety for working inmates." Furthermore, given the constant
prison. On the other hand, suppose prisoner B, also serving a 10-year term, is injured
while eating in the cafeteria. She sues the state under the Tort Claims Act, receives an
award (less than $150,000), and serves out the rest of her sentence. Over the course of her
sentence, prisoner B will receive the same necessities of life given to prisoner A, but in the
case of prisoner B the court does not call those necessities "compensation." Additionally,
if the necessities are compensation under workers' compensation, then non-working
prisoners who receive the maximum recovery under the Tort Claims Act as well as the
necessities are receiving a double benefit at the expense of the state. In other words, what
the court includes in its discussion of benefits-providing for food, shelter, and medical
care-is really just an exercise in semantics. The court redefines what all prisoners
receive, regardless of injury, as a benefit when it is given to an injured working prisoner.
216. See id.
217. See id. Section 97-2(5) defines average weekly wages and mandates that the
average weekly wage "shall mean the earnings of the injured employee in the employment
in which he was working at the time of the injury." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(5) (1991 &
Supp. 1996).
218. Richardson, 345 N.C. at 136,478 S.E.2d at 506.
219. See id. at 136-37, 478 S.E.2d at 507.
220. See id. But cf. MIcHAEL J. MOORE & W. KIP VIScuSI, COMPENSATION
MECHANISMS FOR JOB RISKS: WAGES, WORKERS' COMPENSATION, AND PRODUCT
LIABILITY 123 (1990) (noting that an increase in possible benefits may lead workers to
exercise less care); Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEx. L. REV. 237,
239 (1996) ("Because all insurance affects incentives to reduce loss, welfare will increase
poverty, workers' compensation will increase worker accidents, and products liability will
increase consumer accidents.").
221. See Richardson, 345 N.C. at 137, 478 S.E.2d at 507; see also Woodson v. Rowland,
2466 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75
scrutiny of prison conditions by advocacy groups as being sufficient
to ensure safety, Richardson's policy contention did not do much to
stir the court.m
In conclusion, perhaps the most unsettling aspect of the
Richardson decision is its approval of the apparently meager amount
of compensation allowed by the Workers' Compensation Act."m
However, this problem is reflective of what many perceive to be a
drawback to workers' compensation in general.' In response,
numerous commentators have suggested alternative solutions such as
maintaining workers' compensation but allowing an injured worker
to sue in tort should she meet some predetermined threshold
requirement.' Applied to the prison context, a threshold
compromise could allow a prisoner who had been seriously injured
to receive compensation in tort, while weeding out frivolous and
non-serious claims." 6 This approach would preserve the structure
329 N.C. 330, 340-41, 407 S.E.2d 222, 228 (1991) ("[Wlhen an employer intentionally
engages in misconduct knowing it is substantially certain to cause serious injury or death to
employees and an employee is injured or killed by that misconduct, that employee, or the
personal representative ... may pursue a civil action against the employer."). In practice,
the "substantial certainty" requirement of Woodson has been interpreted strictly to
require that an employer's "conduct must be so egregious as to be tantamount to an
intentional tort." Pendergrass v. Card Care, Inc., 333 N.C. 233, 239, 424 S.E.2d 391, 395
(1993). Ironically, it has been argued that the facts in Woodson itself did not support a
finding of substantial certainty. See Lambert, supra note 67, at 189-92.
222. See Richardson, 345 N.C. at 137,478 S.E.2d at 507.
223. See id at 136, 478 S.E.2d at 506; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-13(c) (1991)
(limiting recovery of discharged prisoners to $30 per week).
224. See Theodore F. Haas, On Reintegrating Workers' Compensation and Employers'
Liability, 21 GA. L REV. 843, 844-45 (1987) ("[W]orkers' compensation by itself had
failed to meet the basic goal of income security for injured workers."); see also Dana AvL
Leonard, Comment, Exclusivity Provisions of Workers' Compensation Statutes: Will the
Dual Injury Principle Crack the Wall of Employer Immunity?, 55 U. CIN. L REv. 549, 550-
51 (1986) ("[R]ecovery is limited, and workers are often left worse off financially than
they were before injury....").
225. See JAMEs ROBERT CHELIUS, WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH: THE ROLE
OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION 64 (1977) (advocating allowing injured workers to sue
employers in tort for gross negligence); John E. Bohyer, The Exclusivity Rule: Dual
Capacity and the Reckless Employer, 47 MONT. L REV. 157, 175 (1986) (advocating that
employers give up immunity in situations involving their reckless conduct in exchange for
employees contributing to the cost of maintaining workers' compensation insurance);
Haas, supra note 224, at 844 (advocating "access to the tort system in cases of serious
injury where workers' compensation substantially undercompensates the victim and the
injury is caused by the employers' negligence"); Robert S. Smith, Protecting Workers'
Health and Safety, in INSTEAD OF REGULATION 311, 331-34 (Robert W. Poole ed., 1982)
(advocating suit in tort by employee in case of disease).
226. See Haas, supra note 224, at 891-94. Haas evaluates three possible threshold
requirements: the "injury threshold, the dollar threshold, and the dollar differential
threshold." Id. at 892. The injury threshold would allow suit in tort based on the type of
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and some of the exclusivity of the workers' compensation statutes
while also alleviating the apparently harsh limits placed on recovery
for working prisoners. However, such a compromise was not for the
Richardson court to make, and under its holding, inmates injured
while performing prison labor must wait until the date of their
discharge before they may petition the Industrial Commission for
relief under the Workers' Compensation Act.
JusTiN B. HEINEMAN
injury suffered by the employee. See id at 891. The dollar threshold would allow suit in
tort should the level of medical expenses resulting from the injury reach a certain dollar
value. See id The dollar differential threshold would allow a tort claim only where the
value of the injured worker's loss exceeded the value of his workers' compensation award
by a minimal amount. See id. at 892.
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Police Chase the Bad Guys, and Plaintiffs Chase the Police:
Young v. Woodall and the Standard of Care for Officers in
Pursuit
Two people are dead and four others admitted to
hospitals as a result of a chase that reached speeds of more
than 100 mph Sunday afternoon, according to the State
Highway Patrol.
As police pursued a juvenile driving erratically ... the
young male driver steered the car across the median[,] ...
colliding with one car and then crashing head-on into
another, according to reports.
Two passengers in the back seat of the car being
pursued died on the scene after being thrown from their car,
troopers said.
Rescue workers ... said victims' bodies were strewn
across the two-lane road.'
Such reports of fatalities resulting from police chases2 anger the
1. Dave Blanton, Two Die As Chase Ends in Collisions, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 12,1996, at B1.
2. The North Carolina State Highway Patrol's Policy and Procedures Manual
provides the following definition of "chase":
An active attempt by one or more officers in Patrol/police vehicles to apprehend
a suspect or violator of the law operating a motor vehicle, while that person is
attempting to avoid capture by using high-speed driving or other tactics, such as
driving off the roadway, making sudden maneuvers, or maintaining a legal speed
while willfully failing to yield to the officer(s) signal to stop.
NORTH CAROLINA STATE HIGHWAY PATROL, POLICY AND PROCEDURES MANUAL A.2-
2 (1994). The manual distinguishes a "chase" from a "traffic enforcement response" and
an "emergency response." In a traffic enforcement response, the law violator has made no
attempt to escape the officer. See id. If the violator "fails to yield to the lights and siren,
the encounter escalates to a chase." Id An emergency response refers to an officer's
driving "for the purpose of responding to situation requiring immediate police attention
.... Failure to respond in such situations would pose an additional risk of serious injury or
death to others." Id.; see also HUGH NUGENT Er AL., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, RESTRICiVE POLICIES FOR HIGH-SPEED POLICE PURSULTs 1 (1990) (defining
"pursuit").
In the first ten months of 1996, one quarter of the pursuits conducted by the North
Carolina State Highway Patrol resulted in accidents. See Craig Jarvis, Supervisor Says
Troopers Followed Policy in Fatal Chase, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 8,
1996, at B1. Out of 642 chases, 86 people had been injured and eight killed. See id.
Between October 1993 and January 1995, three people died as the result of police chases
in Durham. See Pursuing Answers on Chases, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan.
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public3 and urge police and municipal administrators to reassess
policies concerning the pursuit of violators of the law.4 Creating and
reforming such policies present difficult challenges, however, as
these efforts involve a "delicate juggling act between the capture of
suspected criminals and the safety of the public." Unless such
12, 1995, at A12; James Eli Shiffer & Tim Vercellotti, High Speed Pursuit Questioned:
Durham's Leaders Review Chase Policy, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 10,
1995, at Al; see also Geoffrey P. Alpert & Roger G. Dunham, Policing Hot Pursuits: The
Discovery of Aleatory Elements, 80 J. CR1M. L & CRIMINOLOGY 521, 527-29 (1989)
(reporting statistical study of Metro-Dade Police Department pursuits); Larry S. Miller,
Police Motor Vehicle Accidents: An Administrative Concern, POLICE CHIEF, Jan. 1983, at
25, 25-26 (reporting results of study of Tennessee law enforcement officers, finding that
one quarter of accidents involving officers resulted from emergency situations).
3. See Chris O'Brien, Hillsborough Outlaws Chases-Temporarily, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 30,1993, at B2.
4. See Michele Kurtz, Perils Slowing the Pace of Police Pursuits, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 25, 1995, at 1 (reporting comprehensive review of Durham Police
Department policy following chase-related fatality); Shiffer & Vercellotti, supra note 2, at
Al (same); see also Todd Nelson, No-Contest Plea Entered in Involuntary Manslaughter
Case: Man Gets Six-Year Sentence in Chase Death, NEWs & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
Oct. 26, 1993, at B2 (reporting review of Hillsborough Police Department policy in
response to two chase-related fatalities in less than one month). Police policies concerning
pursuits vary among departments. In Raleigh, for example, officers are required "to stop
the chase if the offense is minor and they know the suspect, or if the suspect flees the
wrong way on a one-way street." Jarvis, supra note 2, at B1. In Chapel Hill, officers may
not exceed the speed limit by more than 20 miles per hour. See id. According to the policy
of the State Highway Patrol, a patrolman may initiate a chase after weighing the
importance of apprehension against the safety of the public, the officer, and the law
violator and after determining that "such chase can be accomplished with due regard for
the safety of others." NORTH CAROLINA STATE HIGHWAY PATROL, supra note 2, at A.2-
5. A chase may be terminated by the chasing officers, the officer supervising the chase, or
an authority above the supervisor, after considering "the most rational means of
preserving the lives and property of the public." Id. at A.2-6. After a re-examination
prompted by two fatal accidents in Durham, the Durham police department adopted a
policy "among the most restrictive in North Carolina." Kurtz, supra, at B1. In part, this
policy dictates that officers may enter a pursuit only when the case involves violent
felonies and when the public would be in danger if the suspect is not caught. See id. For a
discussion of the purpose of pursuit policies, basic policy models, and recommended
elements of a pursuit policy, see NUGENT Er AL., supra note 2, at 2, 18-22, and Erik
Beckman, High Speed Chases: In Pursuit of a Balanced Policy, POLICE CHIEF, Jan. 1983,
at 34,35-36.
5. Shiffer & Vercellotti, supra note 2, at Al; see also NUGENT ET AL, supra note 2,
at 2 ("Devising [a police pursuit policy] requires that police and municipal administrators
balance conflicting interests: on one side, apprehension of known offenders; on the other
side, the safety of police officers, of fleeing drivers and their passengers, and of innocent
bystanders."); Kurtz, supra note 4, at B1 (discussing police driving instructor's message
that "the dangers of a high-speed pursuit sometimes outweigh even the benefits of
catching a crook"); Joseph Neff, Putting the Brakes on High-Speed Chases: Deaths Have
Police Rethinking Pursuit Policy, NEWs & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 29, 1993, at
Al ("Police say they need to chase and catch criminals. But high-speed pursuit can
endanger the public and the officers themselves."). The policy of the State Highway
Patrol instructs officers to evaluate the risks of a chase against the safety of the public
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chases are strictly forbidden, it is unlikely that accidents involving
police officers will stop completely.6 High-speed police chases have
been called "possibly the most dangerous of all ordinary police
activities."7
In addition to police departments, which may review the facts
surrounding an accident resulting from a police chase,8 the North
repeatedly. See NORTH CAROINA STATE HIGHWAY PATROL, supra note 2, at A.2-5 to
A.2-7. In defending a police pursuit of a speeding car, one officer said: "'All you know is,
you've got a 3,000-pound vehicle running at an unbelievable rate of speed .... That's a
bullet, and a bullet will kill you whether it has four tires or it's a naked piece of metal....
Somebody is going to die if you don't stop it.'" Jarvis, supra, note 2, at Bi; see also Jim
Phillips & Rebecca Thatcher, Police Driving Record Improves: Recent Wrecks Aside,
Accident Rate Involving Officers Among State's Lowest, AusTiN AM.-STATESMAN, Apr. 2,
1994, at Al ("[O]fficers ... have to look at the citizen's point of view. If someone is
breaking into your house at 2 in the morning, you want them to get here pretty quickly."
(internal quotation marks omitted)). In analyzing a 1987 study performed by the Metro-
Dade Police Department, Professors Geoffrey P. Alpert and Roger D. Dunham concluded
that, "[o]n the one hand, it has been demonstrated that the cost component of the
cost/benefit ratio [of police pursuits] is serious, but much less than commonly thought. On
the other hand, the benefit of initiating pursuits is that, contrary to conventional thought,
nearly three-fourths result in an arrest." Alpert & Dunham, supra note 2, at 535. Alpert
and Dunham note, however, that the results of the Metro-Dade Police Department study
may be due, in part, to the pursuit policy adopted by that department, which included
"distinct controls and accountability, coupled with effective police officer training." Id. at
535-36.
6. See Phillips & Thatcher, supra note 5, at Al (arguing that, even with proper
training, "officers are still going to be rushing to emergencies, and whether at fault or not,
they will have more accidents"). Because the suspects that police officers pursue act
beyond the officers' control, suspects can cause accidents without fault on the part of the
officer. As a sergeant in the Greensboro police department noted, "[alan officer can be
proficient and do everything in his power to prevent an accident in a high-speed chase ....
But he cannot predict what another driver is going to do, and sometimes things can go
wrong in a twinkle of an eye." Shiffer & Vercellotti, supra note 2, at Al; see also Alpert &
Dunham, supra note 2, at 538 (discussing the "uncertain contingencies" created by
behavior of the pursued party and innocent third parties). In April of 1994, the Denton
police, prohibited from engaging in high-speed chases, chased a car until it exceeded 65
miles per hour, at which time they halted the pursuit. See Scott Solomon, Six Dead/Chief:
Cops Abandoned Chase, GREENSBORO NEWS & RECORD, Apr. 4, 1994, at A4. The
pursued driver accelerated to 100 miles per hour, however, and collided with another car,
killing himself and the five passengers of the car he hit. See id.; see also Kelly Simmons, In
Hot Pursuit: Is the Quany Worth the Risk?, GREENSBORO N Vs & RECORD, Dec. 21,
1992, at Al (citing police officer's argument that "there's no guarantee that a suspect will
slow down and drive carefully if the officer does break off the pursuit").
7. NUGENTETAL, supra note 2, at 23.
8. See NUGENT Er AL., supra note 2, at 15 (outlining typical management review
procedures); Peter Khoury, Car Totaled: Greensboro Police Chase Ends in Two-Vehicle
Crash, GREENSBORO NEws & RECORD, May 11, 1994, at B4 (reporting that the details of
a chase resulting in an accident were being reviewed by the police department's Internal
Affairs Unit "as part of standard procedure"); Phillips & Thatcher, supra note 5, at Al
(reporting that the Austin Police Department's "review board examines all accidents in
which traffic investigators believe the officer was at least partly to blame"). Officers may
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Carolina state judiciary reviews pursuit-related accidents if injured
citizens bring their case to court.9 In Young v. Woodall,"0 the North
Carolina Supreme Court examined the law governing civil suits
against police officers and municipalities for injuries arising from
police chases.' Based on its interpretation of the North Carolina
General Statutes, the court established a new standard of care for
officers in pursuit of law violators.' A close inspection of state law
in this area suggests, however, that this new standard has a weak
foundation in precedent and statutory law.' Moreover, the supreme
court ignored questions that the court of appeals expressly left
unanswered in Woodall concerning immunities that may shield an
officer or a municipality from liability.'
This Note gives a brief overview of the facts and holding of
Woodall.' This discussion is followed by an examination of two
areas of background law essential to fully understanding the
significance of the Woodall decision. The first background
discussion traces the development of the standard of care to which
officers are held in suits arising from pursuit-related vehicular
face intra-departmental punishment for causing a traffic accident, including oral
reprimand, a letter of reprimand, or unpaid leave. See id. They may also be required to
undertake additional driving instruction. See i. Compare No Lessons in Hillsborough,
NEws & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 30, 1993, at A10 (arguing that training "might
well encourage high-speed chases by officers who think they are trained for them and have
some kind of expertise"), with Miller, supra note 2, at 26 (reporting study of Tennessee law
enforcement officers that found pursuit training reduced on-duty accidents), and Neff,
supra note 5, at Al ("The [North Carolina State Highway Patrol's] training appears to
have saved lives since it was stepped up in 1988."). See generally Laurie Willis,
Policewoman Who Died Had 40 Hours of Driver Training, NEws & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), Aug. 6, 1995, at B1 (discussing current driver training requirements for North
Carolina law enforcement officers).
9. In addition to safety concerns, the threat of liability for accidents resulting from
police pursuits encourages municipalities and departments to restructure police policies.
See Kurtz, supra note 4, at B1 (reporting that the restriction of pursuits "is a notion that is
catching on nationwide ... as police face increasing liability and safety concerns"); Neff,
supra note 5, at Al ("Twin concerns about safety and legal liability are pushing Charlotte
to write stricter pursuit guidelines."). For a discussion about what employees of a police
department should do in anticipation of a civil suit arising from an on-duty accident, see
Donald 0. Schultz, Vehicle Pursuit vs. the Lawsuit, POLICE CHIEF, Jan. 1983, at 32.
10. 343 N.C. 459, 471 S.E.2d 357 (1996). Justice Webb delivered the opinion of the
court. See id. at 461, 471 S.E.2d at 359. Justices Frye and Whichard each wrote a
dissenting opinion. See id. at 464, 471 S.E.2d at 360 (Frye, J., dissenting); id. at 465, 471
S.E.2d at 361 (Whichard, J., dissenting).
11. See id. at 461-64, 471 S.E.2d at 359-60.
12. See id. at 462,471 S.E.2d at 359; infra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 194-213 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 214-18 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 22-72 and accompanying text.
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accidents. 16  The second background discussion examines the
principles of governmental immunity and public officer immunity.17
This Note then reviews the holdings of the court of appeals"8 and the
supreme court in Woodall,' and then analyzes the effect of the
supreme court's opinion.2' Finally, this Note concludes with a brief
discussion of the policy implications that North Carolina courts and
the General Assembly should consider in reevaluating the issues
discussed in Woodall.
21
In the early morning of May 30, 1992, Christopher Allen
Woodall, an on-duty Winston-Salem police officer, was driving north
on Peters Creek Parkway in Winston-Salem. '  He spotted a
Chevrolet Camaro traveling south with only one headlight working.'
Officer Woodall turned his car around to apprehend the Camaro,
but he did not activate his blue light or siren.' He later claimed that
he did not activate these warning devices because he did not want to
alert the other driver of his presence.2' A witness claimed that
Woodall was driving quickly,26 and the officer acknowledged that,
though he was unsure of the speed at which he pursued the Camaro,
he may have been driving above the posted speed limit of forty-five
miles per hour.' The witness said that she was unsure whether
Woodall's headlights were on.'
As Officer Woodall was traveling south on the parkway in
pursuit of the Camaro, Kimberly Young was driving north on the
16. See infra notes 73-134 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 135-76 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 177-83 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 184-89 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 190-226 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 224-27 and accompanying text. This Note's examination of suits
against police officers and municipalities will be limited to common-law tort actions.
Under certain circumstances, officers and municipalities may be liable under the federal
civil rights statute for the commission of so-called "constitutional torts," committed when
an officer deprives a plaintiff of the plaintiff's civil rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994);
NUGENTETAL., supra note 2, at 3. As the Woodall court did not discuss these actions, this
Note will not review the law applicable to them. For a discussion of potential liability
under § 1983 for injuries arising from a police chase, see NUGENT ET AL., supra note 2, at
3-5.
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parkway.' As Officer Woodall and Young approached each other in
opposite lanes, the traffic light at the intersection of Link Road
blinked a yellow caution light." Young began to turn left onto Link
Road, but Officer Woodall's vehicle entered the intersection and
collided with Young's car.3
Young sued Officer Woodall, the Winston-Salem Police
Department, and the City of Winston-Salem for personal injuries
and property damages resulting from the accident. 2 The City had
liability insurance that covered only amounts greater than two
million dollars and the City did not participate in a local government
risk pool
3
At trial, Superior Court Judge D. Jack Hooks, Jr. of Forsyth
County, granted summary judgment for the Police Department, but
denied summary judgment for Officer Woodall and the City.'
Officer Woodall and the City appealed, and the North Carolina
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, granting partial summary
judgment to the City and to Officer Woodall in his official capacity.
35
The court of appeals also remanded the case to the trial court,
however, to determine whether Officer Woodall and the City were
liable under § 20-145 of the North Carolina General Statutes.3 6 In
addition, the court remanded the case to determine whether Officer
Woodall was liable in his personal capacity pursuant to § 20-145.7
The North Carolina Supreme Court granted discretionary
review? In delivering the opinion of the court, Justice Webb first





33. See id. at 461, 471 S.E.2d at 358. As explained below, see infra notes 135-48 and
accompanying text, because the City did not have liability insurance for amounts below
two million dollars, and because it did not participate in a local government risk pool, the
City retained sovereign immunity for damages less than two million dollars. For a
discussion of the significance of the City's liability coverage, see infra note 179.
34. See Young v. Woodall, 119 N.C. App. 132, 135, 458 S.E.2d 225, 227 (1995), rev'd,
343 N.C. 459, 471 S.E.2d 357 (1996).
35. See id. at 139-40, 458 S.E.2d at 230.
36. See id at 138 n.1, 13940, 458 S.E.2d at 229 n.1, 230; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-145
(1993). The opinion of the court of appeals was unanimous. See Woodall, 119 N.C. App.
at 140, 458 S.E.2d at 230. For the text of § 20-145, see infra text accompanying note 42.
37. See Woodall, 119 N.C. App. at 138 n.1, 139-40, 458 S.E.2d at 229 n.1, 230.
38. See Young v. Woodall, 341 N.C. 424,461 S.E.2d 770, granting disc. rev. to 119 N.C.
App. 132,458 S.E.2d 225 (1995), rev'd, 343 N.C. 459, 471 S.E.2d 357 (1996).
39. See Woodall, 343 N.C. at 461-62,471 S.E.2d at 359.
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supreme court, the court of appeals held that a police officer could
be liable for his official duties under an ordinary negligence
standard: "[T]he standard of care that a reasonably prudent person
would exercise in the discharge of his duties. '  In applying this
standard, the court of appeals relied on North Carolina General
Statutes § 20-145, as well as the interpretation of that section by
previous decisions of the supreme court.41  Entitled "When speed
limit not applicable," § 20-145 states, in pertinent part:
The speed limitations set forth in this Article shall not apply
to vehicles when operated with due regard for safety under
the direction of the police in the chase or apprehension of
violators of the law or of persons charged with or suspected
of any such violation .... This exemption shall not,
however, protect the driver of any such vehicle from the
consequence of a reckless disregard of the safety of others.
After reviewing the court of appeals' Woodall decision, the
supreme court reviewed cases decided before the Woodall facts
arose.43 In Goddard v. Williams.' the court ruled that "'[a]n officer
is liable for his negligent acts as well as his willful and wanton
acts.' "4 In Bullins v. Schmidt," the court bifurcated the standard of
care for police officers in a chase.47 Interpreting § 20-145, Bullins set
40. Id. at 461, 471 S.E.2d at 359.
41. Prior supreme court decisions relied upon by the Woodall court of appeals
included Goddard v. Williams, 251 N.C. 128, 110 S.E.2d 820 (1959), overruled by Woodall,
343 N.C. at 462-63, 471 S.E.2d at 359-60, and Bullins v. Schmidt, 322 N.C. 580, 369 S.E.2d
601 (1988). See Woodall, 119 N.C. App. at 138-39, 458 S.E.2d at 229-30.
42. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-145 (1993). The speed limits are set out in North Carolina
General Statutes § 20-141 (1993). The North Carolina Court of Appeals has ruled that
"[the language of § 20-145 is broad enough to include not only police in direct or
immediate pursuit of law violators or suspected violators but also police who receive
notice of the pursuit and respond[] by proceeding to the scene for the purpose of assisting
in the chase or apprehension." State v. Flaherty, 55 N.C. App. 14, 22, 284 S.E.2d 565, 571
(1981). The statute also provides an exemption from speed limits to "fire department or
fire patrol vehicles when traveling in response to a fire alarm, ... public or private
ambulances and rescue squad emergency service vehicles when traveling in emergencies,
[and] ... vehicles operated by county fire marshals and civil preparedness coordinators
when traveling in the performance of their duties." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-145. For
application of this statute to ambulances, see Campbell v. O'Sullivan, 4 N.C. App. 581,
585-86,167 S.E.2d 450, 452-53 (1969).
43. See Woodall, 343 N.C. at 462,471 S.E.2d at 359.
44. 251 N.C. 128,110 S.E.2d 820 (1959), overnded by Woodall, 343 N.C. at 462-63, 471
S.E.2d at 359-60.
45. Woodall, 343 N.C. at 462, 471 S.E.2d at 359 (quoting Goddard, 251 N.C. at 133,
110 S.E.2d at 824).
46. 322 N.C. 580, 969 S.E.2d 601 (1988).
47. See id. (discussing Bullins, 322 N.C. at 582-83,364 S.E.2d at 603).
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a different standard of care for cases in which a law enforcement
officer's vehicle does not actually collide with a plaintiff or the
plaintiff's property, but the operation of an officer's vehicle causes
another vehicle to collide with a plaintiff.' The Bullins court ruled
that, in such a situation, an officer is held not to an ordinary
negligence standard, but to a gross negligence standard.49
In Woodall, the supreme court overruled the ordinary
negligence standard established in Goddard and the bifurcated
standard created in Bullins." The Woodall court established the
gross negligence standard as the single standard of care by which a
law enforcement officer's conduct should be judged in civil suits
arising from vehicular pursuits 1 In support of its holding, the court
quoted the second sentence of § 20-145 with emphasis: "'This
exemption shall not, however protect the driver ... from the
consequence of a reckless disregard of the safety of others.' "' The
court did not believe that "the General Assembly intended to
provide two different standards of care in one section of the statute.
It seem[ed] clear ... that the standard of care intended by the
General Assembly involves the reckless disregard of the safety of
others, which is gross negligence."5 3
The court then discussed the plaintiff's argument that, because
the General Assembly had not amended the statute since its
interpretation in Goddard, the legislature had acquiesced to the
standard of care set forth in that case.' In response to this argument,
the court noted that "[t]he failure of a legislature to amend a statute
which has been interpreted by a court is some evidence that the
legislature approves of the court's interpretation."5 Believing that
the meaning of § 20-145 is "clear," however, the court did "not need
48. See d. (discussing Bullins, 322 N.C. at 582-83,369 S.E.2d at 603).
49. See id. (discussing Bullins, 322 N.C. at 582-83,369 S.E.2d at 603).
50. See id. at 462-63, 471 S.E.2d at 359.
51. See id. at 462,471 S.E.2d at 359.
52. Id. at 463, 471 S.E.2d at 360 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-145 (1993)). In his
dissent, Justice Whichard also relied on the "reckless disregard" language of the second
sentence of the statute to arrive at a gross negligence standard. See id. at 465, 471 S.E.2d
at 361 (Whichard, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 462, 471 S.E.2d at 359. Justice Webb reported that the court "can see no
good reason why there should be a distinction between the standards of care based on
whether the officer's vehicle was in the collision. [Section 20-145] makes no such
distinction. The statute sets the standard, and it is gross negligence." Id. The justice
further stated that "[s]o far as Goddard is inconsistent with this case, it is overruled." Id.
at 463,471 S.E.2d at 360.
54. See id. at 462,471 S.E.2d at 359.
55. Id. at 462-63, 471 S.E.2d at 359.
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this canon of construction. '
The court then applied the standard of gross negligence to
Officer Woodall's conduct, and found that the trial court should have
granted summary judgment for Officer Woodall and the City.5 7 The
court ruled that Officer Woodall's "following the Camaro without
activating the blue light or siren, his entering the intersection while
the caution light was flashing, and his exceeding the speed limit were
acts of discretion on his part which may have been negligent but
were not grossly negligent."' Because Woodall was not liable, the
doctrine of respondeat superior did not operate to make the City
liable.5 9
Finally, the court alluded to an amicus curiae brief filed by the
North Carolina Association of Police Attorneys that argued for
public officer immunity for the discretionary acts of police officers.,'
The Association argued that public policy supports such immunity
because the immunity encourages people to become public servants
and helps law enforcement officers carry out their civic
56. Id. at 463, 471 S.E.2d at 360. In his dissent, Justice Whichard also found that the
language of the statute was "clear." See iUL at 465, 471 S.E.2d at 361 (Whichard, J.,
dissenting). But see id. at 464, 471 S.E.2d at 360-61 (Frye, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with
majority concerning clarity of statute); infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text
(discussing Justice Frye's dissent).
In response to the plaintiff's argument concerning legislative silence, the court cited
DiDonato v. Wortman, 320 N.C. 423,358 S.E.2d 489 (1987). See Woodall, 343 N.C. at 463,
471 S.E.2d at 359. In DiDonato, the supreme court asserted that it "must be leery ... of
inferring legislative approval of appellate court decisions from what is really legislative
silence.... We cannot assume that our legislators spend their time poring over appellate
decisions so as not to miss one they might wish to correct." 320 N.C. at 425, 358 S.E.2d at
490. Consistent with his position in Woodall, Justice Webb noted in DiDonato that
legislative silence may be helpful in interpreting a statute. See id. at 437-38, 358 S.E.2d at
497 (Webb, I., dissenting).
57. See Woodall, 343 N.C. at 463,471 S.E.2d at 360.
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. See id. The brief states: "The Association respectfully submits that this Court
should apply the doctrine of public officers' immunity for discretionary acts performed
within the scope of a law enforcement officer's duties, including those actions taken as a
part of vehicle pursuits." Amicus Curiae Brief for the North Carolina Association of
Police Attorneys at 2-3, Woodall, 343 N.C. 459 (No. 265P95). Although the Association's
brief argued for public officer immunity, the Woodall court only rejected "absolute
immunity." Id. Moreover, the court discussed the Association's brief in the context of the
standard of care applied to police officers generally, not the protection from personal
liability officers may receive from public officer immunity. See infra notes 165-76 and
accompanying text. Woodall does not address whether an officer may claim public officer
immunity from personal liability for pursuit-related damages. See infra notes 220-23 and
accompanying text.
2476 [Vol. 75
POLICE STANDARD OF CARE
responsibility."' Although the court recognized these arguments, it
felt bound by the clarity of the statute to establish a gross negligence
standard."
In his dissent, Justice Frye appealed to stare decisis and
deference to legislative silence." He noted that Goddard had
established a standard of negligence, and that, in Bullins, the court
had recently affirmed this standard for cases in which the officer's
vehicle actually collides with a defendant or a defendant's property.
6
Justice Frye argued that the General Assembly had "not amended
the statute to change the ordinary negligence standard, and until [the
majority's opinion in this case] it was settled as the law."
'
Responding to Justice Webb's argument based on the clarity of the
statute, Justice Frye contended that § 20-145 is not "so clear that we
should overrule Goddard and those cases which have followed it for
decades."
Unlike Justice Frye, Justice Whichard, who also dissented, did
not question the majority's interpretation that § 20-145 set forth a
gross negligence standard.67 Justice Whichard argued, however, that
the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because the
"forecast of evidence [was] sufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Officer Woodall acted with 'a reckless
disregard of the safety of others' within the meaning and intent of...
§ 20-145." '
61. See Woodall, 343 N.C. at 463, 471 S.E.2d at 360.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 464, 471 S.E.2d at 360-61 (Frye, J., dissenting).
64. See id. at 464-45, 471 S.E.2d at 360-61 (Frye, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 464, 471 S.E.2d at 360 (Frye, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 464, 471 S.E.2d at 360-61 (Frye, J., dissenting).
67. See id at 465,471 S.E.2d at 361 (Whichard, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 466, 471 S.E.2d at 361-62 (Whichard, J., dissenting) (quoting § 20-145).
Justice Whichard correctly pointed out that "[s]ummary judgment is appropriate when
there is no genuine issue of material fact and the undisputed facts establish that a party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. at 465, 471 S.E.2d at 361 (Whichard, J.,
dissenting) (citing N.C. R. CIV. P. 56(c)). Justice Whichard also noted that "[a]l
inferences of fact must be drawn against the movant [Officer Woodall] and in favor of the
nonmovant [the plaintiff]." Id. (Whichard, J., dissenting) (citing RoumUllat v. Simplistic
Enters., Inc., 331 N.C. 57, 62-63, 414 S.E.2d 339, 341-42 (1992)). In applying these
principles to the facts of Woodall, Justice Whichard agreed with the court of appeals,
which also found genuine issues of material fact. See Young v. Woodall, 119 N.C. App.
132, 139, 458 S.E.2d 225, 230 (1995), rev'd, 343 N.C. 459, 471 S.E.2d 357 (1996). Justice
Whichard's dissent also finds support in Roberson v. Griffeth, 57 N.C. App. 227, 291 S.E.2d
347 (1982), overruled by Bullins v. Schmidt, 322 N.C. 580, 585, 369 S.E.2d 601, 604 (1988).
In Roberson, the defendant police officer was sued for the death of a man involved in an
accident with a car that the police officer was chasing. See id. at 227-28, 291 S.E.2d at 348.
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The supreme court's decision in Woodall is significant in two
respects. First, the court established a new standard of care for
police officers in cases in which a police vehicle has collided with a
civilian's person or property during a police chase.69 As discussed
below, the shift toward this gross negligence standard may have been
the result of misinterpretations of statutory and judicial language."
Second, when read in tandem, the decisions of the court of appeals
and the supreme court suggest that § 20-145 may provide a statutory
cause of action that defeats governmental or public officer
immunity.71 Unprecedented in the case law of North Carolina, this
suggestion could lead to greatly expanded liability for the actions of
police officers engaged in a chase.7
A landmark case concerning the standard of care applied to an
officer's conduct in a pursuit was Goddard v. Williams!3  In
Goddard, the plaintiff's car was hit by a car driven by a deputy
sheriff.74 The plaintiff sued the deputy for negligence, claiming in
part that the deputy was driving at an unsafe speed at the time of the
accident. The deputy claimed that he was pursuing the plaintiff
because the plaintiff had failed to stop at a stop sign.76 The trial
judge instructed the jury that the deputy could be liable only if his
conduct "'was willful, and wanton, that is, that it was intentional,
purposeful, and made for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff.' ""
The North Carolina Court of Appeals ruled that
[a]s a general proposition, issues of negligence are ordinarily not susceptible of
summary adjudication either for or against the claimant, "but should be resolved
by trial in the ordinary manner."...
Our [s]upreme [c]ourt has recognized that the actions of a police officer are
subject to the scrutiny of a jury ....
Id. at 238, 291 S.E.2d at 354 (citations omitted) (quoting 6 Ft. 2 JAMES WM. MOORE El
AL., MooRE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE & 56.17 [42] (2d ed. 1996)); see also Moore v.
Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 296 N.C. 467, 473, 251 S.E.2d 419, 424 (1979) ("As a general
proposition, issues of negligence are ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudication
either for or against the claimant .... ).
69. See Woodall, 343 N.C. at 462, 471 S.E.2d at 359.
70. See infra notes 194-213 and accompanying text.
71. See infra notes 214-19 and accompanying text.
72- See infra notes 214-19 and accompanying text.
73. 251 N.C. 128, 110 S.E.2d 820 (1959), overruled by Woodall, 343 N.C. at 463, 471
S.E.2d at 360.
74. See id. at 129,110 S.E.2d at 821.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 129, 110 S.E.2d at 821-22.
77. Id. at 132, 110 S.E.2d at 823. The deputy counterclaimed, and the jury returned a
verdict awarding the deputy damages. See id. at 130, 110 S.E.2d at 822.
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In ruling that the plaintiff was entitled to a new trial, 8 the
Goddard court established an ordinary negligence standard for
police officers in suits arising from an officer's operation of a vehicle
during a chase." The court ruled: "'We know of no better standard
by which to determine a claim of negligence on the part of a police
officer than by comparing his conduct ... to the care which a
reasonably prudent man would exercise in the discharge of official
duties of like nature under like circumstances.' ,80 In establishing
this ordinary negligence standard, the Goddard court relied on case
law8' and secondary sources.'
The Goddard court also discussed the application of § 20-145 of
the North Carolina General Statutes.' The court explained that
under § 20-145, if a defendant-police officer is operating his vehicle
in a chase, "mere speed alone, unaccompanied by any recklessness
or disregard of the rights of others, would be insufficient to support
an allegation of negligence on the part of defendant."'  In other
words, according to Goddard, a plaintiff must demonstrate more
than the fact that an officer's speed exceeded the speed limit because
an officer's excessive speed will not be considered negligence per
se.8
5
78. See id. at 134, 110 S.E.2d at 825.
79. See id. at 132-34, 110 S.E.2d at 823-25; see also Hiram A. Berry, Note,
Tors-Speed Exemption Statute-Standard of Care in Operation of Police
Vehicles-Liability of City, County, or State for Negligence of Police Officers, 39 N.C. L
REv. 460, 461 (1961) (discussing Goddard holding); Note, Seventh Annual Survey of North
Carolina Case Law, Tors-Negligence-Speed Exemption Statute, 38 N.C. L REV. 506,
600 (1960) [hereinafter Seventh Annual Survey] (same).
80. Goddard, 251 N.C. at 134, 110 S.E.2d at 824-25 (quoting McKay v. Hargis, 88
N.W.2d 456,460 (Mich. 1958)). In McMillan v. Newton, 63 N.C. App. 751, 306 S.E.2d 470
(1983), the court of appeals limited the applicability of the Goddard ruling to an officer's
conduct once in pursuit. See id. at 753, 306 S.E.2d at 472. The court wrote that it could
find no North Carolina case speaking to the standard applied to an officer's decision to
engage in a pursuit in the first place. See id. at 753, 306 S.E.2d at 472. Citing Prosser's
Handbook of the Law of Torts, however, the court ruled that an ordinary negligence
standard-that of "the reasonable man"--would apply in such situations as well. See id.
(citing W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THELAW OF TORTS § 32 (4th ed. 1971)).
81. See Goddard, 251 N.C. at 133-34, 110 S.E.2d at 824-25 (quoting McKay v. Hargis,
88 N.W.2d 456,460 (Mich. 1958)).
82. See id. at 132, 110 S.E.2d at 823 (quoting 47 AM. JUR. Sheriffs, Police and
Constables § 42 (1943); 60 CJ.S. Motor Vehicles § 375 (1969)).
83. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-145 (1993); Goddard, 251 N.C. at 133-34, 110 S.E.2d at
824-25. See supra text accompanying note 42 (providing relevant text of statute).
84. Goddard, 251 N.C. at 133, 101 S.E.2d at 824. The court's language preceding the
quoted passage is quite difficult to understand. For some explanation of this language, see
Berry, supra note 79, at 461-62.
85. Without an exemption, the single fact of speeding may establish that a driver is
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Although Goddard made clear that non-speed related conduct
will be judged by a negligence standard s6 and that speeding will not
be considered negligence per se under § 20-145, it is unclear which
standard Goddard intended to apply to the officer's speeding. The
statute itself is difficult to understand because it suggests that the
exemption shall not apply, and thus the officer will be liable for
speeding, under two different standards: the first sentence suggests
an ordinary negligence standard ("with due regard") and the second
sentence suggests a gross negligence standard ("reckless disregard of
the safety of others").' The Goddard court may have intended to
judge an officer's speed by an ordinary negligence standard. Under
this interpretation, the only function of § 20-145 is to disallow the use
of speed as negligence per se; that is, though traveling in excess of
the speed limit may not be negligence per se, such speeding may
create liability if a reasonable driver would not drive as fast under
the circumstances. This construction is consistent with the standard
of care established by Goddard for an officer's driving conduct
generally.' A problem with this interpretation of the statute,
however, is that it reduces the statute's "reckless disregard" phrase
to mere surplusage; if the exemption does not attach when an
officer's speeding is negligent, then it certainly will not attach if the
officer, is grossly negligent.
Two student notes written soon after Goddard suggest that an
negligent per se. See Edwards v. Mayes, 385 F.2d 369, 373 (4th Cir. 1967); Albritton v.
Hill, 190 N.C. 429, 430, 130 S.E. 5, 5-6 (1925); Campbell v. O'Sullivan, 4 N.C. App. 581,
586, 167 S.E.2d 450, 453 (1969).
86. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
87. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-145 (1993); see supra text accompanying note 42 (providing
relevant text of statute).
88. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text. In Campbell v. O'Sullivan, 4 N.C.
App. 581, 167 S.E.2d 450 (1969), the North Carolina Court of Appeals applied the
ordinary negligence standard to an ambulance driver's speeding after determining that
§ 20-145 precluded finding the driver negligent per se based on his speed. See id. at 586,
167 S.E.2d at 453. The plaintiff in Campbell sued the owner and the driver of an
ambulance for injuries arising from a collision with the ambulance. See id. at 582, 167
S.E.2d at 450. The defendant appealed a verdict for the plaintiff, claiming error in a jury
instruction that, if the defendant's ambulance exceeded the speed limit, then the defendant
was liable. See id. at 585, 167 S.E.2d at 452. The court of appeals held that, pursuant to
the exemption granted by § 20-145, speeding "is not negligence per se and that in such
event the common-law rule of ordinary care applies, and a speed in excess of [the posted
speed limit] is only evidence to be considered with other facts and circumstances in
determining whether he used due care." Id. at 586, 167 $.E.2d at 453. Similarly, in
McMillan v. Newton, 63 N.C. App. 751,306 S.E.2d 470 (1983), the court of appeals seemed
to apply a negligence standard to all aspects of an officer's conduct during a high-speed
chase, including speed, after applying the exemption provided by § 20-145. See id. at 753,
167 S.E.2d at 472.
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officer will lose the benefit of the speed limit exemption supplied by
§ 20-145, and thus will be liable for excessive speed, if an officer
speeds with "reckless disregard" rather than with mere ordinary
negligence.' This interpretation of Goddard allows a consistent
reading of the statute's two standards by reading the "with due
regard" language as a standard for non-speed related conduct, and
by limiting the "reckless disregard" standard to the speed itself.'
Thus, applying the "with due disregard" language, if an officer is
driving non-negligently in all other respects, a mere failure to
observe the speed limits cannot be used to establish that the officer
was negligent. The "reckless disregard" language of the statute's
second sentence provides that, even if an officer is non-negligent in
every way except for speeding, if his speeding is in "reckless
disregard of the safety of others" then the speed may be used as
evidence against the officer.91 This interpretation of Goddard and
the statute provides two hurdles for an officer to clear before he can
take advantage of the speed limit exemption: first, he must act "with
due regard" in every respect except for his speed; second, his
speeding itself may not be in "reckless disregard of the safety of
others."' Although inconsistent with cases decided after Goddard,'
this interpretation allows a consistent application of both standards
mentioned in the statute.
The Goddard decision had great influence on North Carolina
courts in the area of police officer liability for accidents arising from
police chases. In the years following Goddard, North Carolina
courts applied the ordinary negligence standard to an officer's
general driving conduct while in pursuit of violators of the law.'
89. See Berry, supra note 79, at 462-63; Seventh Annual Survey, supra note 79, at 600.
90. See Berry, supra note 79, at 462-63 & n.16.
91. See id. at 462-63; Seventh Annual Survey, supra note 79, at 600.
92. See Berry, supra note 79, at 462-63; Seventh Annual Survey, supra note 79, at 600.
An interpretation of Goddard as applying a gross negligence standard to an officer's speed
is also supported by the holdings of cases that Goddard cited with approval. In LaMarra v.
Adam, 63 A.2d 497 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1949), cited in Goddard v. Williams, 251 N.C. 128, 133,
110 S.E.2d 820, 824 (1959), overruled by Woodall, 343 N.C. 459, 463, 471 S.E.2d 357, 360
(1996), the Superior Court of Pennsylvania interpreted a statute with language similar to
§ 20-145. See LaMarra, 63 A.2d at 500 n.1 (quoting Act of June 5,1937, Pub. L 1718, § 5,
75 PA. STAT. § 635 (1939) (amending The Vehicle Code, Act of May 1, 1929, Pub. L 905,
Art. X, § 1026)). In determining if a police officer involved in a car accident qualified for
an exemption from traffic laws under the statute, the court judged the officer's conduct by
a recklessness standard. See id. at 500-02.
93. See supra note 88; infra notes 125-34 and accompanying text.
94. As discussed below, however, in Bullins v. Schmidt, 322 N.C. 580, 369 S.E.2d 601
(1988), the North Carolina Supreme Court altered the standard of care established in
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This approach may be seen, for example, in Collins v.
Christenberry.0 In Collins, a North Carolina Highway Patrolman
sought damages for personal injuries he suffered from a collision
with the defendant.- At the time of the accident, the defendant was
driving a stolen car and the plaintiff-patrolman, in an attempt to
apprehend the defendant, pulled in front of the defendant and
slowed down-a maneuver called a "running roadblock." The
defendant then bumped the rear of the patrolman's car several times
and attempted to pass the patrolman on the left using the median of
Interstate 40." The defendant then swerved back on the road, hitting
the patrol car and "sending both cars out of control and off of the
road."' After a jury verdict awarded the plaintiff-patrolman
damages, the defendant appealed seeking nonsuit on the basis of the
plaintiff-patrolman's contributory negligence."'
The North Carolina Court of Appeals applied an ordinary
negligence standard, ruling that, in determining whether the plaintiff-
patrolman was contributorily negligent, the jury must consider
"whether in performing his duty [the patrolman] exercised such care
for his ovn safety as a prudent man would have exercised in the
discharge of official duties of a like nature under like
circumstances.""1 ' The Collins court quoted Goddard in support of
this proposition" and stated that-"the true rule is that 'the standard
of care which the law requires is the same for drivers of police
vehicles as for drivers of ordinary vehicles, the standard being such
care as a prudent man would exercise in the discharge of official
duties of a like nature under like circumstances.' "103
Collins is also consistent with Goddard in its interpretation of
Goddard. See infra notes 107-24 and accompanying text. Thus, North Carolina cases
remained wholly consistent with Goddard on the issue of negligence only until 1988.
95. 6 N.C. App. 504,170 S.E.2d 515 (1969).
96. See id. at 506,170 S.E.2d at 516.
97. See id. at 506,170 S.E.2d at 517.
98. See id. at 506-07, 170 S.E.2d at 517.
99. Id. at 507,170 S.E.2d at 517.
100. See id.
101. Id. at 508, 170 S.E.2d at 518. Because the defendant's claim of contributory
negligence relied on the officer's running roadblock, and not on his speed, Collins does not
clarify the standard of care to be applied to an officer's speed. See supra notes 86-93 and
accompanying text. Collins applied Goddard's ordinary negligence standard to the
officer's driving conduct generally, especially focusing on his running roadblock. See
Collins, 6 N.C. App. at 508,170 S.E.2d at 518.
102. See Collins, 6 N.C. App. at 509, 170 S.E.2d at 519.
103. Id. at 508,170 S.E.2d at 518 (quoting 60 CJ.S. Motor Vehicles § 375 (1969)).
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§ 20-145. Like the Goddard court,'" the Collins court interpreted
§ 20-145 as a narrowly tailored provision that does no more than
provide an exemption from speed limits.' As in Goddard, the court
relied on case law and a secondary source, not the statute, in
justifying the use of an ordinary negligence standard. °6
Goddard's influence on North Carolina law weakened when the
North Carolina Supreme Court decided Bullins v. Schmidt," a case
in which the court revisited the standard applied to police officers in
a chase and suggested a new interpretation of § 20-145. In Bullins, a
Greensboro police officer began to pursue someone whom he
observed driving a car with out-of-state plates."° In an attempt to
pass a car in front of him in a no-passing zone during the chase, the
suspect drove his car into an oncoming car, driven by Maxie Lee
Bullins.1 9 Both the suspect and Bullins died as a result of the
104. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
105. See Collins, 6 N.C. App. at 508,170 S.E.2d at 58. The defendant in Collins claimed
that the plaintiff-patrolman was contributorily negligent in failing to follow § 20-151 of the
North Carolina General Statutes, a statute requiring a driver who is about to be passed to
move aside. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-151 (1993). The defendant claimed that since § 20-
145 provides officers in the chase an exemption from speed limits only, and does not
provide an exemption from other sections of the Motor Vehicles Act, the plaintiff-
patrolman should be found contributorly negligent for failing to obey § 20-151 in
executing his "running roadblock." See Collins, 6 N.C. App. at 508-09, 170 S.E.2d at 518.
While accepting that § 20-145 granted an exemption only from speed limits, the court of
appeals rejected the defendant's larger argument. The court ruled that another section of
the General Statutes directed the North Carolina Highway Patrol to " 'enforce all laws and
regulations respecting travel and use of vehicles upon the highways of the State,'" and
that the "[jimposition of this duty implies the right to employ reasonable means in a
reasonable manner in fflflling it." Collins, 6 N.C. App. at 509, 170 S.E.2d at 518 (quoting
and interpreting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-188 (1965)). This holding is consistent with
Goddard in that Collins interpreted § 20-145 as concerned only with a speed limit
exemption; the court supplied an exemption from § 20-151 by interpreting a wholly
different statute.
106. See Collins, 6 N.C. App. at 508-09, 170 S.E.2d at 518-19; supra notes 81-82 and
accompanying text (discussing the Goddard court's use of case law and secondary
sources). Other cases reflect Goddard's influence by finding a standard of ordinary care
through an interpretation of case law. See, e.g., Roberson v. Griffeth, 57 N.C. App. 227,
238-39,291 S.E.2d 347, 354 (1982), overruled by Bullins v. Schmidt, 322 N.C. 580, 585, 369
S.E.2d 601, 604 (1988); Wade v. Grooms, 37 N.C. App. 428, 430, 246 S.E.2d 17, 19 (1978).
Goddard's influence is also seen in cases interpreting § 20-145 only as an exemption from
speed limits. See, e.g., McMillan v. Newton, 63 N.C. App. 751, 753, 306 S.E.2d 470, 472
(1983); Campbell v. O'Sullivan, 4 N.C. App. 581,586,167 S.E.2d 450,453 (1969).
107. 322 N.C. 580, 369 S.E.2d 601 (1988). Woodall did not expressly overrule the
holding in Bullins but did overrule the bifurcated standard it applied. See Woodall, 343
N.C. at 462,471 S.E.2d at 359.
108. See Bullins, 322 N.C. at 581,369 S.E.2d at 602.
109. See id. at 581-82,369 S.E.2d at 602.
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collision,"0 and the administratrix of Bullins's estate sued the police
officer and the City of Greensboro.' The trial court denied the
officer's motion for directed verdict, and the officer appealed."'
In reversing the decision of the trial court, the North Carolina
Supreme Court departed from precedent in two ways. First, the
court bifurcated the standard to which an officer was held concerning
his driving during a pursuit."m  The Bullins court ruled that the
Goddard standard of ordinary negligence applied only to situations
"where the conduct of an officer in the chase or apprehension of a
law violator results in the officer's vehicle colliding with another
person, vehicle or object."" 4  The court then held that a different
standard should apply "where the injuries complained of do not
result from the officer's vehicle colliding with another person,
vehicle, or object in the chase or apprehension of a law violator."'"
For such situations the court established a gross negligence
standard."6
The second departure in Bullins was the court's reading of § 20-
145 as establishing a general standard of care. This use of § 20-145
110. See id. at 581, 369 S.E.2d at 602.
111. See id. at 580, 369 S.E.2d at 601.
112. See i4. at 582, 369 S.E.2d at 603.
113. See id. at 582-83, 369 S.E.2d at 603.
114. Id. at 582,369 S.E.2d at 603.
115. Id. at 583, 369 S.E.2d at 603. The supreme court wrote: "This [c]ourt faces for the
first time the determination of the proper standard of care where the injuries complained
of do not result from the officer's vehicle colliding with another person, vehicle, or object
in the chase or apprehension of a law violator." Id. The court of appeals, however, had
faced such a fact pattern twice, and applied an ordinary negligence standard on both
occasions. See McMillan v. Newton, 63 N.C. App. 751, 753, 306 S.E.2d 470, 472 (1983);
Roberson v. Griffeth, 57 N.C. App. 227, 238-39, 291 S.E.2d 347, 354 (1982), overruled by
Bullins, 322 N.C. at 584,369 S.E.2d at 604.
116. See Bullins, 322 N.C. at 583, 369 S.E.2d at 603. The court defined gross negligence
as "wanton conduct done with conscious or reckless disregard for the rights and safety of
others." Id. at 583, 369 S.E.2d at 603.
In applying the standard to the facts of the case before it, the court ruled that the
officer's decisions to engage and to continue his pursuit were not negligent, "much less
grossly negligent." Id. at 584, 369 S.E.2d at 604. In his dissent in Woodall, Justice Frye
noted that, because the Bullins court found that the officers in that case were not
negligent, the Bullins court "apparently would have reached the same result [a granting of
the defendants' motion for a directed verdict] had it simply applied the Goddard standard
to the facts of that case without stating a different standard." Woodall, 343 N.C. at 464-65,
471 S.E.2d at 361 (Frye, J., dissenting).
For an example of a post-Bullins decision in which an officer's vehicle collided with
"another person, vehicle or object," and thus an ordinary negligence standard was
employed, see Minks v. North Carolina Highway Patrol, 116 N.C. App. 710, 711-13, 449
S.E.2d 483, 484-85 (1994).
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deviated from precedent in that, prior to Bullins, the statute had
been read solely as an exemption from speed laws." 7 In Goddard,
for example, the mention of the "due regard" standard of care in
§ 20-145 had been used only to determine whether the speed limit
exemption should apply in a given case."' In Bullins, by contrast, the
court seemed to use the statute to establish a standard of care to be
applied in determining the ultimate issue of whether an officer is
liable, regardless of whether the officer was speeding. The court
wrote:
The last sentence of [§ 20-145] establishes as the public
policy of North Carolina that if an officer's conduct under
the facts of this case is determined to be grossly negligent,
then the statute does not protect him and he may be liable
for damages proximately resulting from such gross
negligence."
In this passage, the court did not hold that grossly negligent
general conduct would result in a loss of a speed limit exemption and
liability for excessive speed; rather, the court suggested that the
grossly negligent conduct would result in liability for the general
conduct itself. The court also wrote that "[w]here the officer's
vehicle does not collide with another person, vehicle, or object under
these conditions, the policy of the state is that liability cannot attach
unless the officer's conduct constitutes gross or wanton
negligence.""0 By making gross negligence a necessary predicate for
liability, the court again demonstrated an intent to apply the statute's
"reckless disregard" language beyond the lesser issue of whether the
section's exemption should be employed, and to apply that language
to determine whether liability may attach at all.
As further evidence that the Bullins court intended to apply the
"reckless disregard" language of § 20-145 broadly to. provide a
standard by which to determine the ultimate issue of liability, the
court explicitly overruled Roberson v. Griffeth." In Roberson, the
plaintiff's administrator sued a Burlington police officer after a car
that the officer was chasing struck the decedent's vehicle.' The
117. For pre-Bulins applications of § 20-145 in which that statute was construed as an
exemption from speed limits only, see supra notes 83-85,104-06 and accompanying text.
118. See infra notes 197-98.
119. Bullhns, 322N.C. at 583,369 S.E.2d at 603.
120. Id.
121. 57 N.C. App. 227,291 S.E.2d 347 (1982), overrded by Bullins, 322 N.C. at 585,369
S.E.2d at 604.
122. See id. at 227,231-32,291 S.E.2d at 347,350.
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Roberson court held that an ordinary negligence standard should be
used to determine whether the officer was liable.l"  Because
Roberson did not implicate the speed limit exemption of § 20-145,
but involved only the general standard of care applied to officers in a
chase, Bullins would overrule Roberson only if the Bullins court
intended to apply its new gross negligence standard beyond a speed
limit exemption to provide a general standard of care."
North Carolina cases decided after Bullins reflect the influence
of the case on state law. In Fowler v. North Carolina Department of
Crime Control and Public Safety," for example, a vehicle being
pursued by a state trooper collided with another car, killing the car's
three occupants." The co-personal representatives of the decedents
sued the North Carolina Highway Patrol (a division of the North
Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety), claiming
that the trooper was negligent.' Because the officer's car did not
actually collide with the decedent's vehicle, Bullins would have
mandated the use of a gross negligence standard." The North
Carolina Industrial Commission decided the case two years before
the Bullins decision, however, and thus applied an ordinary
negligence standard.' On appeal, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals found that the facts of the case allowed a retroactive use of
the Bullins gross negligence standard. "
123. See id. at 238,291 S.E.2d at 354.
124. Despite the arguments made above, see supra notes 117-23 and accompanying
text, one could argue that the Bullins court intended its gross negligence standard to be
used solely for the purpose of determining the applicability of § 20-145's speed limit
exemption, and not for the purpose of determining the ultimate issue of liability. The
decision's language is unclear, and, because the court found that the officer's acts did not
amount to either negligence or gross negligence, see Bullins, 322 N.C. at 584, 369 S.E.2d at
604, it is difficult to conclude with certainty that Bullins abrogated an ordinary negligence
standard completely. It is clear, however, that the court of appeals in Fowler v. North
Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety, 92 N.C. App. 733, 376 S.E.2d 11
(1989); see infra notes 125-34 and accompanying text, and the supreme court in Woodall,
see infra note 194, interpreted Bullins as providing, through an interpretation of § 20-145, a
general standard of gross negligence that should be used in determining ultimate issues of
liability.
125. 92 N.C. App. 733,376 S.E.2d 11 (1989).
126. See id. at 733-34, 376 S.E.2d at 11-12.
127. See id. at 734, 376 S.E.2d at 12.
128. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
129. See Fowler, 92 N.C. App. at 734,376 S.E.2d at 12.
130. See id. at 735, 376 S.E.2d at 13. The court held that the Bullins gross negligence
standard could be applied retroactively because "[p]rospective application [of the Bullins
gross negligence standard] would thwart the public policy of protecting law enforcement
officers attempting to apprehend motorists exceeding a safe speed limit." Id. The court
also found that it could apply the Bullins standard retroactively because doing so would
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One sees Bullins's influence not only in Fowler's use of the gross
negligence standard, but also in Fowler's use of § 20-145 as a source
of a general standard of care. After stating that "a law enforcement
officer will be held liable for damages proximately resulting from his
or her gross negligence," Fowler cited not only Bullins, but also § 20-
145.'1 Moreover, after determining that the officer's conduct was not
grossly negligent, the court did not mention that, as a result of its
finding, the officer attained the benefit of a speed limit exemption. 2
Following the application of § 20-145 suggested in Bullins," Fowler
interpreted the "reckless disregard" language of § 20-145 as
applicable in determining the ultimate issue of liability, rather than
applicable only in determining the applicability of a speed exemption
statute.'M
In addition to implicating the proper standard of care for police
officers in a chase, and the proper role of § 20-145 in developing this
standard, both the supreme court and court of appeals decisions in
Woodall implicated the doctrines of governmental immunity and
public officer immunity. Before discussing the manner in which the
court of appeals and the supreme court treated Goddard and its
progeny in Woodal4 the supporting issue of who may be liable for
torts involving law enforcement officers must be examined.
One potential candidate for tort liability arising from accidents
involving a city's law enforcement officer is the employer of that
officer-the city itself.'" The doctrine of governmental immunity"
not prejudice the plaintiff. The court noted that the Industrial Commission had found that
the defendant had not been negligent. Thus, the defendant certainly would pass the less
rigorous gross negligence standard of Bullins. See id. The court concluded that it did "not
believe a retroactive application of Bullins would significantly impair the administration of
justice." Id.
131. Id. at 736, 376 S.E.2d at 13.
132. See id.
133. See supra notes 117-24 and accompanying text.
134. See Fowler, 92 N.C. App. at 736,376 S.E.2d at 13.
135. The availability of actions against the employers of law enforcement officers
differs depending on whether the employer is a state, county, or city. The availability of
actions against the State of North Carolina is governed by the Torts Claims Act, and
actions against county officers may be pursued under an officer's bond. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 143-291 to -300.1 (1996) (Tort Claims Act); id. § 58-76-5 (1994) (providing suit
on officer's bond). As the facts of Woodall involve a municipal police officer, this Note
considers only the potential liability arising out of the activities of city law enforcement
officers.
136. For a discussion of the history of the doctrine of governmental immunity in North
Carolina, see Jones v. Kearns, 120 N.C. App. 301, 310, 462 S.E.2d 245, 250 (Wynn, J.,
concurring in the result only), disc. rev. denied, 342 N.C. 414, 465 S.E.2d 541 (1995) and
Steelman v. City of New Bern, 279 N.C. 589, 592-95,184 S.E.2d 239, 241-43 (1971).
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protects a city' from liability arising out of governmental activities"8
carried out through municipal officers or employees. As law
enforcement is a governmental activity,"' "it is well-settled that,
137. For recent applications of governmental immunity in the municipal context, see
Lyles v. City of Charlotte, 344 N.C. 676, 679-82, 477 S.E.2d 150, 152-54 (1996) (granting
summary judgment for defendant city after finding no waiver of governmental immunity);
Gregory v. City of Kings Mountain, 117 N.C. App. 99, 103, 450 S.E.2d 349, 353 (1994)
(holding that governmental immunity did not protect city for damages arising from
supplying natural gas); Mullins v. Friend, 116 N.C. App. 676, 681, 449 S.E.2d 227, 230
(1994) (holding defendant city not liable because plaintiff failed to allege waiver of
governmental immunity); and Taylor v. Ashburn, 112 N.C. App. 604, 606, 436 S.E.2d 276,
278 (1993) (holding that governmental immunity protects city from damages arising from
operation of fire department).
138. "Governmental" activities are contrasted with "proprietary" activities. See
CHARLES E. DAYE & MARK W. MORRIS, NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS § 19.42.32,
at 313-14 (1981). In general, the distinction is based on a city's "dual nature"; a city is part
sovereign (governmental), and part corporation (proprietary). See id; see also Koontz v.
City of Winston-Salem, 280 N.C. 513, 519, 186 S.E.2d 897, 902 (1972) (" 'A town acts in
the dual capacity of an imperium in imperia, exercising governmental duties, and of a
private corporation enjoying powers and privileges conferred for its own benefit."'
(quoting Moffit v. City of Asheville, 103 N.C. 237, 254, 9 S.E. 695, 697 (1885))).
Determining whether a particular municipal function is governmental or proprietary has
"been called one of the most unsatisfactory" distinctions in law. DAYE & MORRIS, supra,
§ 19.42.32, at 314; see also Koontz, 280 N.C. at 528, 186 S.E.2d at 907 ("[A]pplication of
these flexible propositions of law to given factual situations has resulted in irreconcilable
splits of authority and confusion as to what functions are governmental and what functions
are proprietary."); Gregory, 117 N.C. App. at 103, 450 S.E.2d at 353 (" 'Our [c]ourts have
long noted that drawing the line between municipal operations which are proprietary and
subject to tort liability versus operations which are governmental and immune from such
liability is a difficult task."' (quoting Pulliam v. City of Greensboro, 103 N.C. App. 748,
751, 407 S.E.2d 567, 568 (1991))); Hare v. Butler, 99 N.C. App. 693, 698, 394 S.E.2d 231,
235 (1990) ("Often making this distinction proves difficult."). For one approach to the
distinction, see Jones, 120 N.C. App. at 304, 462 S.E.2d at 246 (looking to the "mission or
purpose of the City's employee," and ruling that "[ilf at the time of the alleged negligence,
the City's officer or employee is performing a governmental function, governmental
immunity protects a municipality"). In Millar v. Town of Wilson, 222 N.C. 340, 23 S.E.2d
42 (1942), the North Carolina Supreme Court distinguished between governmental and
proprietary acts as follows:
Any activity ... which is discretionary, political, legislative or public in nature
and performed for the public good in behalf of the State, rather than for itself,
comes within the class of governmental functions. When, however, the activity is
commercial or chiefly for the private advantage of the compact community, it is
private or proprietary.
Id. at 341, 23 S.E.2d at 44.
139. Despite the problematic application of the governmental/proprietary distinction, it
is clear that law enforcement is a governmental activity. See Galligan v. Town of Chapel
Il, 276 N.C. 172,175,171 S.E.2d 427, 429 (1970); Moore v. Evans, 124 N.C. App. 35, 41,
476 S.E.2d 415,420 (1996); Ingram v. Kerr, 120 N.C. App. 493,495-96, 462 S.E.2d 698,700
(1995) (quoting Mullins, 116 N.C. App. at 680-81, 449 S.E.2d at 230); Jones, 120 N.C. App.
at 306, 462 S.E.2d at 248; Michael R. Smith, Civil Liability of the City and City Officials, in
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT IN NORTH CAROLINA 86-87 (David M. Lawrence & Warren 3.
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absent statutory law to the contrary, a municipality may not be held
liable for tortious conduct of its police officers in the performance of
their duties."' 4 Specifically, the North Cairolina Supreme Court has
held that governmental immunity protects a city from liability for
accidents involving a police vehicle. 4
A city may waive its sovereign immunity by consenting to be
sued, 4" by purchasing liability insurance,' or by participating in a
local government risk pool pursuant to state statutes.'"4 The
purchase of insurance or participation in a risk pool waives immunity
"to the extent that the city is indemnified by the insurance contract
Wicker eds., 1982).
140. DAYE & MORRIs, supra note 138, § 19.42.32.1, at 315 (footnote omitted); see, e.g.,
Mcllhenney v. City of Wilmington, 127 N.C. 146,149-50,37 S.E. 187,188 (1900).
141. See Lewis v. Hunter, 212 N.C. 504,509,193 S.E. 814,817 (1937).
142. See Messick v. Catawba County, 110 N.C. App. 707, 714, 431 S.E.2d 489, 493-94
(1993) (stating that immunity may be waived by consent).
143. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485 (1994); cf. iU § 153A-435 (1991) (providing
waiver of a county's governmental immunity through purchase of insurance or
participation in government risk pool). For discussions of the effect of § 160A-485, see
Morrison-Tiffin v. Hampton, 117 N.C. App. 494, 504, 451 S.E.2d 650, 657-58 (1995), and
Mullins, 116 N.C. App. at 680-81, 449 S.E.2d at 230.
144. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485 (providing waiver of sovereign immunity through
the purchase of insurance or participation in a local government risk pool); id. § 58-23-5
(1994) (authorizing risk pool agreements); cf. id. § 153A-435 (providing waiver of a
county's governmental immunity through purchase of insurance or participation in
government risk pool). In risk pool arrangements, two or more local governments agree to
pool funds, and the pool has an obligation to cover liability incurred by its members. See
id. § 153A-435; see also Lyles v. City of Charlotte, 344 N.C. 676, 680, 477 S.E.2d 150, 153
(1996) (holding that if the pool is reimbursed by the city that has incurred liability, then
the arrangement cannot be considered a risk pool); Blackwelder v. City of Winston-Salem,
332 N.C. 319, 322, 420 S.E.2d 432, 434 (1992) (holding that a risk pool agreement must
contain at least two local governments). See generally Tamura D. Coffey, Comment,
Waiving Local Government Immunity in North Carolina: Risk Management Programs Are
Insurance, 27 WAKEFOREST L. REV. 709 (1992) (discussing various models and the recent
history of municipal risk management programs, and arguing that North Carolina courts
should find a waiver of governmental immunity any time a municipality has adequate
funds to pay claims). In explaining why a local risk pool waives immunity in the same way
as an insurance contract, one author has written, "once local government funds are pooled,
the third party administrator of the pool acts as the insurer, paying the claims from a
centralized fund. Thus, governmental immunity should not apply because the risk pool
funds are no longer part of a separate municipality's public fund necessitating protection."
Id. at 731.
In January of 1996, 268 municipalities were members of the League of Municipalities,
a risk management pool created in 1986. See Doug Donovan, Suit Bares Shortcomings of
Municipal hmmunity, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 22, 1996, at B1. At that
time the League's members included such cities as Chapel Hill, Wake Forest, and
Gastonia. See id. Many larger cities, such as Durham, were fully self-insured. See id.
For discussions about why a city would waive its immunity through the purchase of
insurance, see Jones, 120 N.C. App. at 312, 462 S.E.2d.at 252 (Wynn, J., concurring in the
result only) and Smith, supra note 139, at 97-98 and Coffey, supra, at 715-16.
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[or risk pool] from tort liability."1" Because a city may tailor its
insurance contract to cover only specific agents and specific torts,146 a
city has waived immunity only for suits involving the agents and the
torts mentioned in the contract.47 In order to state a claim against a
municipality, a plaintiff must allege that the municipality has waived
its immunity. '
North Carolina courts have held that "when public officials are
sued in their official capacities, 'the action is one against the state for
the purposes of applying the doctrine of sovereign immunity.' ,,149
Thus, sovereign immunity bars suits against a municipal officer in his
official capacity to the same extent that the doctrine protects the
municipality itself."o If a municipality waives its governmental
145. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485; see also Jones, 120 N.C. App. at 303, 462 S.E.2d at
246 (stating that a city retains immunity from liability to the extent it is not covered by
insurance or participation in a risk pool); Mullins, 116 N.C. App. at 680-81, 449 8.E.2d at
230 (noting that a city may waive immunity by purchasing insurance but only for the acts
covered by the contract).
146. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485(b).
147. See i § 160A-485; Shuping v. Barber, 89 N.C. App. 242, 247-48, 365 8.E.2d 712,
715-16 (1988); Coffey, supra note 144, at 710.
148. See Ingram v. Kerr, 120 N.C. App. 483, 495-96, 462 S.E.2d 698, 700 (1995) (citing
Mullins, 116 N.C. App. at 680-81, 449 S.E.2d at 230); Morrison-Tiffin, 117 N.C. App. at
504, 451 S.E.2d at 65 (citing Whitaker v. Clark, 109 N.C. App. 379, 384, 427 S.E.2d 142,
145 (1993)).
149. Messick v. Catawba County, 110 N.C. App. 707, 714, 431 S.E.2d 489, 494 (1993)
(quoting Whitaker, 109 N.C. App. at 381-82, 427 S.E.2d at 143-44); see also Gregory v. City
of Kings Mountain, 117 N.C. App. 99, 102, 450 S.E.2d 349, 352-53 (1994) ("An action
brought against individual officers in their official capacities is an action against the
municipality.").
150. See Moore v. Evans, 124 N.C. App. 35, 41, 476 S.E.2d 415, 421 (1996) ("Police
officers, as public officers, share in the immunity of their governing municipalities.");
Morrison-Tiffin, 117 N.C. App. at 504, 451 S.E.2d at 657 ("Under the doctrine of
governmental immunity, a municipality and its officers or employees sued in their official
capacities are immune from suit for torts committed while the officers or employees are
performing a governmental function."); Taylor v. Ashburn, 112 N.C. App. 604, 607, 436
S.E.2d 276, 279 (1993) ("Governmental immunity protects the governmental entity and its
officers or employees sued in their 'official capacity.' ").
In Taylor v. Ashburn, the court of appeals discussed how to determine whether a
plaintiff has filed a claim against an officer in his individual or official capacities. See id. at
607-08, 436 S.E.2d at 279. The court ruled that the plaintiff's caption designation "is not
determinative on whether or not a defendant is actually being sued in his or her individual
or official capacity." Id. at 607, 436 S.E.2d at 279 (citing Stancill v. City of Washington, 29
N.C. App. 707,710,225 S.E.2d 834, 836 (1976)). Rather, the court
must inspect the text of the complaint as a whole .... If the plaintiff fails to
advance any allegations in his or her complaint other than those relating to a
defendant's official duties, the complaint does not state a claim against a
defendant in his or her individual capacity, and instead, is treated as a claim
against defendant in his official capacity.
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immunity by the purchase of liability insurance or through
participation in a risk pool, then an officer, in his official capacity,
loses the benefit of the municipality's sovereign immunity to the
extent that the municipality has waived it.5s
Governmental immunity has been widely criticized in recent
decades. In his dissent in Jones v. Kearns,!'2 North Carolina Court of
Appeals Judge Wynn noted that one criticism of the doctrine has
been its undemocratic source in English feudal law, where it was held
that "the king could do no wrong." ' Judge Wynn also emphasized
the unfairness of denying citizens a redress for harms done to them.
T
5
Id. (citation omitted); see also Robinette v. Barriger, 116 N.C. App. 192, 203-04, 477
S.E.2d 498, 502 (1994) (looking to the "crux of the plaintiffs action" to determine whether
claim was against an official in his official or individual capacity); Dickens v. Thorne, 110
N.C. App. 39,46,429 S.E.2d 176,180 (1993) (looking to complaint to determine if plaintiff
was suing defendant in his individual or his official capacity). An officer accused of acting
beyond the scope of his authority may be sued inhis individual capacity. See Epps v. Duke
Univ., 116 N.C. App. 305, 310-11, 447 S.E.2d 444, 448 (1994). Interestingly, neither the
court of appeals nor the supreme court in Woodall addressed this issue. See Woodall, 343
N.C. at 461-66, 471 S.E.2d at 359-62; Young v. Woodall, 119 N.C. App. 132, 134-40, 458
S.E.2d 225, 227-30 (1995), rev'd, 343 N.C. 459, 471 S.E.2d 357 (1996). It seems that
Young's allegations against Officer Woodall concerned the officer's official duties only,
and thus the courts should have treated Young's claim against Officer Woodall as a claim
against the officer in his official capacity only.
151. See Moore, 124 N.C. App. at 41,476 S.E.2d at 421.
152. 120 N.C. App. 301, 462 S.E.2d 245, disc. rev. denied, 342 N.C. 414, 465 S.E.2d 541
(1995).
153. See id. at 310, 462 S.E.2d at 250 (Wynn, J., concurring in the result only) (citation
omitted); see also Steelman v. City of New Bern, 279 N.C. 589, 595, 184 S.E.2d 239, 243
(1971) (discussing criticisms of the doctrine, and declaring that "[fit may well be that the
logic of the doctrine of sovereign immunity is unsound and that the reasons which led to its
adoption are not as forceful today as they were when it was adopted"). But see Smith v.
State, 289 N.C. 303, 341-42, 222 S.E.2d 412, 436-37 (1976) (Lake, I., dissenting) (arguing
that governmental immunity is not antithetical to democracy).
154. See Jones, 120 N.C. App. at 312-13, 462 S.E.2d at 252 (Wynn, J., concurring in the
result only). In discussing the costs and benefits of governmental immunity, one author
argues:
Originally, the purpose of immunity was to promote the best interests of society
by protecting public funds and providing officials with ample discretion to secure
the public good.
The competing public policy interest, however, which disfavors blanket
immunity, is the idea of protecting the individual citizen. By assuring adequate
compensation, the individual harmed by local government negligence is treated
similarly to an individual harmed by any other nongovernmental negligent act.
While the two policies seem similarly directed toward an aggregate public good,
protection of individuals within a community is the policy which actually confers
an immediate personal and practical benefit to the people.
Coffey, supra note 144, at 730-31 (footnote omitted). According to this author, "[t]he
explicit public policy behind section 160A-485 [allowing waiver of governmental immunity
through the purchase of insurance or through participation in a risk pool] is the concern for
giving adequate compensation to persons injured by a public entity." Id. at 731.
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In Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem,' the North Carolina Supreme
Court refused to alter the doctrine of governmental immunity, but
recognized that this unfairness has contributed to a nationwide trend
to restrict governmental immunity."' The Koontz court wrote:
[W]e recognize merit in the modern tendency to restrict
rather than to extend the application of governmental
immunity. This trend is based, inter alia, on the large
expansion of municipal activities, the availability of liability
insurance, and the plain injustice of denying relief to an
individual injured by the wrongdoing of a municipality. A
corollary to the tendency of modern authorities to restrict
rather than to extend the application of governmental
immunity is the rule that in cases of doubtful liability
application of the rule should be resolved against the
municipality.'
Another criticism of governmental immunity centers on the fact that
the government can decide when it will waive its immunity and which
plaintiffs it will pay, and thus may use the shield of immunity in
negotiating a settlement.'
Although many state supreme courts have completely abolished
the doctrine of governmental immunity since the 1950s, 5 North
Carolina decisions have expressed great hesitancy to abrogate the
doctrine. Such cases note that, although governmental immunity
began as a common-law rule, the General Assembly has recognized
its legitimacy through statute, and thus only the General Assembly
may alter the doctrine.16  In Smith v. State,16' the supreme court
created an exemption from governmental immunity for actions
155. 280 N.C. 513,186 S.E.2d 897 (1972).
156. See id. at 529-30,186 S.E.2d at 908.
157. Id.
158. See Coffey, supra note 144, at 731 ("Governmental immunity historically has been
manipulated so as to deny recovery to deserving claimants, and today, [alternatives to
insurance] are being similarly exploited."); Donovan, supra note 144, at B1. But see i.
("Proponents of municipal immunity say it's necessary to let government operate without
having its tax coffers siphoned by claims filed against the city.").
159. See COMM1TrEE ON THE OFFICE OF ATrORNEY GENERAL, THE NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF ATrORNEYS GENERAL, SOVEREIGN TMMUNITY: THE TORT LIABILITY
OF GOVERNMENT AND ITS OFFICIALS 19-27 (1979); see also Holytz v. City of Milwaukee,
115 N.W.2d 618, 620-25 (Wis. 1962) (providing an overview of other states' action in
abolishing governmental immunity).
160. See Blackwelder v. City of Winston-Salem, 332 N.C. 319,324, 420 S.E.2d 432,435-
36 (1992); Steelman v. City of New Bern, 279 N.C. 589, 594-95, 184 S.E.2d 239, 242-43
(1971).
161. 289 N.C. 303,222 S.E.2d 412 (1976).
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arising out of contract," but the court expressly limited its holding,
noting that "it may well be that if the State's immunity from tort
liability is to be abolished or modified it should be done under rules,
and perhaps within limits, fixed by the General Assembly."'' In
1995, the General Assembly attempted to reform governmental
immunity for localities, but the complexity of the issue resulted in
inaction."
Another candidate for liability for accidents arising out of a
police officer's chase is the officer in his personal capacity." The
second sentence of § 20-145 suggests that a cause of action may lie
against a law enforcement officer individually for torts committed
through his driving conduct during a chase.1' As the defendant's
brief in Woodall noted, 7 the second sentence of § 20-145 focuses on
the "driverls]" liability." Moreover, in Goddard v. Williams,'6 the
supreme court quoted American Jurisprudence as follows: "'A
peace officer is generally held to be personally liable for negligence
or wrongful acts causing personal injury or death.' ,,70
Police officers sued in their personal capacities have a potent
defense, however, in the doctrine of public officer immunity. In
162. See id. at 320, 222 S.E.2d at 423-24.
163. Id. at 322,222 S.E.2d at 425.
164. See Donovan, supra note 144, at B1. The legislature, however, has provided for a
waiver of municipal immunity by the purchase of liability insurance or through
participation in a risk pool in § 160A-485 of the General Statutes. See supra notes 143-48
and accompanying text.
165. As discussed below, see infra notes 171-76, when the doctrine of public officer
immunity applies, in order to sue a public officer in his personal capacity, the officer's acts
performed under the color of authority must be shown as malicious, corrupt, or outside the
scope of official duties. See Moore v. Evans, 124 N.C. App. 35, 42, 476 S.E.2d 415, 421
(1996); Epps v. Duke Univ., 122 N.C. App. 198, 205-06, 207, 468 S.E.2d 846, 852-53, disc.
rev. denied, 344 N.C. 436,476 S.E.2d 115 (1996).
166. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-145 (1993).
167. See Defendant Appellants' New Brief at 9, Woodall, 343 N.C. 459 (No. 265PA95).
168. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-145 (emphasis added).
169. 251 N.C. 128, 110 S.E.2d 820 (1959), overruled by Woodall, 343 N.C. at 463, 471
S.E.2d at 360.
170. Id. at 132, 110 S.E.2d at 824 (emphasis added) (quoting 47 AM. JUR. Sheriffs,
Police and Constables § 42 (1943)); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 132, at 1056 (5th ed. 1984) (stating that a "plaintiff
injured by the policeman's negligent driving... may have a claim against the policeman as
an individual even though the government that has employed him shields itself with an
immunity").
171. In Dickens v. Thorne, 110 N.C. App. 39,429 S.E.2d 176 (1993), the North Carolina
Court of Appeals made clear that public officer immunity could act to protect an officer in
his individual capacity, but not in his official capacity. See id. at 45, 429 S.E.2d at 180. For
a discussion distinguishing governmental immunity from public officer immunity, see 63A
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defining the doctrine of public officer immunity, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals stated: "The general rule is that a public official is
immune from personal liability for mere negligence in the
performance of his duties, but he is not shielded from liability if his
alleged actions were corrupt or malicious or if he acted outside and
beyond the scope of his duties."'17 This immunity has limits. First, as
stated above, the doctrine will not protect officials who have acted
beyond the scope of their authority, nor will it protect acts deemed
to be "corrupt or malicious."'173 In addition, the immunity applies
only to an official's governmental duties (as opposed to proprietary
duties),'74 and is usually limited to acts requiring discretion (as
opposed to merely ministerial acts).S A primary argument in
AM. JUR. 2D Public Officers and Employees § 359, at 925-26 (1969).
172. Slade v. Vernon, 110 N.C. App. 422, 428, 429 S.E.2d 744, 747 (1993); see, e.g.,
Morrison-Tiffia v. Hampton, 117 N.C. App. 494, 503, 451 S.E.2d 650, 657 (1995); Mullins
v. Friend, 116 N.C. App. 676, 681, 449 S.E.2d 227,230 (1994); Hare v. Butler, 99 N.C. App.
693,701,394 S.E.2d 231, 237 (1990). In Epps v. Duke University, 122 N.C. App. 198, 468
S.E.2d 846 (1994), the court of appeals extensively discussed the doctrine of public officer
immunity. See id. at 202-09, 468 S.E.2d at 850-54.
173. In Robinette v. Barriger, 116 N.C. App. 197, 447 S.E.2d 498 (1994), the court of
appeals held that "[a] public official acts with malice when he or she 'wantonly does that
which a [person] of reasonable intelligence would know to be contrary to his duty and
which he intends to be prejudicial or injurious to another.'" Id. at 203, 447 S.E.2d at 502
(quoting Grad v. Kaasa, 312 N.C. 310, 313, 321 S.E.2d 888, 890 (1984)). See also Smith,
supra note 139, at 91 ("All public officers and employees are liable for damages caused by
their intentional torts. No public policy interests are served by granting public officers or
employees immunity from liability for damages for intentional wrongful acts." (footnote
omitted)).
Note also that public officer immunity may protect government officers, but will not
protect government employees. See Hare, 99 N.C. App. at 699-700, 394 S.E.2d at 236
(discussing limits of public officer immunity and the difference between officers and
employees).
174. See Messick v. Catawba County, 110 N.C. App. 707, 714, 431 S.E.2d 489, 496
(1993); DAYE & MORRIS, supra note 138, § 19.42.41, at 328-29.
175. In Hare, the court explained that "[d]iscretionary acts are those requiring personal
deliberation, decision and judgment; duties are ministerial when they are 'absolute,
certain, and imperative, involving merely the execution of a specific duty arising from
fixed and designated facts.'" Hare, 99 N.C. App. at 700, 394 S.E.2d at 236 (quoting Jensen
v. South Carolina Dep't of Soc. Serv., 377 S.E.2d 102, 107 (S.C. App. 1988), aff'd, 403
S.E.2d 615 (S.C. 1991)); see also DAYE & MORRIS, supra note 138, § 19.42.41, at 328
(stating that public officers are immune for activities involving discretion and exercise of
judgment).
Some sources call public officer immunity an affirmative defense. See Epps, 122 N.C.
App. at 205, 468 S.E.2d at 852; Ingram v. Kerr, 120 N.C. App. 493, 497, 462 S.E.2d 698,
701 (1995); Gallimore v. Sink, 27 N.C. App. 65, 68, 218 S.E.2d 181, 183 (1975); 63A AM.
JUR. 2D Public Officers and Employees § 360, at 926 (1969); cf. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S.
635, 639-40 (1980) (holding that the qualified immunity of government officers against
claims under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), which is an immunity based on
common law immunities, is an affirmative defense, and that a plaintiff does not have to
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support of public officer immunity has been the need for officers to
act for the public good without fear of being sued for unpopular
decisions. 6
Against this backdrop, Kimberly Young filed suit against the
City of Winston-Salem and Officer Woodall for damages arising
when Woodall's patrol car struck Young's automobile during the
pursuit of a third party.' At issue before the court of appeals was
the trial court's denial of Officer Woodall's motion for summary
judgment on grounds of governmental immunity and public officers'
immunity, as well as the trial court's denial of the City's motion for
summary judgment or partial summary judgment on grounds of
governmental immunity.
allege facts sufficient to defeat this immunity in order to state a claim). It is clear,
however, that a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to defeat a defendant's claim of public
officer immunity in order to state a valid claim. See Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 331, 222
S.E.2d 412,430 (1976); Ingram, 120 N.C. App. at 497-98, 462 S.E.2d at 701; Hare, 99 N.C.
App. at 701, 394 S.E.2d at 237; Jacobs v. Sherard, 36 N.C. App. 60, 66, 243 S.E.2d 184, 189
(1978). In fact, in Moore v. Evans, 124 N.C. App. 35, 476 S.E.2d 415 (1996), the North
Carolina Court of Appeals held: "To maintain a suit against a public official in his/her
individual capacity, the plaintiff must make aprima facie showing that the official's actions
(under color of authority) are sufficient to pierce the cloak of official immunity." Id. at 42,
476 S.E.2d at 421; see also Epps, 122 N.C. App. at 207, 468 S.E.2d at 851-52 (holding that
"to sustain the personal or individual capacity suit, the plaintiff must initially make a prima
facie showing that the defendant-official's tortious conduct falls within one of the immunity
exceptions" by showing "that the official's conduct is malicious, corrupt, or outside the
scope of official authority").
176. See Epps, 122 N.C. App. at 203, 468 S.E.2d at 850-51 ("If governmental officials
were constantly exposed to the threat of personal liability at the hands of disgruntled or
damaged citizens, the basis of our democracy might well be jeopardized."); Amicus Curiae
Brief for the North Carolina Association of Police Attorneys at 5, Woodall, 343 N.C. 459
(No. 265P95) ("The erosion of public officer immunity... will not enhance officer training
in the least, nor will it improve officer performance. Rather, it will result in the message
that officers should take fewer risks that may assist other people in dire circumstances, if
personal economic harm may result."); Donovan, supra note 144, at B1 (noting that,
without some immunity, "employees would be afraid of being sued for everything they did,
and nothing would get done"). The North Carolina Association of Police Attorneys'
amicus brief argued that public officer immunity is also needed in order to recruit and
retain high quality law enforcement officers, see Amicus Curiae Brief for North Carolina
Association of Police Attorneys at 4-6, and that the doctrine "is designed to save the
public officer the time and resources of a trial over the many daily discretionary functions
he undertakes," id. at 7.
177. For the specific facts of the case, see supra notes 22-33 and accompanying text.
The plaintiff also named the Winston-Salem Police Department as a defendant. The trial
court granted the Police Department's motion for summary judgment, and this decision
was not appealed. See Young v. Woodall, 119 N.C. App. 132, 135, 458 S.E.2d 225, 227
(1995), rev'4, 343 N.C. 459, 471 S.E.2d 357 (1996); see also Coleman v. Cooper, 89 N.C.
App. 188,192,366 S.E.2d 2,5 (1988) (holding that a police department does not have the
capacity to be sued).
178. See Woodall, 119 N.C. App. at 135,458 S.E.2d at 227. The court of appeals began
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The court of appeals concluded that the City and Officer
Woodall in his official capacity "would generally be immune" under
a doctrine of governmental immunity for suits below two million
dollars.' The court also concluded that "Officer Woodall would
ordinarily be entitled to immunity under the general standard of care
required of public officers and employees.""18
The court's hesitance to find the defendants completely
immune, reflected in the court's use of the terms "generally" and
"ordinarily," stemmed from the court's suspicion that § 20-145
provides a statutory cause of action against cities and officers that
circumvents the doctrines of governmental immunity and public
officer immunity. " ' With this analysis, the court of appeals
interpreted § 20-145 more broadly than any other appellate court
previously had interpreted the provision." The Woodall court of
appeals assumed, "without deciding, that claims arising under § 20-
145 are properly directed against a law enforcement officer in his
official capacity."''
its analysis by noting that "denial of defendants' motion for summary judgment on the
issues of governmental immunity and public officers' immunity is immediately
appealable." Id. at 135, 458 S.E.2d at 227 (citing Corum v. University of N.C., 97 N.C.
App. 527, 531-32, 389 S.E.2d 596, 598-99 (1990)); see also Taylor v. Ashburn, 112 N.C.
App. 604, 606, 436 S.E.2d 276, 278 (1993) (holding that appeals from decisions on
governmental and public officer immunity may be brought immediately).
179. See Woodall, 119 N.C. App. at 136, 458 S.E.2d at 228 (emphasis added). The
City's purchase of insurance for claims in excess of two million dollars should not have
waived the City's immunity for the purposes of this case because the plaintiff's damages
amounted to only $30,000 and expenses. See Record on Appeal at 12, Woodall, 343 N.C.
459 (No. 9421SC623).
180. Woodall, 119 N.C. App. at 137, 458 S.E.2d at 229 (emphasis added). The plaintiff
alleged that Officer Woodall had been engaged in a proprietary or ministerial function,
and thus could not be found immune under public officer immunity. See id. at 137, 458
S.E.2d at 228. The court concluded, however, that Officer Woodall's chase was a
governmental function, and that his alleged misconduct involved deeds of a discretionary
nature. See Woodall, 119 N.C. App. at 137, 458 S.E.2d at 228-29.
181. The court stated that the "threshold question [was] whether a statutory claim
under § 20-145 is appropriately directed against a law enforcement officer in his official
capacity, in essence constituting a claim against the municipality or, alternatively, whether
a claim under § 20-145 is properly directed against the officer in his individual capacity."
Woodall, 119 N.C. App. at 138,458 S.E.2d at 229 (emphasis added).
182. Although Bullins suggested reading § 20-145 to provide a standard of care for
officers generally, instead of just as providing an exemption from the speed limits, the
Bullins court had not held that the section provided a statutory cause of action against
officers or municipalities that circumvented governmental or public officer immunity. See
supra notes 107-24 and accompanying text.
183. Woodall, 119 N.C. App. at 138, 458 S.E.2d at 229. In a footnote, the court wrote:
"In the event plaintiff ultimately obtains a judgment premised upon its contentions of
negligence under § 20-145, we defer in the first instance to the trial court to determine
whether a statutory claim under § 20-145 is appropriately directed against a defendant in
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The supreme court discussed only briefly the issues of
governmental immunity and public officer immunity raised by the
court of appeals. The supreme court's decision focused instead on
the standard applied to a law enforcement officer's driving conduct
during a chase. After reviewing the development of the ordinary
negligence standard in Goddard1 84 and the bifurcation of that
standard in Bullins, the court overruled Goddard and effectively
overruled Bullins 6 The court relied on § 20-145 and interpreted
that statute as providing a single standard-that of gross
negligence.1"
In reference to the issues of governmental and public officer
immunity, the supreme court noted only that "[t]he court of appeals
held that because Officer Woodall could be liable for ordinary
negligence, he could be sued in his official capacity, which means the
City would be liable for his tort."1" After finding that Officer
Woodall was not liable, however, the court stated that "[i]f Officer
Woodall is not liable, the City is not liable under the doctrine of
respondeat superior.""
The opinion of the Woodall court suffers from two major
weaknesses. First, although the court implied that it interpreted
§ 20-145 consistently with Goddard, the court actually mirrored
Bullins when it interpreted § 20-145 as providing a general standard
of care for pursuit-related liability of police officers.' In fact,
Woodall based its, new standard of care entirely on a Bullins-type
his individual or official capacity." Id. at 138 n.l, 458 S.E.2d at 229 n.1. The court of
appeals held that if the trial court found Officer Woodall negligent, then governmental
immunity would protect Woodall in his official capacity and the City for damages in an
amount less than two million dollars. See id. at 139, 458 S.E.2d at 230. Public officer
immunity would protect Officer Woodall in his individual capacity. See id. at 137-39, 458
S.E.2d at 229-30. But, depending on the trial court's determination, either Officer
Woodall in his official capacity and the City, or Officer Woodall in his individual capacity,
could be liable under § 20-145. See id. at 139, 458 S.E.2d at 230.
184. See Woodall, 343 N.C. at 462, 471 S.E.2d at 359; supra notes 44-45 and
accompanying text.
185. See Woodall, 343 N.C. at 462, 471 S.E.2d at 359; supra notes 46-49 and
accompanying text.
186. See Woodall, 343 N.C. at 462-63, 471 S.E.2d at 359; supra notes 50-56 and
accompanying text.
187. See Woodall, 343 N.C. at 463, 471 S.E.2d at 360; supra notes 51-56 and
accompanying text.
188. Woodall, 343 N.C. at 461-62, 471 S.E.2d at 359. As discussed below, this is an
incorrect synopsis of the holding of the court of appeals. See infra notes 214-16 and
accompanying text.
189. Woodall, 343 N.C. at 463,471 S.E.2d at 360.
190. See infra notes 194-99 and accompanying text.
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interpretation of § 20-145.' Thus, the significant weaknesses of the
Bullins interpretation of the statute, explored below,'9 greatly
weakens the legitimacy of Woodall's new standard. The second
weakness of Woodall results from the court's failure to address
adequately the issues of governmental immunity and public officer
immunity, and the relationship of these doctrines to § 20-145.193 The
court left the proper application of these doctrines unclear in the
context of suits against police officers for accidents arising from
police chases.
In Woodall, the supreme court looked to § 20-145 in establishing
the standard of care that should be used to determine the ultimate
issue of liability for injuries arising from a vehicular police pursuit.194
The Woodall court asserted that the Goddard court also arrived at a
general standard of care by interpreting the statute; Woodall asserted
that the Goddard court focused on the "due regard" language of the
first sentence of § 20-145 to arrive at an ordinary negligence
standard.' However, when Goddard established a general standard
of care, the court cited only legal encyclopedia and case law. 9'
Goddard used the first sentence of the statute not to arrive at a
general standard of care, but only to provide a prerequisite to an
officer's attaining the speed limit exemption embodied within that
statute.' In interpreting § 20-145, Goddard held that "the speed law
exemption is effective only when the officer operates his car 'with
191. See Woodall, 343 N.C. at 462-63, 471 S.E.2d at 559-60.
192. See infra notes 200-11 and accompanying text.
193. See infra notes 214-19 and accompanying text.
194. While Woodall's language reflects the court's reliance on § 20-145 in arriving at a
gross negligence standard, see supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text, Woodall's
application of that standard demonstrates the court's belief that § 20-145 establishes a
standard of care for determining the ultimate issue of liability. After determining that
Officer Woodall's conduct "may have been negligent but [was] not grossly negligent," the
court decided the ultimate issue of the case, holding that the trial court should have
granted Officer Woodall summary judgment. See Woodall, 343 N.C. at 463, 471 S.E.2d at
360. Had the court limited its use of the gross negligence standard to the applicability of
the speed limit exemption, once it had determined that Officer Woodal was not grossly
negligent, the court would have found that he got the benefit of the exemption and thus
was not negligent per se for speeding. The court would still have had to determine
whether Officer Woodall's overall conduct violated an ordinary negligence standard
before finding that summary judgment should have been granted. By not utilizing an
ordinary negligence standard before determining the outcome of this case, the court
clearly evinced its belief that the gross negligence standard, drawn from § 20-145, should
be used to determine ultimate issues of liability.
195. See Woodall, 343 N.C. at 462, 471 S.E.2d at 359.
196. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
197. See Berry, supra note 79, at 463 n.16.
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due regard for safety' and does not protect him 'from the
consequences of a reckless disregard of the safety of others.' "'
The Woodall court's interpretation of § 20-145 as a general duty-
of-care statute relies not on a tradition begun with Goddard, but
rather on an interpretation first suggested in Bullins.' Bullins's
apparent reliance on § 20-145 in establishing a general standard of
care has weak authority in precedent and statutory construction.
Although the statute had been mentioned in earlier cases discussing
a standard of care, earlier decisions used the statute only to provide a
speed limit exemption.2  Moreover, the language of the statute
strongly suggests that the General Assembly intended the statute to
be an exemption from speed limits, not the establishment of a
general standard of care. The statute's title is, simply, "When speed
limit not applicable."20 1 Furthermore, the first sentence of the statute
strictly limits the scope of the statute to a speed limit exemption.2"
It seems that Bullins departed from prior, and more limited,
interpretations of § 20-145 because the court focused on the last
sentence of that statute.' The Bullins court wrote that if an officer
acts with gross negligence "then the statute does not protect him"
198. Goddard v. Williams, 251 N.C. 128, 133, 110 S.E.2d 820, 854 (1959) (quoting N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 20-145 (1953), overruled by Woodall, 343 N.C. at 462-63, 471 S.E.2d at 359-
60. Goddard's interpretation of the "due regard" language is echoed by the court of
appeals in State v. Flaherty, 55 N.C. App. 14, 22, 284 S.E.2d 565, 571 (1981). In that case
the defendant-police officer was convicted of involuntary manslaughter for the deaths of
three car passengers who died in a collision with the defendant's car during a chase. See id.
at 14, 284 S.E.2d at 566-67. The officer cited § 20-145 to exempt his conduct from the
speed limit as a defense to an element of involuntary manslaughter, culpable negligence,
defined by the trial court as "willful, wanton, or intentional violation" of a safety statute
(here, the speed limit). Id. at 16,18,284 S.E.2d at 568. In determining the prerequisites of
the speed limit exemption, the court of appeals included a finding "that [the police officer]
was operating his vehicle with due regard for the safety of others." Id. at 22, 284 S.E.2d at
571.
199. See supra notes 117-24 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
201. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-145 (1993).
202. The statute provides:
The speed limitations set forth in this Article [found in § 20-141] shall not apply
to vehicles when operated with due regard for safety under the direction of the
police in the chase or apprehension of violators of the law or of persons charged
with or suspected of any such violation....
Id.
203. The last sentence states: "This exemption [from speed limits, provided in the first
sentence] shall not, however, protect the driver of any such vehicle from the consequence
of a reckless disregard of the safety of others." Id. (quoted with emphasis in Bullns v.
Schmidt, 322 N.C. 580,582,369 S.E.2d 601,603 (1988)).
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and he may be liable.2 Similarly, the court held that "upon a
showing of the reckless disregard of the safety of others the officer
loses the benefit of the statute" and may be liable.2 ' This language
suggests that the Bulins court believed that the last sentence of § 20-
145 provided protection for an officer's negligent pursuit-related
conduct by setting a lower standard of care-gross negligence.
This reading detaches the gross negligence standard of the last
sentence from the speed exemption provided in the first sentence,
thus allowing the court-to apply the statute's "reckless disregard"
standard to the ultimate issue of liability. The court read the last
sentence as if it said: "A police officer is protected from the





This reading ignores the structure and language of the last sentence,
which links the last sentence to the exemption provided in the first
sentence: "This exemption shall not, however, protect the driver of
any such vehicle from the consequence of a reckless disregard of the
safety of others.
' 2 °1
In Ruth v. Rhodes,"° the Arizona Supreme Court interpreted a
statute similar to North Carolina's2 1' and noted the confusion
inherent in a Bullins-type interpretation that detaches the last
sentence from the speed limit exemption and construes the statute as
providing a general standard of care. The Arizona court wrote:
[T]he intent of [the speed exemption statute] ... is not to
hold the patrolman to less than the usual degree or
standard of care. Instead, by its very words the section
holds him to "due regard for safety[,]" making exception
only for the speed at which a patrolman's job sometimes
requires him to travel. The last sentence of this section [the
reckless disregard provision] ... refers only to the speed
exception, and is by its own terms so limited. It would
breach all rules of construction to apply the "reckless
disregard" standard to any but this speed exception.11
204. Bullins, 322 N.C. at 583,369 S.E.2d at 603.
205. Id.
206. Cf. id. (noting that jurisdictions are split over the proper standard of care and
relying on the language of the statute).
207. Cf. id. ("[T]he policy of the state is that liability cannot attach unless the officer's
conduct constitutes gross or wanton negligence.").
208. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-145 (emphasis added).
209. 185 P.2d 304,309-10 (Ariz. 1947).
210. Ruth, 185 P.2d at 309 (citing ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 66-105 (1939)).
211. Id. at 309-10; see also Berry, supra note 79, at 460 n.1 (quoting this passage from
Ruth). But cf. Mitchell v. State, 486 N.Y.S.2d 97, 98-99 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (requiring
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Woodall's acceptance of a Bullins-type interpretation of § 20-145
had dramatic consequences: Woodall's reliance on § 20-145 to
provide a general standard of care for determining the ultimate issue
of liability resulted in a shift of that standard from ordinary
negligence to gross negligence. The court discussed no policy reason
for holding officers to a lower standard-of-care, but relied entirely on
its interpretation of § 20-145." The objectionable aspect of
Woodall's shift to a gross negligence standard is not the shift itself,
but the fact that this shift in the general standard of care relies on a
statute that, as discussed above, should not be interpreted as a
standard of care statute at all." North Carolina law enforcement
officers now operate under a new standard of care that is based on
the dubious statutory interpretation suggested in Bullins.
In addition to creating a standard of care based on a
troublesome interpretation of statutory and case law, Woodall suffers
from another weakness because it fails to discuss adequately the
effect of § 20-145 on public officer immunity and governmental
immunity. In deciding Woodall, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals expressed some confusion about whether § 20-145 provided
a statutory cause of action against Officer Woodall in his official
capacity (thus providing a cause of action against the City of
Winston-Salem), or whether it provided a cause of action against
Officer Woodall in his individual capacity. The supreme court
wrote that the court of appeals "held that because Officer Woodall
could be liable for ordinary negligence, he could be sued in his
official capacity, which means the City would be liable for his tort. '"
But the court of appeals expressly did not hold this, but only
assumed it, and remanded the determination of this issue to the trial
court.216 The supreme court did not discuss the subject of immunity
again in the rest of its opinion. 7 Thus, the assumption of the court
of appeals that the section provides a statutory claim against an
officer and his employer remains unchallenged. Because the
supreme court's statement demonstrated some confusion about the
behavior in reckless disregard for the safety of others to incur liability in jurisdiction with
statute similar to North Carolina General Statutes § 20-145); Selkowitz v. State, 389
N.Y.S.2d 45,47 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (same).
212. See Woodall, 343 N.C. at 462-63,471 S.E.2d at 559-60.
213. See supra notes 194-211 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 179-83 and accompanying text.
215. Woodall, 343 N.C. at 461-62,471 S.E.2d at 359.
216. See Young v. Woodall, 119 N.C. App. 132, 138, 458 S.E.2d 225, 229 (1995), rev'd,
343 N.C. 459, 471 S.E.2d 357 (1996).
217. See Woodall, 343 N.C. at 462-65, 471 S.E.2d at 359-61.
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holding of the court of appeals, and because North Carolina courts
have been reluctant to abrogate governmental immunity in the
past,218 the supreme court's discussion concerning governmental
immunity is unsatisfactory.
The supreme court's statement that the court of appeals had
found that Officer Woodall could be sued in his official capacity may
be read as tacit approval of the idea that § 20-145 provides a
statutory cause of action against an officer in his official capacity.
Courts do not need to read Woodall in this manner, however,
because the Woodall court did not need to rule on the immunity
issue in disposing of the case before it. Because the court found that
Officer Woodall did not violate the newly adopted gross negligence
standard, L9 the court did not have to determine precisely who would
be liable if Officer Woodall had violated it. This explains the court's
inattention to the issues of governmental and public officer
immunity, and suggests that the court's extremely sparse immunity
discussion should be read as dicta.
Until recently, public officer immunity had not been applied to
police officers,=0 and until Woodall, it seems that an officer had
never asserted the defense in a North Carolina appellate court
against a claim for pursuit-related negligence involving an
automobile."' Because Woodall did not rule on this issue, a future
218. See Blackwelder v. City of Winston-Salem, 332 N.C. 319,324, 420 S.E.2d 432,435-
36 (1992); Steelman v. City of New Bern, 279 N.C. 589, 594-95, 184 S.E.2d 239, 242-43
(1971).
219. See Woodall, 343 N.C. at 462,471 S.E.2d at 359.
220. No North Carolina appellate court applied public officer immunity to police
officers until 1988. See, e.g., Mullins v. Friend, 116 N.C. App. 676, 680-81, 449 S.E.2d 227,
230 (1994); Shuping v. Barber, 89 N.C. App. 242, 248, 365 S.E.2d 712, 716 (1988); see also
Morrison-Tiffin v. Hampton, 117 N.C. App. 494, 503-04, 451 S.E.2d 650, 657 (1995)
(applying public officer immunity to a law enforcement officer); Slade v. Vernon, 110 N.C.
App. 422,428, 429 S.E.2d 744,747 (1993) (same).
221. Although no direct precedent exists in North Carolina law for applying public
officer immunity to police officers for suits arising from automobile accidents, Jones v.
Kearns, 120 N.C. App. 301, 462 S.E.2d 245, reh'g denied, 342 N.C. 414, 465 S.E.2d 541
(1995), stands as indirect authority for applying the doctrine in such cases. In Jones, a
horse ridden by the defendant, a mounted police officer, stepped on the plaintiff's foot,
giving rise to the injuries behind the claim. See id. at 302, 462 S.E.2d at 246. The court
held that because the plaintiff failed to "allege or forecast evidence of malicious or corrupt
conduct on the part of [the defendant]," the defendant was "entitled to public officers'
immunity." Id. at 306, 462 S.E.2d at 248. Because it is not difficult to draw an analogy
between an officer's liability for riding a horse and his liability for driving a car, a
defendant officer may cite Jones as supporting public officer immunity for automobile
accidents.
The rationale behind public officer immunity, however, may provide grounds to
distinguish liability arising out of horse-back riding from liability arising out of driving a
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North Carolina appellate court must decide whether public officer
immunity protects officers from claims arising from their driving in a
chase. If a court accepts a public officer immunity defense against
such claims, the significance of Woodalls shift from an ordinary
negligence standard to a gross negligence standard will be greatly
reduced in the context of suits against an officer in his individual
capacity. Under the Woodall standard, a plaintiff must show that an
officer acted recklessly. Yet North Carolina case law holds that a
"reckless indifference" towards others is not serious enough
malfeasance to defeat a public officer immunity defense.m Thus, a
successful public officer immunity defense would protect officers
from liability for gross negligence, and Woodall's shift to a gross
negligence standard would have no effect. An officer could not be
held liable for damages arising out of car accidents during a chase
unless the officer was acting beyond the scope of his authority or was
malicious or corrupt.'
Contrary to Woodall's analysis and holding, § 20-145 should be
read narrowly, as an exemption from speed limits rather than as a
statute providing a general standard of care for officers in a chase.'
Furthermore, Woodall should not be read as providing an exception
from governmental immunity.' Finally, the application of public
officer immunity to pursuit-related liability would greatly reduce the
significance of Woodall's shift to a gross negligence standard, giving
car, based on likelihood of harm. A rationale underlying public officer immunity is that
immunity avoids the "chilling effect" of liability on governmental activity. See supra note
176 and accompanying text. The likelihood that members of the public will suffer injury
from an officer's driving a car is significantly greater than the likelihood of injury arising
from an officer's riding a horse. Furthermore, the potential for serious injury is much
greater with automobile accidents. Thus, it may be more important to deny officers
immunity for their car accidents, in that denial would keep officers attuned to the safety of
the public and would give the public redress against the more injurious form of accidents.
However, the differences between the duties of mounted police and police officers who
drive patrol cars may suggest that the latter category of officer receive even greater
immunity. As automobile operation is more essential to law enforcement than mounted
police work, it may be more important to allow police to operate their cars in vigorous
pursuit of offenders than it is to allow mounted police to ride their horses with immunity.
222. For cases ruling that "reckless indifference" will not defeat public officers'
immunity, see Jones, 120 N.C. App. at 306, 462 $.E.2d at 248, and Robinene v. Barriger,
116 N.C. App. 192, 203, 447 S.E.2d 498, 502 (1994). The plaintiff must show malice or
corruption. See Isquierdo v. Frederick, 922 F. Supp. 1072, 1080 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (malice);
Jones, 120 N.C. App. at 306, 462 S.E.2d at 248 (malice or corruption); Slade, 110 N.C. App.
at 428, 429 S.E.2d at 747 (requiring showing of malice and ruling that "[mI]ere allegations
of malice without more are insufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment").
223. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 194-213 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 214-19 and accompanying text.
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officers protection from personal liability as long as they did not act
maliciously, corruptly, or in excess of their authority.26
However a future North Carolina court resolves the issues
raised in Woodall-namely, issues concerning the standard of care by
which the law judges an officer's conduct during a chase,
governmental immunity, and public officer immunity-that court
should consider the policy ramifications of its final decision. Each of
these issues implicates a delicate balancing process similar to the
balance implicated by police-pursuit policies.' On one side stands
society's need for law enforcement officers to pursue vigorously their
duty and for municipalities to enact aggressive crime-prevention
policies, unfettered by the burden of an easy lawsuit. On the other
side stands the concern for public safety from accidents resulting
from police pursuits and the right of citizens to have a remedy for
harm done to them.
Relative to the new recklessness standard established in
Woodall, the now-defunct ordinary negligence standard of Goddard
favored the rights of citizens to recover for their injuries. The new
recklessness standard, governmental immunity, and public officer
immunity favor law enforcement's need for vigorous pursuit of law
violators. The General Assembly and the courts must determine
how the balance will be struck in North Carolina.
JEREMY D. ARKIN
226. See supra notes 220-23 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. For a discussion of criticisms of
governmental immunity, see supra notes 152-58 and accompanying text. For a discussion
of policy justifications of public officer immunity, see supra note 176 and accompanying
text.
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Royster v. Culp, Inc.: The North Carolina Supreme Court
Takes a Stand Against Extending the Premises Exception to
the "Coming and Going" Rule
In a 1996 decision, the North Carolina Supreme Court denied
workers' compensation coverage for an employee injured while
crossing a public road between an employer-owned parking lot and
the employee's work site.' While not in agreement with a majority of
other jurisdictions,2 the court's decision in Royster v. Culp, Inc! is
consistent with the North Carolina Supreme Court's reluctance to
award compensation in cases in which an employee is not injured on
the premises of his work site. In Royster, the supreme court refused
to expand the definition of premises to include the public street
which the employee crossed to get to work and instead followed the
general rule that employees injured while coming or going to or from
1. See Royster v. Culp, Inc., 343 N.C. 279,281, 470 S.E.2d 30,30 (1996).
2. See, e.g., Hughes v. Decatur Gen. Hosp., 514 So. 2d 935, 937 (Ala. 1987) (awarding
compensation where a nurse was struck and killed while crossing the street from employer
hospital to a hospital-owned parking lot for business invitees, visitors, and employees);
Knoop v. Industrial Comm'n, 589 P.2d 1325, 1330 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979) (granting
compensation for employee who slipped on a public road while traveling from employer-
owned parking lot where she was told to park to the work site); Lewis v. Worker's
Compensation Appeals Bd., 542 P.2d 225, 229 (Cal. 1975) (granting compensation for
employee injured when she slipped on a public street while traveling along the direct route
from employer-owned parking lot to the work site); Swanson v. General Paint Co., 361
P.2d 842, 843-44 (Okla. 1961) (awarding compensation for employee struck by a car while
crossing a highway to get to a parking lot provided by the owner of the building in which
the employee worked); Branco v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 518 A.2d 621, 623 (R.I. 1986)
(granting compensation where employee was struck and killed crossing street from
employer-owned parking lot, where employee had assigned parking space, to work site);
Copeland v. Leaf, Inc., 829 S.W.2d 140, 144 (Tenn. 1992) (allowing compensation on the
theory that the employer created the necessity for travel between a noncontiguous parking
lot and the work site and that it would be "inconsistent and illogical" to grant
compensation while the employee travels from the plant to the street, disallow
compensation while the employee crosses the street, and then resume coverage while she
is in the parking lot); Jaeger Baking Co. v. Kretschmann, 292 N.W.2d 622, 625-26 (Wis.
1980) (applying a statute providing compensation for injuries occurring while employee
was "going between an employer's designated parking lot and the employer's work
premises"). For a detailed discussion of cases from different states addressing the issue of
compensation for employees injured between employer-owned parking lots and work sites,
see 1 ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 15.14(b), at 4-60 to
4-70 (1996); Alan Stephens, Annotation, Workers' Compensation: Coverage of Injury
Occurring Between Workplace and Parking Lot Provided by Employer, While Employee is
Going to or Coming from Work, 4 A.L.R.5th 585 (1992).
3. 343 N.C. 279,470 S.E.2d 30 (1996).
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an employer's premises are ineligible to receive compensation under
the workers' compensation statute.
Shortly after the 1957 North Carolina Supreme Court decision
in Hardy v. Small,' which granted compensation for a young boy
injured on a public road after he had completed specific work duties
on one side of the road and was returning to his home located on
employer-owned property on the opposite side of the street,6 this
journal published a note discussing the various theories courts
employed in granting compensation for certain street injuries
occurring off the employer's premises but on the normal route used
by employees while coming or going to work. The note asserted
that the North Carolina Supreme Court had adopted the theory that
compensation should be allowed "where the employee travels along
or across a public road between two portions of his employer's
premises, whether coming or going or pursuing his active duties."'
Now, almost forty years later, in Royster, the North Carolina
Supreme Court has explicitly rejected that theory."
This Note addresses the facts and reasoning of the North
Carolina Supreme Court's 1996 decision in Royster denying
compensation to an employee injured on a public highway between
an employer-owned parking lot and the employee's work site.0
Then the Note reviews the North Carolina Workers' Compensation
Act," pursuant to which Royster was decided, and discusses the Act's
broad purpose and case law interpreting the Act." The Note next
discusses the development of the general rule denying compensation
for injuries occurring while the employee is "coming or going" to or
from work." Following this introduction of the "coming and going
4. See id. at 283, 470 S.E.2d at 32; see also Powers v. Lady's Funeral Home, 306 N.C.
728, 730-31, 295 S.E.2d 473, 475 (1982) (stating the general rule); Bryan v. T.A. Loving
Co. & Assocs., 222 N.C. 724, 727, 24 S.E.2d 751, 753 (1943) (same); Bray v. W.H.
Weatherly & Co., 203 N.C. 160,161,165 S.E. 332,332-33 (1932) (same); Hunt v. State, 201
N.C. 707,710-11,161 S.E. 203,205 (1931) (same).
5. 246 N.C. 581,99 S.E.2d 862 (1957).
6. See id. at 586, 99 S.E.2d at 866-67.
7. See Giles R. Clark, Note, Workmen's Compensation-Injuries Sustained by
Employee While Going to and from Work, 36 N.C. L REv. 367 (1958).
8. Id. at 371. Clark stated that the reasoning behind this theory was "that once the
employee has come onto the premises of the employer he is within the scope of his
employment and subject to the control of the employer." Id.
9. See Royster, 343 N.C. at 283,470 S.E.2d at 32.
10. See infra notes 18-29 and accompanying text.
11. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97 (1991).
12. See infra notes 30-51 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
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rule," the Note analyzes three judicially created exceptions to the
rule. Under the exceptions, compensation may be awarded when the
injury occurs on the employer's premises,'4 when the employee is
performing an employment duty at the time of the injury,' or when
the nature of the employment exposes the employee to an increased
risk of injury.' Finally, the Note considers the factual circumstances
under which a North Carolina court might still award an employee
compensation for an injury occurring off the premises while the
employee is "coming or going" to or from work. 7
On October 23, 1991, Sterling Julius Royster was hit by a car
when he attempted to traverse a public highway that separated his
place of employment at Culp, Inc. from an employee parking lot
which was owned and controlled by Culp. 8 When Royster's claim
went before the North Carolina Industrial Commission, Deputy
Commissioner Jan N. Pittman delivered an opinion stating that
Royster's injury was not an accident arising out of and in the course
of his employment with Culp.' The full Industrial Commission later
affirmed the Deputy Commissioner's opinion denying Royster
workers' compensation."0 Royster appealed, and the North Carolina
Court of Appeals reversed the full Commission in a unanimous
decision.2' Culp then filed an appeal with the North Carolina
Supreme Court and argued that the North Carolina Court of
Appeals had incorrectly granted Royster "compensation for injuries
sustained as a result of street risks while the employee was crossing a
public street not owned or controlled by his employer.'" The North
Carolina Supreme Court agreed and reversed the court of appeals in
a six-to-two decision.'
In denying compensation, the North Carolina Supreme Court
reversed the court of appeals primarily for two reasons. First, the
supreme court noted that the court of appeals had failed to
14. See infra notes 63-102 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 103-29 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 130-61 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 162-83 and accompanying text.
18. See Royster, 343 N.C. at 281, 470 S.E.2d at 30.
19. See Royster v. Culp, Inc., 119 N.C. App. 598, 599, 459 S.E.2d 65, 66 (1995), rev'd,
343 N.C. 279, 470 S.E.2d 30 (1996).
20. See Royster, 343 N.C. at 281,470 S.E.2d at 30.
21. See Royster v. Culp, Inc., 119 N.C. App. 598, 601, 459 S.E.2d 65, 67 (1995), rev'd,
343 N.C. 279,470 S.E.2d 30 (1996).
22. Royster, 343 N.C. at 281, 470 S.E.2d at 31.
23. See id. Justice Frye did not participate in the decision. See id.
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adequately consider Barham v. Food World, Inc.,' a 1980 case in
which the supreme court denied compensation to an employee who
slipped and injured herself in a loading zone in front of the
employer's store.' The supreme court highlighted three similarities
between the facts of Royster and those of Barham: (1) the employee
was injured in a public area not controlled by the employer; (2) the
employee was not performing any duties for the employer at the time
of the accident; and (3) the employee "was not exposed to any
greater danger than that of the public generally."'26 Second, the
supreme court found that the court of appeals, in granting
compensation to Royster, had improperly relied on Hardy v. Small.'
The supreme court distinguished Hardy as demonstrating the
"special errand" exception, rather than the broader proposition that
employees injured on public roads while coming or going between
two parts of the employer's premises should be granted workers'
compensation.'
Before analyzing Royster in further detail, a brief survey of the
fundamental principles of North Carolina's workers' compensation
program is warranted. An employee is entitled to recover for an
employment-related injury under the North Carolina Workers'
Compensation Act if he can prove three separate elements: (1) the
injury occurred by accident; (2) the injury occurred in the course of
employment; and (3) the injury arose out of the employment." The
injured worker's right to compensation depends on whether his
injury was sufficiently work-related, and not on common law
principles of negligence. 1 If the injury is found to arise out of and in
24. 300 N.C. 329, 266 S.E.2d 676 (1980). For a discussion of Barham, see infra notes
75-84 and accompanying text.
25. See Barham, 300 N.C. at 334,266 S.E.2d at 680.
26. Royster, 343 N.C. at 282,470 S.E.2d at 31 (citing Barham, 300 N.C. at 333-34, 266
S.E.2d at 679-80).
27. 246 N.C. 581, 99 S.E.2d 862 (1957); see infra notes 108-20 and accompanying text
(discussing Hardy).
28. See Royster, 343 N.C. at 283, 470 S.E.2d at 32; infra notes 121-24 and
accompanying text (discussing the special errand exception).
29. The court of appeals held that Hardy covered injuries occurring on "non-employer
owned property that an employee has to cross in order to get to the place of employment."
Royster v. Culp, Inc., 119 N.C. App. 598, 600, 459 S.E.2d 65, 66-67 (1995), rev'd, 343 N.C.
279,470 S.E.2d 30 (1996).
30. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(6) (1991).
31. See I LARSON, supra note 2, § 2.10, at 1-5. However, early decisions often seemed
to import common law negligence principles of "proximate cause" as a test for
determining whether an accident arose out of the employment. See Bryan v. T.A. Loving
Co. & Assocs., 222 N.C. 724, 728, 24 S.E.2d 751, 754 (1943) ("Where an injury cannot
fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing proximate cause ... it does not arise
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the course of employment, then the Workers' Compensation Act
provides the sole and exclusive remedy for the injured worker."
Thus, if an employee can demonstrate that he has met the
requirements of the Act, he can recover some compensation
regardless of whether he or his employer was culpable. However, if
the injury is not covered by the Workers' Compensation Act, the
employee's only avenue for recovery is filing a tort claim against his
employer.33
As a general rule courts liberally construe the Workers'
Compensation Act "so that its benefits are not denied by narrow,,
technical or strict interpretation."' 4 However, courts are not given
unbridled discretion to apply a meaning to the Act's provisions that
is "foreign to the plain and unmistakable words in which it is
couched." 5  Furthermore, while the purpose of workers'
compensation acts is to "provid[e] ... financial and medical benefits
for the victims of work-connected injuries ... and [to] allocat[e] the
burden of these payments to the most appropriate source of
payment, the consumer of the product," 6 North Carolina courts have
refused to transform workers' compensation into a general health
and accident insurance policy.37
out of the employment."). One legal observer noted that importing common law
principles of proximate cause resulted in inconsistent administration of workers'
compensation claims: "The courts, torn between a desire to construe the statute liberally
in favor of the employee, and at the same time bedeviled with common law notions of
proximate cause, have not always reached uniform nor logical decisions." George M.
McDermott, Jr., Note, Workmen's Compensation-Falls Due to Dizziness, Vertigo,
Epilepsy and Like Causes, 26 N.C. L REV. 320,321 (1948).
32. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.1 (1991) ("If the employee and employer are subject
to and have complied with the provisions of this Article, then the rights and remedies
herein granted to the employee ... shall exclude all other rights and remedies ...
Freeman v. SCM Corp., 311 N.C. 294,295-96,316 S.E.2d 81,82 (1984) (per curiam).
33. The supreme court has held that "[tihe Act does not ... take away any common
law right of the employee, even as against the employer, provided the right be one which is
disconnected with the employment and pertains to the employee, not as an employee, but
as a member of the public." Bryant v. Dougherty, 267 N.C. 545, 548, 148 S.E.2d 548, 551
(1966) (emphasis added). "The... Act relates to the rights and liabilities of employee and
employer by reason of injuries and disabilities arising out [of] and in the course of the
employment relation. Where that relation does not exist the Act has no application." Id.
34. Whitley v. Columbia Lumber Mfg., 318 N.C. 89, 98, 348 S.E.2d 336, 341 (1986);
see, e.g., Graham v. Wall, 220 N.C. 84, 90, 36 S.E.2d 691, 694 (1941); Johnson v. Asheville
Hosiery Co., 199 N.C. 38,40,153 S.E. 591,593 (1930).
35. Henry v. A.C. Lawrence Leather Co., 231 N.C. 477, 480, 57 S.E.2d 760, 763
(1950).
36. 1 LARsON, supra note 2, § 2.20, at 1-5.
37. See Hales v. North Hills Constr. Co., 5 N.C. App. 564, 569, 169 S.E.2d 24, 27
(1969).
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Even though courts liberally interpret the Act, the
determination of whether an injury "arose out of and in the course of
employment" remains a difficult task. While the "arising out of" and
the "in the course of" elements "are part of a single test of work-
connection," they are nonetheless "distinct requirements."3 Much
of the uncertainty surrounding these principles can be attributed to
the fact that, while basic workers' compensation principles have been
established, determining whether an injury arose out of and in the
course of employment "is a mixed question of fact and law" to be
determined on a case-by-case basis."
In general, courts have considered "in the course of' to refer to
the "time, place and circumstances" of the injury.4' With reference to
time, North Carolina courts have stated that the course of
employment will continue for a reasonable time after an employee
finishes her work, and may also include the time spent going to or
coming from work4" and work day intervals for "rest and
refreshment."3 Premises owned, maintained, or controlled by the
employer will satisfy the "place" threshold. 4' Lastly, with respect to
circumstances, the court will look to see if the employee is acting as
an employee would be expected in order to further her employer's
business. The courts do not require that the employee always be
engaged in an active duty to qualify for compensation. In fact, the
38. Culpepper v. Fairfield Sapphire Valley, 93 N.C. App. 242, 248, 377 S.E.2d 777,
781, aff'd, 325 N.C. 702,386 S.E.2d 174 (1989).
39. Roberts v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 321 N.C. 350,354,364 S.E.2d 417,420 (1988).
40. Hardy v. Small, 246 N.C. 581,584,99 S.E.2d 862,865 (1957).
41. See id.; Culpepper, 93 N.C. App. at 251-54,377 S.E.2d at 783-84.
42. See Maurer v. Salem Co., 266 N.C. 381,382, 146 S.E.2d 432,433-34 (1966); Bass v.
Mecklenberg County, 258 N.C. 226, 232, 128 S.E.2d 570, 574 (1962); Culpepper, 93 N.C.
App. at 252,377 S.E.2d at 783; Harless v. Flynn, 1 N.C. App. 448,456,162 S.E.2d 47, 52-53
(1968). The employee will be deemed to be in the course of employment unless he spends
an unreasonable amount of time departing or approaching the premises. See Culpepper, 93
N.C. App. at 252,377 S.E.2d at 783.
43. Harless, 1 N.C. App. at 456,162 S.E.2d at 52-53.
44. See Royster, 343 N.C. at 282, 470 S.E.2d at 31; Harless, 1 N.C. App. at 456, 162
S.E.2d at 53. While one might believe that adjacent premises used by the employee as a
means of ingress or egress would be considered part of the employer's premises, this
extended premises theory was apparently eliminated by the supreme court's decision in
Royster. See Smallwood v. Eason, 346 N.C. 171, 171, 484 S.E.2d 526, 526-27 (1997)
(holding that even where a road is the sole means of access to the work site, an employee
is not covered by workers' compensation if the route is a public road); Jennings v.
Backyard Burgers of Asheville, 123 N.C. App. 129, 131-32, 472 S.E.2d 205, 207 (1996)
(denying compensation to worker injured on sole means of ingress to the employer's
premises when employee slipped on non-employer owned property).
45. See Harless, 1 N.C. App. at 456, 162 S.E.2d at 53.
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"course of employment" requirement may include times when an
employee is "coming or going" or "tending to his personal physical
needs."4
When determining if the "arising out of" requirement has been
satisfied, courts consider whether the cause of the accident and the
risk involved were sufficiently related to the employment.' During
the early development of the "arising out of" concept, courts would
often require that the injury "spring from or have its origin in the
employment." One of the early explanations offered by the
supreme court provides some clarity:
The injury must come from a risk which might have been
contemplated by a reasonable person as incidental to the
service when he entered the employment. It may be said to
be incidental when it is either an ordinary risk directly
connected with the employment, or an extraordinary risk
which is only indirectly connected with the service owing to
the special nature of the employment.49
As mentioned above, the "course of" and the "arising out of"
elements are distinct requirements that are part of a single work-
connected test. The court has noted "that while an accident arising
out of an employment usually occurs in the course of it, it does not
necessarily or invariably do so.""° However, in some cases, a court
may be willing to "bootstrap" or presume the "course of"
requirement if a strong enough "arising out of" element is present."
Yet, in North Carolina and throughout the United States, an
injury incurred off the premises is not generally found to arise out of
or in the course of employment; rather, the general rule has been
46. Id. at 456-57,162 S.E.2d at 53.
47. See Hardy v. Small, 246 N.C. 581, 584, 99 S.E.2d 862, 865 (1957). Stated
differently," 'arising out of' means arising out of the work the employee is to do or out of
the service he is to perform." Hinkle v. City of Lexington, 239 N.C. 105, 108, 79 S.E.2d
220,222 (1953).
48. Sweatt v. Rutherford County Bd. of Educ., 237 N.C. 653, 657-58, 75 S.E.2d 738,
742 (1953) (citing Duncan v. City of Charlotte, 234 N.C. 86, 66 S.E.2d 22 (1951); Vause v.
Vause Farm Equip. Co., 233 N.C. 88, 63 S.E.2d 173 (1951); Matthews v. Carolina Standard
Corp., 232 N.C. 229, 60 S.E.2d 93 (1950); Hegler v. Cannon Mills Co., 224 N.C. 669, 31
S.E.2d 918 (1944)).
49. Lockey v. Cohen, Goldman & Co., 213 N.C. 356,359,196 S.E. 342,344-45 (1938)).
50. Swean, 237 N.C. at 658,75 S.E.2d at 742 (1953).
51. See 1 LARSON, supra note 2, § 15.15, at 4-73. Professor Larson noted that
[W]hen a court has satisfied itself that there is a distinct 'arising out of' or causal
connection between the conditions under which claimant must approach and
leave the premises and the occurrence of the injury, [the court] may hold that the
course of employment extends as far as those conditions extend.
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that "[a]n injury received by an employee while going to and from
his work is not compensable." ' 2 This is referred to as the "coming
and going rule." An early application of the rule can be found in the
North Carolina Supreme Court case Hunt v. State.3
In Hunt, a member of the National Guard was killed in an
automobile accident while on a public highway en route to report for
annual encampment.' The supreme court found that the deceased
was obliged to follow his commanding officer's order to report for
encampment and was "entitled to receive compensation from the
time he left his home."' Yet, the supreme court distinguished this
finding from a determination that the deceased's travel was "in the
course of employment."'6 The supreme court recognized that an
employee does not have to be at his workplace in order to be "in the
course of employment."'' Rather, the court stated that "in the course
of" encompasses a reasonable margin of time and space for the
employee to reach the workplace."9  Specifically, the court
commented that employees on the employer's premises using an
access route provided by an employer for the sole use of her
employees, or using transportation furnished by the employer, would
be considered "in the course of employment. 5 9  However, the
supreme court refused to find any of these circumstances applicable
to the employee in Hunt, and thus denied coverage, finding that the
employee had yet to enter the "course of employment."' 6
52. Bryan v. T.A. Loving Co. & Assocs., 222 N.C. 724,727,24 S.E.2d 751, 753 (1943);
see also Powers v. Lady's Funeral Home, 306 N.C. 728,730-31,295 S.E.2d 473, 475 (1982)
(articulating the same rule); Bray v. W.H. Weatherly & Co., 203 N.C. 160, 161, 165 S.E.
332,332 (1932) (same); Hunt v. State, 201 N.C. 707,710, 161 S.E. 203, 205 (1931) (same).
For cases from other jurisdictions following the same rule, see 1 LARSON, supra note 2,
§ 15.00, at 4-3 n.1.1; 82 AM. JUR. 2D Workers' Compensation § 296, at 307-08 nn.80-83
(1992).
53. 201 N.C. 707,161 S.E. 203 (1931).
54. See id. at 707-08,161 S.E. at 203.
55. Id. at 708,161 S.E. at 204.
56. See id. at 711,161 S.E. at 205.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 710-11,161 S.E. at 205.
59. See id at 711, 161 S.E. at 204. The supreme court also indicated that
compensation should be granted to an employee "who after entering upon the service is
sent into the streets or upon the highways on his employer's business in performance of his
contract." Id. at 711,161 S.E. at 205.
60. See iU. at 711, 161 S.E. at 205. One critical factor underlying the court's rationale
was the lack of control the employer had over the employee during his travel. See id. at
709, 161 S.E. at 204. Employer control is important for establishing the requisite "course
of" and "arising out of' requirements; thus subsequent decisions have explored whether
the employee or the employer chooses the method of transportation and the route of
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Since the "coming and going" rule denies workers'
compensation benefits, courts have developed several exceptions to
avoid the rule's often inequitable and harsh results. In North
Carolina, courts have recognized three exceptions, which Royster
suggested remain good law. 1 An employee may be entitled to
compensation if he can show that he was injured on the employer's
premises (the "premises" exception), he was injured while
performing an employment duty, or, due to his employment, he was
injured as a result of exposure to a risk greater than that to which the
general public was exposed (the "special hazard" exception).62
The premises exception, which is recognized in all jurisdictions,'
provides that compensation is allowed for "coming or going"
employees who are injured upon premises owned or controlled by
the employer." One court has explained that part of the reasoning
behind the premises exception is that "[t]he 'premises line' has the
advantage of enabling courts to ascertain the point at which
travel. See, e.g., Davis v. Devil Dog Mfg., 249 N.C. 543,548, 107 S.E.2d 102, 106 (1959).
61. See Royster, 343 N.C. at 281,470 S.E.2d at 30.
62. These three exceptions to the "coming and going" rule are of primary relevance to
this Note. While additional exceptions based on alternative theories or factual
circumstances have developed in North Carolina and other jurisdictions, this Note will not
address them in detail. These may include cases in which the employer provides the
transportation as an incident of the contract of employment, see Whittington v. A.J.
Schnierson & Sons, Inc., 255 N.C. 724, 724-25, 122 S.E.2d 724, 725 (1961) (per curiam), or
compensates the employee for his travel, see Kiger v. Bahnson Serv. Co., 260 N.C. 760,
761-62, 133 S.E.2d 702,704 (1963).
Another group of recognized exceptions includes those for "on-call" employees or
employees with irregular hours. See 82 AM. JUR. 2D Workers' Compensation § 303 (1992).
Some courts do not recognize this exception by name, but instead refer to it as the special
errand exception. See iU; see also Powers v. Lady's Funeral Home, 306 N.C. 728, 731-32,
295 S.E.2d 473, 475-76 (1982) (granting compensation to nighttime on-call embalmer who
was injured while approaching his house after returning from his duties at the funeral
home).
Often, compensation will be granted for employees who are traveling pursuant to
their employer's specific instructions. Compare Kiger, 260 N.C. at 761-62, 133 S.E.2d at
703-704 (finding injury arose in the course of employment when employee was involved in
auto accident on public highway after employer ordered him to report for work in another
town the next day), with Hunt, 201 N.C. at 709-11, 161 S.E. at 204-05 (denying
compensation to a national guardsman who followed specific orders from his commanding
officer to report to duty and died in a car accident on the highway). The distinction drawn
by the Kiger court is that "'[e]mployees whose work entails travel away from the
employer's premises are held in the majority of jurisdictions to be within the course of
their employment continuously during the trip."' Kiger, 260 N.C. at 762,133 S.E.2d at 704
(quoting Brewer v. Powers Trucking Co., 256 N.C. 175,179,123 S.E.2d 608,611 (1961)).
63. See 1 LARSON, supra note 2, § 15.11, at 4-3 to 4-5 & n.2.
64. See Maurer v. Salem Co., 266 N.C. 381,382, 146 S.E.2d 432, 433-34 (1966); Bass v.
Mecklenburg County, 258 N.C. 226, 231-32, 128 S.E.2d 570, 574 (1962); Jennings v.
Backyard Burgers, 123 N.C. App. 129,131,472 S.E.2d 205,207 (1996).
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employment begins-objectively and fairly." The employer's
premises "suppl[y] a real and tangible connection between the injury
and the employment."' 6
A common situation in which courts consider whether to apply
the premises exception arises when employees are injured in parking
lots.' Courts generally permit recovery when the injured worker
demonstrates "that the employer owned, maintained, provided,
controlled, or otherwise exercised dominion"' ' over the parking lot.69
The court first recognized the compensability of injuries occurring in
employer-owned parking lots in Davis v. Devil Dog Manufacturing,70
in which compensation was allowed for an employee who slipped
and fell in a lot.7' The Davis court found that the employee's act of
going from the parking lot to the working area occurred on the
employer's premises and "was a necessary incident to [the
employee's] employment.""2 Yet, the premises exception has become
difficult to apply in the modem world of strip malls and shopping
centers, as courts have been forced to consider what degree of
influence or activity constitutes "control" 73 over common parking
65. General Ins. Co. of America v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 546 P.2d
1361, 1363 (Cal. 1976); see also 1 LARSON, supra note 2, § 15.12(b), at 4-12 to 4-26 ("The
real reason for the premises rule is, and always has been, the impracticality of drawing
another line at such a point that the administrative and judicial burden of interpreting and
applying the rule would not be unmanageable.").
66. Barham v. Food World, Inc., 300 N.C. 329,332,266 S.E.2d 676,679 (1980).
67. See generally Alan Stephens, Annotation, Workers' Compensation: Coverage of
Injury Occurring in Parking Lot Provided by Employer, 4 A.LR.5TH 443, 450-61 (1992)
(citing state court decisions on employee injuries sustained in parking lots); 82 AM. JUR.
2D Workers' Compensation § 310, at 332 (1992) (same).
68. Barham, 300 N.C. at 333,266 S.E.2d at 679.
69. See Maurer v. Salem Co., 266 N.C. 381, 382-83, 146 S.E.2d 432, 433-34 (1966);
Bass v. Mecklenburg County, 258 N.C. 226,232,128 S.E.2d 570, 574 (1962); Davis v. Devil
Dog Mfg. Co., 249 N.C. 543, 548-49, 107 S.E.2d 102, 106 (1959); Harless v. Flynn, 1 N.C.
App. 448, 459-60, 162 S.E.2d 47, 55 (1968). For a thorough discussion of how various
states treat employee injuries sustained on employer owned or controlled parking lots, see
Stephens, supra note 67, at 443.
70. 249 N.C. 543,107 S.E.2d 102 (1959).
71. See i. at 548-49,239 S.E.2d at 106.
72. Id. at 549,107 S.E.2d at 106.
73. In his dissent to Barham, Justice Copeland defined control as the "'[p]ower or
authority to manage, direct, superintend, restrict, regulate, govern, administer, or
oversee.'" Barham, 300 N.C. at 335, 266 S.E.2d at 680 (Copeland, 3., dissenting) (quoting
BLACK'S LAW DICrIoNARY 298 (5th ed. 1979)). Justice Copeland opined that it was not
necessary for an employer to exercise "exclusive control" over an area to bring it within
the premises exception. See iai (Copeland, J., dissenting). He emphasized that Food
World exercised control over the loading zone when asking customers, delivery trucks, and
employees to keep the area free. See iU (Copeland, 3., dissenting). He found Food
World's ability to direct the flow within the loading zone to be sufficient to support the
1997] PREMISES EXCEPTION 2515
areas.
74
In Barham v. Food World, Inc.,75 the North Carolina Supreme
Court denied compensation to a grocery store employee who, while
on her way to work, slipped and fell in a loading zone located in
front of her employer's store.76 The loading zone was outlined in
yellow and was used by three separate businesses.' Defendant Food
World did not own or lease the loading zone, the parking lot, or the
sidewalk in front of the store.78  However, Food World customers
picked up their groceries and suppliers unloaded shipments for Food
World in the loading zone in front of the store.7 Additionally, Food
World instructed employees not to park in the loading zone and
occasionally asked customers to move their cars from the area."0
In Barham, the court noted decisions from other jurisdictions
allowing employees to recover for parking lot injuries if the
employer "owned, maintained, provided, controlled, or otherwise
exercised dominion over the parking lot, walkway or other area in
question."" However, the court determined that Food World did
not have sufficient control to support a finding that the loading zone
Industrial Commission's finding the injury compensable on an employer-controlled
premises exception. See id. at 336, 266 S.E.2d at 681 (Copeland, ., dissenting).
For a case in which the Industrial Commission found that the employer exercised
sufficient control over a public highway to constitute its own premises, see Bryan v. TA.
Loving Co. & Associates, 222 N.C. 724, 726, 24 S.E.2d 751, 752-53 (1943). In Bryan, the
supreme court nonetheless denied compensation because the deceased was not injured by
a hazard that could "fairly be traced to the employment." Id. at 729, 24 S.E.2d at 754.
74. See Glassco v. Belk-Tyler Co., 69 N.C. App. 237, 239-40, 316 S.E.2d 334, 335-36
(1984) (finding that employer did not have any responsibility for maintenance of a
shopping center parking area nor did it have an exclusive right to use the parking lot); see
also Jennings v. Backyard Burgers, 123 N.C. App. 129, 132-33, 472 S.E.2d 205, 207-08
(1996) (reversing Industrial Commission's decision to award compensation to an employee
injured by a fall on a stairway located between a designated-but not employer-
controlled-pa:-.ng lot and the premises). Many courts will allow compensation for
shopping center parking lot injuries on a "zone of employment" rationale, finding an
employee close enough to the environs of his employment to be considered in the course of
employment. See, e.g., Frishkom v. Flowers, 270 N.E.2d 366, 369-70 (Ohio Ct. App. 1971)
(extending the zone of employment to a shopping center parking lot to allow recovery
when an employee was struck on his motorbike by another vehicle); see also Stephens,
supra note 67, §§ 15-20, at 551-67 (citing to decisions on circumstances involving parking
lots not owned by the employer, such as shopping center parking lots).
75. 300 N.C. 329,266 S.E.2d 676 (1980).
76. See id. at 329-30, 266 S.E.2d at 677.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 333, 266 S.E.2d at 679.
79. See id. at 329-30,266 S.E.2d at 677.
80. See id. at 335,266 S.E.2d at 680 (Copeland, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 333, 266 S.E.2d at 679.
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was part of the employment premises.' The court also noted that
the employee failed to show "that she was performing any duties for
her employer at the time, or that she was exposed to any danger
greater than that of the public generally." Since the injury occurred
off the premises and did not fall within any other exception to the
"coming and going" rule, the court held that the injury did not arise
out of the course of employment."
While the premises exception provides a rationale for finding
that an injury "arose out of the course of employment, '"' a mere
showing that the injury occurred on the premises is not by itself
sufficient to justify compensation.' North Carolina courts may
consider the fact that the injury occurred on the employer's premises
to be substantially outweighed by the lack of a sufficient nexus
between the risk of injury and the employment.' One example of
the courts' unwillingness to adhere strictly to the premises exception
is Strickland v. King.'
In Strickland, two employees, King and Blanton, collided while
departing from work on a paved road owned by their employer, E.I.
DuPont de Nemours.' The private road was approximately two
miles long and "was the sole means of ingress and egress from the
parking lot at DuPont's plant to the public highway.""0  Two
82. See id at 334, 266 S.E.2d at 679-80.
83. Id. at 334, 266 S.E.2d at 680. The supreme court has acknowledged that one of the
reasons for treating an employer-owned parking lot differently for workers' compensation
purposes than other areas may stem from an increased risk of injury present in the lot. See
Strickland v. King, 293 N.C. 731, 734, 239 S.E.2d 243, 244-45 (1977) (commenting without
further explanation that "the risk of injury in such lots is different in kind and greater in
degree than that experienced by the general public").
84. See Barham, 300 N.C. at 334,266 S.E.2d at 680.
85. Id. at 332,266 S.E.2d at 678-79.
86. See Bryan v. T.A. Loving Co. & Assocs., 222 N.C. 724, 729, 24 S.E.2d 751, 754
(1943).
87. See Stricdand, 293 N.C. at 734, 239 S.E.2d at 245 ("The risks employees were
exposed to in going and coming from the plant were not materially different from those
encountered on a public highway.").
88. 293 N.C. 731, 734, 239 S.E.2d 243, 245 (1977); see also Bryan, 222 N.C. at 728, 24
S.E.2d at 754 (holding that "[w]here an injury cannot fairly be traced to the employment as
a contributing proximate cause, or comes from a hazard to which the workman would have
been equally exposed apart from the employment[,] ... it does not arise out of
employment," even if it occurs on the premises).
89. See Stricldand, 293 N.C. at 732,239 S.E.2d at 243-44.
90. Id. at 732,239 S.E.2d at 244. The accident occurred approximately one and one-
half miles from the worksite. See id. at 734,239 S.E.2d at 245. In addition, the court found
that the private road "substantially complied with specifications for State highways." Id.
at 733, 239 S.E.2d at 244.
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passengers in the vehicles, who were fellow employees, sought to
bring common law actions against Blanton and King.91 Blanton and
King argued that the passengers were prohibited from bringing a
common law action because of the exclusivity provision of the
Workers' Compensation Act.' The North Carolina Supreme Court,
however, ruled against Blanton and King, concluding that even
though the injury occurred on the employer's premises, it did not
arise out of their employment.93
While the supreme court noted the validity of the premises
exception, 4 it reiterated the holding in Bryan that an on-the-
premises injury does not necessarily require the conclusion that the
injury arose from the employment." In determining whether the
"arising out of" requirement was satisfied, the supreme court focused
on whether the risk of such an injury was sufficiently related to the
employment.96 The court found that the employees in Strickland
were not subject to any "materially different" risks in driving on the
private road than the types of risks encountered in driving on a
public highway,' much as the court had found that the employee in
91. See iJ. at 732,239 S.E.2d at 243-44.
92. See id.; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.1 (1991) (providing that rights under Workers'
Compensation exclude "all other rights and remedies").
93. See Strickland, 293 N.C. at 733,239 S.E.2d at 244.
94. See id.
95. See i (citing Bryan v. T.A. Loving Co. & Assocs., 222 N.C. 724, 24 S.E.2d 751
(1943)).
96. See id. at 734,239 S.E.2d at 245.
97. See id. Many courts and commentators have similarly been unwilling to determine
whether compensation should be granted for injuries occurring while an employee is going
to or coming from work based solely on whether the injury occurred on public property or
on employer-owned property. See, e.g., Powers v. Lady's Funeral Home, 57 N.C. App. 25,
32,290 S.E.2d 720,725 (1982) (Martin, J., dissenting), rev'd, 306 N.C. 728, 295 S.E.2d 473
(1982). In his dissent in Powers, for example, Judge Martin urged that the employee in the
case, who was injured in his own driveway, should be compensated because the employer
had sent the employee on a special errand. See iU (Martin, J., dissenting). Judge Martin
felt that the employee was still in the course of employment upon arriving on his own
property. See id. (Martin, J., dissenting). Judge Martin also suggested:
[Tihe proper rule of law to apply to the discrete fact situations is not "did the
accident occur on the claimant's own premises." Rather, an accident arises out of
employment when it occurs in the course of the employment and the conditions
or obligations of the employment put the claimant in the position or at the place
where the accident occurs.
Id. (Martin, J., dissenting) (citing 1 LARSoN, supra note 2, §6.50); see also Jaynes v.
Potlatch Forest, Inc., 271 P.2d 1016, 1019 (Idaho 1954) (rejecting the public-private
distinction); Epler v. North America Rockwell Corp., 393 A.2d 1163, 1166 (Pa. 1978)
("[The public-private property distinction] place[s] undue significance upon a fact that
should not here be controlling. The real question is whether the site of the accident was an
integral part of employer's premises."); Copeland v. Leaf, Ina, 829 S.W.2d 140, 144 (Tenn.
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Barham was not exposed to different or greater dangers in the
loading zone than the public generally.' Hence, Strickland
demonstrated that when considering workers' compensation claims,
the supreme court would discount the significance of the injury
actually occurring on the employer's premises if the risk from which
the injury arose was not sufficiently work-related.
The premises exception, in which the decision to award or deny
compensation depends on whether an injury occurs on private or
public property, represents an attempt to provide certainty to
workers' compensation administration by making the location of the
injury the key determinant in whether compensation will be
granted.' ° At times, some judges have been uncomfortable adopting
such a bright-line rule for administrative purposes "at the expense of
justice."'0 ' However, judicial experiments at moving the premises
exception beyond the employer's property have been short-lived,"~'
leaving only those cases involving certain particular factual
circumstances-several of which are discussed below-as arguments
for granting compensation when an employee is injured away from
the worksite.
Even if a "coming or going" injury does not occur on or
proximate to the employer's premises, courts may find other
exceptions that would allow compensation. One such example
where "coming or going" employees may be awarded compensation
is when their travel involves an employment duty."°  In general,
1992) (stating that it would be "inconsistent and illogical" to deny compensation for
injuries occurring on public property between two employer premises when "it was the
employer who created the necessity of the employee's crossing"); 1 LARSON, supra note 2,
§ 15.21, at 4-74 to 4-76 (criticizing the public-private distinction).
98. See Barham v. Food World, lam, 300 N.C. 329,334,266 S.E.2d 676,680 (1980).
99. See supra note 97 (discussing criticisms of the private-public exception).
100. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons for using the
premises exception).
101. Powers, 57 N.C. App. at 31, 290 S.E.2d at 724 (Martin, J., dissenting) (arguing
against a bright-line rule for ending a special errand once an employee reaches his
property because "certainty [should not be] achieved at the expense of justice"'); see also
Copeland, 829 S.W.2d at 144 (granting compensation for an employee knocked down by a
fellow employee while crossing a public way located directly between the worksite and the
employer-owned parking lot).
102. See 1 LARSON, supra note 2, § 15.12(b), at 4-14 to -27 (discussing the
administrative and conceptual difficulties that arose in Michigan and New Jersey during a
short period in which the judiciary removed the premises line as a demarcation point for
determining whether compensation should be granted).
103. See Brewer v. Powers Trucking Co., 256 N.C. 175, 180,123 S.E.2d 608, 611 (1962)
(awarding compensation for an employee who had been driven to a work site in an
employer-owned vehicle but who was injured while driving his own car back to the
employer's premises); Allred v. Allred-Gardner, Inc., 253 N.C. 554, 557-58, 117 S.E.2d
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North Carolina courts will allow workers' compensation if an
employee can demonstrate that he was furthering the employer's
business when he was injured." If the employee's travel benefited
himself and the employer, then the travel was in the "course of
employment" if the "work of the employee [also] create[d] the
necessity for travel."'"
One category of cases where the employee is performing an
employment duty and in which all courts will find the employee in
the course of employment and grant compensation is when the
employee is carrying out a "special errand" for the benefit of the
employer.' 6 If the special errand takes the employee into the street,
where he is injured, compensation will be granted under the
rationale that when the employee is sent into the street, street
hazards become hazards of employmentY In Royster, the North
Carolina Supreme Court cited Hardy v. Small'" as an example of the
"special errand" rule."
In Hardy, a boy was killed while crossing a public highway after
feeding the livestock at his employer's barn."' The employer's farm
was positioned on both sides of the public highway, with crops
located on one side of the highway and the barn housing the
livestock located on the other."' The boy and his family lived in a
house situated on the employer's farm on the side of the highway
476, 479 (1960) (granting compensation for employee involved in a car wreck after he
blacked out while returning from a service visit to the employer's premises); 1 LARSON,
supra note 2, § 15.14(a), at 4-57 to 4-59 (discussing cases involving employees who are
injured while traveling between two parts of the employer's premises). But see Humphrey
v. Quality Cleaners & Laundry, 251 N.C. 47, 51, 110 S.E.2d 467, 470 (1959) (refusing to
find that an employee, who normally picked up clothes and customer payments for his
employer, a dry cleaner, was carrying out any specific work duty even though the
employee had money and clothes for his employer when he was killed in a car wreck).
104. See Brewer, 256 N.C. at 179,123 S.E.2d at 610-11.
105. Humphrey, 251 N.C. at 51,110 S.E.2d at 470.
106. See Royster, 343 N.C. at 283, 470 S.E.2d at 32 (interpreting Hardy v. Small, 246
N.C. 581, 586, 99 S.E.2d 862, 866-67 (1957), as an example of the "special errand" rule);
Powers, 306 N.C. at 731, 295 S.E.2d at 475 (granting compensation under the special
errand rule after finding that the duties of the claimant, who was a mortician and
embalmer, included his returning home to shower and prepare for further calls); Massey v.
Board of Educ., 204 N.C. 193, 198, 167 S.E. 695, 698 (1933) (awarding compensation
where employee was injured while purchasing cleaning supplies as directed by his
employer).
107. See Hinkle v. City of Lexington, 239 N.C. 105,108,79 S.E.2d 220,222-23 (1953).
108. 246 N.C. 581, 99 S.E.2d 862 (1957).
109. See Royster, 343 N.C. at 283,470 S.E.2d at 32.
110. See Hardy, 246 N.C. at 582-83,99 S.E.2d at 864.
111. See id.
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opposite the barn." The boy was employed as a general farm
laborer" and was called upon to feed the livestock and tend to the
crops when needed. 4 The family did not pay rent but instead
provided assistance on the farm.'
The Hardy court noted that North Carolina allowed
compensation for accidents on public highways "if the employee at
the time of the accident is acting in the course of his employment and
in the performance of some duty incident thereto.11  In granting
compensation, the court found "the trip (across the farm) between
the area of the house and the barn may reasonably be considered
within the terms of his employment."1 7 The court believed it would
be "unrealistic and unduly restrictive" to suspend the course of
employment on the highway when the boy was on the way from one
area of employment, where he fed the livestock, to another area of
employment, where he was often called upon to tend to the crops.118
The court found that "the period of [the boy's] employment
commenced when he left the area of his house for the barn; and, in
the absence of evidence of deviation, terminated upon his return
from the barn to the area of the house."' Lastly, the court indicated
that crossing the highway "constituted an additional hazard of his
employment; for if the house and barn had not been separated by
the public highway, means of access between the area of the house
and the barn would have been equally available and safer.
120
In Royster, the supreme court found the Hardy case illustrative
of the "special errand 12' exception to the "coming and going" rule, "
because the employee in Hardy was "on a mission for his
112. See id. at 582, 99 S.E.2d at 864.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 586, 99 S.E.2d at 866-67.
115. See id. at 586, 99 S.E.2d at 866.
116. Id. at 585, 99 S.E.2d at 866.
117. Id. at 586, 99 S.E.2d at 867.
118. Id. at 586, 99 $.E.2d at 866.
119. Id. at 586, 99 S.E.2d at 867.
120. Id.
121. The supreme court stated in Royster that "[u]nder the 'special errand' exception,
an injury caused by a highway accident is compensable if the employee at the time of the
accident is acting in the course of his employment and in the performance of some duty,
errand, or mission thereto." Royster, 343 N.C. at 283, 470 S.E.2d at 32.
122. See id. The supreme court also emphasized that the deceased employee and his
family in Hardy lived on the employer's premises "so they could be constantly available
for work." Id. Thus, compensation to the injured boy could have been granted under a
separate exception to the "coming and going" rule applicable to on-call employees or
employees with irregular hours. See AM. JUR. 2D Workers' Compensation § 303 (1992).
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employer."' 23 The supreme court rejected the contention of the court
of appeals that the Hardy decision allowed courts to compensate
employees for injuries occurring on "non-employer-owned property
that an employee has to cross in order to get to the place ofemployment.""1
One issue that the Industrial Commission and the North
Carolina Court of Appeals may face is to what extent following an
employer's instructions constitutes an employment duty. One
scenario within this inquiry involves employees who are reporting to
another work site pursuant to their employer's instructions." A
highly relevant factual distinction made by courts in these cases is
whether the employee is traveling away from one part of the
premises to another'2 or whether she is reporting to the employer's
premises for the first time." When an employee checks in for
assignment in one location and her employer sends her to another
work site in a different location, the courts are likely to find the
employee in the course of employment, even if a significant amount
of time passes between when the employee reports for assignment
and when she actually leaves to report to the new location.'
However, when the employee is in transit to her employer's premises
for the first time, the court is less likely to find the employee in the
course of employment.2
If an employee is unable to demonstrate that the injury occurred
on the employer's premises or that the injury occurred while the
employee was carrying out an employment duty, then in order to
recover for her injuries under North Carolina law, she must show
123. Royster v. Culp, Inc., 119 N.C. App. 598, 600, 459 S.E.2d 65, 66 (1995), rev'd, 343
N.C. 279,470 S.E.2d 30 (1996).
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., Kiger v. Bahnson Serv. Co., 260 N.C. 760, 761, 133 S.E.2d 702, 703
(1963); Hunt v. State, 201 N.C. 707,707-08,161 S.E. 203,203-04 (1931).
126. See Kiger, 260 N.C. at 762, 133 S.E.2d at 704 (" 'Employees whose work entails
travel away from the employer's premises are held in the majority of jurisdictions to be
within the course of their employment ..... '" (quoting Brewer v. Powers Trucking Co., 256
N.C. 175,179,123 S.E.2d 608, 611 (1962))).
127. See Hunt, 201 N.C. at 707-08, 161 S.E. at 203-04 (denying compensation to
National Guardsman injured en route to report to service, even though evidence showed
that he would be compensated for his travel time).
128. See Kiger, 260 N.C. at 761-62,133 S.E.2d at 703-04 (finding that injury arose in the
course of employment even though the employee had reported for his instructions on
Monday and did not depart to his employment destination until Tuesday morning).
129. See Hunt, 201 N.C. at 710, 161 S.E. at 205 (finding injury to National Guardsman
did not arise in the course of employment because mode of travel was not within the
employer's control).
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that, due to her employment, she was exposed to an increased risk or
a special hazard." ° Yet the hazard need not be entirely a creation of
the employer; it need only be a hazard which is peculiar and
proximate to the work site."1 In fact, one situation in which most
states" have broadened the premises rule to find an employee in the
course of employment occurs when the employee is injured along a
necessary or normal route to the employment site that contains
special hazards."3 This exception only applies when two conditions
are met, however. First, the injury must occur on the normal route
or the only route for employees, and second, the injury must result
from the risk presented by the special hazard.' M The requirement
that the injury occur on a route which an employer sanctions or
mandates employees take to work satisfies the "in the course of"
requirement, while the presence of the special hazard covers the
"arising out of" element."5 In North Carolina, it appears that the
route must be owned, maintained, or controlled by the employer."6
130. See Royster, 343 N.C. at 282, 470 S.E.2d at 31; Barham v. Food World, Inc., 300
N.C. 329, 334, 266 S.E.2d 676, 680 (1980) ("[P]laintiff has failed to demonstrate ... that
she was exposed to any danger greater than that of the public generally.").
131. See 1 LARSON, supra note 2, § 15.13(b), at 4-35 to 4-40.
132. See, e.g., Sokolowski v. Best Western Golden Lion Hotel, 813 P.2d 286, 290-91
(Alaska 1991); Bechtel v. Winther, 556 S.W.2d 882, 883-84 (Ark. 1977); In re Welham, 653
P.2d 760, 762-63 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982); Chapman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 907 P.2d 828,
832 (Kan. 1995); Goff v. Farmers Union Accounting Serv., Inc., 241 N.W.2d 315, 317-18
(Min. 1976) (per curiam); Ingalls Shipbuilding Div. v. Dependents of Sloane, 480 So. 2d
1117, 1118-19 (Miss. 1985); Buechi v. Arcata Graphics, 97 AD.2d 579, 580 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1983) (mem.); Swanson v. General Paint Co., 361 P.2d 842, 845 (Okla. 1961);
Montgomery v. State Indus. Accident Comm'n, 356 P.2d 524, 530-31 (Or. 1960); Frisbie v.
Department of LLRR. (Indus. Comm'n) Four Wheel Drive Corp., 172 N.W.2d 346, 352-
53 (Wis. 1969).
133. See 1 LARSON, supra note 2, § 15.13(a)-(g), at 4-29 to 4-56. An injured
employee's case is much stronger when the injury occurs on the only means of ingress and
egress. See 1 id. § 15.13(f), at 4-48 to 4-54. The determination of whether certain risks,
such as making a left turn across traffic in order to reach the worksite, are special hazards
is often disputed. See Barrett Div., Allied Chem. & Dye Corp. v. Owens, 169 N.E.2d 453,
456 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960) (noting that for a "coming or going" injury to be compensable
under the zone of employment rationale, it must also be proved that (1) the employer
provided the transportation; (2) the method of ingress or egress was the sole means of
accessing the employers premises; or (3) the employer charged the employee with some
task to accomplish on the way to or from work). For cases denying compensation for
injuries based solely on the circumstance that the injury occurred between employer-
owned premises, see Maddox v. Heaven Hill Distilleries, Inc., 329 S.W.2d 189, 191-92 (Ky.
1959); Verret v. Travelers Ins. Co., 166 So. 2d 292, 294-95 (La. Ct. App. 1964); Hafner v.
A.G. Edwards & Sons, 903 S.W.2d 197,200-01 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
134. See 1 LARSON, supra note 2, § 15.13, at 4-29.
135. See Bommarito v. Industrial Comm'n, 412 N.E.2d 548,550 (Ill. 1980).
136. See Smallwood v. Eason, 346 N.C. 171,171,484 S.E.2d 526,526-27 (1997).
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When deciding whether to bootstrap the course of employment
element required in workers' compensation cases onto a special
hazard, courts consider a number of factors. Special hazard cases
turn on issues such as whether the route was the only one available
to employees, 7 whether the employees were the only individuals
that traveled along that route," whether the employer had taken
some action to provide the access to that route,"s and whether the
employee jaywalked or took an otherwise illegal or unsanctioned
route.'40 In North Carolina, two other considerations are particularly
relevant when determining whether compensation should be
awarded. First, whether the risk of injury was sufficiently related to
the employment, 1 and second, whether the general public was
equally exposed to the danger.'
North Carolina courts have held that the fact that a risk is
common to the public, even if it is due to hazards related to the
employer, may preclude compensation. 43 Such was the case in Smith
v. Dacotah Cotton Mills,' 4 where the court of appeals denied
compensation to a mill employee who was injured while on "fatigue
137. See 1 LARSON, supra note 2, § 15.13(0, at 4-48 to 4-54. But see Smallwood, 346
N.C. at 171, 484 S.E.2d at 526-27 (denying workers' compensation even though the
"special hazard"-a forklift-which caused the injury was directly related to the employer,
because the injury occurred on a public road); Strickland v. King, 293 N.C. 731, 733-34, 239
S.E.2d 243, 244-45 (1977) (deciding workers' compensation did not apply even though the
injury occurred on an employer-owned road that was the only means of access to the
plant); supra notes 88-98 and accompanying text (discussing Strickland).
138. See Stricdand, 293 N.C. at 732,239 S.E.2d at 244 (noting that there were no signs
at the entrance of the private road that directed public traffic to keep out).
139. See State ex rel. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Luten, 679 S.W.2d 278,279-80 (Mo.
1984) (en banc) (finding workers' compensation to be the exclusive remedy for an injury
occurring at an off-premises crosswalk that was painted, illuminated, and maintained by
the employer); Buechi v. Arcata Graphics, 97 A.D.2d 579, 580 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983)
(mem.) (finding a special hazard existed for an injury occurring just outside an employee
parking lot, where the employer had obtained permission to install a traffic light to
regulate the heavy flow of traffic). But see Strickland, 293 N.C. at 733-34, 239 S.E.2d at
244-45 (denying application of the Workers' Compensation Act even though the employer
designed, owned, and maintained the private road where the employees were injured).
140. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bray, 222 S.E.2d 70, 72 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975) (denying
compensation for jaywalking employee struck on a public road in between two parts of the
employer's premises). But see Goff v. Farmers Union Accounting Serv., Inc., 241 N.W.2d
315, 317-18 (Minn. 1976) (per curiam) (awarding compensation to jaywalking employee,
because the employer acquiesced to employees' regular practice of jaywalking, and
available crosswalks were not located in front of the plant).
141. See Strickland, 293 N.C. at 733-34,239 S.E.2d at 244-45.
142. See Strickland, 293 N.C. at 734,239 S.E.2d at 245.
143. See Smith v. Dacotah Cotton Mills, 31 N.C. App. 687, 691, 230 S.E.2d 772, 775
(1976).
144. 31 N.C. App. 687,230 S.E.2d 772 (1976).
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break" when she fell over a cement block in a public road 250 feet
from the work site.' The cement block was in the road due to
construction work being performed for the benefit of the employer. 
14
Recognizing that the employee was still "in the course of"
employment while on break and that the presence of the cement
block was related to the employer, the court of appeals nonetheless
denied compensation, concluding that the accident did not "arise out
of" the employment because it resulted from a risk to which the
general public was equally exposed. 47
One issue many courts have been asked to consider is whether
traffic should be considered a "special hazard.' 4s To date, the North
Carolina Supreme Court has consistently held that "street risks" or
hazards created by traffic generally "cannot fairly be traced to the
employment."'4" Since the North Carolina Supreme Court's
rationale for granting compensation for injuries in employer-owned
parking lots is based partly on an increased risk theory," it follows
that such compensation should be awarded where, for example, all of
the employees of a particular business left work at the same time and
145. See id. at 687-88,230 S.E.2d at 773.
146. See id. at 688,230 S.E.2d at 773.
147. See id. at 689-91, 230 S.E.2d at 774-75. The court concluded:
The hazard to which the plaintiff was exposed was in no way peculiar to her
employment. The cement block was a hazard to which all persons who used the
street were exposed. The risk was not shown to be a natural incident of plaintiff's
employment nor was a sufficient causal connection between the accident and
employment shown for the accident to arise out of the employment.
Id. at 691, 230 S.E.2d at 775.
148. See, e.g., Chapman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 907 P.2d 828, 834-35 (Kan. 1995) ("In
our view, vehicle traffic may constitute a special hazard, depending on the
circumstances."). In Chapman, the Kansas Supreme Court considered the case of an
employee who was injured while crossing the street from an employer-owned parking lot
to the employer's plant. See id at 830. The court granted compensation under a statutory
exception for special hazards and found that traffic on the street constituted a special
hazard. See id. at 834. The court recognized that this special hazard existed,
notwithstanding the existence of three crosswalks, because the road was a busy public
street in the largest city in Kansas, and the court concluded that the people would only
cross the street at that point where the employee was injured to deal with the employer.
See id. at 834-35. The Chapman court also stated that "[fi]f the employee was injured
crossing the street either in a marked crosswalk or in the vicinity of a traffic signal or
dangerous intersection sign, courts have applied the common-law special hazard exception
to determine that workers compensation covered the injury." Id. at 834.
149. Bryan v. T.A. Loving Co. & Assocs., 222 N.C. 724,729,24 S.E.2d 751, 754 (1943).
In Bryan, the court stated that "any other person undertaking to cross a public highway
under the same or similar circumstances would be subjected to the identical hazard." Id.
at 729, 24 S.E.2d at 755.
150. See Strickland v. King, 293 N.C. 731,733-34,239 S.E.2d 243,244-45 (1977).
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filled the streets around the work site." However, the North
Carolina Court of Appeals rejected this theory in Taylor v. Albain
Shirt Co.5
2
In Taylor, an employee was struck by a vehicle while crossing a
public street on her way to a private parking lot not owned by the
employer.' Twenty employees parked in the lot, which was located
across the street from the work site.' More than 400 other
employees parked in another parking lot, which was maintained by
the employer and located on the same side of the street as the work
site.' The injury at issue occurred at 4:00 p.m., when a work shift
ended, and the public street was crowded with cars driven by or
picking up employees."6 The car that struck the claimant was driven
by an individual who had just picked up one of the shirt company's
employees.'
The Deputy Commissioner of the Industrial Commission
initially granted compensation, concluding that the employer's
practice of releasing up to 465 employees at the same time at the
close of the work day "extended the zone of danger and environment
of the employment onto the public street in front of the factory."'"8
The Commission vacated the decision and denied recovery on the
grounds that the employee had completed her work day, the
employer had no control over the employee being on a public road,
and the risk was "shared equally by all members of the traveling
public."'' 9  The court of appeals, relying on the North Carolina
Supreme Court's decision in Bryan v. T.A. Loving Co. &
Associates,'6* upheld the Commission's decision denying
compensation, refusing to accept an increased risk or zone of danger
argument under the circumstances.""
151. See Chmelik v. Vana, 201 N.E.2d 434, 439 (IMI. 1964) (concluding that employee's
"regular and continuous use" of a parking lot, "most particularly at quitting time when
there is a mass and speedy exodus of the vehicles on the lot, would result in a degree of
exposure to the common risk beyond that to which the general public would be
subjected").
152. 28 N.C. App. 61, 64-65, 220 S.E.2d 144,146 (1975).
153. See id. at 61-62, 220 S.E.2d at 144-45.
154. See id. at 62, 220 S.E.2d at 144.
155. See id. at 61-62,220 S.E.2d at 14445.
156. See id. at 62,220 S.E.2d at 145.
157. See id.
158. Id. at 62-63, 220 S.E.2d at 145.
159. Id. at 63, 220 S.E.2d at 145.
160. 222 N.C. 724, 24 S.E.2d 751 (1943); see supra notes 73, 88,149 (discussing Bryan).
161. See Taylor, 28 N.C. App. at 64-65, 220 S.E.2d at 146.
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While the court of appeals decisions in Smith v. Dacotah Cotton
Mills and Taylor v. Albain Shirt Co. illustrate the judicial parameters
of the "increased risk" exception, the Royster decision provides a
more complete analysis of how subsequent North Carolina workers'
compensation cases involving "coming or going" employees and
street hazards will be analyzed. In Royster, the court of appeals
ostensibly applied a special hazard exception to the facts of the case,
noting that Royster was traveling along the sole access route to the
plant and was exposed to an "additional hazard" when having to
cross the street.62 The court of appeals found this application
consistent with the supreme court's 1957 decision in Hardy, where
compensation was granted when a boy was struck while crossing a
public road that bisected the employer's premises.' However, in
reversing the court of appeals, the supreme court in Royster
commented that Hardy was only illustrative of the special errand
exception, and therefore, the Royster court refused to find any
increased risk in crossing the public thoroughfare to reach the work
site.1"
In its most narrow interpretation, the Royster decision indicates
the North Carolina Supreme Court's refusal to grant compensation
for injuries that occur along a normal route that is not owned or
controlled by the employer and that result from a risk shared by the
general public and not specifically related to the employment.'
Royster does not appear to be an outright rejection of the "special
hazard exception"; rather, the decision seems indicative of the
court's unwillingness to extend compensation to cover injuries
resulting from risks arising in the street, unless a specific employment
duty requires employees to enter the street.' 6  Three common,
essential facts found in Royster and Barham provide a framework for
consideration of future workers' compensation claims: (1) lack of
employer's control of the premises; (2) lack of employment duties
being carried out by the employee; and (3) lack of risk not common
162. See Royster v. Culp, Inc., 119 N.C. App. 598, 601, 459 S.E.2d 65, 67 (1995), rev'd,
343 N.C. 279, 470 S.E.2d 30 (1996).
163. See id. at 600,459 S.E.2d at 66-67.
164. See Royster, 343 N.C. at 283,470 S.E.2d at 32.
165. The ruling also reflects the high court's continuing commitment to prohibiting
workers' compensation from blossoming into a general health or accident insurance plan.
See Hales v. North Hills Constr. Co., 5 N.C. App. 564, 569, 169 S.E.2d 24,27 (1969).
166. See Royster, 343 N.C. at 282, 470 S.E.2d at 31 (distinguishing the facts of the case
from Hardy, in which the employee's trip across a street "could reasonably be considered
within the terms of the [employee's] employment").
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to the general public.'o
Following this framework, one should consider first what
circumstances the court will need to find present in order to
determine that an employer has control either over a shared parking
lot, such as a shopping center parking lot,"6 or over a public road or
access route leading to the employer's premises.'69 One should pay
careful attention to the relationship of the risk of injury in such a
situation to the employment."
Second, one should examine whether the employee was
performing any employment duty at the time of the injury. In order
for compensation to be granted, an employee will need to show that
he was carrying on a work duty at the specific time of the accident; 7'
a general habit of performing certain employment tasks may not be
sufficient. 2
Third, even if the injury did not occur on any part of the
employer's premises, practitioners should analyze whether the
employee was exposed to a risk not shared by the general public.'73
Specifically, one should consider what facts and circumstances could
lead a court to decide that such an injury on property not exclusively
controlled by the employer constituted a special hazard.'74
167. See id.; Barham v. Food World, Inc., 300 N.C. 329, 334, 266 S.E.2d 676, 679-80
(1980).
168. See Barham, 300 N.C. at 334,266 S.E.2d at 679-80.
169. See Smallwood v. Eason, 346 N.C. 171, 171,484 S.E.2d 526, 526-27 (1997).
170. See Strickland v. King, 293 N.C. 731,734,239 S.E.2d 245,245 (1977).
171. See Hardy v. Small, 246 N.C. 581,585, 99 S.E.2d 862,866 (1957).
172. In Franklin v. Wilson County Bd. of Educ., 29 N.C. App. 491, 224 S.E.2d 657
(1976), the court of appeals considered the case of a home economics teacher who "was
required to travel to the homes of her pupils to supervise them in their home economics
projects and to travel to retail stores to purchase incidental supplies for use in her classes."
Id. at 492, 224 S.E.2d at 658. While leaving the school parking lot in her car one
afternoon, the teacher was hit by a truck and killed. See id. at 493, 224 S.E.2d at 659.
Even though she had school supplies in her car, the court held that, in the absence of a set
schedule dictating the teacher's activities, the circumstances suggested "nothing more than
a scenario of what [the teacher] might do on any given day," and did not support a finding
that the teacher "was performing one of the duties of her employment at the time of the
accident." Id. at 495, 224 S.E.2d at 660. Consequently, the court denied workers'
compensation coverage. See id.
173. See Royster, 343 N.C. at 282,470 S.E.2d at 31.
174. To date, the supreme court has not revealed specifically under what circumstances
it would award compensation for an injury resulting from a special hazard that does not
occur on property owned, maintained, or controlled by the employer. The recent case of
Smallwood v. Eason, 346 N.C. 171, 484 S.E.2d 526 (1997), suggests that an employee will
have difficulty proving that he should recover under workers' compensation for an injury
incurred while the employee is going from work even where an injury is directly related to
the employment. Smallwood concerned two employees who were injured while going
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As mentioned previously, North Carolina has not accepted the
general argument that traffic can be considered a special hazard.'
For a legitimate chance of recovery, an employee must show that the
risk of injury on the public road was an incident of the employment
and somehow created by the employer." If injuries occurring on
employer parking lots contain a risk sufficiently connected to the
employment, then theoretically a court could find that the same risk
was present on a public road located in front of the employer's
premises. However, the court of appeals seemingly rejected this line
of argument in Taylor v. Albain Shirt Co.' by refusing to recognize a
theory that the employer had created a risk of injury by letting more
than 450 employees out of work at the same time. '78
Lastly, even if the court fails to find any of the three previous
considerations present, a court may nonetheless find that unusual
circumstances warrant compensation. For example, the court could
grant recovery for an employee injured on a public road in front of
the premises if the plant were to explode. The rationale would be
that employees should be granted compensation for employment
risks that extend beyond the premises.79 Professor Arthur Larson
home on a road adjacent to the Perdue chicken plant where they worked. See Smallwood
v. Eason, 123 N.C. App. 661, 663-67, 474 S.E.2d 411, 413-14 (1996), rev'd, 346 N.C. 171,
484 S.E.2d 526 (1997). Another Perdue employee had been operating a forklift on the
road for the benefit of Perdue. See idL at 664, 474 S.E.2d at 413. The car in which the
claimants were riding struck the forklift, which had stalled on the road, and the claimants
were injured. See id. at 663-67, 474 S.E.2d at 413-14. Even though the road was the sole
means of access to the plant, see id, the supreme court denied compensation to the
claimants, apparently only because the road upon which the claimants were traveling was a
state public road. See Smallwood, 346 N.C. at 171, 484 S.E.2d at 526-27 (adopting without
comment the reasoning of Judge Greene, who dissented from the court of appeals'
decision); see also Smallwood, 123 N.C. App. at 671, 474 S.E.2d at 417 (Greene, J.,
dissenting) ("Our courts have specifically held that the 'premises' exception applies only if
the place where injuries were sustained was either owned, maintained, or controlled by the
employer.").
175. See Bryan v. T.A. Loving Co. & Assocs., 222 N.C. 724,729, 24 S.E.2d 751,754-55
(1943); Taylor v. Albain Shirt Co., 28 N.C. App. 61, 64,220 S.E.2d 144,146 (1975).
176. See Bryan, 222 N.C. at 729, 24 S.E.2d at 754-55 (denying compensation because
the risk "did not arise out of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment
[and] ... was neither an ordinary nor an extraordinary risk directly or indirectly connected
with the services of the employee").
177. 28 N.C. App. 61,220 S.E.2d 144 (1975).
178. See id. at 64,220 S.E.2d at 146.
179. This is referred to as the "zone of employment danger" theory and covers off-
premises injuries that result from a particular employment hazard. See, e.g., Barnett v.
Britling Cafeteria Co., 143 So. 813, 813-14 (Ala. 1932) (holding that the portion of a public
sidewalk in front of an employer's business was "a part of the [employer's] premises");
May Dep't Stores Co. v. Harryman, 517 A.2d 71,75 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) (extending
an employer's premises to cover shopping center parking lots with several tenants); Smith
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has noted that "whenever the hazards of the employment spill over
the boundary-line and injure [a] claimant on his way to work, those
injuries should be compensable."1's Thus, the effect of this exception
is to recognize the "course of employment" requirement when the
injury is caused by a risk that is strongly related to the
employment."' Though the court could deny compensation on the
grounds that the general public was exposed to such a risk as well,8
it is conceivable that the risk would have such a strong work-related
aspect that the court might find the employee "in the course of
employment" if he was within a reasonable proximity to the work
site.
Yet, absent unusual or extreme circumstances, North Carolina
courts are unlikely to grant workers' compensation to a "coming or
going" employee. Thus, even if employment contracts were written
so as to require employees to park in an employer-owned parking lot
across a public street from the work site, the courts would likely deny
compensation to an employee injured on a public road while crossing
the street, finding that the injury did not "arise out of the
employment."''
The Royster and Barham decisions are sure to serve as the legal
guideposts for situations like these, in which North Carolina courts
must determine whether compensation should be granted to
employees injured while "coming or going" to the work site. Three
determinations will be critical in deciding whether an employee will
be entitled to compensation for an injury sustained while "coming or
going" to or from work: whether the injury occurred on the
employer's premises, whether the employee was performing an
active employment duty at the time of injury, and whether the risk
which resulted in the injury was common to the public.
Undoubtedly, future claims for compensation arising out of unique
and novel fact situations will further test the line of administrative
certainty that the court drew in Royster. Of particular interest will be
v. Greenville Prods. Co., 462 N.W.2d 789, 790-91 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (finding the
"arising out of and in the course of" requirements to be met under a zone of employment
theory when an employee was struck on a street intersecting an employee parking lot from
the worksite); Marlow v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 225 N.E.2d 241, 244-46 (Ohio
1967) (extending the zone of employment to the employer's parking lot).
180. 1 LARSON, supra note 2, § 15.31, at 4-92 to 4-100.
181. See 1 id. at 4-96. The exception is a means of "reaching out and covering a
particular hazard which has a sufficiently close work-connection to impel the courts to find
temporary room for it within the course of employment concept." 1 id. at 4-96 to 4-97.
182. See Barham v. Food World, Inc., 300 N.C. 329,334,266 S.E.2d 676, 680 (1980).
183. See Smallwood v. Eason, 346 N.C. 171,171,484 S.E.2d 526,526-27 (1997).
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cases requiring courts to determine whether an employer has
sufficient control over an area as to invoke the premises exception,
and those testing what types of risk will be regarded as not common
to the public.
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